The National Audit Office (NAO) report on the Ministry of Defenceā€™s Equipment Plan for 2023-2033 has brought to light the financial challenges surrounding the development of the Type 32 frigates for the Royal Navy.

The Type 32 frigates will be a crucial component of the future fleet, yet they face significant funding shortfalls.

The NAO report indicates that the Royal Navy’s new entries into the shipbuilding pipeline, including the Type 32 frigates, are forecasted to cost Ā£5.9 billion more than the currently allocated budgets.

“For example the Navy has included the full predicted costs of new entries into the shipbuilding pipeline ā€“ including Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance ships Type 32 frigates Multi-Role Support Ships, Type 83 destroyers and Future Air Dominance System ā€“ which are forecast to cost Ā£5.9 billion more than the currently allocated budgets.”

The Type 32 Frigate is expected to help grow the Royal Navy’s surface escort fleet from 19 to 24 vessels.

Gareth Davies, the head of the NAO, expressed grave concerns over the unaffordability of the Equipment Plan in the report, which can be found here.

“The MOD acknowledges that its Equipment Plan for 2023ā€“2033 is unaffordable, with forecast costs exceeding its current budget by almost Ā£17 billion. This is a marked deterioration in the financial position since the previous Plan. Deferring choices on spending priorities until after the Spending Review, while understandable given the governmentā€™s ambitions expressed in the updated Integrated Review, risks poor value for money if programmes continue which are later cancelled, scaled down or deferred because they are unaffordable. The MOD should consider how future Plans can achieve their core purpose: providing a reliable assessment of the affordability of its equipment programme and demonstrating to Parliament how it will manage its funding to deliver equipment projects.”

Brief summary of projects either not Included or partly included in the Equipment Plan

The National Audit Office report on the Ministry of Defenceā€™s Equipment Plan 2023-2033 reveals several critical capability requirements that are partly or fully excluded from this year’s plan. These exclusions, despite being integral to the UK’s defence strategy, have no funding allocated in the equipment plan.

Programmes Not Included in the Plan:

1. Land Environment Capability Assessment Register (British Army):

  • Unfunded Gaps: Significant gaps in lethality, air defence, C4I systems, logistics, CBRN, and mobility.
  • Internal Balancing: The Army is conducting an internal exercise to modernise forces within existing funding.

2. Warrior Armoured Vehicle and Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank (British Army):

  • Costing Uncertainty: Extensions for Warrior and Challenger 2 are still being costed, potentially leading to unfunded pressures.

3. Land Precision Strike (Strategic Programmes Directorate):

  • Requirement: A need for a ground-launched precision guided weapon with at least 80km range.
  • Funding Status: Programmed for the end of the decade, but no financial commitment yet.

4. SPEAR Cap 3 Electronic Warfare Air-to-Ground Missile (Strategic Programmes Directorate):

  • Programme Status: Initial low-cost capability demonstrator under negotiation; full programme confirmation pending by the RAF.

5. Meteor Air-to-Air Missile (Strategic Programmes Directorate):

  • Mid-Life Upgrade: Funding of up to Ā£2 billion required for mid-life upgrade, currently not included.

6. Test and Evaluation Contracts (Strategic Programmes Directorate):

  • Funding Shortfall: Insufficient funding to replace two contracts ending in 2028; development and procurement funding gap exists.

Partly Funded Programmes Included in the Equipment Plan

1. A400M Transport Aircraft Additional Purchases (Royal Air Force):

  • Funding Status: Some funding held centrally; sufficient but does not align with later years’ spending needs.

2. F35-B Combat Aircraft Third Front-Line Squadron (Royal Air Force):

  • Capital Budget Shortfall: Increases by Ā£0.1 billion between 2023-24 and 2026-27.
  • Operational Funding Gap: Lacks Ā£0.4 billion needed to operate the squadron.

3. New Entries into the Shipbuilding Pipeline (Royal Navy):

  • Projects Included: Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance ships, Type 32 Frigates, Multi-Role Support Ships, Type 83 destroyers, Future Air Dominance System.
  • Financial Shortfall: Costs are Ā£5.9 billion higher than current budgets.

4. In-Service Extension of RFA Argus (Royal Navy):

  • Implementation: Extension of the primary casualty receiving ship is underway.
  • Budget Issue: No additional budget was received for this extension.

5. Mine Hunting Capability (Royal Navy):

  • Plan Inclusion: Second phase included in the Plan.
  • Funding Shortfall: No additional budget for this phase; additional funds sought for Hunt Class vessels until new capability is operational.

6. Future Commando (Royal Navy):

  • Modernisation Funding: Ā£0.7 billion required for Royal Marines modernisation to enable operations from the sea in high-threat environments.
  • Budget Exclusion: This funding has not been included in the Plan.

7. Directed Energy Weapons (Strategic Programmes Directorate):

  • Status: Novel capability with assessment phase funding.
  • Review Pending: MOD to review at the end of the assessment phase; may replace or supplement other capabilities.
George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

56 COMMENTS

  1. This sums up the ‘conspiracy of optimism’ perfectly. Put stuff in the plan and money will be found with unspecified ‘efficiencies’… I actually heard someone use that when I was still defence procurement – went into the box on the relevant form I believe. We all know that this is in effect kicking the can down the road for the next encumbent to deal with.

    The result is a bunch of poorly funded projects that are doomed to fail as a result, taking money away from projects that could actually deliver.

    I would apply a military maxim here, ‘reinforce strength, abandon weekness’. So Meteor as a success story would get funded, T32 would get jacked in in favour of more T31’s. The latter could be off-shelf unchanged (mostly) or the stretched version proposed by Babcock (unlikely unless Babcock can keep the price seriously low)… Whatever they chose to do they need to make decisions in a timely manner – the next biggest problem they have is procrastination around vital decisions.

    All very depressing and concerning given the geopolitical situation we face.

    Cheers CR

    • T32 absolutely needs to be a better equipped batch 2 T31. A simple evolution and and keep the production line and staff busy.

      Reinvent the wheel with a clean sheet design and it simply won’t happen, there won’t be a T32.

    • T32 will end up being Babcocks stretched T31 with a mission bay anyway. Theyā€™re making the pretence of it being a competition, but just like NMH which will go to Leonardo, it isnā€™t.

      A b2 T31, or T32 shouldnā€™t be ordered until Venturer is at least in sea trials.

      • Agree It would be very sensible to actually have the first in class finish its first in class trials before ordering another batch. Personally I donā€™t even think they need to go for the stretched version of the T31ā€¦itā€™s a bigger hull than most frigates already, just maybe tweak the sensor or weapons fit depending on RN needsā€¦the important part is getting the escort fleet back to a minimum size of 24 hulls as quickly as a reasonable.

        • The stretched hull is only stretched in order to make space for the multi mission bay. Itā€™ll be really useful and fit in exactly with what the MOD wanted with T32 anyway.

    • As to Tories have already lost the next election they should just order everything with cancellation clauses higher than the contract value.šŸ˜€

        • That worked for the carriers didn’t it? Genuine question. I seem to remember them being uncancellable which is why they ended up both going to build despite (at the time) Cameron’s government trying to find ways to off load them?

          • But there were reasons for that which do not apply here.
            Doing what was suggested would leave all the parties involved open to fraud charges. The politicians involved should face treason charges.

    • To be honest, external factors have derailed the budget this time around – inflationary pressures, need to create stockpiles and adapt to Russian threat, backfilling equipment sent to Ukraine. Treasury has refused to allocate any new money except for replenishing stocks so MOD has had to improve readiness on previous budget which has been eroded by global economic conditions. So blame Liz Truss, Putin and Sunak rather than MOD this time.

    • The air defence system for the Navy that is going to be centred on T83. No, I don’t know why it’s a separate item unless there are going to be two classes? We can but hope…

    • The air defence system for the Navy that is going to be centred on T83. No, I don’t know why it’s a separate item unless there are going to be two classes?
      I hope so, we could have a T31 based outer missile bus/small boats and inner one per group (Build 4) Air defence 8-10,000 tonne AD cruiser with FC/ASW and future anti-ballistic capability

      • It isn’t a separate class. It’s a system of systems that the T83 will just be part of. Like Tempest will be not just be a manned fighter. Drones, networking capability. Linking assets together to create a bigger picture of the battle space.

        • But it was included in their Shipbuilding Pipeline alongside the T83, which implies there will be a separate class of ships.

          • I would imagine that line will be the required work on other vessels to make the system of systems concept work.

          • Good point, they might want to fit aspects of FADS into T31, 26 in order to maintain them as useful carriers of AA missiles as well as offloaded sensors

          • Indeed from the sounds of it the expectation would be that it becomes a very advanced integrated air defence system far above what you find now in the fleet. So this would include an element of work on every escort and probably the carriers and amphibious vesselsā€¦.

    • Letā€™s be honest it never really existed..I still thing Boris misspoke and was actually taking about T31ā€¦then as Boris always has bluff through the mistake with a reconstruction of the trueth.

    • So true but I bet there will be no letup in the ever-increasing overseas commitments? In truth, most of our allies are in a similar financial fog when it comes to defence spending.

  2. We could save a lot of money if we just bought more battle-proven kit off the shelf. Halving the MoD headcount from 67,000 to 33,500 would also save a lot of money. Why does the Army need 650 Colonels and Brigadiers? What do they do all day? Other than having long lunches and nipping off early on Fridays?

    • Yep, because decapitating the command structure to save money has worked for so many countries throughout history. Definitely a military issue not a political one. /s

    • A lot of money could be saved in many ways. All the “pretend” programs in Government that cost a lot but deliver nothing in practical terms for the UK could go – much of the foreign aid could go, much of the “stop climate change” spending could go. But you would have to take on the entire establishment if you did that. Labour will do none of that. Indeed, the pretend program spending would simply go up. But neither will the Tories take on any sacred cows. They seem spent with absolutely no new ideas . … so the end result for defence becomes inevitable. There will be very large cuts in the years ahead.

  3. Increase ā€˜Navyā€™s surface escort fleet from 19 to 24 vesselsā€™, err no, from 17 (at best) to 24, Iā€™ll eat my hat on the day we ever have 24 escorts in play and I mean a serious hat at that, such as an Isambard Brunel style top hat.

      • What do you think it would do? I’m envisaging short range boat defence, like Martlet but wire guided? with submunitions for multiple targets. Maybe limited AA mode?

        • Hi there, this is the Defence Procurement Office of His Majesty’s Government. We’ve heard about your new missile and that it has “Advanced Networking”, “Next-gen guidance” and “Controllable submunitions”. We’d like an order of 3000 to put on all of our warships, please. How much will that cost?

          • Iā€™ve already spoken to the MOD some time ago and they insisted on a Ā£30 million due diligence process with 35 consultants and to pay Ā£25million per missile spread over 12years. I told them they only cost Ā£5k each and I can produce them all in a year, but Tarquin Mangrove, who headed up the MOD contracts team, said ā€˜dear boy, thatā€™s not how we do things hereā€™

  4. Always the same. Shortage of funds and cuts, nothing new.
    Russia and China are Happy to see Britain is no longer a rival.
    The future of one of the two Carriers is not safe with these traitors, (both parties)
    Thanks politicians.

      • What does our current PM know about elections? The last two elected leaders of the Conservative Party were in favour of spending more on defence. The current Chancellor and the Def Sec have both come out in favour of 3%. Only the unelected Prime Minister is against it. Votes have nothing to do with it.

  5. These Articles tonight on ukdj some what on the depressing side .But Facts are facts .Bet George feels like a drink tonight šŸŗ šŸ‡¬šŸ‡§

  6. Things will drop out of the portfolio all of the time. It may not be that far out when it comes to actually spending cash.

  7. We can’t really complain about the equipment budget, the amount available over the 10-year period has jumped 25% from last year (Ā£240 bn to Ā£306 bn).

    But still the projected spend over 10 years exceeds the budget by nearly Ā£17bn. To put that figure in perspective, it’s the equivalent of 200 Typhoons, or 42 T31s or 340 Challenger 3s. So heap big money.

    Of the forces’ 6 Top Level Budget Holders, 4 have come in around budget, having cut their cloth to fit. (Army, RAF, Strategic Command, Strategic Programmes Directorate (aka special weapons).

    2 are miles out, yet again.

    The Defence Nuclear Organisation is Ā£7.9bn over budget. Their budget is colossal but it’s ring fenced, and additionally has a guaranteed HMG contingency of Ā£10 bn, so they don’t really need to worry about breaking the bank. When we don’t have anywhere near enough cash for key equipment for the services, the enormous slice going to the nuclear programme gives pause for thought.

    The other problem child is yet again the Navy. They don’t have the money to pay for:
    – the two Proteus MROS ships
    – the 5 or 6 Boris T32 frigates
    – the up to 6 MRSS to replace the Bays and maybe the Albions
    – this future air dominance system thing.

    (I would take out the T83 destroyer figure, as it’s not now scheduled until 2038 I think, so outwith this 10 year equipment plan).

    What the RN is doing here is playing political games with the exercise. The NAO report says as much, in veiled civil service speak. The point of the NAO reports is to inform Parliament and the nation of HMG’s expenditure v budget, so that they can monitor what the Govt is doing. NAO does this for all the departments.

    What the RN is doing is setting out its wish-list, most obviously with an eye on the next defence review and being first at the feeding trough. Again, the report addresses this in veiled language but does point out that it is not ideal, as the point of the exercise is to monitor budgets and spend, not to get into departmental bidding wars.

    The RN already got a very healthy equipment budget increase from Boris, up from Ā£1.8bn to I gather Ā£2.2bn. I think that will have to do them for now. No doubt the money will be found – hopefully not from another Service’s budget – to pay for the second Proteus ship and the air dominance system.

    But there are far more important equipment needs than buying another 5 low-end GP frigates and the cost in ships to put a couple of hundred Marines onshore for a raid looks well out of proportion. I could see the littoral strike ship idea being canned and the Marines coming in from OTH by helicopter from a moderate-sized platform.

    • You have got it absolutely right. The RN have included what they would really like to have, a political bid. The other services have included only committed programmes.
      This year the MOD has not completed a full 10 year plan, so the NAO is reporting on the separate plans of each service. This is hardly the most useful way to deliver clarity, made worse, as in previous years, by aggregating acquisition and support costs.
      The DNE increase looks enormous but I assume includes costs arising from the Aukus agreement and an accelerated profile for Dreadnought spending.

    • You are right, there’s a huge leap, although not as big as you say. Indicative budget has increased from Ā£242bn to Ā£289bn, that’s a Ā£46bn increase. However, you forgot to check the breakdown. Neither procurement nor support budgets rise by much, not even in line with inflation.

      Ā£43.5bn of that Ā£46bn goes to Head Office funding.

      What is that? Restocking the wine cellar, we don’t know, or just we won’t say. All these “we can’t afford this that and the other” articles can’t be nailed down as we don’t know where the increased projected spend is going. Instead of focusing on the Ā£17bn black hole, how about focussing on the 730% increase in Head Office (centrally managed) funding.

      So instead we look at the pretty graphs in the NAO report, whose numbers don’t match the headlines. What’s that Ā£42.5bn ten year deficit in Fig 13? How does it relate to the Ā£17bn deficit?

  8. About time the MOD were forced to cut the horrendous amount of wastage. This wastage included civil servants in Whitehall as well as totally iliminating absolute waste by these civil servants who decide mid-contract equipment for all three services is not suitable, then change the design making everything far more costly. WASTE with incompetence. Listen to the people on the ground, they wil tell you what is required, rather than listening to some office bod who has never been to sea, never fired so much as a water pistol, never flown in a supersonic jet aircraft in combat.

    • The blurb suggested that the Army used different principles to decide what was included, only showing that which they have budget for. If the medium helicopter comes under their heading, it might still be planned, just not funded.

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