Amphibious assault ship HMS Albion is participating Exercise Joint Viking 23, alongside NATO allies and partners in Norway’s picturesque fjords.

The ship departed from Plymouth to support amphibious landings with Royal Marines along Norway’s rugged coastline.

These exercises are organized by Norway and designed to evaluate the cold weather warfare skills of allied forces, ensuring their readiness to fight across the Arctic’s waters and challenging terrain seamlessly.

Prior to arriving in the Arctic, Albion’s sailors and Royal Marines underwent rigorous training, including ‘internal battles,’ to ensure their preparedness for the upcoming exercises.

During this simulation, say the Royal Navy, the ship was subjected to simulated battle damage, and the reactions of the sailors were tested by Albion’s internal training team as they worked to extinguish fires and make necessary repairs swiftly.

George Allison
George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison
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44 COMMENTS

  1. Let’s hope we see a decent increase in the defence budget on Monday and some suitable replacements for our Amphibious assault ships.
    There was supposed to be a joint effort on this as I recall.

    Pentagon budget 2024: Biden seeks 3.2% funding boost for US DoD10 MARCH 2023

    “US President Joe Biden has asked Congress to approve a fiscal year (FY) 2024 government budget request that includes USD842 billion for the US Department of Defense (DoD), up 3.2% or USD26 billion from the FY 2023 enacted level and nearly USD100 billion above the FY 2022 actual level, the Biden administration announced on 9 March 2023.”

    • Nope

      GoalKeeper was withdrawn some time ago in favour of upgrading the whole Phalanx fleet.

      With smaller RN fleet there were more than enough Phalanx to equip the *deployable* fleet. So it made sense to upgrade the lot rather than keep two types in service.

    • As per SB below, if now with phalanx’s this must be an old photo…. Good to see some hovercraft are still around though. Good British invention that seems to be a bit out of fashion with the UK these days? US, China, Russia, even Norway use them, the first three here, extensively.

  3. Albion is now only ten years away from being decommissioned (indeed she seems have been the verge being retired for many years already!), with plans for less capable replacements still just studies (MRSS).

    In the noughties the RN/RM/RFA had Amphibious Task Group capable of carrying, landing and supporting a full strength Brigade anywhere in the world. Only the USN/USMC could beat that. Now a maximum effort outside of war seems to have become landing a couple of ‘Strike’ companies’ with supporting troops – not even a full Commando Group! I suppose the later stopped being practical when 42 Commando ceased to be a battalion-size combat formation in 2019(?) and the designation of a Lead Commando Group at high-readiness had to be binned as this needed the rotation of three full-strength Commando’s, and only 40 and 45 were left.

    You perhaps have to go back to c.1960 to find the UK’s amphibious forces in worse shape. Or maybe those arguing that the UK still needs a strong amphibious capability are just dotery old armchair admirals who are still excessively influenced by a small war in the South Atlantic over 50 years ago!

    • Do we need a full Brigade capability in the amphibious role? Not sure? But with the re-rolling of 3 Bde into the LRG concept, it does become a more useable and flexible tool! However, the big question is, has that concept of smaller “raiding” and the LRG been thrust on them through reductions and cuts and lack of investment? Probably. However we do need the capability to land people and platforms on a possibly hostile shore, even if it’s to ensure the “enemy” have to take that ability serious and include it in their planning considerations. Cheers.

      • “Do we need a full Brigade capability in the amphibious role?”

        That is the multi-£billion question!

        In 1998 the [Labour] government decided “Yes” and amazingly the necessary shipping was actually ordered and built! But unfortunately, the capability was never demonstrated as 3 Cdo Bde was too busy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Exercise Saif Sareea II in 2001 was perhaps the closest we got, and many units were pulled from that at the last minute due to the 9/11 crisis.  

        Conservative governments since 2010 have said “No”, leading to where we are now.

        • Albion and Bulwark were ordered in 96, by the Tories, and Ocean before that. Labour ordered the Bay Class.

          Do we need a full Brigade for landing? I’m unsure. It is a nice to have.

          Do we need the ability to land on hostile shores? Absolutely?
          Do we need to do that in strength? Probably not.
          The enablers like 17 PMR still exist so moving into secured ports is still possible.

          The LRG concept is very much linked to the Grey Zone scenario, so I would myself like to see the bulk of 3 Cdo moved back to the arctic role and restored to Bde strength leaving some smaller RM elements for the LRG task, which in itself is hamstrung by a lack of aviation assets and vessels.

          It is all moot, it is rumoured LRG will be gone once Labour get in with their rhetoric opposing the supposed “Tilt to the Pacific”

          • Maybe the IDR refresh that’s about to announced with give some clarity on the Future Commando Force and the LRG’s? As far as I’m aware no work has yet been done converting RFA Argus to the LSS role, and plans for a second LSS have long been dropped. It was all too easy 4-5 years ago to quickly save a few £million by demoting 3Cd Bde from an elite frontline Infantry Brigade, to an admin formation. Reversing that will be a long and expensive exercise – and I suspect the Army would make a good case that rebuilding its strength is a higher priority.

          • The RM are Arctic warfare/ Special Forces now not Infantry. That’s how they will be used in any future wars.

          • Incorrect. The 4 ‘strike’ companies each provided by 40 and 45 are infantry formations by any reasonable definition. The planned permanent forward deployment to Oman of two companies of 40 from H2 this year is hardly Arctic ops! Separately, 42 and 43 provide ship force protection teams and guard the UK’s nuclear weapons.

          • The RM is moving to Raiding again.
            Go in
            Mallet everything in sight.
            Get out

            No holding ground, no company attacks and defensive actions… Its going to be straight up max violence and effect against a target and then let the enemy pick up the pieces.

            LPD with LCU as raiding craft lily pads work and have been proven to work. With an LCU carrying ammo and a fuel bladder you can expand the range and the length of coastline that the RM raiders can go against by hundreds and hundreds of miles. Then you can also add in any helo lifts and you give the enemy a massive headache for coastal protection.

            That said I expect the RM and certain Army units to become High North specialists in NATO. Be honest …what can the army bring to a NATO Heavy Armour party that Poland and Germany cannot do a lot easier.

      • My problem with an LPD is the fact that an LPH can land more troops , quicker and over a greater distance. Not relying on “coming ashore” over a beach. Amphibious landings are inherently difficult and dangerous and would require most of the available RN to screen it to ensure success. So a QE carrier providing CAP and close air support. Frigates for NGS and surface strike protection and type 45s for air defence.
        A switch to an LPHD landing platform with 2-3 ships , perhaps based on Trieste hill form would be a superior notion. Providing a useful escort, light role carrier or ASW carrier as a 2nd gain.

        • IRL there are loads of Chinook and Merlin capable and certified landing spots on the RN fleet.

          So you could perfectly well distribute RM parties to the various ships, a day or two in advance, where there is accommodation and they can then be cab lifted from there.

          Whilst i agree two LPH would be a big boost to capacity there is the tiny problem of the cab fleet unless you are going to use Chinook for that role – something we have a decent number of!

          • Folding rotors on chinook would be a great addition. How marinised they are is another question.
            Ideally another 12-24 merlin would help a lot with lift. Next question is merlin really needed apart from initial lift? Would a cheaper helicopter without all the bells and whistles be worth while to operate with them.
            Then there’s the wildcat. If it’s a good fit for the marines it perhaps needed some more armament fitted. If it’s not a good fit then give them to the navy for ASW. Dipping sonar if needed.
            For the navy ships operating wildcat getting 2 onto the deployed escorts with a dipping sonar between them would do a lot until drones can be made to fill that role.
            The best people to say what they need is the marines themselves

          • Chinook isn’t particularly maranised. WD40 by the bucket load is a necessary adjunct to marine deployments.

            I’d say the dipping sonar, sonar buoy dispensing and AEW roles will be done based in 5 years.

          • The question of cost of a military helicopter comes down to a few factors. Range, performance and payload are obvious key drivers. Apart from maintainability the next though would be survivability. It is perhaps the factor that adds the most cost. As this adds in-built redundancy such a triplex flight controls, self-sealing fuel tanks, fire suppression system, armour, radar and laser warning systems, missile approach warning systems, infrared exhaust suppressors, infrared jammers, radar jammers, chaff and flares.

            Unlike built in airframe redundancy systems, defensive aids need constant updating to make sure they keep up against the latest threats. Countermeasures especially are a closely guarded secret and are constantly being tested. This is one of the main reasons why they cost so much.

            The next question you must ask is what price is the value of the pax (passengers) vs the cost of the aircraft. If the aircraft is only required to drop off its pax where there’s no threat, then does it need defensive aids? However, if there is a MANPAD threat, do you use the same aircraft that has next to no survivability?

        • LPH cannot provide anything beyond a Jackal/BV for mobility. Anyone you land is going to be on foot for most of the time. Supplying fuel and munitions by helo to a landed force is not ideal where as a truck and tanker making runs to a secure beachead area make things a lot easier and flexible.

      • The move away from Brigade landings seems to be driven firstly by costs and secondly by advancement of anti-ship missiles and precision long range fires. It’s too costly to create these large capabilities in the first place and it’s certainly too costly to lose them to a couple of missiles. Thus LRG’s, which currently unfortunately make zero sense beyond anti-piracy and counter-terror roles.

        What I think the LRG’s should become are forward-deployed floating bases of heavy equipment to provide area-denial capability, armour and CS/CSS support to pre-deployed units (e.g SAS/SBS/Rangers) or rapid reaction forces (e.g 16 AAB).

        We’ve seen in Ukraine that retaking land is savagely more costly than it is to hold it. Our policy of deterrence against Russian imperialism should therefore be to be there from the start, if we can’t be there for the start then to get there first, and once there to quickly create area denial networks for air, sea and land and to reinforce quickly.

        Then resort to ‘raiding’ if we can’t be there first and have a tertiary capacity for anti-terror and anti-piracy ops.

    • I think 6 MRSS will not be that bad with 2-3 Merlin each. The Falklands Amphibious force was not very impressive with 2 Fearless class and the LSL’s very close inshore which resulted in tragedy of course. Even with unopposed landings 40 years ago we still were very very lucky.
      6 MRSS with 16 Merlin and 6 Wildcats in the squadrons between them and 12 LCU and perhaps a dozen LCVPs as well will be very well equipped.
      Hopefully we get Caimen 90 or something similar to replace LCU mk 10 which can go 2.2 times faster than LCU mk 10 effectively doubling the distance the Amphib is from the shore.
      Even better if we could get some of the US hovercraft but if not we should still make the dimensions so 1 could be operated allowing better interoperability.

      • I’m doubtful we will ever see these 6 ships.
        Current ships will be stretched another 10 years.
        The points will need replaced at some point as well.
        It could be a great program to replace the amphibious ships, bays and points keeping shipyards busy but no doubt it will get messed up.

          • I don’t know how well the bays were built and much life left they have.
            This carry on with Argus is bonkers in my opinion. Leave it as the casualty, aviation support ship.
            Get a ship from trade for the role. There are a lot of ships looking for buyers.
            Work will start on Argus and loads of unforeseen problems will be encountered. This will end up going way over budget or stay in budget with half the work done.

          • I struggle with the logic of the plan for Argus too.

            She is very useful as she is but why convert something so old is beyond me.

            She was very, very well built in that days when the oil companies were awash with money. She is the final survivor of the Corporate fleet as far as I know.

      • >I think 6 MRSS will not be that bad

        You may be right, I’m not sure myself. Hoping we get some interesting posts.

    • I suspect the Albions will be extended. They are very well designed / built and given the 50/50 usage they are low miles and in quite good material state.

      They are also very good at their job!

    • Having been in the Bde in the late naughties, it couldn’t put a Bde ashore. The ambition was to be able to do that by 2020. The most it could put ashore in one wave in 2010 was a Coy Gp (which was a lot bigger than a Rifle Coy)

  4. The is a BAE LHD design around from previous articles which looks pretty useful. Why not a fleet of 1-2 of these, also compatible with F35Bs, along with 4-6 MRSS’s? I’ve no idea of actual Ops requirements and will leave that to others comments. All needs to be affordable also.

    • There is a *very* big difference between providing an occasional F35B landing spot and providing full facilities – that costs serious money and requires a huge number of people.

      We have the two best totally optimisers F35B platforms in the world capable of hosting a huge F35B fleet between them. Why dilute that?

      Lily pad is a different thing where just refuelling is a thing but then adding ski jumps etc start taking space and focus as well as costing ££££. Fast jet environment is dangerous and needs constant practice.

      F35B club is growing fast with Italy, Spain, Japan and SK on board with it and other considering it.

      RN made the right choice and the audience have voted that with $$$.

      • Hi SB, don’t get me wrong. I understand about the carriers, but being able to force multiply, using other platforms could also very useful in times of conflict.

        • Not a good example, but during the Falklands conflict weren’t there Harriers operating off converted container ships? Being able to diversify operations on sea platforms and on land with minimal or less supporting or dedicated infrastructure helps to mimic possible real life scenarios. Like flying off highways for instance that several countries already practice.
          Agree that the carriers Ops should be maximised first up.

          • That story was always a faux amis (false friend) pumped out by Max Hasting and his acolytes.

            Harriers were transported down on converted container ship: Atlantic Conveyor being one – look how that ended?

            If you have planes or cabs on board you have

            Servicing need
            Fuel
            Munitions in quantity
            You also paint a massive target in the ship

            Civilian ships gave no aircraft lifts so servicing is in the open – hopeless for a sustained effort when it is cold and wet. Impossible to do certain things in bad weather.

            Fuel a damage control nightmare as it would be in bladders as the ships tanks are unlikely to have avgas capacity.

            Munitions you don’t have an armoured magazine with water misting etc so when the avgas cooks off so do the munitions.

            And the Max Hastings Coffin Class ship will have its aircraft tracked back to base and become a premium target.

            So, no – it is a terrible idea.

  5. I have no idea if Russia could provide a credible threat to NATO in Norway, probably not much judging by the debacle in Ukraine, however, I’d we do need both a Bde landing ability and the littoral forces as well – so a much bigger Commando than we have now.

    Interesting article in the Economist this week about defending Taiwan with the US Marines doctrine changing to take on the Island Chains and funnel the PLAN into free fire zones.

    Well some of those ‘islands’ look to have emplaced defences and it would take more than a littoral platoon to take them on, more heavy raiding, than light.

    Which brings me to the Defence Review with R4 reporting it is put tomorrow.

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