Just under 300 hulls that will one day become Ajax armoured vehicles have been delivered to the UK so far.

The information came to light via the following exchange.

Kevan Jones, Member of Parliament for North Durham, responded:

“To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many vehicle boxes have been delivered by GD from Spain to the factory in Wales.”

Jeremy Quin, Minister for Defence Procurement, responded:

“296 Ajax Hulls have been delivered to the GD factory in Wales.”

What’s going on with Ajax?

A long-awaited safety report relating to Ajax has just been published. In this report, it’s claimed that safety warnings were ignored. Don’t take my word for it, read it for yourself.

“Madame Deputy Speaker, with permission, I would like to make a statement to update the House on Ajax.

Ajax is an important capability and a vital step-change in the way the British Army will operate on the future battlefield. It will provide Ground Mounted Reconnaissance, allowing the Army to understand the battlefield in all weathers, 24 hours a day. Part of our £41bn investment in Army equipment and support over the next 10 years, this modernisation is critical to address future threats. This is a vital investment and the Defence Secretary and I have been deeply concerned about progress on this troubled project which has been running for over 11 years since its commencement in March 2010. That’s why we have been thoroughly focused on the project; why I insisted earlier this year that no declaration of IOC (Initial Operating Capability) would be made without Ministerial involvement; and why we asked the Permanent Secretary to commission a report from the MOD’s Director of Health, Safety and Environmental Protection into the health and safety concerns raised by noise and vibration.

I am today publishing that report and placing a copy in the library of the house. Over the last 35 years there have been some 13 formal reports on defence procurement: we know the foundations that can build success. Openness, good communication and collaboration within Defence and the ability to act as an informed and challenging customer are vital. This Health and Safety Report has highlighted shortcomings that need to be addressed, not just in health and safety but more broadly. The Review finds serious failings in the processes followed. The result was that personnel worked on a vehicle that had the potential to cause harm.

The Review finds that the failure was complex and systemic. It finds that:

  • a culture exists of not treating safety as equally important as cost and time in the acquisition process; and
  • from a cultural perspective, the Army did not believe it was potentially causing harm to people, especially from vibration, as it was tacitly expected that soldiers can and should endure such issues.

As I informed the House on 18 October, we have contacted all personnel identified as having worked on Ajax. 40 declined to be assessed for hearing but, of the remainder, I am pleased to report that the vast majority have returned to duty with no health impact. As of 9 December, 17 individuals remain under specialist outpatient care for their hearing, some of whom are again expected to return to duty with no health impact.11 individuals have had long term restrictions on noise exposure recommended, potentially requiring a limitation in their military duties. 7 of these had pre-existing hearing issues prior to working on Ajax. 4 did not. In addition, 4 individuals who worked on Ajax have been discharged on health grounds, in some cases for reasons wholly unrelated to hearing loss.”

Warnings ignored over Ajax safety issues

You can read the rest by clicking the link above or by clicking here.

 

George Allison
George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison
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115 COMMENTS

  2. “can and should endure such issues” good to know there’s no consideration for the troops whatsoever. What a phenomenal waste of money. If it’s as crucial as the minister says it is to the future of the Army then for goodness sake take the time to make the right decision

  3. I think another report should be commissioned with two conclusions. What needs to be done to fix the problem and when will it be done. No more than 20 words please.

  5. If you look at the factory there are 20 odd Ajax variants parked outside…

    https://www.google.com/maps/place/General+Dynamics+Merthyr/@51.718588,-3.3544984,1385m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x486e3c9ff3334c77:0x91ccb646c0e0331d!8m2!3d51.7201232!4d-3.3507766?hl=en

    No idea how old the image is, but there clearly isn’t enough space to place 300 odd IFV size bodies around the place. Where are they keeping them? Given GD’s track record to date it wouldn’t be a surprise to see them uncovered, outside rusting to pieces….

    Quite frankly after GD’s previous mess up for the Army, Bowman, they should never be granted a single contract in the UK again.

    LM need to pack up as well after the Warrior upgrade fiasco as well…

    • You really couldn’t make it up could you …. My best guess would be stored in a local scarp yard, piled 5 deep and ready for cutting torch….

      Visions of TSR2 and Nimrod MR4A being scrapped comes to mind… Add Ajax to the list..

      I wouldn’t blame either GD or LM to be honest, the cause of these multi billion pound fiascoes, goes directly down to Government political interference and utterly incompetent MOD management.

      In the case of Ajax, some blame also goes to senior Army ‘yes’ men, who knew very well there were serous issues with the vehicle a good while ago, but they just looked the other way….

          • Indeed I think there is serious blame to be levelled at a Company that agreed it could build a product that it patently has been unable to do within acceptable limits on user safety and technological expectations especially as it was based on a long established base vehicle. Can’t remotely imagine that Bae would be given such leeway here or elsewhere for such incompetence nor for making available specs and support information that has subsequently been described in reports as never should have been taken at face value. Of course both GD and LM for that matter have come under quite a lot of criticism at home in recent times in arguments over apparent incompetence and complacency.

        • But surely they are built to a specific detailed design and specifications agreed on by the MOD?

          I know the question has been asked before, but surely they build a virtual Ajax, refine the design and test it before moving onto prototypes?

          Why wasn’t vibration and noise picked up in prototypes and pre production vehicles?

          If it was, why did they then crack on and produce all these bloody hulls, that I would assume all require modifications to sort the issues out?

          On from that, I assume there are many more moving down the Spanish production line as we speak…..

          Not to worry, it’s only Joe tax payer who foots the bill…

        • It’s not the hull build quality that is causing these noise and vibration problems though – that is an issue and Wallace said GD will have to rebuild some hulls. These problems are caused by the running gear, engine mountings, and quality issues with the internal cabling and bolting according to the report.

      • @ £10m a pop this is unbelievable, Armour means heavy and we would be better off with a Merkava 4 at £4m each which is a tank / IFV and pretty much everything else all in one

        Going forward we need one tracked vehicle type that we can build maintain and operate within our cost envelope

    • Thats the copyright date, not the Imagery date.
      You can get it from Google Earth, but this was from Google Maps. Looking at the car parks in local leisure facilities it does appear to have been taken in 20 or 21 though.

  6. We could rename the Ajax, T45 part 2 as they both have well documented faults before entering service but will end up in service with those faults so that the tax payer has to pay for it not the company’s who built them all settled in the old boys clubs in Mayfair

  7. God it not as if GD are trying to invent a completly new thing, it’s a tracked infantry fighting vehicle that need to carry 8 troops, a 30mm-50mm gun across all types of terrain. The UK has been building this type of vehicle for over 100 years. It not bloody rocket science, as an ex scaley back even I could do better. Why do I have the gut feeling the choice of GD was more to do with politics than requirements or technical know how.

    • Ajax is not an IFV – it is a recce/strike vehicle.

      But your basic point is fine. We used to have 5 British AFV manufacturers – all absorbed into BAE Sytems now – who could have produced a decent vehicle based on the proven CV90.

      But we use a US company who set up a British subsidiary in a Fork Lift Truck factory in Wales to get the political tick in the box, who stretch the design of a 26 tonne vehicle out to be a 38-42 tonne vehicle, employ people who have never built an AFV before, have the hulls subcontracted out to a Spanish factory and the turrets subbed out to Lockheed Martin. Then the MoD changes the spec in 2016. This was never going to end well!

    • Absolutely was, it has already been put forward before that it was entirely down to resentment over Bae (costs in particular) over past contracts and a belated effort to get ‘value through competition’. Yeah that’s worked out well. We seem to have a belief that past incompetences should be taken as proof others do things better. Well that isn’t by any stretch of the imagination the given that many in Govt and Mod believe it to be. That plus the narrow field of vision over decades of over specialising let alone revising products so the original British manufacturers who built them increasingly suffered a shrinking market little chance of exports, decreasing ability to make a profit despite the high cost due to such small numbers and then no immediate follow on work here or abroad after contract completion. Ironically Bae has been the only actor to get around this by investing in foreign design and product (at least from a company over national level) while still due to the above losing actual home capabilities any longer to all intents and purposes. This is a failure decades in the making and numerous visionless Govts in reality just like the greater general loss in our industrial base.

      • Yep. …and that’s why I argue for a new UK agency, independent of the MoD, tasked with management of critical strategic resources and capabilities civilian and military. i.e. including MBT or armoured fighting vehicles. It just oversees/provides a framework for an indigenous capability and accepts that there will be no exports (helps stops arms proliferation) other than to 5-eyes. Partly paid for by a UK Sovereign Wealth Fund profit.

        We must stop relying on others who just consume UK cash and skills which then flow out of the UK economy in a race to the bottom.

      • Spyinthesky
        Surely the Hmg/Mod could find a legal firm that would tie BAE systems to a watertight contract that they supply what they quote for

    • Actually it is very new and on the tip of new technology, sensor/data and recce wise at least. The mistake was the unrealistic stretch of an existing design (like trying to make a Transit van into a 7.5 ton truck). Thats where most of the problems are me thinks vibration wise. The concept is pretty much spot on I’d say, end result is another matter. Please remember though that this is a Recce vehicle not an IFV so the design brief would always have been to start light, weight wise.
      I’m no BAe shareholder but certainly with hindsight the CV-90 would have been a better starting point for this program, but that decision is probably more to do with MRA Nimrod than anything Recce/Strike related.

  8. When you guys go to holiday in Spain, have you not seen the builders just chuck houses up. EVERY A CASE OF THAT WILL DO. All Spanish hulls should be rejected, MADE IN THE UK means MADE not assembled. or scrap the program and recover the money from GD

      • Hang on guys, a little sweeping there, they do build all our A400’s after all.

        They are only building hulls to an exact specification, set out by the customer, as contractors.

        Or is the issue not with the design, but the hull build?

        Have the Spanish deveated from the specific design contracted for? If they haven’t, then it’s not their fault….

      • Neither did glued blots on the Batch 2 OPVs built in the UK. :). Government contracts appear to bring about the worse productivity and quality issues no matter where you are in the world imo.

    • Yes, all that high speed rail covering the country is a real joke.

      It is not the location that matters but the quality control, which is determined by the manufacturer, not the people building it.

    • The noise and vibration problems are not to do with Spanish side, even if it is comforting to blame Jonny foreigner. They are to do with work completed in Wales – engine mountings, running gear and internal cabling. The hull problems are on top of that.

      • IMO, part of the problem is going from 26t to 40t & thinking you don’t have to change anything. It’s taken GD 10 years to fail to do do something that SK’s Hanwha has done in less than 5 years. Their Redback IVF was developed specifically to match Australian requirements starting with their K21 vehicle as a reference. They quickly realised Australian requirements were going to go over 40t & so decided to add the K9 to their reference list. The Redback is 42t & though based on the Hanwha K21 (26t), has the running gear & suspension of the K9 SPH (47t). Ajax is overloaded & underpowered & faults like vibration just get magnified when the suspension & running gear don’t match the load.

  9. Ajax at 38-42 tonnes, with a beefier engine, revised transmission, different turret and cannon etc etc is a million miles away from the original ASCOD Pizzaro (Spanish) or Ulan (Austrian) vehicle. There is no comparison.

  10. Staggering incompetence. Heads should roll and we should draw a line under the terrible procurement practices that have taken place since the Blair years

    • As a Brit I am ashamed that the people responsible for this have let the country and Army down with this colossal balls up and wastage. It’s a disgrace. Sure hope that there really is some serious “B” planning going on to get some good alternatives happening if both Ajax and Warrior can’t be resuscitated. And they need to get on with it fast! As someone has said here, less words, more action, and please. The Army deserves and needs way better investment than this! It’s ultimately peoples lives on the modern battlefield they need to think about!

      • Warrior upgrade aka WCSP was cancelled under SDSR2021 and the vehicle will waste out in the mid-2020s – what makes you think it will be resuscitated?

    • Of course the MoD have commercial officers who negotiate and write contracts. Do you think there is a problem with the contract?

      • Hello Graham, do you think there is anything right with a contract that allows a contractor to be over budget, behind schedule, and trying to deliver a faulty product at the end of that possess. The problem is the MoD has been allowing this to happen for the last 40 odd years from the introduction of the SA80 the first models were a disgrace and only in the last 10 or so years have they managed to make it more user friendly and able to do what it was designed to do. We now have the T45s, delivers over budget, behind schedule and delivered with ongoing faults, the Crows-nest system over budget and behind schedule and still dose not work as it is supposed to work, now we have the fiasco called Ajax. If we were talking a few £ it would pass under the table but we are talking Billions of hard earned tax £s. People at the top of the MoD are either inept or batting for the opposition either way they need to be given to the army as bayonet practice and a new team put in there place.

        • Steven, There will be little wrong with the contract but clearly the manufacturer has breached a number of contract conditions. MoD is focussed on getting a fleet of vehicles that are fit for purpose out of GDUK, rather than sueing them in the courts. You are right that equipment with faults has been accepted into service before, and that says as much about the MoDs procurement organisation and its processes as about the manufacturers. MoD doesn’t like to sue. Some say that they fear being outgunned by better lawyers put up by the errant company – maybe. But they fear it will result in further project delay and invoke a bad working relationship, when all are trying to fix things. What MoD doesn’t want is for GD lawyers to void the contract and for sunk money to be lost, legal fees to mount and then have to find another manufacturer.

          • I just find it strange that when companies like BP or Shell order state of the art design and build equipment it is deliver working to speck and on budget yet the MoD is continually plagued with kit being over budget, late and fault ridden. There is something wrong at the top either some one batting for the opposition or utterly inept either way there has to be a change at the top of the MoD.
            There seems to be utter contempt from the manufactures towards the UKs armed forces as they believe that they can offload faulty equipment onto us and we will be grateful that we have a shinny bit of kit the looks good but in reality is as much good as ashtray on a motorbike. That contempt can only come from the MoD so it time to shape up or ship out.

          • Hi Steven, I know nothing about the kit that oil and gas companies order, however much military equipment is or has assemblies, sub-assemblies and components, some of which have only just transitioned from the experimental lab, and may not have been built for production before.

            Some equipment, regrettably, is made by manufacturers who are inexperienced (GDUK never built anything before Ajax, as it didn’t even exist) or who have not manufactured such a product type for many years.
            British industry last designed an IFV (Warrior) in 1972-80 and last manufactured in quantity in 1984. Dates for a MBT are design (1986-92) and manufacture (1993-2002). Dates for an assault rifle (SA80) are design (1969-76) and A1 manufacture (1985-94). No steady production drumbeat for army kit, sadly. Most staff will have left before a new generation of equipment is required.

            I doubt BP and Shell’s suppliers are in the same boat.
            You then have very long gestation periods for such complex equipment and staff from Industry and MoD changeover many times – and there is massive and terrible interference from politicians and the Treasury. Nimrod MRA4 essentially failed due to Treasury involvement. The QE-class carriers price rose largely due to political interference.

            It is easy to say many, especially those at the top, must be inept – but military procurement is uniquely difficult. It is almost amazing that a very high percentage of kit does get into service on time, within budget and of acceptable quality/reliability. Its only the cock-ups that you hear about.

            There certainly is human error and some ineptitude everywhere (Industry, Treasury, amongst politicians, amongst military and civil servants at DE&S, and military at Arms & Service Directorates), and accountability is not clear-cut, thus no-one gets fired.

            SROs have to cover many projects and often have a secondary role too. DGDQA has been cut to the bone and cannot embed people in Industry.

            Each service does not have any control over procurement for their service. CGS is in no way responsible for Ajax issues, and has no power to speed the programme along.

            So much wrong with Defence procurement for the major, complex programmes. They need another review, but one that looks holistically, not just at Abbey Wood.

          • Hello Graham, I used the oil industry companies as they too have there procurement problems as well as having to design and build cutting edge equipment but they do so by appointing a team directly responcible for that project, Deep water oil exploration is expensive and needs expensive bits of kit that work first time.
            The armed forces should be allowed to enter into direct partnership with industry suppliers with ex and serving members on the military who know what they need. If civilian expertise is needed then they should be recruited for that project paid for by the industrial partner who has been designated to build that bit of kit.
            By having direct partnership between the military and industry it will bring the various industrial partners closer to the military so they are not seen as a cow to be milked for every £ which seems to be the case at the moment.
            In the private sector if you try to deliver kit that is faulty or dose not work as planed then you have to fix it at your cost, if it is a deign fault then you go back to the drawing board with the design team to work out what went wrong then.

            The Institution we call Abby Wood has to face up to the fact that it has been responcible for a lot of these faulty/late deliveries of kit to the armed forces and should be held accountable for those decisions that put our personnel on the front line in danger as the kit dose not do what it says on the tin. From issuing nylon uniforms that melt onto the person wearing them to ships that lose power and AFVs that are more dangerous to the people inside them that they are to the people out side of them.

            Accountability, now there is a word that puts the willys up every politician and civil servant in the country.

          • Hello Stephen, I take your word for it that oil exploration equipment is as cutting edge as much of our military kit. DE&S of course has many specialist teams (Integrated Project Teams) charged with procuring categories of kit – I have worked for the Tank Systems Support IPT for example.

            The individual services (RN/RM, British Army, RAF) do not do procurement; that is the role of DE&S. If you want the services to deal with Industry, then you will have to resource them with extra staff and train them – also, where would that leave Abbey Wood?

            I am pleased that there is soon to be a Land Equipment Industrial Strategy (that’s taken long enough to think of) which will establish and deepen links between the Army and Industry. But it doesn’t mean that the army will procure its own kit.

            At present Industry do see members of the armed forces – there are Industry Days held at ABW or at a military site like ATDU or Copehill Down FIBUA village or wherever is relevant in the run-up to a procurement project. Serving officers such as ABW Requirements Managers or PMs visit and meet with a manufacturer of interest. I regularly met with Thales staff on my last DE&S project.

            We should not blame just ABW staff for all procurement problems, but blame should be laid at the door of MoD officers and officials who have cocked up. Blame is also to be laid at the door of Industry, Politicians and the Treasury too, as appropriate.

          • We are constantly asked not the play the blame game which allows the people who are responcible for the delays/faulty equipment delivered into service/over budget being allowed to continue in that position and in a lot of cases being promoted. We should be playing the Accountability game so that the politicians/bean counters/project managers are held accountable for their decisions and are promoted/demoted accordingly there by we are promoting success not failure.

  12. How can we have so many hulls delivered when the vehicle has not even been accepted into service yet! Should they not have accepted a example first before main production started! So this is why they do not wish to cancel it…. they have already built it!

    This is just mad…

    • Meeting IOC was already tight. If they had started production build after trials they would never have made the date. This sort of thing is very normal, we are building multiple T26 and new SSBN and the first in class of these is nowhere near starting trials.

      • I can see that makes sense for a big item like a ship. However it should not be the cas for an APC or scout vehicle…. this is just wrong.

        So I build 200 rubbish vehicles even before the customer sees if they are what he asked for…. just nuts.

        • Rob, this is not a simple vehicle. It may well be the most complex AFV ever built. Trials on prototypes should have been effective, modifications made to eliminate discovered faults and then for production vehicles to have been built with Acceptance testing being thorough.

    • This is from the report. Para 62.
      62. Noise and vibration in the Ajax family of vehicles have both electrical and mechanical origins from the following broad sources:
      (a) Track, suspension and running gear, in particular the tension and sprocket design/track interface.
      (b) Engine and its mounting into the vehicle.
      (c) Quality issues associated with, but not limited to, inconsistent routing of cabling, lack of bonding and weld quality; all of which can lead to potential electromagnetic compatibility issues with communication equipment. As witnessed during trials, insecure components and bolting within the vehicle can also lead to noise and vibration, and again this was noted by ATDU crews.
      So my reading is:
      1.The hull welds and bonding ought to have been properly inspected and corrected before hulls were shipped for assembly. Doable.
      2.The track, suspension and running gear may need redesign and re-manufacture and then retesting. This could be uneconomic and/or lead to unacceptable in service delays.
      3.Ditto the engine mounting and maybe even optimising cable routing.
      3.Insecure components could be easily fixed in assembly.
      To be honest these faults look to me like they are a result of making too many modifications to an existing ( and successful) vehicle design.

      • Blimey Paul, that’s quite the list!

        Absolutely no reason all these faults couldn’t have been resolved in pre production vehicles.

        It shows multiple failings across all levels of the programme, systemic ingrained failures in fact.

        Hold the manufacturer’s feet to fire to rectify all the faults and pay the money to refurbish and maintain existing in use equipment in the meantime, obviously all at their expense.

        Quite simply, they are delivering a substandard product, not fit for service it would seem.

        When will we learn……

        • Not wishing to be reproachful but if I was GD I would be be shamefaced. What ever happened to professional pride in your work?

          • Hello Paul, If GD was trying to pull this one in the States they would be up in front of a committee being told tor rectify the problems or pay back the money already invested in the program. I just wonder why we in the UK cannot hold our defence contractors to task. It seems the MoD is woefully inept at holding contractors to budgets and time lines also quality of build.

          • There’s a few reasons, mainly because the Americans order in bulk (they would be ordering thousands), they have numerous defence contractors who are used to competitive contracts and fly offs/ drive off etc competitions, to down select a winner from a typical number of three.

            We run a tail wagging the dog procurement policy, where political considerations come first and foremost and are judged as more important than capability and actually asking the armed forces what they want.

            As a result, we always end up with an eye watering expensive and bespoke solution, procured in small numbers.

            As the sophistication and complexity of equipment increases constantly, this vicious cycle of toxic procurement policy just gets worse…

            It’s the main reason we have a reasonable defence budget, but struggle to procure anything on time and on budget…..

            The next great tax payer money pit will be Puma replacement ….. Eyes down for another bespoke UK mess…

          • Hello John, I could not agree more, but we need to change.
            Change the system and above all change the people at the top of this particular food chain, I just wonder how much of these wasted Billions end up in offshore accounts or have they got their luxury apartments already sorted in Moscow.
            Some thing is drastically wrong within the MoD we cannot keep putting it down to ineptitude if we do we are the inept ones who keep throwing good money after bad.

          • The Textron Cottonmouth being considered for the USMC looks to be developed for a very similar recon capability, all be it wheeled and amphibious.

            They are looking to buy 600, so there’s a thought, off the shelf with minimal UK mods, would be vastly cheaper tagging onto USMC orders, probably a lot lighter and air transportable too.

            It doesn’t cover the engineer and recovery versions, but buy an off the shelf option to cover those…

            Problem is, I bet GD have us by the balls with a watertight Contact…

          • Hello John, I would agree the USMC is no mug when it comes to getting kit and it our needs are similar why not jump on their band waggon after all the Ajax is about as British as the new Mini’s

          • Agreed, can we have a third and it’s motion carried!

            Perhaps the MOD should let UKDJ contributors shortlist kit;🤣🤣

            We really couldn’t do any worse than that bunch of Abbey Wood clowns ….

          • Hello Stephen, it is very rare for MoD procurement staff to have taken a bribe, almost unknown. The big money has gone in one direction, from the MoD to GDUK. I doubt many GDUK staff want to buy a dacha in Moscow. So are you suggesting that top people at the Prime are changed?
            We certainly need to understand why MoD processes have totally failed.

          • Hello Graham, the failure of an institution like the MoD normally falls into 3 category’s 1 Ineptitude, 2 Corruption or 3 deliberate intention to fail.
            I personally believe it is a combination of all 3 but which ever it is the people at the top need to go along with autocratic structure that promotes failure.

          • I was in the Army (REME) for 34 years including 2 years at DLO Andover, then left the army and spent my first 2 years of my second career at DE&S Abbey Wood. I am very surprised by what you say – I saw no corruption at Abbey Wood (in fact corruption stories were very few and far betwen, most could only recall the Foxley story from the early-80s). It is inconceivable that a military officer or civil servant at Abbey Wood would deliberately arrange for a procurement programme to fail – in your heart of hearts do you really think that ‘sabotage’ is a factor?

            That leaves ineptitude from your list – and there is certainly some of that as well as insufficient zeal – but this is true amongst politicians, the Treasury, in Defence Industry too.

            There is far more to this than a few inept bods. Do please see my earlier answer.

          • Hello Graham. Just because you did not see it that dose not mean it is not there. People do not go around with a sign on the heads saying “I am Corrupt” or ” I bat for the opposition”
            We only have to look at institutions like the BBC with its red agenda our academic institutions again with agendas that do not align them selves with the UK.
            Our so called “free speech” is being eroded from within by the very people who bang the drum of freedom with the majority of the population made to think that they are wrong to be white, straight and working class.
            Most of the UK’s institutions like Abby Wood are not fit for porpoise they simply do not do what they were design to do. So if we do not have the balls to confront these institutions then we need to grow a set and make the people who hide in these institutions “Accountable” so that they have to put their heads above the parapet.

          • Hello Stephen, I am sure you acknowledge my knowledge and experience of the MoD Procurement and support organisation. Corruption is virtually unknown at Abbey Wood, unless you definitively know different. MoD staff do not bat for the opposition or operate other than in the national interest, no matter what happens at the BBC.

            The Government has cut staff at Abbey Wood by at least 2,000 over the years. Politicians meddle. The Treasury meddles.

            I don’t disagree that many projects go wrong, especially for the complex equipments, in fact far too many. Perhaps lessons can be learned from organisations that procure complex equipments like F1 teams, NASA etc.

            Further reform is required at ABW, staff numbers must be increased, especially in project management and QA roles. I would like to see the User have a much bigger voice in decision-making, more accountability, better slicker processes that incorporate elements of the UOR process, more off the shelf purchases etc.

          • Hello Graham, I am not questioning you knowledge or experiance just your ability to see the wood in the trees!

            Abbey Wood was built to house 5000 personnel with very limited parking and no accommodation.
            There are now over 10,000 people who work at Abby Wood so only half can log onto a secure data point, as there is no accommodation and limited parking if you work at Abbey Wood you have to live close by so there tends to be limited pool of civilian workers you can choose from and is considered by a lot of the squaddie’s who are posted there as a punishment posting due to the difficulty and expense of getting accommodation in the area.

            I just feel that Abby Wood has had its day and is constantly being proved to be inept at doing what it was designed to do.
            My solution is to take away these large projects and let the military run their own projects with ex and serving members who know exactly what is needed and can work directly with industry building closer ties with the contractors so that the military are not seen as a cash cow (as it seems to be at the moment) and if civilian expertise is needed then the military can vet and hire directly paid for by the contractor for the duration of the project.
            In the past this was the tried and tested model and indeed under Admiral of the fleet Lord Fisher he pushed through the design and build of the 1st HMS Dreadnought from paper to sliding down the slipway in just a year and a day. A feet that has never been replicated.

            The British military are renowned the world over for thinking outside the box so why don’t we allow that thinking to flourish by giving them the means to run there own procurement needs.

          • Hello Stephen, your posts are always interesting. I am amazed that you say that ABW was only built for 5,000. Wikipedia says that 13,400 were on site from the early days. I certainly recall the issues about lack of living accommodation and mess facilities for serving officers and warrant officers – it was controversial at the time.

            Parking has always been a problem and it was the same at other sites such as HQ QMG/DLO Andover – the MoD naiively asssuming that junior civil servants would not have cars but would all ride to work on the bus!

            I remember hot desking when I last worked there in 2009 – 2011.

            Much is made, rightly, of the projects that go wrong – but most of the projects go well. ABW needs reform not scrapping.

            I certainly agree that the individual services should get involved in the driving seat in procurement, rather than just supplying a few officers to Abbey Wood but there would be resistance to ‘stove-piping’.

          • Abbey Wood has 5000 secure data points so can only have 5000 people working on any given day on secure project material. the other 5000+ are suppose to work from laptops but they have to be approved and controlled by IT and they simply do not have enough laptops to go around. So on any given day you will have approximatly a 3rd of the workforce unable to log on.
            You are an ex squaddie and are use to muddling through to get the job done unfortunately the majority of the workforce at Abbey Wood do not have the same mind set and go in to shut down mode if they cannot get there own desk and computer.

            The workload needs to be out sourced to end user IE the force/s who will be using that bit of kit, and by having a mix of ex and current military in charge of a project there will be a minimal increase in man power.

          • Hi Stephen, as an officer, I don’t think anyone called me a squaddie! I was last at ABW in 2011 so I’m out of date – we had hot desking then but everyone who went into work on a given day had their own seat or found a hot desk and I never heard then of IT connectivity issues.
            Your idea is ground-breaking and probably too radical with MoD who are happy with the centralisation achieved at ABW in ’96 and the saving of London office rents and then later the merger with DLO – I don’t see them wanting to give up ABW or bedding everything out with the individual services.
            But it is crazy that CGS has virtually no control over the procurement of army kit. Something has to change.

          • Sorry, most of the ex officers I have known don’t mind being called a squaddie. I was in ABW in 2016 and it was pretty grim then and the people who stayed on say it is getting worse not better.
            I do not consider myself to be a radical but I have cross decked a number of times and one thing is painfully clear the MoD has a top heavy management system (inverted triangle) while the private sector go for mean and lean management system (very shallow triangle) with direct responsibility/accountability given to the project manager so that if he/she cannot deliver you only have to change out one bod at the top of the triangle.
            Most of us understand why ABW came into service but back in the 80’s if you told the Defence minister that you were going to consolidate all the armed forces procurement under one roof you would have been deemed a radical. So we have had the experiment called Abbey Wood it is not working as planed so it time for a reset.

          • Hi Steven,

            I worked at ABW for 2 years in my first employment as a civvy after leaving the army. One of my contract periods was for 6 months as a PM.

            As a PM (and a civilian contractor) I had almost no power so had to do my work with charm and persuasion, cajoling others to do stuff. I was being paid on results during my 6-month PM stint so my project worked out well! Good job that I had an excellent boss and an excellent Prime doing the design, test and manufacture.

            It certainly made sense to create ABW as a centralised Defence Procurement Agency and the merger with DLO happened many years after it should have done.

            Seems strange that various reviews starting with the original Levene report (in Thatcher’s era) have not resulted in a near-perfect organisation by now.

            Maybe more folk should be paid by results.

          • I have worked in the civilian sector for a number of years as a PM mainly in the oil, gas and mining industries and the main factors for bringing a project in on time and in budget is accountability, realistic targets, and a financial incentive. There is no reason why the MoD cannot learn from the private sector, it needs to come into the 21st century, or as I would like to see keep the CS away from the MoD and have the military run there own procurement with subcontracted civilian personnel brought in as needed.

          • The MOD need to get with the program: less concern with value for taxpayers money and navel gazing and more concern that the purchase they are making is best in class at what it does, arrives on time and is well received by its users…who are defending us all. They need to be more assertive. If they are not confident in their skills then get trained or get a new job.

          • I do believe there are plenty of contract/project managers in the private sector that would leap at the chance of one of these contracts and would be held accountable if it went wrong not hiding behind layers of bureaucracy waiting for the next money spinner.

          • Only the MOD can fix the problem. They must change the culture so the managers you refer to want to work for them. In fairness there are signs of progress; the Type 31 program went well I thought. The MOD showed a bit of humility in accepting that they did not know the answers but trusted industry to educate them. I think we will look back on Ajax as an expensive learning exercise; sort of half way between BAE cost plus and Type 31 this is what we want and can afford; show is what you can do.

          • My personal view is that Abby wood is not fit for porpoise and should be closed and a tri service support group should take its place with current and ex service personnel at its head, if civilian expertise is needed then it should be contracted in for the duration of the project. They are then given a budget for the project so then can approach industry to set up a contract to supply, much like the USMC do on 99% of their contracts. The Service personnel know what is needed to keep their branch of the services ahead of the game so would have a direct input into the Industrial contractor making the vehicle/ship/plane making it what it needs rather that what the politicians think it needs.

          • Well indeed VFM reigns supreme. The Treasury views the UK as the last remaining colony of the British empire and always seeks to screw the maximum tax return out of the inhabitants from any onvestment. It is this puritan colonial mentality which has given us inadequate armed services, NHS, ‘intelligent’ motorway death traps and a half century delay versus Europe in electrifying our rail system.
            Happy Christmas and a good New Year!

          • In America they have projects that have gone over budget and overcharged the US Government 244 million lol

  14. Is it just me but it seems this has been blown out of all proportion. The article above says nearly everyone involved has recovered/ gone back to normal. Like most on this sight I have damaged hearing due to gunfire as will most of the soldiers involved in these trials.

    Were those affected by hearing problems tested before the program started or only afterwards?

    It sounds to me to be a “Health and safety” over reporting issue.

    As for the vibration issues the UK has some of the finest experts in vibration control in the North Sea oil industry. If they were consulted I’m sure a lot of these issues could be remedied quite cheaply.

    • “If they ( experts) were consulted I’m sure a lot of these issues could be remedied quite cheaply.”
      I have my doubts. As DJ posted above I suspect we have a 40 ton vehicle with a 25 ton engine, transmission and traction. We’re probably fcuk’d.

  15. I wonder when the faulty production line will be fixed. No point in asking the Spanish, the answer is always the same “mañana.”

  16. I think that the British MOD should have jumped onto the same bandwagon as the German army and subscribed to the project lynx IFV

  17. There has been built with that same Hull: 112 Austrian Ulan and 261 spanish Pizarro armoured vehicles without major issues. Main strutural difference with both vehicles (called ASCOD) is the AJAX turret.

  18. It is a pretty sorry tale of incompetence, wrong procurement methodology and passing all responsibility to a private contractor.

    Incompetence – you load an extra 12 to 16 tonnes on a 26 tonne vehicle , increasing the weight by 60%, obviously that is going to put tremendous pressure on the drive train and suspension, plus bolts, brackets, welding, etc – surely the designers and engineers should have allowed for that and redesigned accordingly?

    Apparently the C4 equipment alone weighs 7 tonnes, which is about the entire weight of the CVR(T) Scimitar! Apparently also, GD argued against the CT40/Konisberg because it was so much heavier than the original 30mm Mauser cannon.

    Wrong procurement methodology – everyone else builds and tests prototypes before ordering production, the US for one is pretty rigorous about having competitive trials and disecting the results, before awarding s contract.

    We seem to have sailed into Ajax with a minimum of this and, when the problems started to emerge, it looks like the procurement arm resolutely swept the issues under the carpet for the best part of 3 years.

    Passing the parcel – The old Defence Procurement Agency was no great shakes, but the Defence Equipment & Support agency which replaced it looks entirely unfit for purpose. They are responsible for all tri-service procurement and are the guys that brought us such great success stories as T45, Warrior CSP, Astute and now Ajax.

    A look at their rather self-congratulatory website still has this, which should be framed:

    ”The Ajax programme is the biggest project of its type for 30 years. DE&S teams, working hand-in-hand with the British Army and industry, are turning these impressive plans into reality.’

    Some reality, a long way from impressive.

    I think that what has happened here is that they have been cut from 28,000 civvies and service personnel to about 11,000 and no longer have the in-house engineering and project management skills the old DPA did.

    It looks too that the cost-saving in numbers was prognosticated on passing the responsibilities on to private industry, with DE&S reduced to being paper-pushers and ‘managers’, in the same way that so much of the services’ support has been privatised, with pretty unimpressive results.

    Nothing else explains how GD got away with mass producing the hulls while failing to understand, admit or rectify the serious underlying issues.

    Where does the buck stop? – It should be squarely with DE&S, they after all are in charge of procurement and the individual services have little control over things once DE&S take over.

    Quin himself is Minister for Defence procurement. Some guys there need fired to set an example and the Minister should walk too.

    But I fear the procurement process, based on this aloof organisation, is doomed to repeated failures, because reliance on private manufacturers to mark their own homework, without tight technical overview, is not the way to do things.

    • All good points. Very few military personnel in DE&S. Masive cuts to DGDQA over the last few years – they do not have the manpower to embed staff permanently with the Primes as they used to.

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