On 29 May 2024, Ukrainian missile strikes damaged two Russian roll-on roll-off (RO-RO) rail ferries on the Crimean side of the Kerch Strait crossing, rendering them non-operational, according to an update.

These rail ferries almost certainly provided the primary means of rail transportation for Russian fuel and ammunition train loads to Crimea due to the stringent security measures employed on the Kerch Bridge.

Despite the strike, Russia has resumed operations of vehicle RO-RO ferries to support the movement of heavy loads across the Strait.

However, the loss of the rail ferry service means Russia will likely be forced to replace it as soon as possible, which could impact its wider maritime logistics operations. Alternatively, Russia might risk relaxing its procedures by using the rail bridge to transit fuel and explosive stores.


“These rail ferries almost certainly provided the primary means of rail transportation for Russian fuel and ammunition train loads to Crimea due to the stringent security measures employed on the Kerch Bridge. Russia also operates vehicle RO-RO ferries to support the movement of heavy loads across the Strait, which have resumed operations post-strike.

The degraded rail crossing capacity almost certainly caused significant temporary disruption to Russian military logistics operations and potentially, Crimea’s fuel supply. Russia will almost certainly be forced to replace the rail ferry service as soon as possible, likely impacting its wider maritime logistics operations, or risk relaxing its procedures by using the rail bridge to transit fuel and explosive stores,” the UK Ministry of Defence stated in the release.

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

21 COMMENTS

  1. Good. Even if they can get the same amount across via other types of ferry/barge, they’ll need to unload them from trains on the Russian side and then re-load them onto trains again on the Ukrainian Crimean side- adding additional steps to every tonne of equipment carried by this route.
    Admittedly, most of it probably travels via the Rostov/Mariupol line now. But still, reducing the options everywhere makes it more of a nightmare for Russian logisticians.

    • I would say a large chunk of the Rostov to Mariupol train line is within GMLRS range. I’d fully expect Ukraine to use this to target the rail line. The ATACMS could reach Rostov. Which I bet Ukraine are itching to target, due to both the rail and road transportation (bridges in particular) links.

      • The Ukrainians will eventually be authorized to utilize ATACMs in/around Rostov. Not in a timely fashion, mind you. Perhaps in another year or two. You know, another expedited decision process from Uncle Sugar. 🤔😉🙄

  2. Might be worth thinking about the GRU grey zone activity in Europe/UK – various fires and explosions.

    I suspect BAE don’t want publicity on the site explosions but similar happened at a Dutch facility.

    Donald Tusk has publicly joined the dots so we are not breaking cover.

    Ultimately the best security is for everyone to be alert. There is a long history in the UK of perimeter security being boosted by the locals. So I don’t think keeping quiet about this is the answer.

    George can you do an article on that?

    • Very interesting info, do not believe any account has been published on this side of the Pond re potential sabotage, to date. Isn’t MI-5 (whatever the current title) supposed to deal w/ these matters? 🤔

      • Yes they are, and you can make a large bet that there is a lot going on that we do not hear about. The biggest problem that MI 5 and MI 6 have is that there are multiple threats, and the most difficult part of the staff job will be working out the priority list.

        • Maybe.

          A lot of domestic work was given to plod under Blair.

          Plod won’t have any idea what to do other than firm another large team of ‘highly specialised’ officers buy a stack of expensive shades, all get new high performance cars with blue lights fitted and blue light run between important meetings.

          Meanwhile in the real world unarmed site guards will have to try and deal with this as the armed forces are too small to do this themselves. Maybe with some backing from the civil nuclear force.

      • Actually, just Google searched sabotage in Europe and there were indeed relevant articles in US pubs in mid to late May. My bad, total whiff. Definitely another reason to arm the Ukrainians to the teeth. 🤔😁

        • More to the point if citizens realised they were already under attack they would be happier with increased defence spending.

          At some point the penny has to drop.

          • Yes, Mad Vlad and the Orcs have dropped virtually all pretense of civilized behavior. A majority of the UK populace evidently believes Putin only blusters w/ empty threats, and does/will not follow through on them. Personally believe that assumption is a risky defence policy. In contrast, at least during the latter part of the 1930s, the RAF (especially) and RN were making efforts to rearm, in preparation for the conflict many could foresee. 🤔😳

          • “A majority of the UK populace evidently believes Putin only blusters w/ empty threats”

            Two major London hospitals have been under FSB state sponsored terrorism style cyber extortion attack. Owing to under investment in cyber security their critical systems are either impacted or locked by ransom-ware. So paper based backup is in operation and many procedures cancelled because orcs don’t care about health care.

            That is probably well known to GCHQ but sadly not prevented. Public funding for the NHS focuses on the front line, forgetting that nothing much happens without IT.
            Politicians only fund what they understand at some basic level…

      • The Security Service still maintains its sub-title of MI5 (estb. 1909) its original title (they seem to have dropped the hyphen).

        They are small (just over 5000 staff of which 42% are female) but very effective.

        They are charged with internal security of the UK and domestic counter-espionage activities within the UK. They are authorised to investigate any person or movement that might threaten the country’s security in any way including terrorists and saboteurs. 

        They focus on surveillance, intelligence gathering, handle agents & informers and conduct intelligence analysis. They task Scotland Yard to make arrests.

        They foiled 31 terrorist plots that were at an advanced stage, in the
        4 year period to 2021. Sadly a handful of plots are not foiled.

        • Appreciate the info. Larger staff during WWII and CW-1? Would suggest an increase in staff, given current and projected future threat assessment.

          • As mentioned MI5 just does domestic Int within the UK homeland. The other main Intelligence organisations are The Secret Service (MI6), GCHQ and Defence Intelligence. Staff numbers overall and budget are quite substantial.

  3. logistics operations by the russian forces has been a utter shambles since day 1 if the conflict. it’s been a well known thing since the days of Napoleon he failed because his supply line to his army to bring sufficient food and clothing to cope with the rigororof a russian winter.

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