Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, the conflict has left a staggering toll on Russian forces, with Ukrainian defenders continuing to push back against Moscow’s aggression.
According to data from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as of 25 January 2025, the scale of Russian losses has been immense, reflecting the resilience of Ukrainian resistance.
The human toll underscores the intensity and prolonged nature of the conflict, now entering its 35th month. Russia has also suffered massive equipment losses. Ukrainian forces have destroyed or captured:
- 9,859 tanks,
- 20,545 armoured fighting vehicles
- 22,309 artillery systems and 1,263 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).
- 1,050 anti-aircraft warfare systems
The skies have also been costly for Russia, with Ukrainian defenders bringing down 369 planes and 331 helicopters since the start of the war. Meanwhile, 23,213 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been shot down, an increase of 51 within the last day.
Russian naval forces have also faced setbacks, losing 28 warships and boats, including the once-flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva. Ukrainian forces have even destroyed a Russian submarine, further highlighting the vulnerabilities of the Russian military.
In addition, Ukraine has intercepted and neutralised more than 3,053 cruise missiles, reflecting the country’s growing capability to counter aerial and missile threats.
Many of the destroyed Russian tanks and armoured vehicles, abandoned in retreat, have been turned into scrap metal or repurposed as exhibits, symbolic of Ukraine’s resistance. For instance, some of these wrecked machines have been displayed in Ukrainian cities, while others have been dismantled by locals in liberated regions.
The sheer scale of Russia’s losses serves as a reminder of the cost of its aggression. It also highlights Ukraine’s determination to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
With NATO allies continuing to provide military support, including weaponry and training, Ukraine remains resolute in its efforts to repel Russian advances and maintain its independence.
With the greatest respect to Lisa, one has to be careful with propaganda figures on losses produced by either side. Many believe that the open source organisation Oryx is the most accurate, as it only counts photographically confirmed losses. In January 2025 Oryx had visually confirmed 3,673 Russian tank losses, however this is likely to be an underestimate
Not going to argue on numbers but the photos of emptying storage areas and the fact T55/62 are appearing on the battlefield draw your own conclusions!
Even 3,673 tanks destroyed is a real on-goal in military demilitarization!
Finding in-service numbers for T72 tanks isn’t easy but I found an article on Military Watch Magazine website written at the beginning of 2023 suggesting that there were about 10,000 T72 / T90 available to the Russians, including older reserve variants. If they are starting to bring out T55/62 tanks and the Oryx conservative estimate is 3,673 tanks lost then 10,000 is starting to look like a high side estimate rather than a wild over estimate…
Estimates with so limited real data are more like guesstimates to be honest. Oryx numbers should more correctly say confirmed losses and as such will underestimate the actual number probably by quite a significant factor. Lets guess that they only have data on half the tank losses… that would suggest about 7,300 tank losses. Not that far off 10,000 – in round, order of magnitude numbers 🙂
Regardless the Russian Army has taken a battering. Putin might actually welcome a Trump peace initiative before he runs of tanks.
CR
It’s a massive over-estimate. Go and have a look at Covert Cabal on Youtube, Highmarsed and Jompy on Twitter. They’ve been working on counts of Russian equipment of all types from before the war all the way through to the last few months using satellite data. A lot of the IR/Military think tanks had to adjust their numbers following their initial releases of data…because it turns out none of them had actually been counting Russian kit for years, instead they’d be circulating figures between themselves and taking them as read…we know this because when they released their figures a lot of think tanks suddenly updated their figures…but also copied across an error he made that he later spotted….
Bottom line is Russia started the war with the following:
Tanks in Active force – 2,800-3,300 (all estimates from think tanks, ISW, Intelligence etc. are in this range.
Tanks in Repair Bases and at tank factory (BTRZ) – c500
Tanks in Storage (mainly open air, but accounts for potential vehicles in garages) – 6,107
So maximum number of tanks at the start of the war is just under 10,000. BUT….that was of all types, including T-55, T-62, T-64 etc.
What they’re left with in storage as of 2 months ago is:
T-55 – 162
T-62 – 1,082
T-64 – 653
T-72 – 1,178
T-80 – 266
T-90 – 0
For a total of 3,345
There is nuance to these figures though….the majority of what is left is in appalling condition. For example you might wonder why T-64 and T-72 haven’t been pulled out before T-55 and T-62. The truth is that what is left is likely not recoverable. The models left (T-64 and T-72A/Ural) have made little appearance on the battlefield to date and are parked up in such a way as maintenance is not possible, they’ve been like that for 30 years…and are showing no signs of moving…the fact that there is no T-90 in storage means they’re all either active or in low numbers undercover waiting for conversion to T-90M.
Russia’s production of new tanks (i.e. totally new, including hulls) is estimated by RUSI to be between 40-60 new T-90M per year from Uralgavonzavod. There are also c100-120 T-90M made from converting T-90A last year, but that resource of hulls appears to have been used up. It will be interesting to see if the Russian’s can increase the total number of new hulls produced by moving staff over from conversion. But they can’t do as many as they can conversions. So probably future production is in the 100-120 new tanks per year range if they’re lucky…..The Russian dream of new production T-80 from Omsk appears to have not happened…either way they can only produce 1-2 months worth of losses in new tanks per year…
In addition to the above RUSI estimates that the Russian’s have c2,000 tanks of all types active in Ukraine.
With new production and what remains of the storage they can probably maintain that 2,000 figure through 2025…the crunch comes in 2026…
some OSINT reports im seeing say russiaonly has 3517 tanks remaining, but only 279 are considered combat-ready.
Just to add….
If we do some maths….
3,300 tanks in Russian Main force at start of war (i.e. the highest figure)
500 tanks parked at Repair sites and main factory (also a conservative estimate) in 2022
6,100 tanks in storage in 2022 (also conservative)
You get 9,900 tanks in total (remember not all of these are recoverable) at the start of the war…
Oryx currently lists the following:
2,642 – Tanks Destroyed
534 – Tanks Captured
Basically 3,200 Russian tanks that are total losses…
There are also 377 abandoned and 157 badly damaged on the list, some, if not all of these may have actually ended up destroyed or non-recoverable but as there easn’t video/photo evidence of that they should be discounted for a conservative figure….
When asked Oryx and Warspotting have both estimated that they pick up the majority of lost Tanks (different story for artillery though), but that it is likely that there are at least 20% of tank losses that are not accounted for as no imagery exists. They’ve reached this conclusion based on the fact that losses from earlier in the war are still being discovered, some tanks are just never recorded or drone footage is lost. It’s a reasonable, conservative figure. Particularly so given their refusal to include heavily damaged/abandoned tanks, which may have later been destroyed or were in fact not recoverable.
If you add on 20% to the lost Russian tank figure you end up with 3,840 Russian tanks destroyed or captured i.e. total losses.
We also know that RUSI and other respected outfits, including Ukrainian intelligence, estimate that Russia has 2,000 tanks operational in Ukraine at any one time…
Covert Cabal et al’s most recent count of storage is 3,345 tanks in storage and c500 in repair factories….call it 4,000 in total. Again conservative….not all can be pulled from storage.
Add them all up….
Operational Tanks in Ukraine – 2,000
Storage and Repair – 4,000
Destroyed or Captured – 3,840
Total – 9,840 tanks…
This total tallies very well with the overall pre-war count of c10,000 tanks overall…and that means….
– We know the count of storage is accurate – We have photo evidence
– We know the count of Destroyed /Captured is accurate, we have photo/video evidence
As a result…
– We can also be sure that the estimate of 20% missing tank losses is in the right ball park
– We can also be sure that the estimate of c2,000 tanks operational at the front is accurate
Which also means…
– You can safely ignore the Official Ukrainian figures as not accurate…
– New production doesn’t make a big difference
– Realistically the Russian’s have at most 1,500 tanks that can be re-furbished (regardless of effort involved) to cover losses…
– Current losses of 3-4 per day, on average, mean that unless something changes drastically (i.e. the Russian’s hold their tanks back) the real crisis for Russia, in terms of ability to replace losses, in their tank force will arrive in early/mid 2026…
– Either way the quality and quantity of Russian tank forces has fallen massively, and is likely not recoverable in the next 20-30 years…and thats if they can afford to produce large numbers of tanks per year, which they can’t at present…
isn’t there an issue with the T-64 Engine, in it that Russia cannot manufacture them any more?
So, no, Oryx is not considered the most “accurate source for loss numbers.” It is in fact acknowledged as being, by default, in accurate. What it is is a very accurate “floor.” I.e. Oryx is considered a very good source for “Russia has lost more than x number of y equipment, and ukraine has lost more than z number of w type.”
That’s because requiring open source, visually identifable, loss data means that, by default, a lot of losses do not get counted. A tank that can’t be identified as Russian or Ukrainian? Not counted. A tank that is destroyed without any photographic evidence? Not counted. A tank that is hit but the footage doesn’t show aftermath so it’s unsure if it was disabled or destroyed (or even if the hit had no effect)? Not counted. A tank that is hit by something so big that all that’s left is a crater? Not counted.
So Oryx is useful for “worst case” planning and estimate scenarios. “We know that Russia has lost at least this many tanks, but we know for a fact it’s more than that.”
Just for anyones info….
There are 5 outfits that count armour losses that are worth attention…
Oryx – Probably the most popular and well respected. Regular updates on X from Jakub Jankovsky who is the lead at present. Also Oryx website (only the Ukraine stuff is still updated)
Warspotting – Not as well known, but as well respected, they work with and alongside Oryx but collect subtly different info including unit and geolocation if possible, actually have an even more ‘harsh’ methodology than Oryx, these guys produce the numbers that are the ‘absolute floor’ of Russian losses…on X and own website
Lostarmour – Russian site….don’t collect Russian losses and have made many mistakes before where they have claimed Russian losses as Ukrainian…only useful to the above as they occasionally collect Ukrainian losses that they are not aware of…otherwise ignore.
Andrew Perpetua – His team are great at collecting daily losses and mapping them, his loss data is usually proven right by Oryx and Warspotting at a later date as he is more current. On X, YT and own website. Sometimes purchases his own satellite images on areas where he thinks there have been lots of losses and picks up huge numbers…
Covert Cabal/Highmarsed/Jompy – The acknowledged best at collecting data on storage, repair and production facilities for tanks, AFV’s, Engineering Vehicles, Artillery and AD systems. On YT and X.
There are some others like Athene Noctua, Richard Vereker who collect/analyse data (and a Japanese account who I can’t remember who looks for missing Russian SAM systems at operational bases, particularly in the Far East). Lostwarinua, Dan Spiun and Kriegsforscher are also worth looking for on X as they pickup lots of missing info. Kriegsforscher is a Ukrainian soldier who often uploads tens of destroyed units that his team are responsible for, recently uploaded a huge number of kills of Russian vehicles in Kursk which had not been seen.
Russia started this war with the aim of demilitarising Ukraine and showing off its own military prowess, it’s achieved the opposite. It has demilitarised itself while turning Ukraine into one of the most fearsome fighting forces in the free world.
Well done Vlad, still the master of 4 D chess I see.
Jim, it also exposed the over rating of Russian military, by western Intel. All these huge expenditures on extreme Nato military when the huge Russian military can not beat a 2nd rate Ukraine army. The scares of Russia marching west wards to take all of Europe is fear mongering (and laughable) for more spending on Nato. Another over rated force are Iran and their proxies, Israel easily defeated them with advanced US weapons. China on the other hand refuses to fight, they will wait, and wait, and wait.
I agree that we massively overestimated Russia, and they did as well….they’re not a conventional threat to NATO, except in a quick ‘gray zone’ operation like interfering in the Baltics where NATO may struggle to react.
But….we forget how large Ukraine’s Army and reserves were….Ukraine had vast numbers of tanks, artillery, IFV at the start of the war, with more in storage. They also had colossal reserves of ammunition, with 800,000 men who had been in the military and served in the ATO (Donetsk/Luhansk) active combat areas over the 8 years before the war started….no other European nation was in a similar position to resist Russian forces as they were.
Even 3,673 tanks destroyed is a real on-goal in military demilitarization!
And here we are reducing our tank numbers yet again the artillery has already taken a big hit what’s next
Bit inaccurate this report, the exact figure of 820,000 personal comes from a Ukrainian report, but it states “combat losses” not “dead” and it’s not clear what it means by combat losses, but probably an Estimate of total dead, injuried, captured, missing, AWOL etc. most estimates are around 200,000 to 250,000 dead and 500,000-600,000 injured.
Russia did not have those figures even in its entire arsenal of tanks and APCs in 2022 at the start of the invasion, it would not have even 6,000 active tanks and about 14,000 APCs, it is true that they have put into service a few thousand more but still those figures are pure Ukrainian propaganda, I thought that the Russians were the only ones who lied with the figures but I see that these numbers are not far behind, mp of those who have published them do not believe them, on the other hand, far from all the tanks and APCs are in Ukraine, the country has 22 million square kilometers, let’s be serious and not do like the Russian liars please.
What is also really interesting is the impact of learning in Ukraine on CCS specifically the operational patient care pathways (medical care) ..which essentially are totally different from what the west has been use to. It’s worth noting the British army is particularly weak now in its CCS as its medical services got hit in the CCS cuts of 2015.
But the key takeaways from Ukraine are
conventional war creates mass casualties due to artillery and 70% of casualties are artillery. This is very different from the asymmetrical warfare the west has been fighting..asymmetrical warfare creates a few casualties at a time…conventional warfare can create hundreds at a time. The area the casualties are in is also profoundly unsafe and evacuating can be difficult to impossible and it needs to be done by armoured vehicles.
This has lead to a collapse in the Speed to definitive care..from less than 1 hour to many many hours. With the chance of overwhelm of definitive care being likely. This means that in the asymmetric wars the west had a 1 in 10 death rate for seriously wounded casualties but in Ukraine that’s moved to 1 in 3.
It also has seen Russia purposefully attacking medical services linked to operational care pathways…
So what has that mean
1) a massive increase in the level of role one resources including greater interventions across all the parts of role one…essentially delivering of much more role one at the casualties side before any evacuation occurs.
2) massive increase in the capacity of role 2 facilities..including how many surgical procedures they can undertake in a day and how many casualties they can manage as well as how long they can operate without any logistic support…but this makes for larger less mobile units more at risk of being located and attacked.
3) significant protection for role 2
4) greater tactical aeromedical evacuation to role three and a massive increase in role three ( ability to manage hundreds of serous casualties in a day)
5) a significant increase in strategic aeromedical evacuation to role four……it takes a lot of resources to evacuate a casualty with serious injuries to role 4
6) a massive increase in the surge capacity of role 4…the only role 4 we have is NHS and if we were in a peer war the NHS would probably be…attacked ( because one thing Russia has done is hit acute hospitals because they are never well protected and you can kill a lot of strategically important and irreplaceable workers) have to deal with mass civilian casualties at the same time surge it’s role 4 capacity for the armed forces….and I can tell you now the NHS has zero surge capacity and is essentially collapsing on itself every winter.
I’m guessing CCS is an NHS acronym? I’ve never heard it used in the army. Critical Care Something? I’d add a few things:
1) Role one is already post evacuation. It’s still considered Pre Hospital Emergency Care, but it’s usually in a Battalion or Brigade rear Echlon (depending on the Role 1). Sometimes a PHTT can be pitched forwards from a Medical Regiment, but those still tend to be in a Battalion rear, very rarely they end up in a Squadron Rear. But any patient that arrives in a Role 1 will have had a Case-Evac from point of wounding unless. I don’t see much upgrade in the capability to conduct interventions at the Role 1 level, but a bigger emphasis on Pronlonged Casualty Care, which has historically been the real of HCA’s and Nurses in the QA’s rather than the RAMC, in training.
2/3) Role 2 and 3 provision is usually in a Brigade or Divisional Rear, so if the Role 2/3 isn’t protected from threat the other elements of the Brigade and Division are not protected either. Role 2 and 3 should fall under the same GBAD umbrella as Logistics dumps, HQ’s, REME parks. A Bigger emphasis with Role 2 and 3’s (and the rest of the RAMS is catching up on what certain branches have been doing for years luckily) is training to adapt pre-existing structures into Role 2’s, rather than erecting the tent cities that previous facilities required. Honestly if you can’t keep your Role 2’s and 3’s supplied as far back as they need to be, you’re in bigger trouble then just not being able to care for your casualties, because you are not going to be keeping the front supplied at all.
4) The big issue with Role 3 facilities is their reliance on reserves. In theory the British Army is really well set up for Role 3 units, in practice the issue is we’d have to strip a load of doctors out of the NHS to support them.
5-6) Role 4 I’m kind of least concerned about because frankly 1) We’d stop just sending blokes to Birmingham, if we where in a full scale war the entire NHS would basically be told “no you’re taking military casualties now.” and 2) Lets be honest the only way this is an issue is if we are fighting Russia and then we’d probably accept every NATO hospital from Warsaw to Lisbon as an acceptable Role 3-4 facility. The NHS would struggle, and it would SUCK being a civilian needing an operation during the War because, you aren’t getting it, but that’s probably what would happen.
The real issues the army has to grapple with are in the Pre-Role 1 environment. We’re talking Company Medics, Platoon and Section Team Medics, what the AMS trusts them with, what the NHS trusts them with, and what is practically achievable. The reality of the Ukrainian Battlefield isn’t so much “getting people back from a Role 1 to a Role 2” it’s “Getting people to the Role 1.” (Again, some branches of the British Army are really ahead of the game on this one, working hard to provide the best capability at reach with long evac time lines to anything resembling a role 1, while the wider RAMS is playing catch up, but even that comes with some big *’s around scalability and EW signature).
I’m talking about things like the ability to gain access and give fluids. Who is allowed to give anti-biotics? Where do we get fluids from? (Op Vampire, and Blood Far Forwards exist, but fuck me they are hard to access, rare to be qualified in the wider field army, and usually aimed at Role 2 facilities, or at a push a role 1 facility rather than your infantry section or platoon). Where do we get blood products? How do we store them? (Again most British Army blood storage is not meant to go further forwards than a Role 1 facility. You’ll have these great conversations with RAMS staff who will beam about this new cool box that you can store blood products in, and you just ask them how you’re supposed to fit that thing into a daysack an they just look blank). Who are we trusting to do minor surgical interventions, unsupervised, in a ditch or a dug out? Because if we can’t get a patient to a role 1, and we’re looking at decompressing a chest, or gaining a surgical airway (or even just getting a definitive airway), that’s going to have to happen.
I could go on, but the big work the RAMS needs to achieve is really all in the Pre-Role 1 space, and it’ll have to make some difficult choices. If it doesn’t, then, well, frankly all the work on the Role 1-3 space won’t matter at all.
Very interesting, yes the cold chain issues are going to be huge in the pre hospital care pre role one environment. Carrying blood on your case vac vehicle is easier..interestingly I’ve seen some work in the US around using whole blood 0 for pre hospital care, European systems tend to used packed red cells and also carry plasma for a mixed product transfusion…but from what I have read the whole blood transfusion seems to be the way forward for trauma care especially out of hospital as it seems to both have simpler logistics/cold chain as well as the fact studies in military and civilian settings have shown reduced mortality.
I’m surprised that there would not be more training around definitive airway management, surgical airway and Needle thoracostomy, even a chest drain….as you say in the end you loss your airway or lung pre hospital it’s all pointless. Yes there are risks, but in the end if the casualty needs a surgical airway or needle thoracostomy and they doesn’t get it or role 1 in minutes then they are dead before they bleed out.
I find “Pre-Hospital Care” to be a really unhelpful term in the military context because it covers so much, from a fully stocked MERT helicopter through to your BCD Trained bloke with a tourniquet, so while I’m sure the US uses whole Blood, I don’t know how far forwards they push it. I think there might be some effort to push whole blood further forward to Role 1, but again, the issue we’re seeing in ukraine is that just getting casualties to the Role 1 is a challenge, which means that you need more further forward organic with the units. I’m a fan of lyophilised plasma, but it’s in short supply, and packaging choices are less than helpful. It’s certainly a step up from Saline, which is what is standard at present in the Field Army at Role 1 and forwards.
There’s also (as mentioned) Op Vampire, but there’s relatively few at Role 1 who are trained in it, and it’s even rarer further forwards (outside of specific units). But Op Vampire is designed for Role 2 and rearwards, so activating it further forwards is always a bit of a nightmare. Individual initiative from a competent medic can work around some of those restrictions, but they shouldn’t have too.
Re interventions; Within the RAMS you have Nurses, Paramedics, CMT-1/BATLS, CMT-2 (And some niche exceptions like SF Medics, NSOCMs etc), and then you have non RAMS personnel; Team Medics and BCD’s (Hopefully all these terms will change soon to bring us in line with NATO but…. people don’t like letting go).
Nurses and Paramedics have NHS PIN’s and have to keep at NHS standards. CMT’s do not have a PIN (they operate under the responsibility of their medical officer, who basically stake their PIN’s on their CMT’s competency) but are still considered Medical Practicioners. Team Medics are not considered Medical Practitioners, do not operate under an MO’s PIN, and are effectively considered first aiders.
The problem becomes where in the Battlespace these various groups operate: Nurses usually work in Role 2-3 environments (I think teeth arms units are scaled at 1 Nurse in the Role 1 facility), Paramedics usually work on the Med Evac space between Role’s 1 and 2/3. CMT’s, typically who you think of when we talk about Medics, work all over the place, there sort of the “medical generalist” job, but they’re the ones who go furtherst forward. Typically a teeth arms battalion will have a few CMT’s in their Role 1 and then 1 CMT per Company. (Sorry if this is teaching you to suck eggs).
Now a Class 1 CMT with a BATLS certificate should be signed off by their MO to do limited interventions; gain access (either IO or IV), Needle thoracostomy, and a surgical airway, give Saline and some drugs (TXA, Ondans, and some Antibiotics in a trauma scenario really). They are (again excepting some niche jobs like SFMs) not signed off to do chest drains or gain definitive airways. (A non-RAMS team medic meanwhile is basically limited to, tourniquet, basic burns management, and postural airway management. The RAMS is against them even being taught basic airway adjuncts).
So at point of wounding you’ll be cared for by your BCD guy (who basically just knows how to put a tourniquet on), and then hopefully shortly after by your Team Medic. Then your CMT closes in, if they don’t have their hands full with other casualties or are rounds complete with the equipment they can carry on their back into combat, then the CSM organises a Quadbike or a Land-Rover to get you back to the Role 1, where there might be a Nurse who can do further treatment (in practice it’s usually multiple CMT’s manning multiple trauma bays calling to MO’s/Nurses/Paramedics for more advanced interventions when the CMT identifies the need). But as you identified; if your evac timeline to Role 1 is elongated, due to difficult terrain, FPV threat, or whatever, suddenly your CMT with some very basic surgical interventions and a bag of saline is just set up for failure.
SF/SOF work around this by investing a lot more into their CMT’s (hence my comments above about Niche roles). If a team is the only team in country there is no evacuating back to the Role 1, your best bet might be a 12 hour road move to a local role 3 hospital, then your SFM needs not only to be really good at the basics but needs some more advanced surgical interventions in their back pocket (and also needs to have a good grasp of pain relief and be able to do prolonged field care etc, none of which is taught to your average Company CMT at the moment really). So why not just lift the SF/SOF models onto the Field Army?
Well 1) Because SF and SOF drop a tonne of money and training on their CMT’s that the Field Army probably can’t afford. 2) Because SF/SOF can be a lot pickier about who they accept than the Field Army, while Field Army really needs the numbers of CMT’s in order to do all the jobs. 3) You now have to turn around to a Doctor and ask them to put their PIN on the line to say they are willing to sign off a CMT to do a Chest Drain… yeah…
(Yes that was a bit of a rant, but being in the NHS I hope you think it’s at least interesting, hopefully I didn’t ramble too much on things that are too obvious).
Perhaps, what does need re-evaluating is the expectation that helicopters will be available to do the medical.
In Afghan, Iraq and perhaps including Mali our helicopters have operated in a relatively benign environment. Ukraine is a completely different kettle of fish. Where there’s both GBAD and a significant air threat. How likely would we be able to maintain the golden hour if we faced such threats?
It doesn’t. The RAMC (or I guess now RAMS) has a unit structure build around ground evacuation. Point of wounding ->Casevac by unit to -> Battalion Role 1 -> Medivac by Ambulance to -> Brigade Role 1+/Role 2 -> Medivac by ground or air assets to-> Role 3 in the divisional or corps rear (or RFA Argus)-> Stratevac by airlift to -> Role 4 in the UK. In a warfighting, as opposed to a coin counter insurgency, the RAMS would just revert to it’s actual orbated evacuation chain, instead of Helicoptering casualties directly from point of wounding to the Role 3.
I am thinking about the role the Chinook and its medivac teams did during Afghan and how that work in the future. Where the medivac team could do limited surgery on the wounded whilst in the Chinook. In a lot of respects they provided a better service than the US Army Pedros, as the team included a doctor along with a trauma team, rather than a battlefield medic. Which I’d put down to having more cabin space on a Chinook than a Blackhawk.
My concerns are how will the Role 1 casevac be carried out? As if we’re facing someone like Russia, they are using drones to deliberately target ambulances. Which is one of the reasons why Ukraine are trying to do as much trauma management as possible in the “front line”. There is a vid on Youtube, showing a donated Mastiff being targeted by three Russian FPV drones after it has just collected casualties. The cage armour seems to have protected it, but it is seen heavily smoking after the attacks as it races down a road to escape.
I know that the MoD/DE&S are looking into the counter-UAS problem, where they announced two streams, one for personnel and the other for vehicles. So perhaps there’s going to be a system to protect vehicles and especially ambulances be that the future LMP (Patria 6×6) or the Boxer variant. The last I heard was that they are looking at utilising a remote weapon system (RWS) and marrying that to a search and tracking sensor, that can then kinetically target the UAS via GPMG or HMG.
Okay so let’s take a big step back:
The MERT Teams on Chinook where never intended as a integral piece of RAMS doctrine. MERT on Chinook was basically an ad hoc adaptation by the army to the situation it found itself in in Afghan. It’s a great service, and nobody would turn their nose up at it, but nobody in the Army ever believed that we’d be landing Chinooks to pick up casualties from the Point of Wounding in a Peer-Conflict.
The evacuation chain I described is the Pre-Afghan evacuation chain. It’s what the Army planned to use in the even of the Cold War going hot (it’s also what the Army used in Granby and during the initial phase of Telic). The RAMC/RAMS never really moved away from that plan, and kept itself organised to work it. So in terms of how does Chinook factor in: The Army is just kind of going “Well that was really nice, but we can’t use it anymore we go back to the old ways now.”
Re how Role 1 casevac gets carried out… Histoically the job of evacuating from the CCP/CAP (Casualty Collection Point/Company Aid Post) to the Role 1 would fall to the CSM, and excactly what platform he’d use would depend on the unit in question. Basically anything from a 432 to a Quad Bike with the casualty strapped to a tailer has been in the plan (hell, sometimes even people manpacking a stretcher). BTW when people talk about Casevac, this is technically casevac: Evacuation of a casualty on an improvised Platform. Medivac by contrast is evacuation of a casualty on a dedicated platform, which implies a different level of capability. So yeah, there won’t be a dedicated vehicle specifically to get a casualty from the Company to the Battalion Role 1 facility, it’ll be an organic vehicle that the Company HQ uses for general run around purposes (and therefore in general needs protection from the FPV threat). Sometimes a Role 1 Facility might send it’s ambulance forwards, but generally because the CSM will have a better idea of the R1’s location than the R1 will have of the CCP’s (and because getting lost going towards the front is generally worse than getting lost coming back to the rear) it’ll be an improvised platform.
(Side note; in armoured Units the CAP might be in an armorued vehicle already, eg A Challenger Squadron might have it’s medic following it around in a 432, so in some cases the CAP can self-evacuate, but this isn’t ideal because… you don’t have med cover then).
Not sure if that answers your question completely?
(Also fun side note: Due to IRC rules, the MERT Chinooks never had red crosses painted on them. Because once registered with the IRC a vehicle can only ever be used for medical purposes. So no moving ammunition or troops. Because the Armed Forces knew that Chinook based MERT was a temporary luxury and that they’d want to use the Chinooks for other purposes later, they never registered them. Meaning that A) MERT Chinooks technically where improvised CASEVAC platforms not dedicated MEDIVAC platforms (which I find hilarious to think about) and B) like most CASEVAC platforms they where perfectly legitimate military targets.
Is it 828,470 killed and injured. Still a huge number but killed would mean multiplies of that also injured and Russia at this point would be out of the war.
US estimate is around 200k killed and 600k injured. Going by those factors 828k killed would mean 5m also injured.
Not sure how they are counting.
But we have to temper this news with the fact that Russia has two large tank production plants, which also repair and refurbish older types.
It is estimated about 15 t90M tanks are rolled out each month and about 80 older models repaired/refurbished per month.
In comparsion: 148 CH3 over 5 years = 2.4 per month
The counter to that is that Russia is rolling out T90’s as fast as it humanly can, screw the long term industrial plan, because it needs them at the Front.
The UK is looking at sustaining the production run as long as possible to avoid famine and drought procurement resulting in a closed factory once the order is completed.
In the end, once all other tanks from storage are used up by end 2025 \2026 by some sources, all that can be left is tanks in new production – which is T-90s only…
russians wont be able to keep up with their production verses losses from fpv and artillery
And they are already swapping over to other vehicles to compensate
As for the state of our own tank production… roll eyes…
Yeah, it may be the best option for UKR to keep fighting until the attrition bites Russia – assuming UKR can hold out.
I don’t see why sound industrial strategy should make anyone roll their eyes.
Those plants are able to do this because after the war started the Kremlin passed a law requiring banks to loan money at cheap rates to industries involved in war production. Effectively using people’s savings to finance the war effort. With inflation at 9.5% and the interest rates at over 20%, there are the conditions for a banking crisis in Russia. The national bank has even had to make public statements saying that savers won’t be stopped from accessing their accounts in the event of banking runs…
Just needs a trigger to set off a collapse.
Let’s hope that economic collapse happens soon…
The lists like above are estimated total combat losses done by visual sightings in combat, geolocation and plotted on many viewable maps, OSINT
russians are now starting to struggle and changing tactics due to the high number of losses via FPV drones and artillery
2025 \ 2026 may be the end of russian armour period!
We can argue over the exact numbers, but it doesn’t take away from the fact that it’s a lot. Yet we still seem to think 148 CH3 is enough. I tend to think not.
One word. Propaganda. Believe Oryx, disbelieve everything else.
Oryx is a floor, not an accurate count.
True, but it is indicative of how things are playing out.
Russian/North Korean losses 24 Feb 2022–26 Jan 2025:
~830,190 personnel
9868 tanks
20549 APVs
22323 artillery systems
1263 MLRS
1050 air defence systems
369 aircraft
331 helicopters
23253 UAVs
3053 cruise missiles
28 ships/boats
1 submarine
35124 vehicles
3715 special equipment
Russian losses today per 26/01/25 reported by the Ukrainian General Staff.
+1720 men
+9 tanks
+4 AFVs
+14 artillery systems
More important than loss of equipment,& tanks is that Russian economy is in serious trouble. Interest rates at 21%, and businesses near bankruptcy. Russian oil is not thru to India or Europe by back doors.
Russia is fast running out of money to keep the war going. Russian only hope is a miracle maybe from China.
With Russia evidently losing all its men and equipment on the retreat, and economic collapse in “two more weeks”, can someone justify all this clamour for increased military spending at home?