South Yorkshire-based MTL Advanced has been chosen to supply armoured steel for the production of the UK MoD’s Boxer Armoured Vehicle Programme, under a £-multi-million, multi-year contract awarded jointly by WFEL and parent company KMW.

The armoured material will be used in the Boxer vehicle hull assembly, which will be fabricated at WFEL’s specialist ‘Manufacturing Centre of Excellence’ in Stockport.

“MTL Advanced have invested in excess of £2m in new capital equipment to help support this project and meet increased demand. The new investments have been spread around the various manufacturing cells of the Rotherham business, to provide an enhancement in capacity, in line with the production schedules for the UK Boxer vehicles contract.

In a major boost to the local community, this contract award has contributed to the creation of 30 new jobs at MTL Advanced, who have also welcomed 12 new Apprentices to their Engineering & Welding Apprentice Academy during September 2021, demonstrating MTL’s on-going commitment to train the next generation of Engineers. MTL Advanced says that investing in the next generation of talented engineers is critical to their ongoing success.”

MTL Advanced General Manager, Karl Stewart, said:

“We are really excited to have been awarded this major contract, which will give us the opportunity to work in partnership with WFEL and KMW on such an important UK Defence project. We look forward to engaging closely with WFEL and KMW’s engineering teams and leveraging our armour manufacturing expertise to help make this Boxer Vehicle programme a great success for the British Army.”

You can read more from WFEL on this here.

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

131 COMMENTS

  1. Just a question. Could we not just get Boxer vehicles to undertake all roles that Warrior and Ajax are designed for? Scrap both Ajax (get a refund because its not viable) and get Boxer in multiple versions. Scout, fire support, recon, command, ambulance, mortar carrier etc etc. Im confused why the Army are wasting billions on multiple platforms when we could have just one with commanality of repair, spare parts etc.

      • Dave,
        I get my information from MoD and HCDC releases. They are highly damning of the vehicle.

        What do those working on AJAX actually say? That there are no noise and vibration issues? That such problems are minor and can be fixed in a few days for a few pence? That several hundred trials personnel have not had noise induced hearling loss? Do they say why it is nearly 5 years late in achieving ISD?

        • Apparently several hundred trials on personnel is BS and the guy I know involved in the project says warrior and CH2 are not far off the noise levels apparently they are working on the head gear to reduce the problem , vibrations I’m not sure what they doing to solve that , so that will be the main issue I should think. My understanding is don’t expect Ajax to get cancelled any time soon.

          • Unfortunately with occupational injury it can be a small margin that makes the difference, the vibration levels between to vehicles could be minor, but if it tips over to the damaging level to the occupants then it’s a bit irrelevant that it’s a small difference.

          • How do noise levels in Ajax compare with older service vehicles I wonder. Are they really noisier than WW2 era machines or a Chieftain?

          • The track links don’t clang on challengers sprockets and it has hydro gas suspension, the ajax has old fashion torsion bars which you would only use because they are cheap -boosting profits! Suggest you pop down to the test track viewing area at Bovington to hear it yourself before you pass judgment ?

          • Does the fact that it’s as bad as Chally 2 make it acceptable 40 later? If your not the poor beggar riding in it, anything is OK.
            But, my personal opinion, as someone who has ridden in both Warrior, and its twice as expensive Ascod , I’d prefer the Warrior and spend the billions saved on better weapons, why pump money into Europe, when we’ve left it, and USA when we’re only allies till they decide otherwise

          • I suspect they only started trying to solve it once it made it to the media, and now they are haggling over who pays what and what’s in the statement about how it went wrong.

          • ? What did I say was easy? Nothing about Ajax’s vibration problems have been or will be easy to fix.

        • Graham,
          Whilst you are correct in saying that the HCDC report is not too complementary about the current state of the AJAX noise and vibe issues, it is much more scathing in it’s wording regarding the MOD’s management of the programme. In the HCDC report the numbers of troops described as suffering hearing issues is broken down quite precisely and if I recall correctly there were only 5 or 6 personnel with permanent damage which may or may not be attributable to working on or near AJAX. IOC is currently on hold due to the MODs moratorium on trials. GD have supplied the necessary number of platforms to the first unit.

          • Ian, you are a very optimistic and positive fellow!

            The HCDC report criticised everyone (not by name of course) and every organisation connected with the Ajax debacle, including MoD staff, as you say. MoD programme management has been lamentable, but then so too has the performance of MinDP (disinterested until it was too late) and the manufacturer. The only people who come out of this well is the army trials unit, especially the CO.

            I too understand that GDUK has supplied a (small) number of Aries variants to MoD and they seem to have been accepted, but I don’t know if they have been issued to the army’s training organisation yet.

            I would not like to be one of the 5 or 6 soldiers who have been trialling Ajax, who have permanent hearing damage. There is nothing apart from close proximity to a moving Ajax that would have caused such hearing damage, unless they were all also standing next to an AS90 when it fired, without hearing protection.

          • Hi Graham, the 5-6 guys have been working in/ next to/ around AFV’s of all types so it’s a sweeping statement to say “There is nothing apart from close proximity to a moving Ajax that would have caused such hearing damage,”. Funnily enough, a moving AJAX is surprisingly quiet, even at speed. On concrete it’s a tad rattly, but cross country, from the front it’s very quiet, as per the MOD requirements.

          • Thanks Ian, I spent a fair bit of time with AFVs but never heard of permanent hearing loss due to the in-service AFVs, hence my comment.
            The Noise Induced Hearing loss in this case (Ajax) seems to be from a defect in the headphones, which picks up engine noise and magnifies it, so I heard. I also heard these were noise-cancelling headphones – so engine noise should have been cancelled, not magnified. The info is all over the place.

      • Too much noise, size and weight for reccy vehicle and not air portable. The Aries at Bovington is louder then CR2 when being marshalled out of ATDU. Final drive sprockets clang as links pass over them, how’s shot detection supposed to work?

        • ARES doesn’t have “Shot detection”.
          Any tracked vehicle driving on dry concrete will “sprag” when making sharp turns at slow speeds.
          AJAX is airportable (admittedly after removal of armour packs)

          • Without the armour packs, you might just be able to transport one Ajax in a A400M – or very easily transport two in a C-17.

            We don’t routinely fly such heavy vehicles in AT though as it would take so many sorties to move a significant number.

            I struggle to recall seeing a photo of any British AFV being flown into Theatre.

          • Graham, you’re correct. It would be a monumental task and waste of valuable resources to airlift armour to a conflict, however, that’s what the MOD wanted. RORO is the way.

      • Hardly a disinterested opinion then? My personal experience is that it wasn’t the best vehicle offered, but MOD were peeved with BAES attitude and would have bought Reliant Robins rather than deal with Smug Smug and Smugger.
        ASCOD as was was mundane at its best, by the time it was altered, it became a buggers muddle.
        Its badly built before it gets here, and all The Taffia can do is polish the turd

    • I suspect it will come down to just how bad the issues really are and whether they are fixable within a sensible budget.

      The issue is the last thing we want is for them to go from Ajax to Boxer, as you can guarantee they wont’ order another equiv number and will use it as an excuse to cut numbers.

      Same thing appears to have happened with warrior, there was no annoucement of extra boxers being ordered, just that they will be used instead.

    • That would be too easy, too sensible and not waste enough tax payer money…

      Maybe we just give up on armored vehicles and mount our army on horseback…

    • Because when Ajax and Warrior CSP were ordered we were to have both Armoured and Strike Brigades.

      Now, with the latest cuts, they are in effect merged.

      Boxer came after Ajax and Warrior / Ch3.

      Why did the army not get the tracked element fixed before rushing off and deciding on Boxer AS WELL as the other programmes? Without the money to do all properly?

      Boxer is a bigger issue than people realize.
      Not the vehicle. The billions spent ordering it.

      • Daniele, for me the problem is that we have sourced vehicles for both Strike and Armoured roles, then cut the Strike concept but kept some of the vehicles and stuffed them into the armoured role. This is effectively the worst of both worlds.

        With such a small army we should concentrate on doing one or the other properly. That means either doing:
        A. Armoured (Challenger 3, a tracked IFV, tracked 155 SPG, GMLRS, a tracked recce vehicle & a tracked utility vehicle.
        B. Wheeled light armoured (everything on Boxer with IFV, 155 SPG, HIMARS, recce & utility variants – maybe a 105mm light tank version too).
        Mixing vehicles between the two roles means the heavy armoured option isn’t really heavy and the light armoured option isn’t really light.

        Personally I’d go with the heavy option since in the worst case scenario this has significantly more firepower and survivability. Also, and people don’t mention this much, Boxer, especially the turreted versions seem to have a very high silhouette for such a lightly armoured vehicle.

        • Pretty much what I briefly outlined, Rob.

          The 2010 SDSR bet heavily on your option A.

          2015 SDSR watered that down, by way of a cut, to include Option B.

          People forget up to then there were also 2 “deployable” Infantry Brigades in 1 ( UK ) Div, in that regular CS/CSS for them existed.

          The army/HMG COULD have put Strike into them and kept the 3 AI Bdes. Nope. They cut 1 Armd Inf Bde, a process still in progress.

          Mixing the two is a despairing attempt by the army to salvage some sort of brigades out of the mess.

        • Have we cut the strike concept? – its not been around that long. I accept that we no longer have brigades called strike brigades.
          Problem is no-one really ever even defined the word strike, let alone developed a CONOPs.
          I have my own definition of strike – essentially the destruction of high value enemy targets (eg. medium and heavy armour, arty and strongpoints) – and I think we still need to do it.

          We have always had a golf bag of capabilities – eg. back in the day we had armoured infantry (WR), mechanised infantry (Saxon) and Lt role infantry (soft-skinned trucks and LRs).

          It is not a good idea to go to a single construct – we need our army to be flexible. If you have only a B type army with wheeled light armour, you will not cut it against heavy forces. If you only have heavy, you won’t have very much kit and will be numerically too weak and will be poorly configured against a light enemy.

          • Good spot. Strike is something you do; its not a permanent structure. Whatever assets you use to strike must be able to do other things. The failure of the Warrior upgrade is a blessing in disguise. But Ajax with its 40mm CTA must work.

          • Hi Paul, I am not sure why it is a good thing to fail to upgrade Warrior, let it further lose capability over several years, then scrap it. We will lose a very effective IFV for the armoured infantry, that is an excellent ‘partner’ for Challenger.

            What replaces it? Boxer, which is unlikely to have as good mobility (especially in mud and snow) and I doubt each one (if any) will have a 40mm stabilised cannon.

            Apart from anything else a new Boxer (hopefully with turret and cannon) will surely cost far more than a WCSP upgrade.
            So we will pay a lot of money to give the armoured (or mechanised?) infantry a vehicle with less mobility and firepower.I woudl call that another procurement cock-up.

            Ajax, being a recce vehicle, is a different matter. I wish we had not bought this vehicle from that manufacturer. But, you are right – it must work.

          • Hi Graham, not arguing the procurement debacle or the WCSP screw up; and as a layman am not going go argue tracks vs wheels etc, And agree there will be less money but…let’s assume Ajax can be made to work and that its the only vehicle which can mount the CTA 40mm. Some thoughts…we have bought over 500 of these cannons; that’s 500 light tanks / reconnaissance / APC gunfire support go anywhere vehicles whose cannon can defeat a T72. One question I have ( my ignorance) is why so we need both Ares and Boxer; aren’t these both APCs? I’m assuming that in the same way you can have a mortar and an ATGM version of Boxer you could have equivalent ARES versions. Also if the OAs demonstrate that you can create a ‘logical IFV’ by pairing up an Ajax with an APC why would that not work?
            Just trying to see this glass as half full. Cheers..

          • A demonstrator ARES equipped with Brimstone (I think) has been shown by GD. BTW, ARES is not an APC in the traditional sense as it carries only 4 dismounts.

          • Interesting about Brimstone; thx. I confess I was being lazy. Did some research and found as you say that Ares carries only 4 dismounts. So that clarifies things. Boxer is the only candidate we have to replace Warrior in the IVF role. Their are several 30mm turreted versions on the market. But JWF posts below that OA’s say that Boxer doesn’t work as an IVF even with a cannon. So unless we buy another proven IVF we have only one option; to create the functionality of an IVF by combining Ajax and Boxers; which the OAs say does work,

          • Ian,

            Good, detailed info on Ares is hard to find.

            This article says that Ares carries 7 dismounts (plus crew of 3)
            http://www.military-today.com/apc/ares.htm

            Under the FRES programme a vehicle was postulated to replace Spartan and that would have only 4 dismounts, but of course FRES was cancelled and all the money channeled into the CV(F) programme (allegedly).

          • Hi Graham, just read the article. Badly written, full of factual errors or inconsistencies and not even spell checked. No wonder some people are misinformed.

          • Hi Ian, thanks for that. So it is 4 dismounts then? I wonder why there are not seats for more dismounts given that it is a Warrior size vehicle. I wonder what is taking up the rest of the space inside an Ares.

          • The space is taken up by all of the garbage that British Squaddies like to hang from the outside of an AFV, stored in racks inside, plus an awful lot of “other kit”.

          • The change in length meant fewer dismounts. And since Warrior was rarely full its almost understandable..but there’s never too much room for extra kit.Uparmour of Cvrt was designed to provide at least as much stowage as efore, and the turret cage mod on Warrior gave an additional 10 cubic feet of stowage internally
            BTW, an external turret mounted fire extinguisher was offered to MOD for Warrior in Iraq. Costing less than 5 quid, rejected because of the cost of extra fire extinguisher..anyone remember the photo of the soldier bailing out of a burning turret?

          • Phil, I don’t follow your comment about ‘the change in length’.
            Warrior is 6.3m long by 3.03m wide and takes 7 dismounts in the back. Ares is bigger at L7.62m x W3.35m, but can only take 4 dismounts. Why?

          • Golden rule of defence buying.
            Like with cats, if you give it a name you HAVE TO BUY IT
            TRACER, Fres Mrcv ..Ascod even. But now its got a name, its like killing a kitten

          • Ares is the APC version of Ajax and is non-turreted and is intended for small specialist teams such as engineer recce, anti-tank teams etc.
            It is not being bought for the infantry as their main APC.

          • Warrior suffered greatly over last ten years with poor quality work and poor quality parts via DSG and Babcock,
            The push for price reductions meant buying non compliant parts and carrying out unapproved, even condemned repairs. They even shot blasted wheel nuts to avoid buying new ones on major overhauls. The WCSP was a good deal, again animosity to BAES meant our Allies got the contract,
            But she has life in her yet

          • Thanks Phil. As an ex-REME man I am disappointed with all that you say. Our Allies got the WCSP contract? Who?
            WCSP was terminated – which means Warrior is terminated.

          • Graham. Yes they have cut the two strike Bdes. The original CONOPs was that the 2 Bdes would be light armoured wheeled formations that could deploy rapidly, if necessary by driving directly to the area of operations to produce immediate affect, thus the term strike (which is an awful, misleading Americanism).

          • Thanks Rob. It is ridiculous to incorporate Americanisms in to British military use, thus we have ‘Line of Departure (instead of ‘Start Line), ‘fires’ (instead of ‘artillery support’), and Rivet Joint (instead of Airseeker) – to name but a few.

            However I recall seeing the word ‘strike’ in British use years ago. I seem to remember the ‘Find, Fix, Strike’ mantra from my army days 15 or more years ago.

            Strike in a modern context, though, needs defining – as said I have had to produce my own definition as I can’t find a MoD one.

            Clearly Strike will be done by the Deep Recce Strike BCT.

        • Why does everything have to be tracked. The logistics are horrendous. If the Finn’s are happy to use 8×8 to navigate snowy terrain then we don’t need everything tracked.
          Boxer never should have been cut to begin with its cost us billions in wasted UOR’s. It’s too big to be a scout vehicle but then so is Ajax. Had we not pissed away 7bn in failed procurement decisions we could have had 600 boxer delivered from 2011, selected bae to deliver warrior LEP from 2016, teamed up with the French for Griffon MRVP and Jaguar Scout and had money for C3 and long range precision and indirect fire support to take us to 2030.

        • Forgive me, but Boxer when I worked on it 30 years ago was protected against stuff like 30mm apfsds, this may have changed/ been improved by age. But Ajax is almost as tall as Boxer and its supposed to replace Scimitar. Which could stack 2 high and be lower

    • The issue is that Boxer can’t do IFV even with a cannon. There have been operational assessments and it doesn’t work. However these same OAs say Ajax used as a light-tank (so-called medium armour), working with Boxer APCs can provide the same capability. So in this scenario each Boxer platoon will have 2-4 Ajax attached as Fire Support Vehicles. Thus 2 Ajax regiments will be used a Medium Armour with the Armoured BCTs and the other 2 as Armoured Cavalry with the DRS BCT, directing deep fires. https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FH4dcf5XoAUDOMJ?format=jpg&name=4096×4096

      • When were these tests carried out and what was the reason given?
        I was under the impression that it could? Very interesting.

        4th August 2021

        “This is the first time that the Boxer has been seen with the RT60 turret integrated offering a capable IFV Boxer variant. (Photo: Kongsberg)”

        • What else to do with 4 regiments worth of tracked vehicles at around 5 billion in an army that wants to be lighter and more wheeled!

          • I knew you’d be happy Daniele. 😂
            As I’ve written before, indecision is the signature characteristic of the British psyche. you just have to love it. If the OAs say it works then I’m good, What I’m missing now is a Boxer variant for AA, Can the Ajax 40mm do that?

          • No idea.

            RA expansion should include a SHORAD Regiment with AA vehicle mounted guns.

            RA expansion should include a Precision Fires Regiment with Brimstone, mounted on Boxer / or tracked vehicles.

            RA expansion should include a MRAD Regiment to augment Starstreak/Sceptre.

            RA expansion should include a HIMARS type Regiment.

            That is 4 regiments, get the headcount from cutting a few cap badges!

            RA should be priority to expand firepower across the board.

            Instead, we have talk of a future ER CAMM, and a handful of GMLRS which will be upgraded after all with the new longer range rockets being procured. Good, but window dressing to what is needed.

            The expansion in the GMLRS long range fires comes at the expense of a conventional RA gun regiment.

            That is not expansion. it is moving the goalposts.

            So far HMG/Army, your Future Soldier is the usual glossy brochure full of spin and “new” that is not new at all.

      • James,
        I would love to see those operational assessments – are any ‘Open Source’?

        So we move from an AI Platoon of 4 Warriors (that would/should be upgraded with WCSP), to a Mech Inf Platoon of 4 Boxers plus 2-4 Ajax. So many disadvantages (all of them serious) and absolutely no advantages.

    • If you look back to the 1950s/ 60’s the UK army relied heavily on a single-wheeled platform called, Saladin FV601, and its sister Saracen. Tracked armour started with FV432 before most wheeled armour was phased out. Today, Boxer appears to be as flexible as the FV601, so why not expand the fleet to replace some if not all tracked vehicles? The burning question of wheeled V tracked appears to be fuzzy, however, the Ajax plans do avoid reliance on just one traction system?

    • Boxer is a really big vehicle to do recce (by stealth) from. Recce troops are well forward and need to have outstanding mobility as they are out on a limb – not sure a wheeled vehicle will be as good in snow and claggy mud as a tracked vehicle. It would take time to develop a recce vehicle from Boxer, time we don’t have.

      • Can’t be any worse than Ajax, which is a very big vehicle weighing 40 tons and deafeningly loud. But yes you’re right it wouldn’t be suitable either. Realisticly we need something small and tracked on the same lines as CVRT but more up to date.

        • I’d love to know where some posters on here get their information from. Alexander, you state that AJAX is “deafeningly loud”. Is this from personal experience, scientific data, do you drive it or crew it? Or, do you watch it at the public viewing point at the all weather track in Bovvy?
          cheers

        • I think that British cavalry officers were perhaps biased by the American experience with Bradley CFV during the TRACER programme and became convinced of the idea of a large replacement for Scimitar.

          To me it is crazy to go from a 8t recce vehicle that epitomises the British ‘recce by stealth’ approach to a big and tall, badly built, noisy, massively expensive 40t behemoth that injures its crew, has limited airportability, might lose tactical mobility due to weak bridges/culverts – and is many years late into service.

          Just can’t find anything good to say about Ajax.

          • Oh, now come on Graham, be fair. The behemoth is a direct result of MOD requirements, has a fully digital architecture that is light years ahead of a CVRT equipped with M-SPIRE, is much better protected than any other vehicle in it’s class and can “see” a sparrow at 10kms. See, good things!

          • Thanks Ian. I think the Combat Development and the Requirements guys got a bit over-excited and gold-plated the requirement. Looks like it’s ‘fools gold’ they used. The concept with CVR(T) was that if you recce by stealth and do it well, you won’t be seen and won’t be engaged, so you don’t need 40 tonnes of armour to protect you.

            Those sparrows better watch out when this thing finally gets into service!

    • Has a lot of logic on paper but experience in conflict can surely so often be different to that perceived beforehand so surely some flexibility between options is preferable I would say. The balance needs to be right though and that’s where budgetary restraints effect desirable decisions adversely for the most part though, as alluded to elsewhere sometimes necessity creates a better more focused choice even than so called experts, though wouldn’t want to rely on it even when the MoD is involved.

    • Mark ,
      thanks for that, the foreward to that doc says it all:
      Summary
      The recent history of the British Army’s armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) capability is deplorable. Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the Army’s AFV fleets have been characterised by increasing obsolescence and decreasing numbers. In 1990 the UK had around 1,200 main battle tanks in its inventory, today has 227, and those that remain are in urgent need of modernisation.

      The perceived loss of a challenging but known threat in the form of the armoured forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact meant the British Army has struggled to re-define its role. Since at least the 1990s it has tried to move to more deployable, medium-weight armoured forces, suitable for expeditionary warfare against unforeseeable opponents. However, indecision around requirements, a desire to have the latest (immature) technology, operational experience and a lack of stable funding for its programmes mean the British Army’s AFV fleet currently faces mass obsolescence and requires significant funding for modernisation. At the same time the UK is reviewing its future defence and security posture and what this means for traditional military capabilities. Therefore, the Army’s AFV programmes and capability is now vulnerable when weighed against the desire to fund other priorities such as ‘cyber’, information warfare and other capabilities.

      We are astonished that between 1997 and late 2020 (with the exception of a small number or armoured engineering and Viking protected mobility vehicles) the Department has not delivered a single new armoured vehicle from the core procurement programme into operational service with the Army. It is clear that the Ministry of Defence’s armoured vehicles programme requires independent scrutiny. We ask the National Audit Office to revisit this issue.
      
      The delayed Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review (at time of writing scheduled for publication in March 2021) is expected to make a number of significant decisions about the UK’s defence posture and the capabilities it requires to meet this. These have been characterised as being about the need to reduce or remove ‘sunset’ (or industrial-era) capabilities and replace them with ‘sunrise’ (or information-era) alternatives. There has been much speculation about what this means for the Army’s AFV capability, notably the Challenger 2 main battle tank and the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle. Both vehicles have been in service for decades without meaningful upgrades and are both awaiting decisions about modernisation programmes.

      In 2015 the Ministry of Defence outlined the requirement for a warfighting division that by 2025 could be deployed to assist NATO in the event of conflict on its Eastern borders. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 highlighted that NATO (and the UK) still face a potential threat from a challenging peer adversary state that retained considerable armoured forces which were being modernised at pace. The UK division was to draw on a number of capabilities but its core would have been two armoured infantry brigades and a new strike brigade, alongside 16 Air Assault brigade.

      If the Integrated Review concludes that the Ministry of Defence and the British Army are to retain a heavy armoured capability it is clear that they must learn the hard lessons from recent history, and these are spelled out in the rest of this report. Furthermore, to support this capability the UK requires an industrial base. The current procurement and upgrade programmes have led to new investment in skills and production facilities. To sustain this regrowth in what was a decaying sector, the Ministry of Defence (and wider government) must provide greater certainty about future requirements and possible contracts. The proposal to develop a Land Industrial Strategy is a welcome step in this direction.

      In the course of this inquiry, it emerged that the Army will be unable to field its warfighting division as planned, reducing it by one Armoured Infantry brigade. This was apparently due to a lack of resources. In addition, the Army is deficient in important capabilities such as artillery and air defence. We heard evidence from witnesses that, despite assurances from the Ministry of Defence, it is possible that such a reduced UK division could be ‘overmatched’ (i.e. defeated) by its Russian armoured counterpart. This assessment was based on the assumption that current in-service vehicles would be upgraded or replaced, which as this report shows, is a matter of some uncertainty. It appears that the UK’s armoured forces are at very serious risk of being both quantitively and qualitatively outmatched by potential peer adversaries.

      This report reveals a woeful story of bureaucratic procrastination, military indecision, financial mismanagement and general ineptitude, which have continually bedevilled attempts to properly re-equip the British Army over the last two decades. Even on the MoD’s own current plans, (but subject to the Integrated Review) we are still some four years away from even being able to field a “warfighting division”, which, itself, would now be hopelessly under-equipped and denuded of even a third combat brigade.
      
      As a result, were the British Army to have to fight a peer adversary – a euphemism for Russia – in Eastern Europe in the next few years, whist our soldiers would undoubtedly remain amongst the finest in the world, they would, disgracefully, be forced to go into battle in a combination of obsolescent or even obsolete armoured vehicles, most of them at least 30 years old or more, with poor mechanical reliability, very heavily outgunned by more modern missile and artillery systems and chronically lacking in adequate air defence. They would have only a handful of long-delayed, new generation vehicles, gradually trickling into the inventory, to replace them.

      • And that sums it up very nicely indeed, reduced to a token force.
        Shameful and people wonder why it’s soo difficult to get the younger generation to sign up? Obsolete equipment, fitted for but not with the list goes on and on.

      • First question is where did the money go from the 23 Years without any delivery? Was it cut at the start and has not been returned? Was it moved to other procurement stuff?
        They need a very honest talk with mod and parliament to say we messed up for last 20 years and now if we are to have an armoured division we need this many tanks. This in turn means we need this many ifv’s, recce vehicles, artillery, air defence etc etc. With this we can deploy a fighting division of this many soldiers. Also show what would happen with over funding and underfunding.
        Basically the army needs 25 years worth of vehicles. That’s going to cost a fair bit. I can’t see any other way of doing it. Unless they ditch the heavy vehicles and it’s all man and light vehicle deployable missiles with a small amount of truck artillery and air defence.
        We are where we are. If typhoon had somehow failed badly the raf would have to of said we need extra money to get some aircraft please.

        • The problem is the Army have pissed away the last 25 years worth of AFV budget. The RAF and RN are not going to agree to pay the price for the Army’s flip ups. Why should they ?

          • Hi David,

            “The Army have pissed away the last 25 years worth of AFV budget.”

            Sums it well – sadly. The problem is the secondary impact of that is that the UK has lost its AFV industrial base as a result of the foul ups and with our historical AFV customers have gone over to other suppliers. In effect, we do not have a creditable AFV stance anymore, not for a tier one military power.

            Some progress on rebuilding the industrial base is being made but it is struggling to deliver. It was the same with the SSN programme, but in this case the country has lost an entire generation of AFV engineering experience. Full regeneration will take decades. As I have said often enough, it takes 15 years to train an engineer and give them the minimum experience they need to achieve (sub) team leadership capabilities. Chief design engineers take even longer, or they used to.

            We are going to have to work in partnership with allies to rebuild the capability, both with in industry and the army. In the meantime we need to build and exploit on areas where we excel. For example, we could use specialist capabilities such as small and medium precision missiles such as Martlet, CAMM and Brimstone derivatives and the supporting ISTAR and C2 technology developed for the RN / RAF as the basis for vehicle mounted precision fires systems (including autonomous vehicles). This would give the Army and UK industry niche capabilities around which expertise could be developed. A tracked missile system still has tracks, so experience gained could read across into future AFV, for example.

            Upgrading Challenger is another way to redevelop the industrial base, but industry will need early view of long term plans so they can develop their own investment plans with confidence. That means some discipline needs to be brought to bare on the requirements and through life sustainment and development of equipment. No more changing the requirements every two years during the development cycle of a new system…

            We know what is wrong, but it appears we still wait for the Land Industrial Strategy which in turn ‘should’ advise the formulation of a detailed plan to fix it. Strategies are vital but they are, relatively speaking, the easy bit. The detailed plan is far more difficult and the government needs to decide what it wants from the Army over the next 20 to 30 years! The Army then needs to understand what it needs to do the job.

            Next comes detailed equipment, recruitment, sustainment, basing and housing and infrastructure plans all of which need to be consistant and mutually supportive. Frankly, I cannot see the Army being able to meet its NATO obligations without expansion at some point in the future. The next round of cuts have to be the last, but the Army needs to understand that it has to be responsible with taxpayer money or face more pain (I sense cuts are being used as some kind of punishment…).

            Meanwhile, the Army’s equipment becomes increasingly decrepit. We risk being end up with just two effective armed services a la 1940, at least when considered against a peer enemy in Eastern Europe.

            Cheers CR

          • You make perfect sense in my opinion except on 1 point. The Army isn’t being punished with a smaller headcount. There are 2 parts of Army spending wholly within the Armys control. Manpower and equipment. If it needs to spend a bigger % of it’s budget on one then it must spend a smaller % on the other. The disasters of the last 25 years means the Army has to catch up on AFV procurement and that will not be cheap even they manage it brilliantly. Admittedly recruitment has been affected by the end of the war in Afghan as well but that’s not within the Army’s control. On long-term planning for equipment and industrial strategy I couldn’t agree more but I am extremely dubious that the Army has the collective intellect to implement it. Your summary of where the Army is is both shocking and spot on.

          • I don’t think the raf or navy will have to pay for the army mistakes. It would have to be extra money. As a multi year one off kind of thing. Go to Rheinmetall and ask for help to make lynx ifv, artillery guns, challenger upgrade etc put together in the uk. Then over the next few years try and make more of the parts in the uk that can be made easily without massive cost increases. Get research teams to look at improving and developing designs. Or Bae or suitable company.
            It may cost but it’s the only way out this mess. It has to have a steady drumbeat for next 30 years etc to make it work and to make development possible. If there are enough vehicles for 2 companies then great.
            Or it’s mostly buy foreign from now on unless we have the tech in this country. If we don’t buy things here why would anyone research the tech.
            What a mess.
            And the army must stop messing about with designs. Almost every complicated thing they touch has been a shambles. Watch keeper, Ajax, warrior upgrade, fres, bowman, etc etc. The list goes on and on.

          • The forces have just had and are having a big increase in the budget over the next few years. One that was not popular anywhere in Whitehall outside of 10 Downing Street. There’s not going to be another one at least this decade thanks to Covid.

      • Well chosen words, although a minor point is that I am sure we did not have 1,200 tanks in 1990 – maybe they are adding in tank variants. No matter. Since that piece was written we are of course heading down to just 148 tanks (albeit modernised CR3s).

        That statement that between 1997 and 2020 there has been no armoured vehicles delivered into core, less Viking and Trojan/Titan is damning. Pretty much like saying the RN had received no warfighting ships or submarines over that time. Yet no-one important made a fuss at the time. Also the lack of major upgrades for complex AFVs over that time is astonishing.

        I also hear the target to field a warfighting division has quietly slipped from 2025 to 2030 – and will that be a 2-brigade div or a full div? Seems a long time ago that we had a warfighting Corps of 4 armoured divisions in Germany and a division-equivalent of light roled infantry on ops in Northern Ireland – plus other units in GB and ROW.

  2. Whichever way you look at it we are now planning to have Challenger 2.5 for what purpose exactly; tracked Ajax at huge expense to go (?) with wheeled Boxer with pop gun to be deployed where? Add in virtually no ATGM or AA support and a complete lack of FIRES support of a modern long range type for at least ten years and I would say that the army is in the manure.
    Think what we could have spent this money on. More Apache; increased medium lift, more transport planes or we could have kept the Herky Birds, improved light weapons for all, not just the Rangers….A true Light Army that with the Marines could have intervened anywhere in the world The only time we have used heavy armour and massed infantry in the last seventy years is in two wars we didn’t want to fight. Will we never learn?

    • They do appear to be in the manure and struggling to find reverse.
      I did see a challenger tank in Iraq after 2003.

    • fair assessment Geoff

      It all starts with the organisation, what do we want from the Army

      1. Home Force (20%)
      2. Northern Flank (20%)
      3. Central European Heavy Armour (25%)
      4. Commonwealth (10%)
      5. Ceremonial (5%)
      6. Peacekeeping / constabulary (10%)
      7. Special Forces (10%)

      If the above is accurate, then we need to decided who and what we need to deliver.

      Royal Marines (14.8k personnel – 3 Bgdes of 4.8k + 400 Staff)

      • Northern Flank -Tracked Light – CV90, Ripsaw, Viking, Bronco etc.

      Army (65.2k personnel (7 divisions of 9.2k personnel +800 Staff)

      1. Div Home Force – Wheeled – Jaguar, Foxhound, Boxer, HX3
      2. Div BEF – Jaguar, Foxhound, Boxer, HX3
      3. Div Central Europe, Heavy Armour – all tracked (Merkava 4?)
      4. Div 16ABB + Ranger + SFG – Whatever they want…
      5. Support Division (reuse current estate)
      6. Support Division (reuse current estate)
      7. HQ (reuse current estate)
      8. Staff (800)

      So you can see from above I would increase the size of the RM (double it) and hand over the northern flank to the RN/RM fully, leaving the army everything else

      What then becomes clear is the type of vehicles we can have, with one exception.

      From a NATO perspective surely its good to have the UK as a reserve force as we are ideally place to reinforce either the northern or Central European zones.

      If this is the case then an all wheeled force would be best for the Army backed up by a large volume of helicopters and combat aircraft (something we are woefully short of). Additionally we need a ballistic missile defence shield for the UK to ensure these reserves are not taken out in a first strike.

      So accepting we are sticking with Boxer – the current order needs to be changed now to ensure all are either Fires or IFV’s (with CTA & ATW as per the Franch Jaguar that is costing 25% of these), with our fleet of Jackals, Buffalos, Foxhounds etc taking on the roles set out for the currently ordered boxer fleet.

      Lastly, the Army should really partner with the IDF, as they have some excellent equipment that is relatively cheap and really innovative with a view to setting up a UK manufacturing capability and shared stockpiles. it also has to work so we can gain a lot from partnering with them

        • Hi graham, it’s my own I am afraid.

          I have done more work on it I part as a response to another thread on UKDJ about the size of the army and the ongoing conundrum of how to deliver everything and have come up with the following

          1. Double the size of the RM and integrate into a UK land force
          2. Quadruple the royal armoured corps to provide full mechanised capability across the whole force.
          3. Each division has 18 battalions of 400 people split into 5 companies of 80) with an all arms regiment being circa 1280 personnel.
          4. All AAC to move under RAF with RAF restructuring to provide each combat division 2400 personnel and agreed aircraft mix.
          5. The whole force will be 11 small Divisions of 7200 personnel and a staff of 880 for a grand total of 80,080 (Inc. current RMC)

          From my perspective it’s the only way to deliver what HMG wants in terms of capability and reach whilst ensuring our troops have over match

          1 x Heavy Armour Div – Central Europe
          2 x Strike Div – home force / BEF
          1 x Airbourne Div – Rapid Reaction Force
          1 x Royal Marine Mountain Div – Northern Flank
          1 x Royal Marine Maritime Force – current RM maritime duties.
          1 x SFG with Ranger Force Special Forces
          3 x Combat Support and logistics Groups
          1 x HQ

          In each of the combat division there is a further breakdown which includes 1600 infantry, 400 C4istar, 400 Fires, 2400 RAC, 2400 CSLG.

          Please note all combat vehicles are armoured and driven by the RAC, hence the massive uptick in that corps role and numbers.

          The above gives the scale and scope, but requires £30bn of new kit and the RAF to commit 20k personnel and loads of its assets to supporting the ground divisions combat capability.

          Sorry for the length… all above is costed and can be done within the current resource and fiscal plans

          • We have discussed a few of your ideas in the past, but I cannot see why you would put the AAC under RAF control – the RAF has no expertise at flying light/utility or armed/attack helicopters – that is army business to be done by army helicopters. Would you also put the Navy’s helicopters under the RAF?

            If anything the RAF should hand over Chinooks and Pumas to the AAC (with the requisite headcount of aircrew and maintainers) as these are solely used to support army operations.

          • I think we are now at a size where we merge into a single force, we will be far more effective.

            I don’t care about cap badges etc. I do care about our service people having great kit, leadership and excellent housing and benefits.

            I do think we should have a set of Commands that are aligned to the capability required. an example would be the Northern Command that would have all the required assets to fight across the Northern Flank.

            by being clear on the capabilities and geographic spread of those capabilities

            • Strategic Command
            • HA: Europe
            • 16 ABD: Global
            • Strike1: Europe
            • Strike2: Home
            • RMC1: Global
            • RMC2 Northern Flank
            • SFG: Global

            Now if we want an extra Heavy Armour Division to be based anywhere else, then that is fine but it will be at the cost of a strike Division or 16ABD or we fund the extra div.

            All Commands should get their agreed % of the budget and spend as they see fit, promotions then go to those who leave the division in a better state than it was previously in.

            This is all achievable the ADF and IDF are doing amazing the former with their equipment and industrial strategy and the latter with their innovation of relatively cheap equipment that is world leading and extensively tested in combat.

            Neither have massive budgets, but over time have just nailed it. we can do the same and need to start.

            It is also proven that the quality of equipment has a major impact on casualty count, with estimates in Afghanistan showing that UK troops were far more likely to be injured or killed than their US counterparts. This in my eyes is totally unacceptable.

          • Hi Pacman, the only armed forces who have merged their forces were the Canadians a few years ago – pretty much disastrous for morale and esprit de Corps – and did not markedly improve efficiency. You may not bother about capbadges, but everyone in the army does, and I doubt the RN and RAF would like to lose their service identity. The Canadians have largely reverted to seperate services after the ‘failed experiment’. Their Navy and the Air Force are once again proud to be the RCN and the RCAF.
            We have smaller armed forces than before but they are not so small as most other nations in NATO – none of the minnows have merged into a single force so why us?

            I have always thought that some rationalisation is overdue – why does the RAF operate Chinooks and Pumas that almost exclusively support the army? The AAC could take this on with the approprate budget and manpower grant – and would pare back the overblown support service enjoyed by RAF helos – army (REME) helo technicians don’t work shifts!

            The problem with commands dedicated to a geographical area is that you lose flexibility. What if Northern Flank command has nothing much to do but Strike 1: European command is facing WW3?

            Interesting point about Industrial strategy. The army is finally soon to get a Land Forces strategy, years after the navy got theirs.

            I am exceptionally interested in your comment that UK troops were more likely to be killed or injured in Afghanistan than US counterparts. Where is the article or report?

          • You raise valid points and perhaps there is a way around this, all air is raf, all land is army and all sea is navy, but importantly it is one command

            I would like to see the command structure flattened and layers of duplication removed, it is also very clear that inter service rivalry is becoming counter productive.

            If my old cap badge can go, then any can. We can accommodate individual units but I do think force commands should now be capability aligned instead of service aligned and then it becomes far clearer whether a capability is needed and / or funded properly.

            Key capabilities would have all the force types they need and broadly would be:

            1 home defence force
            2 CASD
            3. Northern / Arctic force
            4. NATO 1 (Central Europe)
            5 NATO 2 (other NATO)
            6 BEF 1 (commonwealth)
            7 BEF 2
            8 Global SFG

            Not exhaustive but I think a good starting point, importantly the commands have access to all the resources they need to do their tasking and can operate autonomously if required.

            If you want to keep cap badges fine, but reorganise them into forces that can actually do stuff.

      • Hello Pacman…sorry for the delay. …been away.
        I agree with you about the U.K. and the Baltic/Scandinavian idea. As you know we are involved with the Dutch and the Poles at the moment with the expeditionary force. A logical step would be for the U.K. to further it’s contacts and build resources in the region for peacetime deployment and reinforcement on behalf of N.A.T.O.
        Given our limited armoured resources, and the agreement of the locals, I would build a brigade with Challenger and Ajax in the Baltic states. Add in a regiment of Apache and FIRES support and the Russians would have something to think about.
        What you say about Boxer makes sense to me . There must be hundreds of wheeled vehicles that could back up a gun armed Boxer for all sorts of roles including peacekeeping.

        • Hi Geoff

          It’s really difficult to do anything witch the size of Uk’s armed forces now, it’s almost a bit like hitler in the last days moving divisions that only exists paper.

          I do think we should invest in a reserve armoured division as quite a lot of the training can be synthetic and it would be a good recruiting aid as who wouldn’t want to drive tanks in their spare time!!! Given the time to generate a HA division it also works well with timings and readiness.

          Whatever we do, we need to stop the debilitating inter service force rivalry (one force structure?) and make leadership far more accountable ( It amazes me how Gen Carter got promoted given he was the lead on FRES and has mixed reviews on his command in the Middle East – for me he epitomises everything that is wrong).

          I would also stop the trend of more services being outsourced and make the military a vocation once again.

          I do believe it’s doable, but it needs some really old moves… and I am not sure anyone is up for it.

          • There is time to really get things done but does anyone have the will to grasp the nettle. I think your other comment about inter service punch ups and who gets the top job is and always was called the old boy network. What school old boy, what club old boy, what money old boy. Sad but true.

        • Hi Geoff, Sadly we will have to wait a few years until Ajax is fixed and available in significant numbers for deployment to the Baltics. I wonder how many Apaches we have available for ops whilst they are being remanufactured into E models.
          What about the Infantry! But it looks like you are focussed on displaying potent weapon systems to the Russians rather than manpower holding the ground. Fair enough.

    • Geoff, I am sure you know what Challenger tanks are used for! We would deploy Ajax (if they fix it) and Boxer overseas on NATO and US-led Coalition operations as they are teed up – no change to past practise.
       
      We have never had, aspired to or wanted an army that was just light, anymore than we would want a navy that just had River class patrol boats. Our army has always deployed overseas in a detterent or warfighting role and has to be able to deal with any enemy threat and for our vehicles to protect their occupants.
       
      There have been many occasions in the last 70 years that we have deployed any of the following in a deterrent or warfighting role: tanks, armoured/mechanised infantry and/or armoured recce vehicles –
      Korean War 1950-53, Suez 1956, BAOR/BFG (1945-2020), Gulf War 1 (1990/91), Gulf War2/Iraq (from 2003), Afghanistan (to 2002-2014), and in the 90s – Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo. Recce vehicle squadron with UN Cyprus for decades. In so many of the above there was warfighting, not just deterrence.
       
      In contrast, other than for a few weeks in 1982, when was the last time in the last 70 years that the RAF’s fighters did any dogfighting? Or a British submarine sink a ship? Or the RNs surface ships fire on enemy ships?
      The Army actually uses its kit for warfighting on a frequent basis, including the armoured stuff.

      • Graham, I think you have missed the point here. My suggestion was about trying to do one thing well, not spread ourselves thinly over too many disciplines. It is a point that is true of all our forces. Spread the butter thinly and there is no jam for anyone.

        • Hi Geoff, thanks for the reply. ‘Role specialisation’ is the buzz phrase, of course – and to date our wonderful armed forces have never done it – we have a full spectrum of capability in each service (albeit thin and with elderly equipment, in part), as befits a country that has a global role and is the 5th biggest defence spender in the world. That sounded like a politician’s sound bite – sorry!

          But as politicians over the last 70 years have somehow managed to spend huge sums on defence (albeit at a lower %age of GDP since the Cold War) they have also managed to cut the strength of the forces and platform numbers repeatedly. It is quite surprising how this has happened. France’s armed forces, conventional and nuclear, are far stronger than ours and they spend a similar amount on defence. There are some big inefficiences at work clearly (just one of which is an expensive and slow equipment procurement process).

          The irony is the view that we should perhaps switch the army out of armoured warfare with ‘heavy metal’ equipments whilst we have actually used our AFVs in real shooting wars far more than the Navy and RAF have used their key platforms in anti-ship/anti-submarine warfare or dogfighting respectively. But I don’t hear any views that the RAF or RN should indulge in role specialisation and drop or pare back a particular role. [I personally would drop the independent nuclear deterrent, the Red Arrows and vain-glorious Space Command but that is another story].

          • Hi Graham, Interesting phrase “role specialization” isn’t it? Could be a politicians excuse or in the right hands it could make sense. I make no excuse for my rabbiting on on UKDJ about the need for us to do somethings well instead of trying to do everything. You have picked this up yourself in some ways. Inefficiencies and shambolic and painfully slow procurement are a constant irritation.
            I am not even against heavy armour. What I am against is the years of the army being messed about, sometimes of their own making, with constant restructuring and projects badly handled. Similarly, I really don’t see how tracks and wheels efficiently go together. They are chalk and cheese.
            You mention no comments about role specialization for the R.N. or the R.A.F. I’ve been pushing this for the last couple of years. The carriers should become the main striking force along with improved amphibious capability and receive their full complement of aircraft as a matter of urgency. The R.A.F.’s main role should be the defence of the U.K. and the northern flank of N.A.T.O.
            There is a lot more that could be said but enough for now I think!

          • Hi Geoff, even small countries fight shy of doing role specialisation (which to some is code for dropping some capabilities) with the possible exception of Belgium – they finally decided to give up tanks – they retired the Leopard 1A5 tank in September 2014, although they had fielded a full Corps in the Cold War. Canada seriously considered retiring their Leopard C1’s without replacement but had a rethink and equipped with Leo2. I find it hard to imagine what the British Army would ever contemplate dropping as a capability, although parachute forces came close to being lost or at least downgraded when 5 AB Bde was re-roled to 5 Inf Bde and at least one para bn came out of the para role. About the only thing the Army has dropped is the White Helmets display team!

            Formerly the tanks were supported by tracked SP arty and infantry in tracked vehicles (APCs then IFVs), a handful of forward support vehicles were tracked (CS armoured engineers with Titan/Trojan and their predecessors – and forward REME vehicles with CRAARVs, FV434s and WR repair and recovery variants) – everyone else folllowing along was wheeled. It was mostly all fine.

            In the near future, we will have tanks supported by infantry in wheeled Boxers and the Mobile Fires Platform (replacing AS90) might be wheeled. I doubt that Boxers will move as fast in deep snow and mud as tracked vehicles but I will be happy to be proved wrong. I sincerely hope that every Boxer has a 40mm stabilised cannon like upgraded Warrior (WCSP), but of course they won’t – so we will shell out a lot of money for something that is inferior to upgraded Warrior. The lunatics are now running the asylum.

            You mention role specialisation for the RN and RAF but what capability would they drop to concentrate on the main role you have assigned them?

          • Hi Graham…answering your last paragraph.
            My point about the army remains. It’s not that I want it to. It’s just that I don’t see how we can run the whole gambit of being on the ground in real force, ie BAOR, without the funds to match.
            With regard to the RN and the RAF I don’t really see it as specialization, more like prioritization. As I say the carriers and amphibious warfare would be the main role but this wouldn’t stop the other activities other parts of the fleet are involved in. The RAF would look after the northern flank of NATO with fighter and recon but deploying an expeditionary wing oversea shouldn’t be out of the way. Other info. gathering and transport issues as before.
            Mind you , what an extra half a per could achieve but i can’t see that happening soon. All the more reason to make the most of what we have.

          • Hi Geoff, we will never recreate BAOR (centred on a Corps of 4 armoured divisions, which totalled 55,000 – plus a Brigade of 5,000 in Berlin), or its smaller successor, BFG. That was Cold War.

            My reading of the Future Soldier Guide shows that we will in future have a Deep Recce Strike BCT, two armoured BCTs, a Lt Mech BCT and a Light BCT. Plus a Global Response Force (16 AA BCT and 1st Avn BCT at its core), a Special Operations Brigade (Ranger Regt at its core) and a Special Forces Assistance Brigade. Sounds a lot but there is a fair bit of smoke and mirrors. Bottom line is that we are unlikely to deploy a modernised, networked div of 2 or 3 BCTs until 2030, although some think it could be achieved by 2025. The key issue for the army is modernising the AFV and artillery fleets – and fast. I have mentioned before that I think the army should be focussed on flank protection for NATO in Europe and providing a strong ‘heavy metal’ force in the west of Germany as a NATO Reserve – together with a versatile and flexible OOA Expeditionary Force. Reserve Army should lead on Home Defence and MACC/A/M, with any spare capacity for reinforcing the regular army on operations.

            I am sure that the RN would put their CSGs and amphibious capability front and centre and you are right that most day to day activity will be at a much lower scale of effort. [Let’s not forget CASD as a very key remit]. I think it a pity that the SSNs seem to be entirely committed to protecting the CASD sub and any deployed CSG – and there is little to no additional capacity. I think there is scope for a number of SSKs with AIP to bulk out the numbers.

          • HI Graham…same info on the Future Soldier. Looks reasonably sound finally, save our doubts about time scale and enough kit being available. The trouble is we’ve already wasted ten years plus with the other restructuring so let’s hope they stick to this although I still have mixed feeling with Tracks and Wheels.
            Agree with you on the number of SSN’s. I can’t see any more coming though. There is talk about the new autonomous subs taking on the CASD protection role so let’s hope again that the powers to be get a move on.

  3. Anyone fancy manufacturing a turret as well, with a 40mm?..30mm?..20mm?
    anything a little lethal, or even dangerous?…..ah bugger GPMG and harsh language it is then!!!!!

  4. Well done for the order. Great the uk can still do some stuff. Can u cut a person with the laser lol. Metal cutting must take a powerful laser. Is it because it’s cut really close or something else that makes cut through hard steel?

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