Why the British army is so unprepared to send troops to Ukraine.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer has said that Britain is “ready and willing to contribute to security guarantees to Ukraine by putting our own troops on the ground if necessary”.
While reports suggest these would be “peacekeeping” forces, the reality is that true peacekeepers must be impartial. British troops placed to support Ukraine could certainly be seen as “partial”. And the positioning of British forces in Ukraine would fit the Russian narrative that casts Nato as the aggressor.
This article is the opinion of the author, Kenton White, University of Reading, and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines.
Ukraine is not a member of Nato, but the goal of Nato membership is enshrined in its constitution. British forces involved in any sort of fighting in Ukraine would not enable article 5, which states that each member will regard an attack on any other member as an attack on themselves and assist it, to be invoked.
Additionally, US defence secretary Pete Hegseth said last week that European troops deployed to Ukraine should not be covered under article 5.
The weakness with Starmer’s idea is that Britain does not have the wherewithal to provide enough troops, supplies and weapons to act as a real deterrent. This isn’t too dissimilar from the state of British forces when faced with war in Europe more than a century ago.
In 1914 Lord Kitchener, then secretary of state for war, speaking of the cabinet’s decision to go to war in Europe, thundered, “Did they remember, when they went headlong into a war like this, that they were without an army, and without any preparation to equip one?”
Small numbers would be nothing more than a “speed-bump” against a large attack, as the British Expeditionary Force was in 1914 and again in 1940. Poor preparation, small numbers and limited equipment meant their deployment was more an indication of Britain’s support, rather than real capability to fight a long war against a peer enemy.
Britain is again in this position. Years of spending cuts have removed the ability of British forces to prosecute a war against a peer adversary for an extended time. The number of troops has fallen from 100,000 full-time trained personnel in 2000, to approximately 70,000 today.
Britain also does not have the capacity to manufacture at the levels required for a modern war. Much will be needed for immediate capital investment, such as manufacturing capacity for arms and ammunition. Longer-term investment will be required for arms production, as will the reinstatement of supporting infrastructure, such as airfields and storage facilities abandoned after the end of the cold war, both within Britain and across Europe.
There is no solution to the immediate problem except increasing the money available for defence. But Britain, and many other Nato members, have been unwilling to increase spending on defence, even though the current capabilities have been run down to such an extent that European nations cannot field a capable force.
Defence spending
US president Donald Trump has called for Nato countries to up their defence spending to 5% of GDP from the current Nato target of 2%. This would be very difficult to achieve in Britain’s current financial situation without spending cuts elsewhere.
While it has been reported that defence chiefs are pushing for a rise to 2.65% of GDP, Starmer indicated he would resist pressure to increase spending above 2.5%.
The last time the UK spent more than 5% of its GDP on defence was in the height of the cold war. The current international situation has already begun to shift into two distinct blocs similar to the east-west split between 1945 and 1991. However, the bipolar balance of the cold war has been replaced with an increasing instability, as displayed by Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine.
Replacing lost capacity is almost always more expensive than maintaining it. Had the governments of past decades maintained the capabilities of the armed forces, the overall cost would most likely have been lower than the amount the nation will now have to invest to obtain the same level of defence.
Each defence review since 1957 has led to cuts to the defence budget in real terms. Reductions in the military budget continue because, previously, nothing presented a sufficient sub-nuclear threat to the nation deemed significant enough to reverse them. Those cuts are now so deep that the nation is on the edge of being unable to defend itself, let alone project military power abroad in any significant capacity.
The prime minister wrote: “We have got to show we are truly serious about our own defence and bearing our own burden.” This assertion is quickly undermined by the indication that he won’t increase spending anytime soon.
None of the western members of Nato have shown any willingness to significantly increase their defence spending. Great Britain expects to spend £56.4 billion for 2024-25, amounting to approximately 2.3% of GDP. But this includes £0.65 billion in pensions and benefits, and £0.22 billion in “arms-length bodies” that do not contribute to the defence establishment in any practical terms.
Britain and Nato have had clear warning since 2014 to correct the deficiencies of their defences. All have chosen to ignore the developing threat from Russia. The impression is that not only are we hoping for the best, but we are planning for the best too.
Lord Tedder, chief of the air staff after the second world war, wrote, “It is at the outset of war that time is the supreme factor.” Three years into the war in Ukraine, and it is clear that Nato missed the opportunity to strengthen its defences in the early stages. It now faces a significant increase in defence spending simply to make up the shortfall from previous decades.
Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of Reading. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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Historical comment. Agree with the First World War commentary. I would strongly challenge the second world war analysis however. Following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in ’31, it was the UK that requested to break the ‘ten-year rule’. the country was fully mobilised in ‘rearmament’ by 1934. In particular bringing the RN and RAF to fighting strength. Yes, more could be done with hindsight but in face of uncertainty, the correct decisions were taken to support expeditionary, defensive and latterly total war. Britain was far from under resourced with ‘limited equipment’ having the only fully mechanised army in the world in 1939 and the most credible Navy in terms of support infrastructure, numbers and training.
Modern comment. There is a significant difference between unpreparedness and under-preparedness. I would argue we are very much facing the latter. The disappointingly slow behemoth of our military industrial complex has been waking for a few years. We have been increasingly (and somewhat fortunately with current hindsight) building military alliances outwith of the core restrictions of NATO (thinking JEF, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, increasingly working with the Commonwealth, and most recently announcements with Norway etc). I suspect we are contributing to the conflict in Ukraine far more than is being reported with (likely) intelligence, SF, tactical and operational advisors, training and some Combat Support capabilities either in country or very nearby. We have proven an ability to train conscript infantry at scale and speed – which regardless of how many drones exist in the world – will always be the backbone of the British Army in order to take and hold ground. Yes, much much more to do, particularly with regard to slowburn equipment production that should have been developed and paid for years ago, and the obvious requisite increase in spending, but far from unprepared. Perhaps it is an academic’s trope, but I’m sure we can collectively assure the author, they are not the only person thinking about this.
I’d disagree with your WW2 analysis. The Army might have been “Fully Mechanised” in 1939, but that needs context. For starters the BEF (the 1940 version) only had 9 Divisions when the Germans crossed the border (of the 135 Divisions the Western Allies had). The BEF was mechanised in 1940, but that was mostly by the artifact of us only sending Mechanised Units, while Germany and France sent everything (British Yeomanry Units would deploy to Palestine on horseback in 1940, and British Colonial forces would continue to have mounted components into 1942). Britain did not field a single Armoured Division in the lead up to Dunkirk (1st Armoured did eventually deploy, under-strength to France, and had to be evacuated from the Atlantic ports separately). So no, even with the breaking of the ten year rule, and going into re-armament, the British Army had still not become a large well equipped force.
(Also not sure why you’re bringing the Navy into this, the comments are clearly about the Army, and if the Navy in WW2 was in a good place, then the Navy in WW1 dwarfed British advantages in 1939).
Otherwise not much I disagree with in your modern comments.
Fair challenge, my own inherent bias brings the Navy in – apologies for broadening unnecessarily. Another key aspect is that the ‘full mechanisation’ relied heavily on rail, which being 60 years before the Chunnel, in hindsight brings further redundancy to my comment! You’ll probably have the figures to memory or at least on hand but what was the comparative mechanisation of the Wehrmacht coming up against the BEF. I recall hearing about them stealing French civilian cars/vans to support the advance. I think many (including me until embarrassingly recently) have the image of an armoured beast striking through Belgium when in reality there were a lot more horses, carts and shoe leather involved.
Fully acknowledge/agree your points on armour vs mech. I don’t think the Army ever really intended to be a large force however. Or rather the governemnt didn’t ever want a large army, what the Army wanted was probably very different. Small professional career soldiers with the ability to surge and train conscripts had been the British way for a long time before ’39.
Its funny to think that the 9 x WW2 BEF divisions that Dern referenced was considered to be a small force then. Today we would struggle to deploy just one well-balanced, well-equipped, well-resourced division.
Okay but:
1st Infantry Division in 1940 consisted of 3 Brigades with 3 Light Infantry Battalions and and AT Coy each, supported by 3 Field Artillery Regiments and a AT Regiment, 2 Machine Gun Battalions and a Armoured Car Regiment. 1 Engineer Regiment, 1 Field Hospital and 1 Logistics Regiment.
Like, yes, we had 9 of them, plus the Corps enablers, and there was a lot more on the way, but today a BEF Infantry Division would hardly be considered well equipped, well balanced, or well resourced.
Ooof no I don’t have that percentage to hand, and tbh I don’t even know how I’d find it, but what I know I’ll share: The Wehrmacht had 140ish divisions with which they invaded France and the Low countries. Out of that 8ish (I’m saying ish because there are a few detached Regiments, especially the ones that would later grow into Waffen SS Divisions) Divisions where in the Panzergruppe Kleist, which where all definitely motorised, mechanised, or armoured. Additionally there where another 5 Panzer Divisions outside the Panzergruppe which would have been fully mechanised. But I don’t know if, for example the 62nd Infantry Division (which together with 5th and 7th Panzer Division formed the XV corps in May) was Motorised, Partially Motorised, or completely reliant on foot and rail.
I’d say being as generous as I can possibly be, the Wehrmacht had at most about 20ish fully motorised divisions (if we assume any division that was in a corps with an armoured division was mechanised), of which 10 where Panzer Divisions, plus a few detached SS Regiments which where mechanised. For the remaining 120 Divisions, no idea, I’m sure none of them where fully mechanised, but how many of them might have had a motorised regiment here, or trucks to tow their guns there… eh your guess is as good as mine.
I don’t blame the image of the armoured beast striking through Belgium, because it kind of was. As I said Germany had 10 Armoured Divisions (again Britain started the Battle of France with none, the Matilda II’s of the Arras Counter Attack where a single Independent Army Tank Brigade that could be attached to an Infantry Division as required), and of those 10, half where all grouped together in an all Mechanised force that spearheaded the operation. Yes there was a lot of Horse cart and Shoe Leather (and trains) that followed, but they where much more about securing, and pinning then manuvering. (Also why a lot of senior Wehrmacht Commander got very pissy with Panzer Officers like Rommel who raced off into the sun; the Infantry couldn’t keep up.)
(Worth noting though that in those days there where ships and docks that meant that a train could leave london, be driven straight onto a ferry, and then when the Ferry came alongside in France be driven straight off the Ferry and onto the French rail network! (There still is one of these in Uganda).
While I don’t think the British Army was ever thought of as a force that could go toe to toe with the Wehrmacht on it’s own, I think everyone saw the beast that the British Army had grown into in 1914, and correctly saw that it would have to do the same again if required (By the end of the War the British and Commonwealth Forces where fielding 58 Divisions, and that was down from the high point in 1944).
Outstanding! Cheers!
I understood that most Wehrmacht infantry divisions relied on horses to pull there artillery
@Simon yes, but the question was “How much is “most”?”
I would go further, Britain from 1935 was seriously rearming in terms of naval and RAF but also in tank design for the Army, Chamberlain was buying time with diplomacy but we had already got into a war footing. It was this change in 1935 that brought us the the spitfire and carriers for the Navy, both of which were huge assets in beating the Germans. If we had blindly kept the levels off spend up to 1935, we would have had loads of useless battleships and legions of biplanes, instead the 1935 reboot allowed for new thinking and it gave us the weopons we needed, so the perception we were very ill prepared by 1939 is incorrect. Where we went wrong in the BEF was tactics not equipment, our tanks were decent against German/czech tanks.
But we did have 26 TA divisions with a field force of @340000 to add to the regular army. Even though modern weapons require longer and better training, increasing the reserves to allow total forces to be double, even treble the current 70,000 ought to be achievable. However well trained and equipped ( they’re not,yet) 70000 is too small a force to make much of a contribution anywhere, especially the vast areas on the Ukraine Russia border.
Sending British troops to keep the peace between two sides who have far larger experienced and fully equipped forces is a foolish idea.
We shouldn’t interpret the Ukraine war as an imminent threat to the UK. Rather it is a timely reminder, especially to politicians who like to ignore the problem, that our defence forces are too small to deliver credible conventional deterrence. A well planned longer term expansion will be far better than a panicked over reaction.Germanys commitment of €100b to upgrade the Wehrmacht has delivered very little. The German army is actually slightly smaller than 3 years ago.
Correction: The TA had *IN THEORY* 26 divisions. But there’s a reason why the BEF, even after nearly a year of War, still only had 9 Divisions, and not it wasn’t “They didn’t deploy TA Divisions,” of those 9 Divisions, 4 where TA. In fact there where 3 more TA Infantry Divisions in France, but they where placed on rear area Security details because they where judged not ready for combat operations and didn’t see action.
I agree with much, but not all, of the nuance you have provided. However, the ability to train infantry is one thing, the ability to equip them is another thing completely. Rifles, body armour, ammunition, vehicles would all be beyond us to manufacture in quantity at short notice (unless we’re sending them into battle in Nissan Qashqais. I hope that some secret contingency plans for such a scenario do exist; if not a secret reserve of weapons, at least some sort of legal insurance contract to have first dibs on manufacturing facilities / plant machinery in the US or elsewhere, that could essentially be requisitioned by HMG at short notice.
I also hope that when we do eventually replace the SA80, rather than being scrapped or sold, they are put into war storage in case we need to raise a large number of troops at short notice in the future. Easy enough to do with small volume objects like personal weapons and ammo; harder (but still possible) to do with vehicles.
We do however have the geographic advantage of any potential enemy having to get through the rest of Europe first, which would buy us some time. The regulars and reserves could play their part in expeditionary operations helping allies while the rest of us get our act together back home!
Carrickter, cheers. Any idea what they did with hundreds of thousands of SLRs? Were they pragmatically put away somewhere or just sent to be razor blades and plowshares?
Many were just scrapped, some sold to Sierra Leonne, and some sold for spare parts to other countries operating different versions of the rifle. I believe a small amount were deactivated and retained for ceremonial purposes. Here’s hoping some of that is porkies from HMG, and that in reality there is a bunker somewhere with thousands stored in case the s*** hits the fan. But that’s probably wishful thinking.
Carrickter, why would we keep any SLRs for ceremonial purposes? Ceremonial troops always use the in-service weapon.
As mentioned before we do not store equipment that has been superseded.
Carrickter, in my experience we have never kept any kit (vehicles, weapons, whatever) once it is formally declared Obsolete and superseded. Thus it would not be at all unusual to keep SA80 when it is replaced. We lack storage and the money to keep old kit.
On a seperate and quite different point, Daniele and I had some discussions a while back about whether Army Reserve units all even had sufficient vehicles to move themselves en masse in one lift.
Ironically vehicles is the easiest. You joke about Nissan Qashqais, but civilian 4×4’s being bought up, or even just requisitioned and given to light motorised brigades is 100% something we would (and do in fact see in places like, for example, Ukraine)
There is a rumour that the goverment has a plan to increase defence spending to 3% and it will be announced soon. It will be over several years but seems like positive step in the right direction if true.
Yeh ive seen a paper with some stats on .. 3% by 2030 blah blah
Too little too late
We need it sorted today so we can equip for tomorrow
Couldn’t spend 3% today if you tried.
It would be rapidly wasted.
A jump to 2.5% now and a ramp by 0.1%/yr actually makes sense.
3% is massive as about 0.8% is DNE and other ‘stuff.’.
So 3% actually means 2.2% on conventional up from 1.5%(ish).
Whether it happens or just policitcal speak is anyone’s guess, but here’s hoping.
We could easily spend 3% next year. I don’t know why you think otherwise. Are you just parroting the claptrap spread by the Treasury? Of course some of it will be wasted, but probably far less than the penny-pinching, slow to go ordering that we are doing at the moment. The gapping, the firing and rehiring, the extra training and working slowly up to operational status. That costs us far more per item than consistent ordering and replenishment.
3% is about an extra £20bn pa. We all know that we need spending on so many things, and what stops industry expanding is inconsistency and Treasury rules.
I think It would be difficult spending 3% next year as that would imply we could purchase 20 Billion £££’s worth of stuff, off the shelf. We could certainly commit this amount to advanced ordering but we ain’t getting anymore T26’s or Typhoons next year. You can’t spend all that money on things that are not produced.
@Freddie “We could certainly commit this amount to advanced ordering ”
Exactly. Who says that expenditure next year has to give us equipment next year? There is no such implication. Even off the shelf purchases won’t always come the same year. So let’s say that to keep the Typhoon lines hot and running we order 24 T4 Typhoons. It might mean coughing up a billion next year just to get the ball rolling. Nobody expects the Typhoons that year, but if we are lucky they’ll come before there’s another big war. We could pay BAE, BMT and Babcock to get designs for the Type 83, something we don’t epect to see operation much before the end of next decade. You have to start the buying at some point.
Not sure about this one. It is possible to engage building of factories, prioritize production for military, ramp up production in all installed factories. Barracks have to be built, air strip as well, naval shipyard must be enlarged. The school system can prioritize profil for workers, technicians and engineers. This is all relevant in this path. This won’t give you overnight an army, but will create the conditions to have one.
In the short term rapidly warmed-over Bulldogs and Warriors can be made available for patroling purposes with Foxhound and Mastiff. Boxer and Ajax production rates would need to be increased using both German and UK production for the former and a likelihood of follow-on orders not to be ruled out. Deploying CH2 should not pose too many issues beyond those identified under Ukrainian control. I feel sure a deferment of OSD for Bulldog and Warrior is the best option for quickly deploying vehicles on the ground.
The obvious way to fund a boost in UK defence, would be to cut the excess 66,000 civil service jobs, created during lockdown & now surplus to requirements, as the last Tory government was about to do. That way the UK can boost military numbers by 15,000. 2500 each for RAF & RN, 10.000 for the Army. That is needed for any Ukraine peacekeeping force. Also keep the last tranche 1 RAF Typhoon & upgrade them for less than ten million each, or we will not have enough Typhoon to deploy.
Let’s pay for Defence spending by cutting spending on Defence! That’s what you just argued for. Civil servants do the job far more cheaply than uniformed secondees and more cheaply still than the industry consultants who were brought in after Cameron’s ransacking of the civil service. Somone has to do the job, and the civil service is the cheapest way of getting it done.
Rubbish, Most of the excess were taken on for pandemic schemes that no longer exist. You can’t spend the same pound twice, so you have to make sure each pound is well spent.
Truly, you are clueless. You voted for brexit? Do you understand the costs that Brexit has heaped upon the Civil Service and private sector?
Why is this about Brexit? Excess civil service numbers are still a drain on the economy, regardless of whether we are in or out of the EU.
I think he’s talking about the civil service more generally, and not MOD civilian staff.
Except 66,000 isn’t the Civil Service more generally. There are around 62,000 civil servants in MOD and around half a million in the country as a whole. Cutting MOD civil servants to pay for defence was a Sunak talking point as was the idea there are excess civil servants who had been hired to deal with Covid. Absolute nonsense, but cleary swallowed hook, line and sinker by some people.
All the politicians trot out the efficiencies line because they don’t want to spend more money, and that “plan” has been an abject failure since long before I was born. They still keep trotting it out. So you’ll hear we shouldn’t spend more money until we spend what we have properly. Unfortunately Defence expenditure is inherently risky and some projects will always fail or come in over budget — always. So the efficiency first, more money later argument is the same as saying never anymore money.
Sorry, you are right, I misread John’s original message.
use the foreign aid budget , since it is a bit of a emergency .
I watched Question time on the BBC last night, Ben Wallace was excellent but listening to for CGS Nick Carter was just laughable, yes he sounded plausible with all the right soundbites but when he started going on about the Army’s lack of MBT’s I just lost the will to live.
It’s worth a watch on iPlayer.
I thought he was the General who cancelled Warrior upgrades, extra CR3 and just about anything else for his Strike idea. The way he was talking anyone
would think he’s hoping to get recalled as a candidate to replace the present CDS !
I’m quite happily waiting to hear what Mrs M & M (Moore & Mandelli) have to say about it.
He WAS!!!!!!!
Comedy Gold – calling himself out….
I’ve explained that sorry saga enough times here, and the damage to the CS CSS area. We had 6 deployable brigades, 7 including 3 Cdo, till Strike came along and neutered 3 Divisions 3 Armoured Brigades and the 2 in 1 Division that had a full set of CS CSS.
And now he wants Tanks.
Another journalist gave him an easy ride as usual.
Yes that man burned the CS and CCS as well as gutting the actual deployable brigades..quite amazing really.
Ben Wallace is a jingoistic idiot.
ABC, Carter presided over the Army 2020 restructuring work and its evolution into the Orbat shown in ‘Future Soldier’ (FS). The FS structure was published in booklet form sometime after the April 2021 Integrated Review (possibly in November) and reduced the RAC from 3 armoured regiments to 2 (that change has not happened yet but it is a matter of time). With only 2 armoured regts in the Orbat it is hardly surprising that translates to having only 148 tanks, although that postulates a tiny Attrition Reserve.
Carter cannot, with a straight face, complain about the small number of tanks once CR3 is fielded. Whatever other talents he undoubtedly had, he was a hopeless strategic planner and Portfolio Manager.
I also disagree that we are not prepared for War!
British Army and the armed forces in general is seen continously training at home and abroad for all types of battlefields
I think that we can put a good sized force straight into Ukraine…and adapt as “future soldier” has been created for exactly this reason
We have equipment, not quite enough but if the Ukrainian’s can fight with sweet FA then the “be the best” British Army whose been helping give some basic training should damn well be able to DO IT!
This “cant do” attitude is part of the problem…in fact its ‘institutional’
I think everyone agrees that we have great people who are highly trained and motivated, but in no way do we have the same sort of mass that the Ukranians had even at the start of the war. They had large amounts of legacy soviet equipment leftover from the dissolution of the USSR. Poorly maintained, if maintained at all, but at least most of it wasn’t scrapped or sold. The UK MOD has a very stingy storage policy, and sells or scraps virtually everything.
The Ukranians have also had huge amounts of donated equipment and funds to keep them in the field.
But I also agree that we need to be more optimistic about what we can achieve, it’s the political will / competency that is lacking.
We also work our equipment to death (which is a side effect of having highly trained personnel), even compared to ‘peer’ countries like France. So it wears out faster and we end up cannibalising units to keep others functional. Modern, digital, and especially western, equipment also needs more TLC than cold war era analogue technology / equipment. Obsolescence of niche parts (especially electronics) plays a big part in decisions about the economic viability of storage vs canabilisation etc.
John, What do you call a good size force for this Peacekeeping or Peace Support or Stabilisation operation in Ukraine, if it ever came Britain’s way?
This would be an enduring operation, not a ‘one-shot’ short duration operation.
We would be very pressed to send a brigade group of 6,000 on an enduring operation without massive recourse to the Army Reserve and/or RM. If the powers-that-be decided it had to be done by just the regular army, then we could only supply and roule a BG, plus a National Support Element, say about 1,000 – 1,500+ guys and girls. That also fits with the limited amount of armoured/mech equipment and troops we have, as light role troops would not be suitable.
Does Starmer know?
That there are 2 Batteries of 155mm left?
2 Regiments of Tanks.
4 Battalions of Warrior.
And can maintain a BG in Estonia by committing the 2 heavy Bdes we have, 12 and 20, from their supposed reserve role.
And he loftily suggests deploying to Ukraine, an act which would split our minimal forces even more?
Even using 1 Div assets is not sufficient as they lack CS CSS bar 16 and 7.
Last time Labour were in power, around 2006, there were 6 Regiments of 155mm, 6 Regiments of tanks, and 9 Warrior Battalions.
They need to stop this can do attitude and say no.
If Russia is a threat to NATO, then give the army an area, Estonia, or further north, and do not disperse it.
Re reading that. To clarify, there are still 3 Tank Regiments, due to reduce to 2. The KRH did not convert thankfully, due to Ajax delayed.
DM, now that M777 is going back into production, perhaps some could find there way into British Army Artillery units?
I think unlikely.
DM, credible summary as ever. Cheers. This is a really valid question; I do wonder how honest the MoD are being with the Cabinet. The ‘can do’ attitude is the MoD’s self-harm. We saw plenty of ‘good old bloke’ whitewashing when I was in Whitehall. Figures squeed, statistics left out to make the situation appear better, and double-tapping at-readdiness units into various commitments. It’s quite a worrying state of affairs. I think I have just enough faith remaining that Jonathon Powell and Lord Robertson are actually holding the Chiefs to account through the Review… hopefully there will be something meaningful on the horizon.
Thank you, NDG.
Respect.
Fingers crossed, but my faith in HMG re defence has never been lower.
Agree Daniele – i watched the British Army detachment in Romania ( commander ? ) the other night on the news and he was positively Gung Ho – yes Sir ,No Sir ,Three Bags Full Sir,we can do X,Y and Z.it’s about time someone stood up and said NO ! if you send us into the quagmire that is Ukraine we will have our Arseholes handed back to us on a Plate.
It’s a scary though but I suspect starmers grasp of the actual capabilities of the armed forces will be what he’s told by the MOD and what seniors say to the people they care accountable to tends to be a load of bollox to be honest..because it’s those that say yes and don’t rock the boat are the ones that get promoted…
Starmer has no idea about defence , he is an expert in woke endophobic and welcome “refugees” policies
I am hoping all the pro-Ukraine chaps here tape a kitchen knife to a broom handle and take off to the Ukraine as soon as they can!!!!
Remember to take the brush off first.
I hope the weather in Moscow is better than it is here in Britain.
No need I can just fundraise for all my equipment, just as i do for the Ukrainians😉
If I need to replace the handle when the damp rots it, then later the blade after I’ve snapped it in some Ivan’s spine, can I proudly say when the war is won I’ve carried the same broom through the whole war?
Question is. Could UK, France, Germany, Poland and Holland etc pull together a force. Remember, Russian forces have had massive losses.
It’s about tipp8ng the deter balance alongside Ukraine. ..not instead of Ukraine.
I think the JEF provides a credible enough framework for a ‘coalition of the willing’ that could operate within an existing Command Structure to form together forces outside of a NATO ‘Article 5’ activation, which is looking increasingly unlikely with US rhetoric at present. It is a really useful coupling of the more vulnerable nations with some actual players. Let those in the Baltic/East deal with conscription and mass, let those in Scandinavia develop and deploy technical expertise and advanced weapon systems. Let the Brits and Dutch hold the standing Commands and contribute the Enablers. Any further interested Europeans could essential ‘bolt’ onto this model. All while maintaining a UK nuclear umbrella. It’s a good enough ‘starter for ten’. Also keeps the inherent infighting between UK, France and Germany as the major political players far outside of the conversation of Command.
Would be nice to see Turkey or Poland contribute the heavy armour though… as I can’t see it coming from anywhere else.
Pete – absolutely no chance,TTK went to Paris on monday full of hope for a consensus on sending Boots on the ground to Ukraine and came back empty handed,it won’t happen,too many different interests and insecurities at play.
Germany is never going to actively do anything to really confront Russia…it’s simply a void in the heart of Europe and in reality one of the main drivers of why Europe is not really able to flex is military or geopolitical muscle…
In reality is also the hear of the EU so the EU is essentially a security and geostrategic void.
Paul, the Russians have squashed any chance that NATO member nations will contribute peacekeeping forces. So they may be UN troops from the Third World.
The Russians have squashed any chance of Nato members only if Trump accepts the Russian position. Starmer needs to put Trump straight on why we are supporting Ukraine. Trumps’s accusation that the UK has done nothing to stop the war is out of order. Starmer needs to remind Trump that Ukraine is striving to free itself from same neighbour that gave them Stalin, collectivisation, Holodomor and millions of famine deaths.
This is where I think the use of the term peacekeepers forces is incorrect..the BAOR was not a peace keeping force and essentially any force put in Ukraine will not be peacekeepers they will be a deterrent force to help Ukraine defeat any further attack by Russia.
Peace keepers in Ukraine would be pointless as Putin is going to try and end Ukraine as in independent sovereign nation if it’s possible to do so..
We shouldn’t ever lose sight of the fact Russia has the capacity to reform and re-equip army groups fairly rapidly currently.
Their conscription and call ups of reservists have meant that despite massive loses in Ukraine they re-equip and reformed 1 an armoured corps and separate infantry division on the border of Estonia just 12 months after the original units were sent to Ukraine and decimated.
The UK needs to be careful not to become an Army focussed military- our national interest is in Naval and Air warfare not a large land army, the minute we need a large land army is the minute our EU allies and partners have utterly failed to face off against a Russian military they should easily be able to out muscle with far superior equipment, numbers and technology.
The EU is 500 million people with a GDP X8 times that of Russia- there really shouldn’t even be a contest
Putin however knows the EU is fractured, unorganised and ponderously slow to react- those are the greatest risks to an EU response or combining its militaries into a potent force that should be second only to the USA’s armed forces in terms of capabilities, reach, technological prowess and firepower.
Mr Bell, don’t worry that we will ever have a large land army. The last time it was large was well over 50 years ago, some might say 60-70 years ago. However our army exists to fight expeditionary operations – we do not leave all the army taskings to the Continentals. It may be small but its fight is in Europe (or elsewhere) not back at the UK base.
Yes- we still have to go to war with the army we have than with the army we ought to have!
It is one of the true tragedies and sad facts that when you are talking about an existential peer war the army you start with is sort of irrelevant, it’s the army’s you can construct and reconstruct that is the key to victory or defeat.
The peace time army really only has four core purposes
1) to act as a deterrent to your enemy actually starting a war.
2) to undertake any expeditionary activity and peacetime security
3) provide a core set of skills for building the actual armies that will fight the war
4) to ensure the nation does not suffer complete collapse before it can build a wartime army
If you look at every major war this nation has fought it essentially burnt through a number of armies and the peacetime army was long gone by the time the war ended.
A well written article – wish this was much more within the general public’s awareness.
The fact the Army is just 70,000 strong, the fact the RN has just 8 active frigates, 6 destroyers, 6 attack submarines and 2 carriers with limited air wings
the RAF has just 100 or so available typhoon aircraft and 35 or so F35Bs- not exactly a tactical airforce.
We have been crippled by incessant creeping cuts to our military with a reciprocal reduction in defence-industrial base.
To stop the rot and return muscle, mass and capacity will require targeted expenditure.
SDSR will have to take the armed forces budget up to 3% within the next 1-2 years.
Putin we all know is just going to repair, re-equip, rearm, train and then go again- we have 12-18 months max from the point the Ukraine war ends to prepare for his next military campaign and land grab- this time probably against a NATO country.
A crash rearmament programme is needed- but we wont get it, instead we will likely deploy around 10,000 UK troops to help form a ENATO peacekeeping force of just 30,000 to guard a Ukrainian frontier of nearly 900km frontline.
those 30,000 troops are NOT going to deter Russia, quite the opposite it will likely encourage and entice the chance to engage and destroy the “cream” of what Europe has to offer.
It is highly likely those 30,000 peacekeepers will be facing off against a Russian army (albeit poorly trained in the majority) but with a core of combat hardened and experienced soldiers. Russia is forecast to have a field army of around 1 million men/women within the next 12 months- equipment for those 1 million will be drawn from whatever stores they have left and donations or purchases from North Korea, China, Iran and some African states. So not exactly a high-quality army but the core will be reasonably experienced and they will have a significant numerical advantage over a much smaller Ukraine and ENATO peacekeeping force.
For me the biggest concern isn’t the small number of troops involved (30,000) its their complete lack of back up- what is going to be the rescue and full-back plan if this force is engaged, pushed back or suffers heavy losses?
To really deter Russia would require a European and ENATO force around 100,000 strong.
If he wanted something else (not that I think he does), I have a more generous time frame for his actions is typically 6-10 years:
2nd Chechen war 1999-2001 (major operations)
Georgian War 2008
Ukraine/euro maidan crisis 2014
Russo-Ukrainian war 2022
Hi Mr Bell you have to remember what the core would and and that’s arguably the single most experienced and successful army in the 21c and that’s the Ukrainian army…this is an army that has successfully driven the army of a nation 10 times its size into a grinding stalemate..that is very very impressive.
So ENATO would be providing the balance.. Ukraine would provide a battle hardened 250,000 strong army that would essentially take the hoard on faces to face .if Europe then sat say 10 heavy brigades behind that army to act as a mobile punch in the face. Then provided say 10 squadrons of 4.5 and 5 gen fighters to essentially maintain air dominance over Ukraine any Russia offensive would be a bloodbath on their part.
Ukraine would still provided the bulk of the on the ground fighting forces..
also you would essentially get Poland to hold kalingrade at risk…Russia attacks the rump ukrianne and ENATO forces..make it clear kalingrade gets removed. Play Russia at its own escalate to deescalate game.
So what does a decent British peacetime army look like…
3 heavy armoured brigades ( 1 MBT reg, 1 armoured cav reg, 2 armoured infantry battalions, 1 mec battalion, 1 armoured fire reg, 1 long range fires, CSS)
3 mec brigades (4 mec battalions, 1 cav regiment, 1 mobile fires reg, CSS)
1 air mobile/light brigade ( 2 para battalions, 4 light infantry battalions , 1 light fires regiment, 1 cav regiment)
Special forces
So by regiments and battalions
3 type 56 MBT regiments should have a total of around 220-250 MBTs all with active armour
6 armoured infantry battalions need a tracked infantry fighting vehicle ( say an updated warrior) 400 IFVs with active armour
3 heavy mec battalions 200 boxers
12 mec infantry battalions, decent APC ( Stanag level 3- 4) 1000 vehicles , some form of direct fire vehicle in support
4 light infantry battalions, should have protected mobility vehicles ( air mobile)
3 armoured fires regiments ( 155mm tracked self propelled 65 vehicles)
3 mobile fires regiments ( 155mm wheeled, 65 vehicles)
3 long range fires regiments ( rocket artillery 65 vehicles
3 armoured cav regiments..Ajax
3 Cav regiments wheeled cav vehicles
1 air mobile fires regiment..mix of 105mm guns and 120mm mortars
also increase the lethality of each of the infantry battalion by provision of 120mm mortars at battalion level and 60mm mortars at company level.
css for 7 brigades…
That’s a decent size peacetime army.
Pictures paint a thousand words (as ever remove spaces)
https: //i.imgur.com/m1kLykz .png
Baisically my take on what, money minimal object, a peace time British Army should look like (some of the Corps and Divisional enablers still need the correct unit counters and names applying). Baisically: The British Army needs to be looking at putting a small Corps in the field, it already has a framework for it through ARRC. It needs to make 1 Division a deployable Mechanised Division with 3 Brigades, it needs to make 3 UK Division a deployable armoured division with 3 Brigades, it needs an Airmobile Rapid Reaction Division built around 11 and 16, with 19 Brigade split into two sensible light motorised brigades, and Corps fires (though having a Corps Artillery brigade would lessen the need for Divisional Deep Fires, so it balances out).
We couldn’t field a division let alone a corps! Also we have huge capability gaps in our force structure- The ship that was Article 5 and US support has long since sailed in case anyone was in any doubt. We live in a new dystopian world. If we don’t reindustrialise and rearm we will be forced into a obligated US, Chinese or Muslim vassal state
I’d say reading comprehension isn’t your strong suit, but I even included a pretty picture, so you’re so bad at this you can’t even make sense of something a five year old could do?
I’ll say this in few words for you:
Chart shows what we should aim for. Also shows what is missing.
Got it?
(Also, absolutely could field a division. It’s the “for enduring ops” bit we’d struggle with. But for a single campaign or a peer war where we’d not care about harmony guidelines and long term retention? Yes we absoultely could deploy a division).
An expanded version of your earlier efforts, noted “money no object”
What would the establishment requirement be for such a force, given the several CS CSS formations that don’t actually exist that would need raising to realise it, beyond the combat arms.
Like the inclusion of Patria to mechanize as many Bns as possible.
I counted 24 extra units, 9 CSS, 6 Fires, 5 Air Defence and RPAS, 3 Infantry and 1 Cav. So anywhere from 8-10,000 extra headcount to enable that.
FFS mate, surely that is doable.
Yes, I didn’t count but there were quite a few I didn’t recognise. 😊
Interesting thoughts around having a full air mobile division. You are correct it would be useful and cover all the smaller global developments so the core heavy brigades can be focused on European security, while not impacting on UKs global picture.
Would you beef up 11 brigade and make those battalions full size light role infantry and add full CS CSS or just keep them as the small security intervention battalions with no CS CSS ? Amid with 19 brigade split into 2 would you make those reserve formations again fully deployable on their own as is ?
Reserves is one of the areas I think we have wrong in the UK, I think the reserve formations should be set up to be able to be constituted into actual deployable formations..not just as feeder formations, I think that would make them more understandable and appealing to young people who may want to serve but not have a career in the forces. Maybe look at the Scandinavian models or even the U.S. national guard model. I think the national guard model could be useful as I think we need to do a hell of a lot more around civil defence and civil contingencies in this country and to be blunt having used it the MACA process is not fit for purpose.
So as I understand it, speaking to people in 11 Brigade, they’re being beefed up anyway back to full Light Infantry Strength. I’m not sure I fully follow the Conops, but my impression is that the idea is for them to deploy to say, a Baltic Country, and slot into Paramilitary or Reserve Units to provide them with specialist capabilities (Snipers, Mortars, Anti-Tank), the ability to call in fires, and a few more professional infantry units. It’s an interesting idea, that has merits and weaknesses (I’m unconvinced that they’d be calling in a lot of fires for example, and I’m not sure how people would in practice feel about subordinating a light infantry brigade to an Estonian Defence Leauge General), but at least they’d be using Estonian CSS if they where embedded in their formations.
I agree with Reserves, although I think a balance can be struck (If it’s not clear on my orbats I differentiate between Regular and Reserve by having Reserves be a lighter colour, so each Brigade has at least 1 Reserve Battalion to beef it up). Dividing 19 Brigade up is exactly that, to make them entirely deployable as stand alone formations, with a clear orbat. Frankly I think 11 and 16 would take heavy casualties in any Rapid Reaction to a Peer-Peer conflict so probably would get amalgamated, and then reinforced by the two AR Brigades to keep the Airmobile Division a useful formation. I also think that while an Airmobile Division would be a global response unit, I included it in the Corps (I left some units like ASOB and the Overseas Garrisons, off the orbat because the Garrisons wouldn’t feature and ASOB would probably only provide a few sub units (so a SOF Group as per the orbat)) because it would also have a role in a European response. Rough Conops would be: Something happens in Estonia. 6 Airmobile HQ deploys with lead elements of 16 and 11 and takes command of units present in Estonia as a Brigade Group. As the rest of 16 and 11 and Divisional enablers arrive the Brigade Group becomes a Division. Then 1 and 3 mobilise and the Estonia Armoured BG is transferred to them, 11 and 16 probably rotate out of the line for refit as the division is probably just a Brigade again at this point. 19 and 42, having to call up are the slowest to arrive in theatre, are used to make 6 a Division again.
Just an example of how it could go, obviously there are permutations of this, but I think it’s a good way to balance having a rapid reaction force and giving it longer term mass.
I think there should be a civil defence structure, but I don’t think it should be MoD based. It should be set up as a purely civilian organisation that is appealing to people who, in peace time, wouldn’t touch the military with a barge pole. Fuck off things like dress standards, if your house is flooded your not going to refuse help because the person offering it has pink-blue ombre hair and a nose piercing, and make it clear that it’s not a reserve formation for the Army so that someone who has moral objections to interventions and expeditionary warfare can’t say it’s all a ploy to get bodies into the military to be shipped off for rich peoples wars. At most you’d have a LO to the local Regional Brigade, to facilitate Recruitment if a Peer War breaks out (the Regional Brigades should also handle the Regular Reserve and be responsible for them) and to coordinate Civil Defence Corps and Reserve MACA work. Plus we both know that having Civil Defence double hatting as a 3rd Line Army Reserve means that when the shit hits the fan we’d loose our Civil Defence Forces at the same time as they’d be most needed with Cruise Missiles falling on civilian infrastructure.
Interesting re 11 Bde.
Where is the manpower coming for that, considering the RA in both fires and AD also needs expanding, as does CS CSS generally.
No idea. :/
In reality, not far off the position pre 2010.
Indeed , I’m not really over ambitious for the army with the list, just what a peacetime army would look like for the commitments we have now. Mainly because I think our core military strength should always be the navy and airforce, We are still an island and don’t need to fight of a land invasion, just have a really solid core army that can deploy with an ally or nation we want to support at a strength that helps tip the balance on deterrent to stop a conflict occurring ( most people really do forget once your in a peer war you did not choose to start you have lost no matter the outcome).
If the British army then had to deploy formations to stabilise Ukraine as a long term commitment it would need to be added on a 3 for 1 basis to that basic list. Unless we stopped commitments elsewhere at the same level. So essentially if we were asked to add a heavy brigade to a European armoured division based in Ukraine we would essentially need an extra armoured division.
As you know, in full agreement regards the primacy of the RN and the RAF.
Why is the army so unprepared to send troops to Ukriane? … perhaps because sending troops to the Donbas is not in the British national interest?
Today the army has been in steady rapid decline since the end of the cold war, earlier in fact since Thatcher atarted cutting forces after the Falkands war. Every government has cut further so today we have a tiny 70,000. Of that the great majority are support & traning personnel etc vital to enable a very small field force to deploy when needed. Our army hasn’t been this small since c1800. Our two biggest & best LPD amphibious ships that would be excellent to move troops & heavy gear to UKR are about to be scrapped without replacement in sight. They’d also be invaluable if we need to evacuate forces. To save money we’ve also run down much of the basic arms manufacturing we once had, so replacing or increasing kit & stocks would cost us more on the open market & if we need stuff, it’s probable that all our allies would need it also, creating quite a scramble for it.
Basically we’re already cut so far our forces are considerably too small for the most peaceful times. If we were to deploy say 6,000 troops to UKR, they’d need to be rotated every few months & yet we have a very small pool of combat troops, so that would be a real struggle. Get into serious combat & losses of men & material & we’d likely soon be unable to sustain what we need to do as the capacity was thrown away decades ago. The RAF & Navy are in no better condition.
Sadly I think until Ukraines allies are prepared to deploy forces to face down Putin & tip the balance to drive him either out of UKR or to the peace table in a suitably contrite, serious state of mind, this will just carry on until either UKR is ground down(being stabbed in the back by Trump doesn’t help) or Russia breaks under the expense of the war & the losses taken.
Thatcher? Um no.
In 1946 the BAOR was 4 Armoured Divisions and 7 Infantry Divisions.
In 1950 it consisted of 3 Armoured and 1 Infantry Division, 80,000 soldiers
In 1956 it was reduced to 2 Armoured and 2 Infantry Divisions, and cut to 60,000
In 1960 the 4 Divisions where disbanded and the BAOR became 7 Brigade Groups, cut to 55,000 soldiers
In 1970 the BAOR had become 3 Divisions.
In 1978 the trend was briefly reversed by the addition of a 4th Armoured Division
But by 1982 The BAOR was again 3 Armoured Divisions, with an Infantry Division stationed in the UK.
The continuous down-scaling predates Thatcher, we just seem to not pay attention to the force structure pre 1980.
It’s worth mapping the actual manpower of the British army against its BAOR position as it really does tell the story of what size army we need for a specific level of permanent commitment in central or Eastern Europe.
1950 364,000 for those 80,000 deployed BAOR forces ( which is probably way more than was needed for the commitment due to other imperial requirements).
1960 258,000 for those 55,000 deployed BAOR forces
1970 178,000 for 6 brigades ( although it was 3 divisions, each division only had 2 brigades)
1980 158,000 for 6 brigades deployed
You can probably state the case that we have the equivalent of 2 brigades deployed at preset for our 70,000 army..which does show the point that smaller armies are actually less efficient at generating deployable brigades and if we actually want to up our deployments in Eastern Europe we need a bigger army with permanent basing to make it efficient and effective and that the 70,000 army we have at present is insufficient for efficient generation of brigade level formations. If we are being very very serious about defending Europe then efficiency of effort needs to be considered…essentially lots of small armies are inefficient and a smaller number of large armies would be better able to defend Europe…maybe this is where we need Poland and Germany ( if they wake up ) to step it up and build 150,000 strong armies…
Because it would seem the most effective way to deliver significant impact in central or Easter Europe is to have some 150,000 armies as these are able to deliver 3 divisions on a permanent deployment basis.
hrrrrmmm I think the problem with that is that the British Army in the 50s-90’s generated a lot more permanent overseas deployments than just the 6 BAOR Brigades. A non-exhaustive list of permanently deployed UK Brigades in the 70s and 80s would include
-Berlin Field Force/Berlin Area Troops/Berlin Infantry Brigade
-Hong Kong Garrison
-48th Gurkha Brigade (Hong Kong/Brunei)
-Belize Garrison
– 4 Brigades deployed to Northern Ireland.
(And as for your other point, I think Poland and Germany are not far off 150,000 strong armies (Poland is 110,000 and Germany is somewhere between about 100-120,000)
@ Dern indeed I don’t think we should be heading back to 150,000, Poland, Germany need to do that and if Ukraine ever joined then so would Ukraine. Also a lot of the smaller nations that are directly threatened need to up their armies a lot. Personally I think the central and southern European field field army burden should be
Germany 2-3 deployed divisions
Poland. 2-3 deployed divisions
France 1 deployed divisions
Italy 1-2 deployed divisions
Uk 1 deployed brigade and a divisional HQ supporting:
Spain 1 deployed brigade
Netherlands and smaller nations 1 deployed brigade and divisional CS/CSS
Then if Ukraine joins and becomes the frontier 3 deployed division
That would essentially give a central and southern Eastern European army of 13 divisions, Russia could not fight that.
In the north I would have
1 Uk divisions
1 france 1 brigade and HQ for division
2 brigades from Denmark and other smaller nations
2-3 divisions Lithuanian, Lithuania Estonia
1-2 divisions Norway, Sweden and Finland
Marine division UK lead
Giving 10:divisions for the north
Perhaps we, and the rest of Europe, should boost defence spending to 5% or maybe more. We should build a European Treaty Organisation and build a solid defence for Europe second to none. This day was bound to come whereby we cannot 100% count on our allies and perhaps need to make absolutely sure we can defend ourselves. It might be an advantage in some ways as we can more quickly to autonomous solutions which are obviously cheaper and easier to produce.
Currently we have a peacetime military – just as we have had at the outbrek of every major conflict throughout history.
Perhaps we need to accept that and shift to a war footing or at least a cold war footing.
When you say ‘we’ are you referring to the UK or freeloaders like ROI?
The UK. That said we need to accept the ROI are incapable of defending themselves so we might need to station troops there as we would not want an enemy gaining a foothold.
The ROI have not worked out that most of the UK’s friends were once enemies. Perhaps if the ROI were to be invaded by the Russians they might suddenly see the UK as potential liberators and their attitude might change.
Never going to hit 3% of GDP
We don’t hit 2% real defence spend is around 1.8% to 1.9% of GDP.
According to the PESA tables from the treasury. They forcast GDP for 2025 as £2784.2 Billion with defence spending being £66.2 Billion.
(100/2784.2)*66.2 = 2.38% of GDP is spent on defence.
If you take of Foreign military aid (£3.3 Billion), and Foreign economic aid (£6.5 Billion). Plus the quoted £0.65 billion in pensions and benefits, and £0.22 billion in “arms-length bodies you get.
(100/2784.2)*(66.2-(3.3+6.5+0.65+0.22)) = 1.9945% of GDP spent on defence
Then you have the cost of Trident WHICH WAS NEVER INCLUDED IN THE DEFENCE BUDGET percentage of GDP until that git Osbourne. That’s anywhere between £3 Billion & £5 Billion a year.
(100/2784.2)*(66.2-(3.3+6.5+0.65+0.22+3)) = 1.887 %
(100/2784.2)*(66.2-(3.3+6.5+0.65+0.22+5)) = 1.814 %
So the real spend is around 1.8% to 1.9% of GDP. Great no wonder the Army has triple the amount of horses (roughly 500) compared to the number of main battle tanks (>200), It is 1914 all over again. Is two-tier Stalin planning on another charge of the light brigade in Crimea ?
OMG, it’s almost a horse isn’t the equivalent of a tank. Who’d have guessed!?
So are you going to be leading the charge on the horses then ?
I think what Dern is saying is that a horse does not cost 25 million dollars which is what a modern MBT will set you back..infact you can get 5000 horses for the price of an a new MBT so those 500 horses would buy you 1/10 of an Abrahams.
See that bit where I said a horse isn’t equivalent to a tank? Yeah re read that.
Umm you do realise the foreign aid budget does not sit in the MOD/defence budget…it sits with the foreign, commonwealth and development office and then around .5 billion sits with the home office..so you can stop removing that 6.5 billion from the defence budget.
As for the military aid to Ukraine that budge line comes straight from the treasury reserve and not the mod budget..so you can remove that as well. People tend to get confused because they stick it in the MOD accounts as a supplementary figure, but it’s not part of the UKs defence budget.
I do wish people would actually go into the parliamentary and department library and look things up…we do have open government so if you spend the time you can find these nuggets…
“The UK has been one of the leading donors to Ukraine, alongside the US and Germany. To date, the UK has pledged £12.8 billion in support to Ukraine since February 2022, of which £7.8 billion is for military assistance. This includes £3 billion for military assistance in 2024/25. Funding is met from the Treasury Reserve and will not come from the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) main departmental budget. Spending on Ukraine does, however, appear in MOD spending figures towards the end of the financial year as part of the MOD Supplementary Estimates. “
As for the nuclear deterrent..well if we are comparing like for like everyone else in the world includes it in defence spending..but then many nations also totally lie about defence spending
USA..inflates nits defence spending as it includes a lot of security service stuff that others don’t also includes all the free stuff it gives Israel
China basically just straight out lies about it and is actually spending 2-5 times what it says depending on who you trust..but then china has managed to convince most of the world it does not have a blue water navy…har har.
Isreal. It’s actually a crime to mention Israel’s nuclear weapons even though everyone knows they have the full triad and as many warheads as the Uk and France combined…
But we are pretty open with our defence budget and it does not include foreign aid…