The government has established a set of frameworks for the supply of military-grade tactical communications systems worth around £8 billion, according to a contract details notice published on the Find a Tender service.
The notice, published by the Government Commercial Agency under reference RM6393, describes the requirement as covering “specialised military-grade tactical communication and information systems, including hardware, software, associated design, implementation, and support services.” According to the notice, the systems are to be “deployed in active battlefield environments for critical real-time operational tactical communications, with potential cross-government Defence and Security sectoral applications.” The scheme expands on the offering previously available under the Network Services 3 agreement.
The competition establishes the first of a scheme of frameworks. Framework one runs for 36 months from 26 June 2026 to 25 June 2029, with a second framework intended to follow to 2032 and a final framework running to 2034, giving the open framework an eight-year total lifespan.
The requirement is divided into three lots. Lot 1, Services, covers “architecture design, system integration, field support, training, and system sustainment activities.” Lot 2, Systems, covers “end-to-end rapidly deployable, secure Information and Communication Services” including vehicle-mounted and dismounted solutions. Lot 3, Components, covers “discrete hardware and software components.”
The three contracts signed on 26 June carry a combined value of just over £8 billion excluding VAT. According to the notice, Lot 2 is the largest at £4.7 billion, followed by Lot 1 at £2.6 billion and Lot 3 at £727 million, with the notice cautioning that framework lot values may be shared between lots.
The frameworks admit a broad field of suppliers, with 68 named on Lot 1, 55 on Lot 2 and 74 on Lot 3, and many companies appearing across multiple lots. The named suppliers span established defence primes including BAE Systems, General Dynamics UK, Thales UK, QinetiQ and Rheinmetall Electronics UK, major IT and telecommunications firms such as BT, Vodafone, Fujitsu, Capgemini, CGI and Ericsson, and a large number of smaller specialist communications and technology companies. Also present are firms including Elbit Systems UK, Helsing, Roke Manor Research, Viasat UK and L3Harris.
Being placed on the framework does not itself guarantee work, though, as readers will know. The notice sets out that individual requirements will be awarded through competition among the admitted suppliers, using a range of processes from catalogue-enabled further competition to multi-stage competitive procedures, with Lot 3 structured around a capability matrix allowing buyers to identify suppliers able to deliver specific capabilities.
I personally wouldn’t spend another penny with GD UK until they have 100% fixed Ajax at their cost.
“Dude”
still cracks me up !
Fortunately, Grinch, no one is asking you to part with your own hard-earned cash.
More to the point, you are completely conflating General Dynamics Land Systems (the vehicle division handling the Ajax hulls) with General Dynamics Mission Systems (the entirely separate cyber and communications branch). Suggesting a total blanket ban across an entire multinational corporation because you are unhappy with a completely different engineering programme shows a total misunderstanding of how these corporate structures work.
Furthermore, this £8bn project is an open, multi-lot framework explicitly designed to foster competition among dozens of firms like Ericsson and Radionor. Barring a major communications prime from even bidding would completely defeat the Ministry of Defence’s goal of driving maximum market competition. Let’s keep the critique grounded in actual procurement reality.
BM that was sooo sensible I must admit I nearly fainted. Very welcoming thank you.
Cheers Spy. If we actually banned every tier-1 defence prime that hit a snag on a completely separate project, the MoD would be left buying tactical radios from Maplin. The real test for this RM6393 framework is how well it integrates the 100 or so SMEs alongside the big players like GD Mission Systems or Ericsson.
Yes and it will permit using any of the products from any of the companies that end up on the framework with limited if any bureaucracy. There is a danger of some activity. Does Maplin still exist? I thought there was a closing down sale?
Exactly, Mark. Frameworks look great on paper, but the MoD’s historical appetite for bureaucracy is always the hidden danger. If civil servants smother the SMEs in paperwork, the framework fails. Regarding Maplin, they went bust on the high street years ago and only exist online now. Though at this rate, ordering tactical radios off a standard website might still be faster than the old Morpheus procurement timeline!
People’s default setting is to moan about something. Usually because they don’t understand it.
Exactly, Robert. It is much easier to just repeat a headline than it is to actually look at how a multi-lot framework operates. If we wrapped up procurement based entirely on emotional reactions, nothing would ever get built.
Spot on 👍
You’re right, it’s not Ajax that means GD shouldn’t be anywhere near this contract.
Bowman on the other hand.
The legacy of Bowman is precisely why this new framework exists, Legbye. The original Bowman disaster happened because the MoD locked themselves into a proprietary contract with a single prime, leaving the military completely hostage to their delivery failures.
The £8bn RM6393 framework is specifically designed as the exit strategy from that old single-source trap. By bringing in nearly 100 suppliers—ranging from telecom giants like Ericsson down to agile British SMEs—the MoD is forcing an open-architecture approach. GD Mission Systems won’t have a proprietary monopoly this time. They are just one player among dozens, meaning if they underperform on a specific lot, the MoD can instantly shift the task order to another framework supplier without the entire front-line system collapsing.
And not just Ajax:
‘…the (Bowman) contract was won by…now General Dynamics United Kingdom Ltd as prime contractor…When Bowman was first introduced into service, the system was said to contain many faults to the extent that troops dubbed Bowman “Better Off With Map And Nokia”.
A 2007 report by the Commons Public Accounts Committee was overwhelmingly critical of the entire system and its procurement. The report itself was split into four sections entitled: “programme governance arrangements were not fit for purpose”, “initial decisions were not well informed”, “through life costs were not rigorously assessed”, and “operational benefits are limited”.
As Bowman was being phased into service, senior officers in the British Army had serious reservations about the system, especially as many of their initial design specifications and feedback had not been adequately incorporated by the Defence Procurement Agency in the re-tendering process that was won by General Dynamics United Kingdom. Such were the misgivings, that the Director of Infantry initially refused to accept the portable “manpack” radio into service, saying:
All the rumours you’ve heard. It is as bad as you’ve heard. But we have been told that, politically, we have got to make it work. Now you guys will have to go out and find a way of making it work.
— Brigadier Jamie Balfour’
‘…the cancellation of a major component of the United Kingdom’s Project Morpheus military communications system. Specifically, the Evolve to Open (EVO) stage of the programme was axed. EVO used the latest version of the Bowman tactical radio and Command and Control (C2) system as its baseline, known as Bowman Combat Infrastructure-5.6 (BCIP-5.6). The EVO initiative was being led by General Dynamics’ UK subsidiary.’
‘We have been open that progress on the Morpheus project has fallen short of what was expected’ Mr. Cartlidge told the British parliament. Sources close to the programme told Armada that the MOD and General Dynamics were at an impasse over EVO’s expectations and deliverables…One thing that does seem certain is that General Dynamics’ role is likely to be confined solely to sustaining Bowman. An MOD source close to Morpheus told Armada that the company is unlikely to be allowed to bid for any future work involving Bowman.’ March 2024
Oh dear!
I blame Net Zero 👀
Good point:
GD UK Ltd Carbon Reduction Plan
‘We will:
Comply with all relevant current statutory regulations that impact on procurement and require that our suppliers and contractors (and their supply chains) do the same
Seek to procure environmentally sustainable goods and services that minimises the impact to climate change (eg accreditation to a recognised environmental standard)
Encourage all suppliers and contractors to adopt policies and systems in relation to their corporate responsibilities, sustainability and ethics which lead to improved environmental performance (eg ISO 14001 (EMS) and ISO 45001 (OHS)
Seek to procure materials and services which are ethically sourced, and demonstrate application of the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) Base Code standards…’
And so and so forth.
Hot air doesn’t come cheap…or, clearly, enhance quality…
Don’t forget Dr Fauci I’m sure he is to blame for their incompetence too. Logic would inform us that as those carbon reduction plans are pretty much consistent amongst all suppliers that we can’t therefore expect any better results from them too. I’m sure that argument will indeed crop up from the tin hat brigade led by the Daily Mail and Telegraph at some point.
Re Fauci, another excellent point:
‘It now appears using epi data and genomic data that the first infection was in early December [2019] and was not connected to the (wet) market. Early on, the Chinese were saying that there is no human-to-human transmission and all the original 27 cases were from the market. Now we know the market was not the source, it was the amplifier.’
Fauci diary entry 26 Jan 2020
Oh! That confirms the comments of coronavirus expert Prof. John Nicholls of Hong Kong University:
‘There’s a vast underreporting of cases in China. Compared to Sars and Mers we are talking about a coronavirus that has a mortality rate of 8 to 10 times less deadly to Sars to Mers. So a correct comparison is not Sars or Mers but a severe cold. Basically this is a severe form of the cold.’ 06 Feb 2020
That was further confirmed by the Director of the U.S. National Institutes of Health:
‘…3 or 4% of people who get COVID do not die from COVID. That’s just a lie. What that seroprevalence study found was that it was 0.2% so two out of 1,000.’
That was further confirmed by the U.S. National Library of Medicine in 2022:
‘The (COVID-19) IFRs (Infection Fatality Rate) had a median of 0.034% (interquartile range (IQR) 0.013–0.056%) for the 0–59 years old population, and 0.095% (IQR 0.036–0.119%) for the 0–69 years old.’
That is very similar to the IFR for the common cold coronaviruses 229E, NL63, OC43, and HKU1.
So Britain squandered £500 billion on a common cold coronavirus and is now squandering a great deal more on the net zero political agenda for societal change:
‘Hammond warned that the total cost of transitioning to a zero-carbon economy was likely to be in excess of £1 trillion. The letter quoted estimates from the Climate Change Committee (CCC) of £50 billion per year and from BEIS of £70 billion per year. Over a 30-year period these estimates would amount to a cost of £1.5 trillion to £2.1 trillion.’
That is why Britain has slumped from second to fourteenth n NATO’s defence spending rankings, cannot meet its commitments to its allies, cannot respond to attacks on its bases and servicemen overseas.
What a complete shambles; an utter disgrace!
‘Dr. Anthony Fauci invoked his Fifth Amendment rights more than 100 times during a high-profile showdown before the Senate Homeland Security Committee. He declined to answer questions regarding the handling and origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.’
29 July 2026
Dr. Fauci should be on trial.
His dishonesty – on this he is far from alone in health sector- made certain in the next epidemics the credibility of health authorities will be next to zero.
Exactly, Monro, but that history actually proves why the MoD is moving to this new RM6393 framework. The old Bowman and Morpheus disasters happened because the MoD locked themselves into a single, proprietary prime contractor. This new multi-lot framework brings in close to 100 suppliers—including companies like Ericsson—precisely so the MoD is never held hostage by a single supplier’s failures again. It is the exit strategy from the history you just quoted
Or they could just visit the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps to see what works, is working?
A lot of this stuff is available from L3Harris off the shelf…
‘We can receive a radio order on Monday and deliver product by Friday…’
Sam Mehta, President, Communication Systems, L3Harris.
‘…our products are future-proof through open-system designs…’
Chris Aebli, President, Tactical Communications, L3Harris
‘To deliver our vision for UK Defence, business as usual is no longer an option. Through the UK’s support to Ukraine, we have seen what effective joint working between the MOD and industry looks like. Processes designed for peacetime have been revolutionised to enable delivery at speed.’
SDR 2025
You make a fair point about the availability of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) tech, Monro, but buying straight from US primes isn’t the silver bullet it appears to be.
First, it completely ignores sovereign capability and strict US ITAR restrictions. If we simply buy standard L3Harris kit off the shelf, Washington retains ultimate control over export terms and modifications. We lose the freedom to integrate our own proprietary UK encryption, specialized software, and sovereign data systems.
Second, RM6393 isn’t designed to reinvent the wheel or build radios from scratch. It is structured precisely so the MoD can buy the exact type of open-system tech you mentioned, but without the baggage. Instead of handing a blank cheque to a single prime contractor to manage L3Harris hardware for us, the MoD can buy from L3Harris directly as a framework supplier, whilst simultaneously utilizing telecoms like Ericsson for the 5G and network architecture.
Finally, your SDR 2025 quote about Ukraine actually cuts against your argument. The rapid procurement for Ukraine succeeded precisely because we bypassed rigid, single-supplier monopolies. We pulled fast-paced innovation from a massive ecosystem of civilian telecoms, tech start-ups, and diverse commercial vendors. That is exactly what a multi-lot, 100-supplier framework mimics—agility, speed, and resilience, rather than betting the entire £8bn house on a single corporate entity.
Thanks very much for this. Very interesting.
But, in a spirit only of constructive criticism (we are all on the same side), surely there is your MoD procurement ‘gold plating’ right there:
‘integrate our own proprietary UK encryption, specialized software, and sovereign data systems.’
I don’t hold any brief for L3Harris. They are as moribund as any other bloated para-statal. I simply use them as an example of ‘not making perfect the enemy of the good’ We already have L3Harris kit (MMR) with all three services.
If I am a potential customer, I access RM6393. I am immediately confronted with this:
‘For a more detailed step-by-step process on how to run a direct award or further competition, download the buyer guide in the documents section below.’
The buyer guide then fails to download: ‘This file type is not supported. Please visit the Chrome Web Store to find an app that can open this type of file’.
Maybe RM6393 attempts to replicate the way procurement is now working in Ukraine.
‘This market-based model is closely associated with the agency’s current head, Arsen Zhumadilov. He previously rolled out a similar system for food supplies, known as DOT-Chain. After taking over the DPA, he moved to scale it up to weapons, branding it DOT-Chain Defence.
DOT-Chain Defence has shifted a significant portion of procurement into a digital format. Lengthy approvals and paper documentation have been replaced by electronic documents and digital signatures, significantly reducing the time required to conclude contracts. In addition, manufacturers maintain direct contact with military users, allowing for communication and immediate feedback.
“Our interaction with manufacturers has been reduced to a minimum. We select the equipment, place an order and it arrives within a few days,” one serviceman noted.’
Has MoD actually done a customer trial of RM6393 and received feedback? It looks like it still needs work?
I appreciate the constructive discussion, Monro, but classifying sovereign encryption as ‘gold-plating’ misses the fundamental reality of national security. Having independent cryptographic control isn’t an optional luxury; it is the baseline requirement for sovereign operational independence. If the UK relies entirely on a foreign ally’s encryption keys, we lose the ability to conduct independent operations without their explicit oversight and technical sign-off.
Regarding the website glitch, a broken buyer’s guide download link on a public-facing Crown Commercial Service portal is an IT administrative nuisance, but it has no bearing on the actual procurement mechanism. Frontline military buyers aren’t sitting on Google Chrome clicking public links to order tactical networks; they use secure, classified defence systems.
In fact, the RM6393 framework is the exact UK equivalent of Ukraine’s DOT-Chain model that you referenced. It moves away from the old paper-heavy, multi-year procurement loops and replaces them with an open, pre-vetted digital marketplace where the MoD can place fast, flexible orders directly with manufacturers.
The framework is literally the digital shortcut designed to bypass the very bureaucracy you are rightly criticising.
British L3 Harris MMR in service with all three UK armed services use L3Harris Denali® encryption. One of the reasons for which those MMR were bought was interoperability.
‘Secure classified defence links’ aren’t going to help the customer with website glitches. The question was whether anyone within the MoD had bothered to test the website from the customer’s perspective.
Interoperability and sovereign encryption are not mutually exclusive Monro. We use L3Harris hardware for interoperability, but the UK generates and loads its own national cryptographic keys onto those Denali modules. That is how you maintain sovereign control while sharing a network with allies. On the website issue, public-facing portal testing is handled by civilian commercial teams, not the MoD buyers. Frontline procurement happens through secure internal channels, so a public link glitch is completely irrelevant to the actual framework operations
Precisely. Encryption is simply another layer on an open architecture system. It can be procured separately instead of over complicating an otherwise straightforward procurement.
A nugatory discussion in any case since tactical radios are already out of fashion…have been, some would say, since the introduction of the GD UK ‘Better Off With Map And Nokia’
Well done everyone…or not really…
@Grinch. Not sure they sell much to individuals. Out of interest what mission system were you thinking of buying.
In fairness to all here, there’s nothing wrong with questioning the wisdom of these seemingly constant ‘telephone number’ quotes. Why are companies outside of the UK constantly favoured in British MOD contracts anyway.
All equipment used in warfare has ‘gold plated’ price tags. An issue that effects most militaries in the world. However, if those companies want gold plated prices, their guarantees need to be ‘gold plated’ as well. These companies need to be made much more accountable, than they already are.
There are 10,s-100’s and even more companies and businesses, that would love to be involved in government contracts. The other ‘demand’ that should be made to these people is that ‘you buggered it up, you fix it’, at no extra cost!
Companies who provide faulty goods should be blocked from tendering, even clowns like General Dynamics who frankly, have fleeced the great British public out of an awful lot of money, by providing shoddy unsuitable goods.
Exactly what the MOD are looking for right now, I do not know. What I do know is that once upon a time, all manner of things were looked into, drafted, crafted and tested in-house. Those ‘lost’ abilities have cost this (and probably other) countries and militaries… millions, billions and whatever.
When all said and done, this future military-grade tactical communications system will cost more than is currently suggested, and the Gov will end up going through all the usual ‘hoops’ before something usable appears from the myths, mysteries and madness of dealing with contractors, and their proffered terms and conditions.
You’ve raised some completely fair points about historical accountability, Tom, but the reality of modern tech makes a return to the old in-house ways impossible. No government has the internal capability to build modern secure 5G mesh networks or advanced cyber infrastructure from scratch anymore—we simply have to rely on commercial tech partners.
As for blacklisting, the MoD legally cannot just arbitrarily ban a massive prime like General Dynamics without triggering an instant High Court judicial review that would cost the taxpayer a fortune. The real solution isn’t a blanket ban; it’s exactly what this RM6393 framework is doing by splitting the project into multiple lots and opening the door to 100 different suppliers. If one player underperforms, the MoD can seamlessly shift the work to someone else without the whole system collapsing
Fair points there BM… thank you.
I am not sure how a discussion about procurement of a BOWMAN replacement turned into a rant about DR Anthony Fauci and COVID plus net zero. Can the moderator remind contributors to stay on topic. I appreciate there are first class ranters out there especially about COVID and Net zero but can they do it somewhere else perhaps the high arctic in winter. By the way GD UK was not the original prime for BOWMAN that was a JV called Archer Communications Systems Limited I know I worked on the BOWMAN project during that period. The MOD became unhappy with Archer and were courted by CDC and Westlands Group CDC was taken over by GD UK and the rest is history. The whole process is a bit like watching a middle aged man grow unhappy with his middle aged wife and switch his affections to a younger model only to find once he divorces the first and marries the younger one that he is also eventually unhappy with her as well.
Let us be clear about one thing though both MOD and GD UK are to blame for AJAX and I for one don’t think it is unreasonable to hold GD’s feet to the fire on AJAX by reminding them that they need to fix it before getting any further UK defence business. It is cold hard commercial sense after all you would not give a shoddy builder more work if the wall he had built was falling down and don’t tell me but the way its more complicated than that it is not I worked in the defence business. The irony of course is that we do keep giving MOD more projects to control so they can waste money and it now appears ditto GD.