Ireland’s undersea cables are at risk

The protection of undersea cables is rapidly becoming a top security priority for NATO and European countries.

Recent operations in the Baltic Sea, particularly NATO’s Operation Baltic Sentry, reflect heightened concerns over hybrid threats, including alleged acts of sabotage against vital undersea infrastructure.

For Ireland, this raises urgent questions about the security of the vast network of critical cables along its coast, which serve as the backbone of global internet and financial transactions.

Ireland plays a crucial role in the global undersea cable network, connecting Europe to North America via multiple high-capacity transatlantic links. Its undersea infrastructure handles enormous amounts of internet traffic, international communications, and financial data, making it a high-value target for hybrid warfare tactics. With over 20 major undersea cables landing on Irish shores—such as those at Killala Bay, Ballinskelligs, and Loughshinny—any disruption could have wide-reaching implications not only for Ireland but for the broader European and global economy.

Many financial institutions and tech giants rely on these cables to conduct transactions and manage data flow between the US and Europe. Damage to undersea infrastructure can interrupt communications, but it also provides an opportunity for data interception or cyberattacks.

I went onboard a Swedish warship patrolling the Baltic Sea

As NATO increasingly frames subsea infrastructure protection as a strategic concern, Ireland’s relatively neutral stance leaves a potential gap in broader European defence. NATO’s operations in the Baltic highlight the shift in focus towards deterrence and proactive protection of critical maritime infrastructure.

With Russia’s suspected involvement in several recent cable-related incidents—including anchor-dragging and potential sabotage—NATO has deployed warships, maritime patrol aircraft, and cyber units to monitor and protect subsea assets.

Key implications for Ireland:

1. Proactive Surveillance: NATO’s use of real-time vessel tracking, maritime patrols, and subsea monitoring systems provides a model for how Ireland could enhance its protection of cables. Currently, Ireland lacks the military capabilities and coordinated surveillance network that NATO allies have adopted.
2. Hybrid Threat Awareness: Ireland must recognise that hybrid threats—acts of sabotage, cyber intrusions, and interference disguised as accidents—are not limited to military conflict zones like the Baltic. With Russian ships previously observed near Irish cables, including vessels suspected of intelligence-gathering, Ireland’s security environment is more volatile than it may appear.
3. Strategic Cooperation: Although Ireland is not a NATO member, its position at the western edge of Europe makes it an essential partner in protecting the transatlantic lifeline. Increased cooperation with EU allies and NATO states in intelligence sharing and joint maritime monitoring could help mitigate risks.

Ireland should develop or acquire real-time maritime domain awareness capabilities, similar to those used in the Baltic. This could include deploying maritime patrol aircraft, underwater drones, or sonar-based monitoring systems to track activity near undersea cables.

The country should, I believe, also explore deeper partnerships with NATO and EU defence initiatives like the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Gibraltar (EMASoH) or the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Sharing intelligence on vessel movements, particularly involving suspected Russian or hostile actors, would significantly improve situational awareness.

NATO warns saboteurs in Baltic Sea will be caught

Without proactive measures, Ireland risks becoming a soft target in Europe’s undersea infrastructure security. Disruption to its subsea cables could result in:

• Severe interruptions to global internet traffic, affecting major tech companies with data centres in Ireland.
• Significant financial losses from delays in transactions and services.
• Strategic vulnerabilities for Europe, as key communications channels to North America could be severed.

As NATO ramps up its efforts to protect subsea infrastructure in the Baltic, the spotlight is now on Ireland’s role in securing transatlantic cables. While its policy of neutrality has served it well in the past, the increasing prevalence of hybrid warfare and undersea sabotage means Ireland can no longer afford to remain passive.

Collaboration with allies, investment in maritime surveillance, and a comprehensive security strategy are essential to ensuring that its position as a gateway to Europe remains an asset—not a liability. The stakes are clear: if adversaries can target cables in the Baltic, they can just as easily do so off Ireland’s coast.

At sea with Operation Baltic Sentry – A report from onboard

As we conclude, let’s respond to some of the myths I can see this article generating on social media. When the topic of protecting Ireland’s undersea cables comes up, you can always count on the usual chorus of “Why should we pay for it? Let others pay since they use the cables too!” or “This is clearly about pushing Ireland into joining NATO!” Let’s dismantle this nonsense right now and focus on reality.

“Other Countries Should Pay Since They Use the Cables Too”

Let’s not forget—these cables are Ireland’s lifeline. They support domestic communications, online banking, emergency services, e-commerce, and basic internet access for millions of Irish citizens and businesses. When the cables are damaged, Ireland suffers first.

Yes, other countries benefit from the transatlantic connections, but expecting them to pay for securing infrastructure that lies within Irish waters is a fantasy. Ireland cannot afford to sit back and hope the EU or the US will handle its security for free.

Think of it this way: If a water main bursts on your property, do you expect your neighbours to fix it for you just because they drink from the same source? Of course not.

That said, cooperation is key. Ireland should collaborate with EU partners on joint maritime surveillance and information-sharing initiatives. However, the core responsibility for securing Irish infrastructure must rest with Ireland.

“This Is Just a Backdoor Attempt to Drag Ireland Into NATO”

This tired argument is as lazy as it is wrong. Protecting undersea cables has nothing to do with Ireland joining NATO. Countries around the world, neutral or not, have recognised that hybrid threats—like sabotage, cyberattacks, and espionage—require proactive defence measures.

Ireland can and should protect itself without compromising its neutral stance. Sweden and Finland, before joining NATO, invested heavily in maritime defences and operated successfully with EU partners like PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation). Ireland can follow this example without joining any military alliance.

Additionally, Ireland has access to EU maritime initiatives like MARISA (Maritime Integrated Surveillance Awareness) that enable coordination without NATO involvement. Neutrality does not mean inaction—it means independence while ensuring national security.

“There’s No Real Threat to Ireland’s Cables”

The idea that Ireland’s undersea cables are safe because nothing major has happened yet is willful ignorance. Just because the cables haven’t been severed doesn’t mean they’re not under constant threat. In fact, Ireland’s digital infrastructure faces regular cyberattacks from state-sponsored actors, including Russia and China. These attacks target everything from financial institutions to government servers.

Ireland’s transatlantic cables are a prime target for hybrid threats because of their strategic importance to global internet traffic and financial data. The only reason we haven’t seen a catastrophic event yet is that much of this activity remains covert.

And it’s not just cyber threats—Russian intelligence-gathering ships have been spotted off Irish waters, with their proximity to key cables raising serious concerns. Ireland isn’t immune to these risks. Ignoring them is like leaving your door unlocked because you haven’t been robbed yet.

“The Only Country to Invade Us…”

Yes, let’s address this too. Some love to bring up the idea that “the UK is the only country that has ever invaded Ireland, so why should we worry about Russia or others?”

Let’s break down why this argument doesn’t hold water:

1. Today’s threats are digital, covert, and targeted at infrastructure. The cables off Ireland’s coast represent a much larger vulnerability than any physical invasion. They can be tapped, severed, or monitored without firing a single shot.
2. The UK and EU are part of Ireland’s security network. Whatever historical baggage exists, modern threats don’t care about that. Countries like Russia and China won’t hesitate to exploit gaps in Irish security if they find them.
3. Ireland’s digital infrastructure is already under attack. Every month, Irish banks, hospitals, and telecom providers are hit by cyberattacks from state-sponsored groups. In 2021, the HSE (Health Service Executive) was crippled by a ransomware attack linked to Russian networks. That incident should have been a wake-up call.

At the end of the day, protecting undersea cables is about safeguarding Ireland’s sovereignty, economy, and security. The threats are real, and ignoring them will only make Ireland a soft target. Neutrality doesn’t mean inaction. It means having the ability to protect yourself without relying on alliances you don’t want to join.

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