The Royal Navy faces a decade of difficult choices. Between sustaining the Dreadnought programme, completing the Type 26 frigate build, introducing Type 31, and designing the Multi-Role Strike Ship (MRSS), the surface fleet is already heavily committed.

Into this crowded agenda, BAE Systems has put forward the Adaptable Strike Frigate (ASF), a concept that blends frigate characteristics with amphibious and modular capabilities.

BAE frames the project in ambitious terms. “Embracing adaptability whilst credibly delivering the complex self-defence capability required in the Maritime environment, BAE Systems has worked with industrial colleagues to develop the Adaptable Strike Frigate design concept to promote the technologies of future warships.”

At around 130 metres long and displacing roughly 6,000 tonnes, the ASF would sit between the high-end Type 26 and lighter offshore patrol vessels. Its forward section looks conventional enough, with provision for a medium gun, vertical launch cells and sensor arrays. The aft half, however, is dominated by a wide mission block. Here a Chinook-capable flight deck sits above a cavernous hangar, with four boat bays along the flanks and a stern ramp able to launch craft or unmanned vehicles.

The mission bay is the heart of the concept. BAE highlights that “with modularity at its core, Adaptable Strike Frigate has been designed to accommodate over 20+ TEUs.” These containers could be fitted with missile batteries, minehunting drones, command suites or humanitarian supplies, with specialist handling systems allowing them to be moved and deployed at sea. The ability to switch payloads rapidly is pitched as the antidote to fleets locked into single-mission hulls.

A system of systems

The ASF has been described as a “system of systems vision.” The idea is that the ship acts as a mothership and command node, operating crewed helicopters alongside Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs), Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) and Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). BAE points out that it will be “optimised for lethality and adaptable mission system requirements,” with the flexibility to host both established weapons and rapidly emerging technologies.

The ship’s digital backbone is central to this. According to BAE, “cloud based Mission Systems will be at the heart of future warfare to deliver machine speed warfare at the speed of relevance”. I’m not a fan of the terminology here but you get the gist.

The ASF, say BAE, is designed to integrate into a wider combat cloud, fusing data from its own sensors and weapons with information collected by disaggregated autonomous systems. The intent is to create a warship that is less about the sum of its onboard hardware and more about its ability to orchestrate a network of off-board assets.

Lean crew, green propulsion

Crewing is another deliberate departure. BAE notes that “automation and a high level of resilient systems integration” would allow the ship to sail with a small core complement, perhaps around 60, freeing up space for embarked specialists or an augmented military force. This mirrors Royal Navy ambitions to cut manpower demands across future surface combatants.

Propulsion is pitched as both agile and environmentally aligned. ASF incorporates “an innovative propulsion design to allow high manoeuvrability with sprint capability, whilst being aligned to NetZero targets.” The idea is to combine efficiency for long deployments with the burst speed needed to manoeuvre in littoral zones.

Type 32 or MRSS?

The strategic question is where ASF fits. The Royal Navy has outlined Type 32 as a future general-purpose frigate designed to act as a platform for autonomous systems and to support Littoral Response Groups. On paper, the ASF maps neatly to those aspirations. Its modular payloads, autonomous integration, small crew and ability to support raiding parties all align with the Type 32 vision.

The MRSS programme, by contrast, is aimed at building large amphibious ships in the 20,000–30,000 tonne class, each with a well dock and the ability to deploy landing craft, vehicles and command facilities for brigade-scale operations. That scale is beyond what a 6,000-tonne frigate can deliver. ASF could land commando-sized forces and launch uncrewed craft, but not much more.

Industrial and strategic context

BAE, on their website, highlights collaboration. “In developing the Adaptable Strike Frigate concept, BAE Systems has collaborated with colleagues across both the commercial and defence industry to explore innovative concepts and technologies that will shape the conduct of platform design for future operations.” This aligns with wider Ministry of Defence messaging about shipbuilding as a driver of industrial capacity and international partnerships.

Yet the financial reality cannot be ignored. Both Type 32 and MRSS have been identified by the National Audit Office as high-risk in affordability terms. Even if the Royal Navy wants both, securing funding for a new class alongside Dreadnought, Type 26 and Type 31 will be difficult.

A glimpse of the future fleet

What the ASF does show is how British industry views the future of naval warfare. A frigate that doubles as an unmanned systems mothership, built around modular payloads, lean crewing and a digital backbone, signals a break from the traditional template of steel and missiles.

Whether it is ever built or not, the concept points toward a Royal Navy that expects to fight through networks of autonomous systems, with frigates and amphibious ships acting as flexible command and launch hubs.

“Adaptable Strike Frigate: embracing technology to deliver future naval capability at the speed of relevance,” is how BAE summarises its proposal. For the Royal Navy, the challenge is less about vision than resources. The ASF makes sense as a Type 32 contender, or whatever results rom the Type 32 idea, but the question is whether Britain can afford it alongside the rest of its naval commitments.

George Allison
George Allison is the founder and editor of the UK Defence Journal. He holds a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and specialises in naval and cyber security topics. George has appeared on national radio and television to provide commentary on defence and security issues. Twitter: @geoallison

84 COMMENTS

  1. I remember as a kid, sketching all sorts of fantasy cars, they never came to anything though.

    It was a great way to pass the time.

    • Ha. Me too. I moved on from drawing Death Stars on my parents walls and books! Us early 50s somethings are into the REAL Star Wars.
      Later, at the start of my military interest in my early teens I used to draw the outlines of T42, T21, T22, Leander, and RAF aircraft.
      The CCF instructor at school was always impressed I could IFD all the silhouettes on the board at school, yet never tried to recruit me.

    • Yep me too, it’s how I went on to become a designer though not a car designer sadly as I had wanted back then. Been trying to come up with various concepts of this nature but isn’t easy to get the balance right especially with so little information on what capabilities and balance they might want. Not easy and this looks like a decent starting point for greater discussion. The propulsion system though great in theory and no doubt opens up much needed space and versatility for a vessel of this nature, would worry me considering previous problems with more conservative systems. But good to see some proposals especially as more flexibility in role and absorbing developing technology is vital for any future foreseeable designs as single role is likely to be unsustainable. On that note I have great concerns for committing to a large littoral focused type certainly, unless it has far wider capabilities, so it will be interesting to see what compromise between that sort of vessel and a strike frigate of this nature might materialise. Probably endless committed to decide sadly.

  2. BMT has a much better concept out now for MRSS at 29,000 (t)

    If we need anti ballistic missile protection on amphibious ships (which we do) then we need few ships that are larger.

    Moving to 3 X 29,000 tonne ships makes alot of sense.

    6 smaller ships makes no sense.

    Hopefully BMT can work it out with Navantia and get these three ships built across their UK yards and assembled in Belfast.

    We will probably just have to accept that Babcock will be back out of the warship business as I can’t see Rachel from accounts getting the money for 5 x T32’s

    It’s not the end of the world as Rosyth will remain open for refits and Fife is a very economically vibrant area with lots of jobs.

    Better the UK tries to sustain 2 surface yards on our crappy budget

    Lord Robo has obviously bought the drones patrolling the North Atlantic coolaid for submarines with no need for frigates.

    • Yet that is totally the opposite to what the RM have become, and against all the naysayers against larger amphibious assets that we’re told are too big and obsolete, are sitting ducks, and you need to disperse your Cdo Group from one fat target onto several smaller ones.
      Why do you need a 30k leviathan to drop off a few RIBS with the RMs new raiding concept, which MoD HMG try to use to justify the cuts.
      See the contradictions here?
      You say moving to smaller makes no sense, but that is exactly what HMG, MoD, the RM themselves, and critics of traditional amphibious methods have been saying for years.
      Smaller. Dispersed. Networked. Agile.

      • The threat is real but smaller and dispersed does not protect you.

        Loosing one amphibious ship with 500 personnel on board is every bit as bad as loosing a larger ship with 1000 thousand.

        The difference is larger ships are more survivable and due to the inverse scaling laws vastly more efficient and you can then afford to have much better protection onboard against ASM.

        The USMC have been following the plan you discuss but are now looking to revert back.

        Dispersed forces find it hard to make meaningful contributions at scale.

      • To be fair, it’s also what the USMC are doing too…
        They’re also looking at delivering distributed mass that a 30k Te vessel probably isn’t required for. Although in all fairness they’re still operating at larger scale than the RM.

        • Exactly my points, Joe.
          We have 2 Battalion sized Commandos left in role, that, from what I understand, have a Strike Company forward.
          We have no mass, never mind distributed.
          And sure enough, the USMC continues to operate LPD quite happily, as do many other nations, while we throw ours away on a scrapheap of excuses.
          Which is why I’m pointing out the hypocrisy of now wanting 30k tonne ships.
          Make your minds up!
          Be one or the other, but not both.
          I favour a RM Brigade as it was with the associated shipping and “ship to shore connectors” to match. Flash way of saying Landing Craft and helicopters.

          • RM brigade level ops are dead, have been for a long while – with little to follow it up it’s a moot point, so now it’s a more short duration raiding – which even that will not be achievable unless there is clear focus on what is required and what is nice to have.

            Everyone gets obsessed about the platform but it’s all about the connectors and will be interesting to see the CIC order be made in terms of numbers and final specifications. Similar orders are required for additional aviation assets to even get close to a credible capability. The platform itself is just an Expeditionary Sea Base operating far out over the horizon most likely integrated as part of a CSG, so large is fine. Equally, using land bases like Camp Viking and ESB may not be required at all.

            • When 3 Cmdo went into the Falklands all that was available to follow it up was an Infantry Brigade, which we certainly could muster. 3 Cmdo operating in Iraq was alongside an Air Assault Brigade and an Armoured Brigade, and in Afghan it was rotational with Infantry Brigades. It’s really not a moot point, and the reduction from 6 to 5 Brigades that the loss of 3 Cmdo represents is non-trivial.

              If they are going on “short duration raiding” then at a minimum 3 Cmdo Army units should be released to field army so that 4 Light Mech doesn’t have to rely on calling up reservists.

          • I agree about not going for huge Amphibious ships but I actually hate both of the MRSS concepts I think they are Gold plated exercises thought up when someone mentioned “increased budget by 2035” and we shouldn’t use the US / PLA as a role model for future amphibious capability.
            The latter both build large LPH/LPD due largely to needing to carry sufficient forces to combat a similar sized force and do so across the Pacific. Hence they need huge capacity and range (also in PLA it’s a lot to do with size envy 🤔).

            I wonder if either concept designer has got the message about distributed weapons over numerous platforms (see USMC for details).
            I look at these designs and am reminded of what happened to previous hybrid designs, in WW2 many navy’s looked at a Hybrid Battleship / Carrier (IJN built 2). The RN and USN both concluded that you would need to build just as many ships overall and just end up with 2nd rate ships which couldn’t compete with the single purpose designs.

            Amphibious ships are by their very function big, slowish, bulky ships with huge amounts of volume which is exactly the opposite of most surface warships !
            I’d love to see someone design a modern Bay class 15/16 K tonnes with a multi use Flight deck, flood down dock, capacity for 300 / 400 marines + equipment and lean maned. I’d bite the bullet and build at least the hulls abroad so we can afford 6.
            And as for the Strike Function I’d assume an escort can control any missiles fitted (a la Arsenal ship) so lots of room for containerised weapons like the US Typhoon missile system on the flight deck or helicopters as required or even fit VLS (£££).

            And by not building an all singing, all dancing MRSS they could save some money to buy faster landing craft and some amphibious vehicles.

            • I’d say 15-20kt, multi use flight deck (ideally through deck but whatever), flood down dock, 600 embarked personnel (any amphib ship should be able to transport an army battalion or regiment, not just a RM Cmdo) and (vitally) a permanent hangar

      • Larger ships are better for aid relief, but for the life of me though willing to be contradicted, I just don’t see how these big ships would be survivable in littoral environments. What defensive capability would they need to even contemplate such larger scale operations. Even research in the US this past decade have raised considerable doubts about survivability leading to cut backs or role reassessments of their specialist assets.

    • Hang on….I remember last year when you said you met her at Rosyth and she was positive about more orders after T31?
      A politician talking rubbish or then going back in what they say?
      Who’d have thought it?!

      • Unfortunately I very much have the feeling that’s the case now and Rosyth will close.

        Lots of empty promises made and I was told by several sources (this year) expect orders to be flowing but now I have serious doubts.

        It’s not a single person making the call but a combination of Lord Robertson review backing drones at all costs and the army desperate to prove it can guard Eastern Europe solo if only it had a few more quid and the eye waterering sums for warhead renewal program (£15 billion is a scandal)

        Labour has already lost every seat in Scotland to the SNP due to the Reform surge so there is no longer any interest from London labour. Scottish labour already spent all of its capital on getting the navantia deal to take over the yards at Methill so nothing left for Rosyth.

        T32 was never a funded program so they dint even need to cancel it, MRSS is more important but it’s three ships you might keep one yard going with that but not two.

        Maybe I am wrong and things will work out but I now doubt it.

        • Hmmm.
          15 billion is a scandal, IF that is just the warheads.
          I read the US is doing it for 5.
          I assume, hope, all that includes the other infrastructure upgrades AWE and the rest of the DNE is doing.
          Hope you are, Rosyth needs an ongoing drumbeat of work like all .

          • I’m sure the £15 billion includes an en tire host of items and upgrades but at the product is the same (220 warheads) and nothing else.

            Government cost have just become nonsense for everything now.

          • Hi M8, Part of the reason is down to the old Engineering problem of “Economies of Scale” just like our Nuclear Subs we just don’t build enough to achieve that ideal scenario (yet). The US has reduced its stockpile to @4k in service and reserve Nuclear warheads from a mind boggling 31K. That means they have contracted their infrastructure and invested in updating it so they can build and maintain in an efficient (cost effective) manner.
            The other reason is because we contracted our facilities to maintain just 200 odd, we spent virtually zero for 40 odd years.

            So now we have a very expensive problem as we need to maintain our existing warheads and build replacements at the same time but our facilities both those functions and the production of certain materials are quite frankly either decrepit or in some cases no longer in use / exist !

            Buying off the US is an absolute no no for HMG as it would come with a duel key condition and veto on independent deployment.

            The real scandal is Governments just haven’t spent the money to stay in the H bomb business, just think what a 1950’s facility looks like compared to today.

            So they have no choice but to spend the dosh !

            Oh and the £15 billion that Jim quotes isn’t just for the warhead production it covers a very large chunk of other DNO recapitalisation as well.

            • Hi mate.
              Thank you, as I thought. I have no problem if that outlay includes the rest that as you say has been neglected for decades. It is needed.

    • The thing with the 29,000 full fat amphibious vessel is you need the marines to actually function from it.

      If you have 3 30,000 ton amphibious vessels and the potential of using 1 carrier as a commando carrier your looking at the ability to shift 2-3 battalions of marines over the beach.. which is great but seriously do we have 2-3 battalions of marines to shift ?

      Second question to ask is where are we likely to need to put 2-3 battalions of marines across a beach, in which war and for what purpose ?

      Europe: Now we have the old Cold War need which was the northern flank and involved dumping the RM on the coast of Norway, but the northern flank is now a different battleground, it’s the Baltic states and Poland and for that fight you want the army not so much the Marines.

      Africa: to be honest the sort of intervention in Africa is more likely to be airmobile in the interior or securing a port and using logistic ships.

      South Atlantic: now in 1982 the only way to move forces to the Falklands was via ship, but now there is a very effective airbridge and the army if it so wished could move an airmobile battalion to the Falklands or in time even a air mobile brigade. For the BAT if that ever kicked off you would want marines yes but it would be small specialist artic ( well Antarctic ) warfare units on ice hardend patrol vessels. You may need an intervention on one of the other south Atlantic islands but this would undoubtedly be a small raiding unit intervention.

      Indian Ocean: anything we would be doing in the Indian Ocean would be dependent on landing in an allied port and working from an allied nation.. that’s logistic ships.

      Pacific Ocean.. that would be an apposed landing while fighting the CCP and or North Korea.. sending a couple of RM battalions into a fight that will involve probably over a million combatants is a bad move and like mean we will not have a RM left.

      So what do we really have a need for, we clearly have a need for specialist RM landing forces to maybe secure a port or for cold weather work. But a lot of expeditionary force requirements are around logistic vessels and air mobile forces not mass amphibious forces.

      Personally I think we could do with 1-2 larger amphibious ( 30,000 tons) vessels with big flight decks and hangers, then a force of frigates that have stern ramps and large flight decks for amphibious raiding and autonomous vessel operations, about 4-5. That would make the 6 vessel MRSS programme, but it would have 2 designs.. a large amphibious vessel and a smaller litoral combatant vessel. Then a force of logistics vessels that replace the points for moving the army around… but MRSS is a programme of 6 and we don’t need 6 full fat 30,000ton amphibious vessels..

      • I agree, two is probably plenty and if we need anything especially for forward deployment then something like the Littoral Strike concept on a converted Ferry is fine.

        • Completely agree, but the army has shown little will to engage in that sort of joint work with the Navy and on the other side the RN has shown no will to taxi the army about.. the impression I get is that the services have little love for large scale amphibious capabilities.. the RN and RM seem very focused on small scale littoral actions and the army just want some big logistics vessels to shift their heavy equipment about to ports as needed ( without the Navy if they can get away with it).

          • It’s not really about willingness. The army occasionally dabbles in Amphib, but the way the armed forces work is that various branches own certain capabilities. The Navy and RM own opposed Amphib, it’s one of their USP’s so are unlikely to share training time with those capabilities with the army, especially not qualifications (this isn’t a navy only thing, the RAF guards Air MERT as it’s one of the primary reasons you’d go RAF med rather than Army or Navy, the Para’s will fight anyone who wants to bring jumps quals into their unit, the RM used to do the same with AWICs which was almost exclusively theirs at one point).

            Anyway: the RM isn’t going to want anyone else practicing Amphib as it threatens their existence, the Navy isn’t going to want to spend money sending ships out to an Army exercise, and the Army is rarely going to have a Battlegroup at a point in its training cycle to do an Amphib exercise. But with all that being said: The Army might not fight it’s way ashore, but it is more than capable of being ferried from a LPD to a Beach and advancing to an MSR.

            • Yep and let’s be honest the most likely need is for a safe but austere landing on a beach or harbour and then moving to contact..

  3. A brilliant concept and one of the most innovative ideas in many years. I have always believed that multifunctional warships would allow for increased operational flexibility. When I was a boy (55 years ago), I envisioned a destroyer that could carry troops and disembark them, as well as light vehicles, and also house helicopters. I sent it off to the MOD, but never got a reply, and now I know why – they obviously kept it back until now! Apart from my dreams, this new class looks like the future of warship design and should be applauded for its innovation.

    • Ha,

      You were not alone !

      I think my picture with Rainbow colour camoflage was a bit too radical back then, maybe i’ll re submit it, you never know with this Labour Government !

  4. Hang on.
    We’ve had the UKCF repeatedly saying they’ve moved away from the previous Light Amphibious 3 Cdo Bde style to light “raiding” forces, and I’ve lamented, and listed, the consequences of that with the ongoing destruction of our amphibious assets, loss of Landing Craft units, and so on.
    In exchange for a new uniform, rifle, and some toy Drones, alongside the new operating concept. ( my cynicism sees it all as window dressing for cuts, but never mind. )
    Meanwhile, others point out that the LPD is dead, obsolete, a “sunset capability” and that shore based ASM will prevail.
    I disagree with all this, I still wish 3 Cdo was as it was, with it’s shipping.
    When it is pointed out that other nations still happily maintain and even expand their LPD LSD types, silence.
    Why?
    So, to my main point.
    IF the UKCF is now all about putting small groups ashore in a RIB…. WHY is the MRSS planned to be so big? We keep being told LCU LCVP types are obsolete and their LPD mothers a sitting duck.( I’m sure their not. )
    So why then, is this BAES concept not the front runner? Cheaper. Smaller. Lighter. Supplements the escort fleet. Can do littoral while doing the Commando stuff at the same time.
    I see contradictions everywhere here.
    The Cdo force seems to be neither one or the other, and MoD is now planning on getting shipping in the form of MRSS that replace LPD and LSD(A) that we’re told are outdated.
    If UKCF is now light, fine.
    Lets have the smaller ships to go with it then in greater numbers.
    Weren’t we told that the idea is a greater number of smaller targets rather than a big fat LPD?

    • I have come to the conclusion the problem is the MRSS programme itself.. a 6 ship programme that is trying to be to many things.. I think we need a couple of large amphibious vessels, then 4 smaller littoral combatants..that have a frigate set of weapons, big flight deck and stern ramp. With space for a company marines. Becuses the present structure of the programme is a problem.. we need 6 ships but there is no way the RN is getting or running 6 30,000 ships… so as structured it’s either to few ships or not having any large vessels..

      • Makes sense.
        2 for 2 for the LPDs, the QEC can do the airborne lift, and then you have a bit of mass with smaller types.

        • So small, flexible ships with a decent flight deck and a large mission bay? I know an American who can sell you a dozen slightly used Independence Class LCSs

    • That’s nailed it perfectly. FCF is in the typical mantra of the MOD, a cut in capability dressed up as something else with defence management speak used liberally to cover up what is really going on.
      The process was started in 2010 and was accelerated during the following SDR’s particularly when the cap on personnel numbers meant the only way the RN could crew the carriers was to reduce the RM headcount.
      Nobody would argue the Brigade needed to evolve and change as the nature of warfare developed with the use of drones and ASMs creating distinct challenges. However, for those who say LPDs and bringing people and kit ashore over a beach are obsolete I would remind you that many people were saying that not that long ago about MBTs which were characterised as dinosaurs and the British Army can do without them.
      There is no defence expert that can predict the future so those on here who suggest there is no likely scenario where we might need light amphibious forces to go over a beach (ideally and in line with British amphibious strategy – uncontested) with supporting heavier equipment and the Army following on behind are just guessing.
      Ships are indeed vulnerable to modern ASMs and drones but airfields and fixed port installations are incredibly exposed to an accurate ballistic missile strike but this never seems to be mentioned in the same discussion because it raises some very awkward questions about our real preparedness.
      The RMs and the U.K. require faster, better protected, longer ranged and armed ship to shore connectors along with shipping that can strike targets, provide air defence, utilise drones and of course loiter for long periods.
      This all costs money and that’s where the whole problem lies.

  5. Bin the Type 32 and focus on a few more 31s and or 26s. After that we require the MRSS, Type 83, MCM motherships and some replacement OPVs and patrol craft.
    The innovative ideas shown here need to be included in the MRSS, MCM motherships and possibly the OPVs with patrol craft possibly moving towards unmanned vessel’s.
    The Type 83 needs to be a powerful ship providing ABM defence with genuine all round capabilities.
    The ASF at 130m long is similar in length to the Type 23 and even with a greater beam and overall displacement any idea of these offering any worthwhile amphibious capability is a joke.

  6. Here we go then, just sent the wife out to buy a RC Hoover and some pop corn, then we can snuggle up all cosey reading all these comments !

    Just done a wicked crayon drawing of a 200 thousand ton Battleship, going to draw a Destroyer next, It’ll have Drones and everything, wonder If Rachael would be interested ?

    JJ # day1 (F18 lands in Scotland).
    I know you are out there !

          • You must know her well, I was chatting earlier and can’t really work out if she is in the Iranian segment of the Arctic working for the Russian hot air production company or an Alien from a different world as she mentioned some stuff about my world.
            She’s deffo not a Bot though and the word Troll is only used by people without intellect.

            Tell you what though, despite seemingly being out of touch for long periods, she does pop up almost instantly when mentioned.
            I think she is the shopkeeper from Mr Ben.

            *As if by magic, the Shop keeper appears*.

            • I don’t know her well but I have a good memory with what is said over the years. And I have had some pleasant conversations with her/him/it over the years, while others called her out for what they see/think she/he/it actually is.
              Which is fine, she’s never disrespected me here, unlike some, so I’m civil back.

        • Oh, something like HMS Maskirovka, then.
          Sums up the MoD and our political class and their attitude and words re defence nicely.

  7. Does the RN need 6 adaptable strike frigates? Hell yes. The number of surface warships is far too low. Should we get this BAE design over a revised type 31 hull form? No.
    Stick with the type 31 hull form. Add the functionality of the BAE ASF design, which by the way has already been offered and demos by Babcock.
    We need a hull that can launch company sized commando raids, double up as a drone mothership for airborne, surface and sub surface unmanned systems whilst having a reasonable frigate payload of guns, missiles and the self defence suite needed to survive.
    3 FSS, 6 of a type 31 hull form adaptation and say 6 new MRSS will offer the best adaptability to cover commando, humanitarian and lifting capacity for the British army.

  8. I can’t see these ships if built being as capable as described, as most of that capability will come from systems that have not invented yet, nevermind built and tested. As the whole area of autonomous warfare systems is in its infancy i think they never reach full potential and this is not time to build a ship class that relies on them. This is the time to build systems that work with our existing designs while we gow, invent and mature the technologies.

    The Type 26 and Type 31s already have significant capability, to carry and use autonomous systems as does the Aircraft carriers. So I would build a batch two Type 31s or even a stretched more capable batch 3 River class ships and build on the capabilities of the Type 31 and 26s, and Aircraft carriers. Focus on a UK based missile defence dome and the Type 83.

    I think you will find the Type 31s can launch a fair sized raiding party already with quoted extra capacity of 80 with three boat bays / 6 TUEs and large helicopter landing pad. With Type 26 able to carry 60, with enhanced mission bay and the Type 45 able to carry up to 90 marines.

    • And on the other side of the world china is building autonomous ships that have their own drones and autonomous systems.

  9. Fine, as long as these are complimentary to the planned surface escort fleet and not seen as substitutes/replacements.

  10. Ok, many of you know my thinking on this. The BAE concept does not fit one or the other. Looking at the layout everything seems a bit to tight. So if we want a adaptable strike frigate then I would go for either the Bobcack stretched T31 design which make a lot of sense or the Damen Crossover combattant. However, the stretched T31 would get my vote with a few tweeks.
    I have noticed the arguement about the MRSS in the comments. Everytime I think about this vessel one question keeps coming to mind, what are they to be used for. So what is the multi role bit of the ships, are they to support the RFA supply ships for example with one or two RAS postions. If they are to be pure military/humanitarian and at about the 30,000 ton range then I keep coming back to the LHD as the most flexible and adaptable platform. Three LHD type MRSS and 6 stretched T31s would give the RN/RM army and RAF a huge amount of flexiblility. The two LHD designs that I would look at would be the HMAS Canberra type or the Italian Trieste. i would prefer the Italian design a bit more expensive but more flexible.

  11. The Albions are being sold to save money and crew. Why does the RN think that even larger ships have become more affordable? Public finances are becoming ever more strained and Starmers commitment to increase defence spending to 3.5 plus 1.5% won’t happen.
    We are desperately short of surface warships and ASW capability will be limited to just 8 T 26, eventually.
    The BAE strike frigate looks like an enlarged Absalon hybrid design capable of supporting a company sized raiding force. It seems better suited to the new RM operating model and would increase the surface fleet above the 19 currently planned.
    Whatever is eventually chosen, there is likely to be a gap in amphibious capability of at least 10 years. A similar design, based on T31, might be more affordable and delivered a bit earlier.

  12. For those of you proposing a more flexible version of the T31, perhaps a little insight into its design History would be educational.
    The T31 is a version of the HDMS Iver Huitfeldt design (but pretty well degraded capability wise to meet the tight RN Budget).
    The Iver Huitfeldt is in turn a modified version of the HDMS Absalon design (less flexible, improved hull form and far heavier weapons load) what makes it really interesting is it was designed as a multi role, highly flexible ship which included the ability to carry and land 200 troops and their equipment. Spookily the original design concept and a lot of the redesign was carried out for Odense by BAe. So Babcock are essentially building a BAe design concept from the late 1990’s !

    So yes it can be done as it already has been, however the Dane’s found the Absalon class to be just too much of a compromise and have now repurposed them as ASW Frigates.

    • Indeed , they will be the only Danish ships with ASW capability including towed array.. I believe they still retain the multi role flexibility if needed.

  13. Lots of questions, contradictions, options. Let’s turn the question around. Ok, I’m making this up as I go along; but just supposing for the sake or argument that we did want to land a brigade sized force ( part of 1 Division) somewhere like Mozambique – a Commonwealth member – to combat an ISIS take over. What would we need to effect that insertion and sustain that force?

    • Great question Paul because that is probably about as high end and offensive a deployment as we could contemplate for whatever concept we go for. Even that probably wouldn’t be possible without considerable allied support, peer to peer operations just seems delusional especially with such a limited budget where neutralising Russian submarines and assets is going to be route 1 2 and 3 of any plan for the RN in such a conflict.

    • Depends what exactly the force was, and what it was meant to do, and exactly what the situation was in Mozambique.
      Let me illustrate two examples, at opposite ends of the scale:
      Scenario 1
      Mozambique is worried about an ISIS take over, and invited the UK government to send a brigade force to be temporarily stationed in the country for TA2E (Train, Assist, Advise, Enable) missions. The UK Gov pulls together a Brigade Combat team build around 3 Battalions 11 SFA Bde, with an additional Infantry Battalion from 4 Light Mech Brigade in the security role.

      In this scenario what is required to land the force is… very little. The forces are light enough that they can be flown out in Voyager and chartered air, the FOB can be constructed by civilian contractors, or at a pinch a short term deployment of RE’s with equipment loaded onto C-17’s. Logistics can be sorted by civilian contractor with local Mozambique security. As the mission is TA2E resupply needed will be minimal.

      Scenario 2:
      Mozambique is falling, the Government asks for a military intervention. Boots on the ground to fight ISIS. This will probably take the form of a Mechanised Infantry Brigade. 2-3 Battalions on Boxer, with a Artillery Regiment, Engineers, and maybe a Regiment of Ajax and a Regiment of Apache in support, we’d also probably want F-35 or Typhoon on station. We’d also probably set up at least a 2 star HQ with forces from 8 Engineer Bde and 2 Med Group, as well as a Logistics footprint to support the Brigade and Air Component. This would require sealift in the form of point class ships, assuming there’s a SPOD. If there isn’t an APOD available then you’d probably need ships for the troops as well. Either way that would probably require all the Point Class ships to be committed to Sealifting the Brigade. If there’s no secure APOD then the carrier will go too, at least initially. Sustainment would be easier, done via chartered shipping and the odd Point class run, as well as C-17 and chartered cargo flights if APOD is secure.

      There’s obviously a ton of variations between those two extremes (and either side of it), but it just sort of gives you an idea of how hard to answer that question really is.

  14. 99 out of 100 of these concepts never come to anything. Back in the 1960’s and 1970’s the likes of Vosper Thorneycroft, Yarrow, Vickers and Swan Hunter were releasing new warship concept designs at every trade show. The only one that the RN adopted – with mixed results – was the T21. With the 10 year Defence Investment Plan currently being finalised, I suspect that BAES is desperate that the moribund T32 project doesn’t morph by default in to a small T31 Batch 2 order for Babcock. What would really twist the knife is if the money for that order essentially came from selling two RN T26’s to Norway, with a decision on whether to directly replace them kicked down the road until say SDR2030, when it will be considered in close conjunction with the first Type 83 order.

  15. Likely not going to happen, as a 3rd class is Frigate makes your maintenance load excessive.
    But as a replacement for the River OPVs?
    That would be potent, a light frigate SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED to be “fitted for but not with” as the “with” is a stack of TEUs full of heavyweight seadrones, hexcopter sea drones, missiles and torpedoes.
    I think the OPV would quickly become a liability if the world caught fire.

  16. It’s nice to speculate, but as hardened followers of this excellent site know, sadly the whole thread is almost certainly a waste of time. The chances of another class of frigates are zero – if SDR2025 had strongly advocated the Type 32 then maybe there was a chance, but it didn’t get even a mention.

    Regardless of all the governments fine words about the importance of national security, the UK is broke and the Treasury won’t allocate an single extra pound to defence. Smoke and mirrors and the recategorization of other government spending to the defence heading is having to be used to get to even 2.5% of GDP – and that will go in to overdrive when we have to report to NATO 3.0% and eventually 3.5%.

    Equipment programmes are only being sustained by the MOD diverting the over £1 bn p.a. freed due by a 10,000+ shortfall in service personnel, if recruitment is really picking up as claimed, that it going to cause problems.

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