The Ministry of Defence has published its tenth annual summary of the defence equipment plan.

According to a statement:

“Building on the 2020 summary, it sets out our plans for the next 10 years to deliver and support the equipment our armed forces need to do the jobs we ask of them.”

Jeremy Quin, Minister for Defence Procurement, said:

“This year’s equipment plan report is one of the most important in recent years as it implements the strategy and financial reset provided by the Integrated Review, the Defence Command Paper and Spending Review. The Integrated Review outlined the evolving nature of the threats we face. This Equipment Plan sets out how our military capability will evolve to meet these threats within an affordable financial envelope.

This Equipment Plan sets out how we are funding the capabilities we need, including more ships for the Royal Navy, a new batch of F-35s, a new medium helicopter and a major upgrade to our Land equipment. This represents a significant enhancement on last year’s capability plans while, through additional investment and tough prioritisation, we have reversed the £7.3 billion pressure on the plan outlined last year to a surplus.

This year is the first since 2018 when we have entered a new financial year with a funded contingency for the equipment plan. We have funding set aside to deal with urgent operational requirements and funding set aside for future research and development and its exploitation. We have made good progress in the first year of delivery and for the first time in many years, we expect to live within budget without Ministers having to take decisions on savings measures in year or running central savings exercises.

This has been possible by setting a clear vision for the Armed Forces through last year’s Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper, which has allowed us to retire less relevant equipment and refocus our programme on the kit we need for the future. We are making progress on delivering this change, including cancelling the Warrior sustainment programme and setting out plans for a more high-tech and agile Army as set out in our recent Future Soldier publication. This Equipment Plan relies on fewer low confidence efficiency measures than in previous years and our plans to reduce costs are supported by significant investments in acquisition, support and digital programmes to improve the way the department operates.

We have, alongside capability investments, reversed the decline in Defence R&D spend with a £6.6bn ring fenced commitment. This will help reduce the risks associated with identifying and bringing into development the game-changing future capabilities we will need to meet the future threat.

However, delivering state of the art Defence capabilities carries inherent risk. On a plan of this scale and over this timeline there will always be risks to affordability. We are clear-eyed on those risks and set them out in our report. As the National Audit Office have said, the MOD is responsible for some of the most technically complex, risky and costly procurement programmes in Government. New, large and complex programmes like the Future Combat Air System, which will deliver the next generation of combat air capability, and the replacement warhead, which will allow us to renew the UK’s nuclear deterrent, are extraordinarily complex endeavours. We continue to carry out and publish our own independent challenge of costings to help us understand and mitigate financial risk. Excluding Dreadnought, which has its own contingency funding, the risk identified in programmes which were reviewed both last year and this reduced by £0.3bn, showing an improvement in the department’s costing and management of risk. However, additional risk inevitably arises from new programmes entering the Plan, including the warhead programme.

Planning over ten years is inherently uncertain and we must be able to respond to changing threats and project-specific circumstances. As challenges emerge on programmes which delay expenditure, we will be flexible in accelerating other programmes to maintain momentum and where possible reduce cost. The HM Treasury £10 billion contingency for Dreadnought shields the rest of the Equipment Plan from changes in annual spend on our largest and most complex programme. We continue to reduce risk through the forward purchase of foreign currency.

New funding has enabled key decisions to be taken and priorities set but this alone is not enough to deliver on time and to budget. Having the right skills, tools, data and processes are critical. The department has made real progress, which we set out in our report, but we recognise there is more to do. To deliver value for money for the taxpayer we have invested in our acquisition reform programme which aims to improve the speed and agility of our procurement processes and we are working to improve the capability and availability of senior responsible owners for programmes.

The nature of Defence means that the plan is not without risks to which we will be agile in responding, however, new funding, a clear vision and a balanced plan mean that this is a very different programme to those of recent years.”

You can read the report here.

George Allison
George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison
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100 COMMENTS

  1. Just reading the plan and found this:

    “The Army is also retiring its oldest CH-47 Chinook helicopters and purchasing newer variants of this operationally proven aircraft from the US”.

    Since when is the Chinook operated by the AAC? Who writes this stuff.

    • All the helicopters come under Joint Helicopter Command which is army led, which why I guess they come out of the army’s budget.

      • No JHC is a joint service organisation. The cost of purchase and operation of each type comes from the respective operating service ie Chinook Raf, Merlin RN and Apache, Wildcat from Army. The Minister was wrong.

      • The JHC has traditionally sat next to HQ Land first at Wilton then Andover, so the 2 HQs operate together and the army tasks the RAF SHF.
        Whether JHC is actually “led” by the army, I’m not so sure as it is a tri service organisation and the command rotates between the 3 services at 2 * level.

    • Does it say how many of the chinooks and how many they are replaced by or give a total number.
      Will these include the cut and shut jobs. A different front and back welded together. I’m sure there was an Argentine back end and a British front end aswell.
      Some of them are long in the tooth.

  2. Scan read the whole document. Not much new in it but it does contain further reference to speeding up Boxer procurement and uplifting numbers, also implying that the total will be more than we have of Warrior. Good news that, lets hope they have some firepower.

        • They are cakes, so yes are a positive. But they are cakes that maintain the bare minimum of 13 Frigates, which with each new review and reduction suddenly becomes the aspirational baseline to get to.

          When in reality Frigate numbers should be 20, that was the 16 T23 and 4 batch 3 T22.

          Increases like T32 are always way in the future beyond this Parliament and HMG lean heavily on the spin.

          We never or rarely see any increases in number, the key ingredient missing in every single review no matter how capable the new kit may be.

          • The question is would you increase the numbers of T31 and/or T26 until such time as they have proved themselves. The option to build the final 6 T45s was always there but there were problems.

            Another point is that our current T45s are far more capable than anything we have had before and I wouldn’t want anyone using anything but the best kit we can design but how do we balance capability vs quantity. An example would be that the Russians have vast quantities of tanks but how many of the actually work and would they be able to match ours.

            My point I think is that it is not just hulls / vehicles that count but lethality?

          • It’s got to be both in my view, depending on the capability area. Example an AAW destroyer must have lethality so yes need best possible but the Medium Helicopter requirement does not need lethality. It needs affordability, reliability and numbers. So go for an OTS solution, Black Hawk.
            You just know MoD will order the AW offering and I fear we won’t get the 44 required for the budget.

          • Hmmm.

            What good is a world-beating AAW destroyer that can’t stop the submarine that will sink it?

            Especially when we all know that it will not go everywhere in company with an ASW ship.

          • Quantity has always had a quality of its own. All 148 challenger 3s (that don’t exist yet) would likely all be lost on the first morning of a major conflict with Russia. 🙁

          • £5.4 million for each upgraded Challenger 2/3. I think back in 2005 ish, the official plan was 25 RN escorts. If we went back to the 25 figure, perhaps 17 frigates, 8 destroyers?

          • Yes, 25. Dropped to that low as the 3 T23s were cut and the T42s continued to be paid off and their replacements were set at 8, and then later 6.
            That reduced numbers to 23.

            The plans 18 frigates 6 destroyers to get to 24, but again, it’s a future aspiration, despite HMG “growing navy” spin.

          • Hi D

            is there provision in the document (and a timeline) for the ordering of the second batch of 5 type31/32? Given the slow pace of ship construction, we’ll still be discussing the RN “plan” to get to 24 surface ships in 10 years time!

            P..S. Any reverence to a future confirmation buy of additional F35s?

          • I didn’t see any, I think T32 and MRSS too are beyond this 10 year plan.

            HMG spin spin spin talking of “by 2030” as earlier.

          • Thanks D. You point on the spin component is spot on ! Perhaps events in the Ukraine will see the government/MOD find more funds to accelerate the pace of re-armament. Perhaps back to 2.5% of gdp?

          • I think there is more chance of Pigs flying with our useless political class, of all parties.

            Hope is eternal though.

          • There’s a strong case for a wealth tax to fund additional defence spend. A lot of people and companies have done very well in dealings with Russia.
            Speed up T26 build; build more
            Fit Mk41 to more T31
            More P-8s
            Fix Ajax of buy OTS
            By OTS artillery
            More faster Land Ceptor batteries
            Upgrade all the C2s
            Review Warrior decision
            Increase RM to 10,000
            More Typhoon squadrons.
            This is not rocket science, Its just a decision. We need a step function increase.
            Tackle recruitment by offering graduates the chance to write off their student loan in exchange for 3 years service.

          • If Type 32 is beyond the scope of this plan and all Type 31s will be delivered by 2028, what will they be doing at Rosyth after that? Praying for orders?

            Any sensible policy will have first steel cut for the first T32 one year or so after first steel is cut for HMS Active. That’s in 2026 or 2027 at the latest. So the contract would expect to be signed by the end of 2025, and payments would definitely be in the scope of this plan.

            Alas the numbers don’t add up. They appear inconsistent with anything but the slowest build of Type 26, no Type 32 and stage pagements that are extremely front loaded.

          • Selling the T23’s to Latin America and the run down of T22 made little sense to me.

            I agree frigate numbers should be 20+, actually I think there is a pretty broad church on that and has been for a while.

            Trouble is needs for things like Albions and QEC’s, Bays that all cost frigate + money to run.

            My instinct, for what it is worth, is that the B1 Rivers will be replaced by T32 and the T31 will be slid to cover B2’s roles. B2’s then cover B1’s roles. That way there is little crewing stress. Just a thought and a real uplift in hull functionality. Maybe?

          • You may well be right. I hope not myself, as the RB2s do a good job in their overseas role and seem over qualified for fisheries home duties to me?

            I’d have them remain in role, augmented by T31 /32.

            On the other assets, yes, always better to have a balance of capabilities, Albions, Bays, Carriers, SSN, RFA, and less escorts than none of those and many more escorts.

            For me though, the Royal Navy require both!!

          • Hi Supportive Bloke, I think your prediction for B1, B2 rivers and type 31 & type 32 are spot on.

            For myself after I got over the total shock of the massive frigate and destroyer reduction in numbers, I never understood why the four Batch 3 Type 22 were not sold to Chile, instead of the 3 T23. The three extra T23 even if not kept in service would have been worth their weight in gold for spares alone.

          • 40, 35, 32, 31, 25, 23, 19, 17 is the ongoing, sad sequence of reduction.

            30+, 23, 12, 8 for Fast Jets.

            Farce.

          • Hi Daniele, if there is ever going to be a change in the reduction of numbers (of everything) this current crisis with Ukraine could be the catalyst end the cycle of cuts. I hope.

          • Batch 3 T22 were specialised EW / ELINT ships.

            Removing T22 left a big capability gap until T45 were upgraded to fill the role.

            T23 -> Chile were due refits so were sold to balance cash flows. Stupid.

          • Which ever way you cut it; the reduction in the surface fleet was going to create gaps. But we could have recouped some funds by selling T22 batch 3 to Chile, the lone batch 2 we did sell Chile could have been sold to Romania instead to add to there batch 2 fleet. The 3 extra Type 23 could have been used for spares or mothballed. To be honest as I type this, all the options were poor ones. I remain hopeful of the Frigate/Destroyer fleet returning to 24… then who knows further increases?

          • My recollection from that time was that the original plan was to sell the type22 batch3’s to Chile, but the Royal Navy protested, in that they preferred to keep them and dispose of the early batch 23’s…

          • Maybe the right decision at the time ( I don’t agree with that). But the navy didn’t have hindsight of the further cuts to come.

          • The 4 B3 Type 22’s had command facilities which the type 23 ‘s lacked and as the Type 45’s which have command facilities were not ready in 2006 the Type 23’s were sold.

        • Navy has a serious problem in that they are already digging into the reverve funds for dreadnought and we are still extremely early days. I suspect there will need to be major cuts in a few years once the reserve is full used up.

  6. “The Army is also retiring its oldest CH-47 Chinook helicopters”

    Sums it up.

    Scanned through the doc. The usual waffle, lots of world class, lots of more lethal, lots of more agile, with some doses of spin to add.

    The real details, The HOW MANYs and the WHENs are evaded in most cases. I was hoping to read of additional equipment purchases, but it seems not.

    Where are the extra air defence missiles for the army?
    Where are AA systems to deal with UAV?
    Where are the precision stand off missiles to expand on Exactor?
    Where is the expansion of the RA, which is supposed to be at the fore now with “deep fires”?
    In reality this seems to be a small increase in GMLRS systems, with a longer ranged munition, and the formation of a second GMLRS regiment, at the expense of a gun artillery regiment which should really also be increasing, not being cut to pay for something else.
    Where is the confirmation of more Atlas, after the report the other month that was covered here on UKDJ? Edit – apparently there is! I missed that. Welcome.

    Mentions more Boxer, nothing on what they will be armed with.
    The army will be more lethal while its artillery, armour and IFV are all cut or removed.

    By comparison, other nations like France and Japan publish their equipment plans in full, with how many and when, rather than pull the veil of secrecy over things.

    Strategic Command is spending over 30 billion over the decade. I could not see a list of what exactly.

    As expected, spending on SF “falls out of the period of this review” which is a given but still amusing.

    Did Carter write this?

  7. The document is full of waffle – and dangerous words like “risk” (mentioned a dozen times) dangerous phrases like “acquisition reform programme” and “improve the capability and availability of senior responsible owners” and particularly “we recognise there is more to do”

    Once translated from blobspeak, the gist of it is clear. There are more cock-ups in the system (but we have managed to keep them hidden so far). The platforms are far more important than the actual weapons our chaps will have to fight with. We intend to keep a toy army of 20,000 infantry using 1990’s equipment. Tempest is far too expensive and will be cancelled. The new warheads for the Dreadnought CASD have a ginormous cost overun and other, unspecified, problems.

    Sir Humphrey would be proud of this document. It says much – but commits to very little.

    • Indeed did you read about Sky Sabre…p58..ishhh it’s now a ‘Falklands Optimised System’ that may provide a pathway for the ‘contingent’ land requirement!!

  9. I’m sorry but everything I’ve read about in these last few UKDJ updates about procurement for the Forces, is just Blah, blah, blah. We are completely out gunned and out classed in 99% of any of our weapon platforms.

    • And yet, we spend more on each of those than any other country except the two superpowers. Truly inefficient and ridiculous procurement.

  10. Can anyone provide a quick guide of numbers and of what. The thought of reading anymore than the waffle that was above is turning my stomach.

    • It wouldn’t be quick, there are dozens and dozens of programs and MoD are usually coy on numbers.

      What programmes are you after?

      • Army vehicles would be interesting. Currently it would appear the army will have more reconnaissance Ajax than anything else tracked.
        Did they mention a bulldog and similar types replacement yet other than sometime in the future.
        Personally I would look at doing a cheaper upgrade to challenger to keep numbers up and get on board with a replacement as soon as possible. Whether that’s joining a program or whatever. It seems expensive (and it’s not even started). Put the money in the replacement.

  11. I’m still worried about the delivery dates of the Type 26 batch 2. The only thing I can see about that is the following statement in the NAO discussions on the plan:

    “In addition to re-affirming investment in many existing projects, such as the Type 26 frigate, the Department plans to bring forward spending on other projects, such as the replacement for Astute submarines.”

    To me this implies if batch 2 was going to be glacial before, it still is. After thirty years of never building a complex warship at full speed (2010 to 2040), an entire generation of shipbuilders at BAES will have real problems doing it correctly. Not only will the navy not have sufficient ASW warships in the 2030s, the National Shipbuilding Plan’s goal of upskilling the workforce will take a sharp reverse turn.

    That’s far more important than the £1.75 bn that will also be thrown down the toilet.

    To me it’s the most crucial naval contract of the decade by a large margin. Even if SSN(R) is moved forward into this decade.

  12. If I read it right page 62 of the 22-25 plan has surface to surface weapon funded, with the copy on p33 stating this will replace Harpoon after 2023. I read this as RN getting harpoon replacement in 2023. Am I wrong?

    • Thought it said ……replacing Harpoon which retires in 2023. Ie it will replace it.. eventually…but whatever happens Harpoon retires next year.

      • yet the equipment budget funding timescales were 22-25? Harpoon retires, but with something replacing it funded out of 22-25 budget

        • 22-25 budget might refer to development, prototype testing and milestone Payments on full production orders with deliveries to follow. ..but like much in the report…it’s glib

          • agree. Though at £200m-£1bn (of new money) that’s a lot for no actual kit? I guess I’m reading this (in hope) as funding for some sets of surface to surface to replace Harpoon up to 2025.

          • Given how fast the Israelis worked with Singapore tailoring their subsonic medium/long range anti-ship/surface missile, we could see Sea Serpent on RN ships in 18 months. But they’d have to buy it first.

            I don’t get why they want FC/ASW to be subsonic. Get Sea Serpent or NSM or something else subsonic now, and go all in with the French on hypersonic.

    • If Russia decides to invade Ukraine, the UK gov will be forced to move large numbers of troops to the NATO borders, at which point hopefully the press will challage the government on why so few equipment is being sent and why our forces are so undergunned. I doubt it however, as the media appears to be in the pockets of the government.

      • It would be interesting for someone to question the government on why over the last decade of the current government the army has been slashed in size, to make way for increased expenditure on new kit (this was the story explaining each cut) and yet what new kit has actually been added during those 10 years, for the army that is.

    • Wallace said that Johnson promised a defence budget increase if Russia invaded Ukraine, so we best hope that happens for Russia has, indeed, invaded Ukraine.

  15. Do we know this time whether a la QE and POW, salami slicing delays are going to result in these projects ebign much more expensive?

  16. I think we need to urgently speed up the fit of UK’s world beating weapons onto F35B. Simply hopeless to wait for LM to deliberately prevent this to enable it to play catch up and ensure the UK has seen its market for its missiles taken away. Historic shades here.Can we go it alone? Israel would.

    • I would push forward with tempest technology as quickly as possible. For carriers push the unmanned assets for quicker into service. Integrate the U.K. made weapons onto these.
      Lockheed is not going to cut its profits and speed up f-35 development just because the U.K. asks nicely. Waste of time even asking

  17. 10 year plans are based on the old fashioned thinking that we had 10 years notice before a major war broke out. With Ukraine and Taiwan can we with any degree of certainty guarantee that we will not be in a major war in the next 5? If the answers no then the U.K. must immediately and significantly increase its defence spending and expand its national defence infrastructure (particularly naval) to support such a move.

  18. Has anyone else noticed that the planned spend on surface ships has decreased? Not only over the 10 year budget, but throughout? Less next year and the year after.

    The government wanted more spent on the navy and gave the MoD £16.5 billion extra over 4 years. So why is less being spent? I’d love to think they’d saved so much by freeing up the cash flow they are buying more with less, but every time I view things like this with optimism, I’m disappointed.

  19. Its really quite amazing: the MODs budget has only been reduced 10% in real terms over the last decade but that turns into the Navy having half the ships and the airforce having half the aircraft.. More money needs to be spent, but the rank ineffectiveness of the Civil Service is the big reason we have so little of anything.

    So much short sighted stuff in here: lets retire our tranche 1 typhoons for a saving of less than £99m…..f**king idiots…..

  21. “Planning over ten years is inherently uncertain and we must be able to respond to changing threats and project-specific circumstances. As challenges emerge on programmes which delay expenditure, …”
    Er, Russia has invaded Ukraine, we will get back to you after the latest project-specific circumstances.

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