A new 878 Institute paper says four armoured infantry battalions face a gap between Warrior leaving service and Boxer arriving in numbers, and wants the shelved Warrior upgrade revived to bridge it.

The first of eight recommendations in Britain’s Military Deterrence Gaps is that the Government halt the decommissioning of the Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle and fund the Warrior Capability Programme, which was part funded and then rejected. The £1bn scheme would upgrade 380 platforms with “a modified turret and 40mm cannon” and extend the fleet’s service life past 2040. Robert Clark, who wrote the paper, puts the revised cost at £1.25bn including inflation.

The point is not to keep Warrior indefinitely, though. Funding the upgrade would, Clark writes, “enable the Boxer programme to continue at its current speed without leaving armoured infantry battalions without armour or mobility”, given that Boxer’s 2027 date is expected to slip.

Warrior is supposed to end service by 2027, and the paper notes that “many units already decommissioning their Warriors, ready for Boxer”. Boxer itself missed an Initial Operating Capability of Q4 2025 on supply chain grounds. By June 2026 the British Army had received 100 of 623 platforms for unit trials, with no revised date published for the rest.

On the paper’s reading that “will leave a significant capability gap”, with Warrior phased out and no operational replacement for the Army’s four armoured infantry battalions. Clark also warns the 72 howitzer platforms planned for the Royal Artillery from 2028 would face “knock-on delays” if the first tranche of armoured infantry Boxers overruns.

General The Lord Dannatt, who wrote the foreword, goes further, calling for an Ajax programme “that should be scrapped in favour of upgrading the WARRIOR infantry fighting vehicles”. The report’s own recommendation is narrower, treating the upgrade as a bridge rather than a substitution.

The Government has previously ruled out retaining Warrior in service, a decision this publication reported in 2025 and which the paper cites. The Ministry of Defence has not yet responded to the report.

Britain’s Military Deterrence Gaps by Robert Clark is available in full from the 878 Institute.

Lisa West
Lisa holds a degree in Media and Communication from Glasgow Caledonian University. With a background in media, she plays a key role in the editorial team, managing industry news and maintaining the standards of the publication's online community.

110 COMMENTS

  1. We arent getting an ifv version of the boxer nor a tracked version doesnt matter how many boxers arrive we still have a gap when warriors retire

    • Exactly, the same genius general is also saying we should scrap Ajax and upgrade Warrior. How does upgrading an old IFV replace an armoured fighting vehicle. I think that invalidates anything the General has to say on the report.

      I know that the warrior and Ajax may look similar but anyone with the most basic knowledge of the army knows these vehicles serve completely different roles.

      • And anyone with basic knowledge of the subject would understand that he has identified that the gap in IFV is the more pressing capability gap, given what we know about Ukraine, fighting the “pacing threat” and the requirement for protected, integral firepower for ground close combat.

        What he is saying is that the AJAX platform could swallow money and still not be fit for purpose, indeed it could be obsolete before it gets to FOC.

        Now, we still need a networked, protected FIND capability, integral to making recce-strike really work, but if you can’t have everything, where do you prioritise.

        • What you definitely don’t do if your short on cash is scrap a £6 billion fixed price contract for one vehicle to then invest £1.5 billion in a totally different armoured vehicle capability and leave a massive gap that you then have to go back and spend billions more to fill in again in future.

          Actually that seems to be the exact logic the army follows which is probably why Lord Dannatt managed to get to the top of it 😀

          Everything I have seen in Ukraine suggests armoured recce is still a vital capability. You can probably do most things that Warrior can do with boxer but there is almost nothing that Ajax does that Warrior can cover.

          • My understanding of Ukraine is that the Ukrainians are telling everyone that will listen, that on the drone saturated battlefield you don’t take a dump without serious Rece.

          • Having seen Bradleys knock the snot out of BMP’s, BTR’s and even blind T-72’s by shooting all their whizz gear off the turret, I don’t see Boxer doing that anytime soon and say it is a lost capability when Warrior is gone.

              • No they aren’t M2 Bradley’s are IFVs NOT recce vehicles,Warrior and Bradley were brought into service around the same time give or take a year or so!
                M3 Bradley’s the CFV version however are closer to Ajax although not as advanced in kit as yet.
                There are no M3s in Ukraine just the M2 ODS version which are just infantry carriers with a gun and a TOW missile launcher on top!

                • The difference between an M2 Bradley and and M3 Bradley is largely doctrinal, M3’s carry more ammunition instead of dismounts. But Ukraine has been using it’s M2’s in a M3 CFV doctrinal role a lot of the time.

          • Can they urgently manufacture a block of new up-specced chassis’ for Ajax, transfer the turrets over to them and then fix up the original chassis’ or use them for something else that could be turreted like a counter drone shorad?

          • Can they urgently manufacture a block of new up-specced chassis’ for Ajax, transfer the turrets over to them and then fix up the original chassis’ or use them for something else that could be turreted like a counter drone shorad?

          • The four dismounts on an Ajax also make for an excellent drone team for deeper Recce and even strike, increasing the hitting power of a unit of Ajax really quite significantly.

  2. It has been well known for some time that Warrior is gone next year, good that this gets some publicity, as always probably too little too late.
    So it seems another gap is incoming, like when CVRT was withdrawn en masse before Ajax was available in bulk to replace it, leaving CVRT Sqns in the Recc Armoured Recc Regiments ( now Armoured Cavalry ) on foot, or using Warrior themselves as a stop gap.
    SP Artillery went the same way with AS90, I don’t know what the Batteries of 1 RHA and 19 RA are using beyond a handful of Archer.
    No wonder the Army is prioritising the FLF and the likes of 4 and 11 Brigades, they do not use it, and the ARRC elements can sit back in the UK trying to catch up, reorganise, and rebuild.

    • We could see if Germany still have their broomsticks: they don’t need them now?

      Joking apart this is getting beyond the pitiful phase….

      • Sums it up well, the RAF and RN seem to actually have a plan for the 2030s, the Army seems to have SF and elite forces nailed down, but really doesn’t appear to have a clue what to do with the bulk of the Army.

        • I don’t go that far myself mate. There’s a lot of kit on order it’ll take time.
          I think the Army structure now is much improved from what it was.
          If only there was money for a tracked IFV, as NATO and the Army want, then 3 Div would be predominantly tracked, Boxer could go to 7 Bde, and the Foxhounds go to 4 Bde, or even the Reserve.
          I’m still waiting for a big CAVS order to fulfill the LPM Medium role.

          • The problem is, mate we are still sized and equipped to fight a limited insurgency war in tbe sandpit.

            The danger is once again the possibility of fighting Ivan in Europe, all well known and firmly established before Labour came to power.

            Yet we still only have 148 Chally 3 on order, with 60 Trophy systems.
            Soon to be no tracked IFVs
            Extremely limited Reece
            Extremely limited GBAD
            Extremely limited Artillery
            No attack drone capabilities.

            So the question is, what do we expect our Army to actually do?

            It’s equipped to fight at Brigade levels when the situation in Europe requires us to have a fully functioning division, with all tbe bells and whistles.

            The last SDR didn’t address that, because its simply unaffordable within the budget, taking AUKUS, GCAP and ongoing Dreadnought funding.

            I maintain (very sadly) I’m really not sure what the bulk of the Army is expected to do at present, under strength and woefully poorly equipped for the 21st century battlefield.

            Like I said, SF and elite forces, that’s well catered for at least.

      • Jackal doesn’t operate with the Armoured Infantry or the Armoured Regiments though, it’s limited in the units it’s been issued to.
        All reconn assets for me have a role and complement each other.

        • It does now, from the Army’s own horses mouth….

          ‘ The Jackal is a highly agile, lightly armoured reconnaissance and patrol vehicle used by the Light Cavalry regiments within the British Army’s The Royal Armoured Corps.’

          • Which sorry to say, shows your lack of knowledge here on Army formations and force structure.

            I did not say “it does not operate with the Royal Armoured Corps.”

            I said it doesn’t operate with the Armoured Infantry. They are not Royal Armoured Corps.

            I also said it does not operate with Armoured Regiments, which indeed are Royal Armoured Corps.

            Both those force elements used CVRT as their integral recc asset. Will be replaced by Ajax Recc Troops in the Armoured Regiments.

            In the Armoured Infantry they too used CVRT Scimitar, their replacement has yet to be openly seen and we’ve discussed that here before. Ajax? A recc variant of Boxer?

            I DID say “it’s limited to the units it’s been issued to” in response to your attempt to portray it as a put down as “all the Army has.”

            As you say from the horses mouth ( don’t always rely on that, it’s often out if date and generic lacking detail ) and which I know perfectly well as I know and understand the ORBAT, it DOES operate in the Light Cavalry Regiments.

            One of them supports 1 DRSB. So not with Warrior or Tanks, none of which are in the Division 1 DRSB is assigned to.

            Another supports 7 LM Brigade as formation Recc Regiment, so alongside Foxhound, Mastiff, Coyote. Again, no Warrior or Tanks.

            The third is assigned to 4 Light Brigade, which has no other Armoured vehicles.
            Jackal is also used by, I understand, the UKSFG as needed, by Pathfinder Platoon as needed, by 1 Royal Irish in their Light Strike role, and possibly by the Infantry Battalions of 7 LM Brigade in Recc Troops, uncertain there.

            • Yes, it’s all part of the cunning plan, CVRT shall be replaced by the AJAX wunderwaffe, but the wunderwaffe isn’t proving to be so wunderful and a major credibility and capability gap has developed.

              As always, the ‘what have we got box’ is being raided and behold! We’ve got this wheeled thing Jackal that can do ‘reconnaissance’ – it’s all proving so very back to the 50’s and Ferret, although the comment it will be used for ‘ deep battlespace surveillance’ is rather troubling.
              The fact a vehicle so utterly unsuited to the modern FPV drone and cluster munition infested battlefield is still in production for our bright shiney ‘new’ army shows how desperate for anything that moves reliably the Army has become.

              They’ve just taken delivery of 123 new Jackals, more terrifyingly, they retain an options for a further 230.

              So yes, it’s all wonderful on the power points, but in the reality, it will be so very 1960’s…

              Tanks, with a recce screen of chaps in light open topped Armored cars, sweeping majestically across the plains – just need to bring back the SLR to made it properly gucchi.

              • None of which you mentioned when you told me that Light Cavalry now operate Jackal who are indeed in the RAC….but nice rant anyway, you had to find something to cover!😉

                • Whatever you say to this fool, everything is doom and gloom unless it’s his bessie Trumps doing or the ultimate paymaster Putin.

                  • I know, the lack of subject matter knowledge from some here is frustrating.
                    I’ll bemoan real cuts as much as anyone, but so many of these posts, especially the drive by shooting ones, moan for the sake of it with no reason or debate possible.

                    • He’s been praising the Russian army and saying how Ukraine is done for in other threads. I don’t think this is just moaning for the sake of moaning.

    • The comparison to the CVR(T) drawdown is entirely accurate. We are repeating the exact same mistake by hollowing out a legacy capability before its replacement achieves full operational status. The artillery vacuum with the AS90 is just as critical—14 interim Archer systems simply cannot sustain a deployed divisional artillery brigade while we wait out the Mobile Fires Platform timeline. Prioritising the lighter 4 and 11 Brigades feels like a symptom of the wider Strategic Defence Review pressure; it’s far cheaper to field lighter, wheels-based infantry than it is to fix our heavy tracked armour bottlenecks.

        • Cheers, Daniele. It is a frustrating pattern to watch play out, but hopefully, the upcoming review finally forces some realistic decisions on industrial mass rather than just managing decline.

          • What upcoming review, you mean SDR 2030?
            “Managing decline”….exactly where we’ve been for decades now. 😒

            • Yes, looking ahead toward the 2030 horizon, though the worry is that the implementation of current review frameworks is already cementing these very capability gaps rather than fixing them. When we are actively scrapping hulls and binnings programs less than a year from Initial Operating Capability, it feels less like a temporary transition and more like permanent structural downsizing.
              That phrase ‘managing decline’ is exactly it. Every decade we are promised a leaner, more agile force, but it always ends up being just a nicer way of saying smaller and less capable. The industrial mass and supply chains are being allowed to wither away, and as we’ve seen with the artillery vacuum, you cannot just buy that depth back overnight when a crisis hits.

      • Land has literally reinvented itself as a 1950’s army.

        Recce…. Ferret – Jackal
        Infantry transport….. – Saladin – Boxer

        But with less tanks and no artillery.

        • It is a striking parallel, even if Boxer is more of a spiritual successor to the Saracen APC while the Saladin acted as the wheeled firepower. The underlying point is entirely correct: we are structurally regressing to a medium, wheel-reliant constabulary force. The terrifying difference between now and the 1950s is that back then, BAOR (British Army of the Rhine) still maintained massive, organic tracked armour mass and heavy artillery regiments to back those wheeled platforms up. Deploying a 1950s-style wheeled architecture into a 2020s high-intensity, drone-saturated, artillery-heavy European theatre without that mass is nothing short of a tactical death sentence.

    • Presumably the Archer purchase was about retaining core skills, rather than maintaining a deployable force…

    • Half the archer are in Estonia and 1RHA and 19 have six light guns between them the gap in artillery capability is barking mad yes they have ordered 70 turrets for Rch to be built in Telford but are they going to take 70 boxer chassis from the original order for the army or build the extra 70 I agree that the warrior upgrade should continue there will be nothing comparable after they’re gone

  3. I think this is one of those “Duh” moments!

    Pretty certain that if push came to shove, the Army would want to keep Warrior rather than swap over to Boxer in the Mech Inf role. Purely for the fire support that the Rarden can provide, even if the gun is obsolete by today’s standards. I very much doubt the MoD have a pot of money stashed away to provide our Boxers with a turreted autocannon. The Army with the current money pot, will either have to cut something else to pay for the Warrior’s capability programme or fund an turreted autocannon for the Boxer. It won’t have enough for both, and probably not enough for one.

    • The Boxer already comes in several turreted auto cannon IFV versions for other operators. There is also a demonstrated CTA 40mm version. Apparently we have 200 CTA 40mm turrets in storage from the failed Warrior upgrade program as well. It should not be that difficult or expensive to get an IFV on Boxer.

      • According to the Aussies, the turreted Boxer is top heavy (and a roll risk) and too heavy to work properly on soft ground.

        And, you’ve kind of rubbished your comment above… maybe the General knew of these 200 CTA turrets for WR2…

        • Actually the Aussies don’t have an issue with it and countries keep ordering IFV versions of Boxer.

          What the Aussies did have is just like a us a bunch or arse hole former generals and click bate media acting like experts on the matter.

          The Australian CRV remains in service, its close to the weight limit which has made in more difficult to install active protection systems but here is engineering work around already being developed. Other operators of Boxer IFV’s don’t have the same issue.

          • Ok, so the Aussie tank officer I spoke to last week was lying was he?

            Jim, there’s a difference between what organisations say in public and what the experience of their people is in public. Just like there is a difference between people with real connections into defence and those who shout from the sidelines.

            • The gap between official MoD press releases and the actual engineering realities experienced by crew commanders on the ground is always massive. A vehicle can look flawless on a corporate datasheet, but when a heavy turret leaves you with zero growth margin for active protection systems or compromises tactical stability on soft terrain, the blokes inside are the ones who have to manage the risk. First-hand insights from the guys operating these platforms will always beat promotional brochures.

            • …and we have difference of opinion between those who use platforms too, we need a range of views not simply one. One view of this nature yes raises questions, but is not definitive in its own right. It’s not simply a matter of lying or not, there is nuance or different experiences and opinion to consider in such matters. I doubt you will have any military platform that doesn’t have critics and some very effective platforms still had serious faults on occasion. When some years ago we interviewed pilots of the Whirlwind fighter its pilots praised it, hated moving to anything else in the same interview Eric Brown said he disliked it that it had serious shortcomings. Were either lying, of course not, it’s perception even where realtime technical issues present themselves.

              • Whirlwind?
                A classic example ‘experts’ chasing perfection, while the people on the front lines were happy enough.

                Let’s not forget, these same cadre of experts that Brown was part of declared the SBD Dauntless ‘unsuitable’ for combat operations and the FAA didn’t aquire it.
                That’s the SBD that acquired the nickname ‘Slow But Deadly’ after turning a very large chunk of the Japanese navy into reefs while fighting through swarms of the deadly A6M Zero and getting a rather respectable 1:1 kill ratio against them.
                Meanwhile, we carried on with a biplane until 1945….

            • No, he probably wasn’t lying, he probably just didn’t know what he was talking about. Funnily enough according to the bloke I was talking to in the pub last week being a tank officer doesn’t qualify someone to have an engineering opinion on an infantry fighting vehicles top weight or stability .

            • I wonder if the the Vilkas version, using the unmanned turret suffers the same issues, as it “should” be lighter.

      • Of course, we can’t just buy off the shelf, can we… I know we already have them, but are they up to snuff for today’s battlefield. Perhaps some IFVs have some 35mm Cannons for lite AA and keeping those troops on the ground covered. And already integrated on the Boxer.

          • That timeline is exactly what makes the cancellation so frustrating. Scrapping a major armoured vehicle programme when it is less than a year away from Initial Operating Capability is the definition of false economy. We sank nearly half a billion pounds into perfecting the engineering, proved the CTA 40mm platform worked, and then threw away the entire capability just to balance the immediate budget spreadsheet. Now the army is left managing the exact capability gap we are seeing debated across this thread.

                • It highlights a deeper, more systemic disconnect between the MoD’s marketing and its strategic reality. We are selling an aggressive, heavy-armoured capability to new recruits that will not even exist by the time they finish their training pipelines. Stripping away that organic tracked capability does more than just create an operational gap; it damages institutional pride and retention. Selling a modern army on the concept of riding around in wheeled utility vehicles simply does not have the same recruitment pull as a premier, heavy tracked IFV fleet.

      • Totally agree, by obsolete I mean, it has the inability to fire on the move, but also limited to a burst of 6 rounds. It is a purely mechanical gun, so the operator cannot switch between ammo types during firing. The HE round had a few issues when used against mud brick walls, as it invariable drilled a nice hole through the wall or make small windows. It didn’t have the oomph to make a large breech. Be interesting to see how the new CTAS 40 would do against a mud brick wall?

        • A fully stabilised belt fed DELCO turret was available for Warrior since the late 90’s – see the Kuwaiti warriors

    • The fire support deficit is the massive elephant in the room with the Boxer transition. Swapping an IFV for a baseline APC means our mechanised infantry units are losing a huge amount of organic punch. While the international Boxer market has excellent turreted options available—like the 30mm RCT30 turret—the MoD simply hasn’t allocated the budget for a heavily weaponised British variant. Relying entirely on a 12.7mm heavy machine gun or grenade launcher for a front-line mechanised role is a major step backward, but as noted, the current funding pot leaves absolutely no room to bridge that capability gap.

        • Without that organic cannon punch, these mechanised units will be entirely dependent on Challenger 3 or Ajax to bail them out of any serious engagement. Forcing our already tiny tank and scout fleets to babysit baseline APCs completely compromises their own strategic roles. It is a massive structural headache waiting to happen.

  4. These people can write all the papers they like, there is no more money, there will be no more money and there never was going to be more money. Burnham and Healey have no more intention of hitting 3% anywhere near 2030 than Starmer and Reeves because they do not believe there is a threat and they are more concerned about keeping their jobs by bribing fools with promises of peace in our time and a buss pass. If he has a shred of integrity Al Carns will call this out after the budget and resign the labour whip but he wont.

    • The Peace Dividend delusion has allowed politicians to safeguard their electoral prospects by shifting Defence spending to social provision and even war in Europe hasn’t enabled them to pivot back to Defence.

      The UK Defence Investors’ Advisory Group (DIAG) is a logical step having realised that public funding can’t cover the Defence Investment Plan so private investment is required.

      Welfare or Warfare is the wrong discussion, assuming that only taxes are available.

      We bailed out the bankers in 2008 and now its their turn to invest in Defence since their business depends on peace and stability. Lower risk means lower cost for Defence Investment Bonds than standard Gilts.

      Thus the 3.5% GDP Defence spending target for 2030, and 2.75% GDP for 2027 are affordable without tax increases.

      A long term investment plan for national security. A requirement for a banking licence, a duty in law.

      Ethical investment means defending people that you expect to profit from.

      Over to UK & European Finance Ministers to make it happen. Banks must do their Duty or face Windfall Taxes.

      • I don’t really get this Private business, i.e. Banks “Invest in Defence” thing. What’s the proposal? They buy the British Army Kit? if not, then they can invest in the companies all day and unless the Govt buys stuff it’s not going to change anything. If it is the proposal, now the Military is dependent on essentially what is charity handouts?

      • Actually banks are keen to buy more government bonds however the Bank of England puts severe limits on how many GILTS banks can hold as part of their tier 1 capital ratio. As far as I can tell the UK is unique in this and in other European G7 countries the banks will hold four or five times more of their national governments bonds.

        • Jim,

          Thanks for that Gilts insight, which I imagine relates to the BoE stress testing for capital adequacy ultimately safeguarding the UK financial sector.

          My suggestion for Defence Investment Bonds is quite different to Gilts that are kept risk neutral, as known and accepted government borrowing for Spending, being Investment that lowers risk to the whole UK financial system.

          So the BoE and the banks that they manage will need to pay diligent attention to the risk added by deluded aggressors who support the pre-United Nations “Might Is Right” philosophy and not the UN Charter that those nations committed to after WW2.

          The sacrifice of the WW2 generation was a heavy price of freedom, sadly forgotten or unknown to many. If we only have to pay the insurance premium for freedom and not in blood & treasure we will have had a lucky escape..

          Banks who expect to profit from the population enabled by a banking licence have an obligation for Defence.

  5. The only conclusion I draw from the Ukraine war :Warrior needs up grading, Ajax yet built need to be done so urgently ( without the defects ) ditto boxer. Because if Russia starts on us we will need all 3.Labours DNA dictates none or very little of that will be done. We don’t need NATO on our side we need God!

    • The military logic regarding the vehicle mix is entirely correct. Ukraine has comprehensively proven that a balanced, modern division requires a combined arms mix of heavy tracked IFVs, armoured reconnaissance, and wheeled utility platforms to survive. Relying on a single hull type leaves fatal capability gaps. On the political front, the real test for the Strategic Defence Review won’t just be about political DNA, but about brutal financial reality. Pushing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP is going to be a necessity just to fix these basic tracked and wheeled armour bottlenecks if the army expects to maintain a credible deterrent.

    • No, the turret ring of Warrior is significantly smaller than the Ajax:
      Warrior = 1.4 meters (4 ft 7 in)
      Ajax = 1.7 meters to 1.75 meters (5 ft 7 in to 5 ft 9 in)

      • Is the armour plating a significant portion of the overall weight? Are there lighter options that are still effective in their protection levels?

        • The Ajax turret uses modular armour fixed to a base armour. The base armour as far as I know is made from steel. Though you could also use an aluminium alloy. But as Ali is a less dense material, you will need a thicker amount of material to equal the same toughness as steel. There’s no getting round the fact that steel based armour is heavy. But it needs to be, as the density and hardness work together to prevent penetration from high velocity and dense objects.

          The modular armour can be anything from spaced steel/aliminium to a composite sandwich of materials. Each will provide a certain level of protection. But composite armour does cost a lot more than steel based armour. Composite can also be a lot lighter than a pure steel armour.

          Another option would be to use a remotely operated turret. By getting rid of the need to accommodate the crew in the turret. You can significantly reduce the amount of armour needed. Thus saving a shed load of weight.

    • Even if it could fit (it won’t), the Ajax turret would take up all the space inside the Boxer and thus make it unusable as an IFV for transport.

      There are a couple of CT40 cannon remote turret designs knocking around though, so we could put the same gun on top of an APC module.

  6. What is it with the MoD and Civil Service intent on creating capability gaps? Wait until the new equipment is available and then scrap the old. Though instead of scrapping it should go into an operational reserve.

  7. Actually Boxer isn’t going to replace Warrior under any circumstances. It won’t have any firepower (we won’t buy a turreted version), and won’t be any going over any shitty ground. Only a tracked vehicle will sort out the WR replacement..

    • Exactly, forcing a wheeled APC to do the job of a tracked IFV is a fundamental doctrinal error. Boxer is an exceptional utility platform for moving infantry rapidly via roads and firm terrain, but it lacks the off-road trafficability and organic weight margin for heavy assault roles. If the Strategic Defence Review acknowledges this gap, the army will eventually have to look at a genuine tracked solution for the heavy brigades—whether that means developing an IFV variant on the existing Ajax chassis or eventually procuring an off-the-shelf platform like the CV90 down the line.

          • The Saracen comparison is a fair historical parallel in terms of the basic ‘battle taxi’ doctrine. We are essentially returning to a model of driving infantry rapidly to the edge of the battle zone and dropping them off to fight dismounted. However, the critical difference today is the weight and protection class. The Saracen was a light, poorly protected vehicle with genuine off-road limitations. Boxer is a modular behemoth with peerless blast protection. It is a fantastic asset for what it was designed to do—it just shouldn’t be treated as a magical shortcut to replace the heavy, tracked organic firepower that our armoured brigades actually need.

    • Moving tracked IFV’s around Europe is difficult and slow, the advantages of a wheeled IFV’s for fighting in Europe are clear which is why they are so prevalent.

      • True Jim but that alters nothing i wrote. You need a tracked armoured fighting vehicle to attack enemy close in positions in the mud. Nothing has changed in that regard. My old battalion still does that role and has done for decades. They know Boxer ain’t it!

        • So then the question becomes how many billions are you willing to spend to bring an infantry squad and a 30mm cannon to attack a target surrounded by mud that’s so thick an 8X8 can’t reach it?

          Could those extra billion have produced the same effect in a better way for less money. Also was it worth putting that 30mm cannon and infantry squad on a tracked vehicle that can’t deploy by road and also requires its own transporter crew that probably doubled the number of people required to deploy the effect so you only get has as many?

          If the mud was so bad that a premier off-road vehicle like the 8 X 8 boxer can’t get to the location do you really want to risk a £5 million tracked IFV and the lives of 10 soldiers in the area knowing that track vehicles often also get stuck in the mud?

          Could you have achieved a similar effect with a drone or a missile launched by a soldier?

          Once you start adding all these points up you tend to find that a Boxer IFV is a perfectly acceptable solution compared to something like a CV90 and in many instances far superior. There are lots of really useful things a wheeled IFV can do that a tracked IFV can’t (self deploy over long range) and few things a tracked IFV can do than an wheeled one can’t ( over come slightly more muddy conditions)

          • The Soucy style band tracks (as fitted to CV90 Mk4) should allow a tracked IFV to self deploy. They have proven to be a lot more robust than expected. Needing significantly less maintenance, are quieter, generate less vibration and don’t damage roads nearly as much as a steel track, easily allowing the vehicle to cruise at 40mph+ along roads. The main downside for long transits is heat build up in the track. Being mostly rubber based, which is a very good insulator, heat builds up and can’t be radiated away easily. Meaning the vehicle has to stop for an hour or so to the track to cool down.

            The Norwegians had a number of CV90 on trial in Afghan, fitted with the Soucy tracks. They performed much better than expected.

          • It would be good to see some better fire support options for units equipped with boxer. Could stick with boxer and go down the lines of the 105mm turreted version, something like the Centauro 2 with it’s 120mm or even the Fuchs JAGM. Means they’d have something that can keep up with them and provide some extra punch.

  8. I appreciate that times change, that we are coming into a time of drones. But no ifv and minimally armed boxer is aomething i am struggling to get my head around.

  9. I am in the group that Boxer is not, and never will be an IFV even if you stick a turret on it. I read an article maybe a year or so ago about the Americans doing the same thing with Stryker. The biggest argument against that was although it was a good addon, people will THINK it’s an IFV and start expecting it to do IFV things. Subsequently they will get in way above their heads real quick taking on vehicles and units they have no business taking on. I like the Boxer, I think it is a pretty good piece of kit from what I know, but it is an APC. Yet, like with the Stryker, it’s already being treated like an IFV and all it has at the moment is a machine gun.

    • Yes boxer in the UK is not an IFV it’s an APC. If you stick a turret on it then you create an IFV version just like Germany,Australia and the Netherlands have done. Boxer is the only IFV solution that we have that’s good to go with a hot production line.

      Boxer Variants come with the same level of protection as other IFV’s.

        • Both CV90 and Boxer come in STANAG Level 4 on their base line design and both have up to STANAG level 6 available for frontal arcs but with boxer it’s a module. Trophy APS is already integrated on boxer.

          I have no doubt CV90 is a marginally better IFV but Boxer is also up to the job and comes with many advantages over CV90.

  10. Oh, as an addendum, yes, we all know we don’t have the money right now, and that could be put down to wrong priorities (another discussion for another day), but unless people keep on beating the drum the Govt will never find the money. If the drum wasn’t beat real loud we all know we wouldn’t have gotten the extra 12-15bn or whatever it was in the DIP.

    • There is no amount of money that can ever be spent on defence where defence will say it has enough, the US spends over $1 trillion a year and the pentagon claims to be chronically underfunded.

      If we had a 200,000 man army, 400 fast jest and 30 escorts all I would be hearing is how back in the day we have 300,000 in the army, 50 escorts and 500 fast jets and how we are a diminished power and not really a world class military anymore.

      It’s the same spiel that’s being going on since we demobilised after Waterloo.

      The only large army that can ever be afforded in peace time is a reserve army, the only kind of army that has ever won a major industrial war is a reservist and conscript army.

      Professional army’s will always be too small to stand and chance against a major continental power with large conscription army. Another lesson that Russia is learning right now.

      No professional British army in history has ever served as a deterrent in Europe, in 1914 the Germans mocked the size of the British army so much they claimed if it appeared on the battlefield they would sent the local constabulary to arrest them.

      • Always thought the UK should follow a similar method as used by Sweden or Finland. Where the Army is predominantly made from reservists but includes a core of full timers.

  11. It would be good to see some better fire support options for units equipped with boxer. Could stick with boxer and go down the lines of the 105mm turreted version, something like the Centauro 2 with it’s 120mm or even the Fuchs JAGM. Means they’d have something that can keep up with them and provide some extra punch.

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