The Government’s policy on when the United Kingdom might employ its nuclear deterrent, and the resources needed to sustain that capability, were debated in the House of Lords on 5 June, according to Hansard.
Lord Trefgarne, Conservative, sought categorical assurance that “our nuclear weapons will be used only when our supreme national interest so requires, and in no other circumstance.”
Defence Minister Lord Coaker replied that the deterrent would be contemplated “in the most extreme of circumstances,” stressing a principle he has “said many times at the Dispatch Box”—that the purpose of the deterrent is to prevent conflict: “It is that whole concept that sometimes seems contradictory: that by preparing for war, you prevent war. The strategic nuclear deterrent is the most significant example of that.”
Labour peer Lord West of Spithead said Britain’s nuclear enterprise has “always been at the very limits of our technological, industrial, scientific and cost profiles.” Recalling the slow pace of early warhead projects such as Blue Danube and the subsequent Beard series, he warned that current pressures from the civil-nuclear sector compound the challenge.
“We have to have a really national endeavour among all departments to pull together so that we can get the training of scientists and everyone focusing on this particular issue, because otherwise we will find it very hard to deliver—certainly within the cost parameters, but very hard to deliver anyway.”
Lord West added that a prime-ministerial review he conducted while in government had confirmed the independence of the deterrent—“I was allowed access to all sorts of things, and the answer is that it is independent”—though over the next two or three decades “that becomes more difficult, because of maintenance of missiles, for example.”
Lord Coaker agreed that sustaining the arsenal must be “a national endeavour,” acknowledging that “the need for us to upskill, to have more apprentices and to have more of the systems available to us in order for us to be able to deliver the defence programmes and projects that we want is a challenge.”
He concluded, “Let me be clear that we will make sure that we have all the necessary skills and capabilities required to maintain our nuclear deterrent.”
This fantastic deterrent capability continues to put the UK at the cutting edge of global power, the skills and technical brilliance are second to none and a credit to the determination and professionalism shown by all involved.
Shame the missiles keep plopping back in the salty stuff.
I wish there was a like button here to click.
There was once, along with a dislike.
Both were abused so they were removed.
“Be careful what you wish for”.
Two failures in 2016 & 2024, unless there’s others that haven’t been publicised. I know they were successive but maybe that means they should be tested more often.
We have a nuclear deterrent and a conventional deterrent. I am not sure most people have the foggiest idea what deterrent means. Our CAST nuclear deterrent has been 100% successful demonstated by all the wars we haven’t had. The conventional deterrent needs a little re-inforcement with a substantial increase in kit to demonstate that we can easily defeat any force which might threaten us. We also need our allies to understand that Russia cannot be allowed to enlarge itself to become the sort of threat it was during the cold war.
Correct insofar that a strong defensive and offensive posture and capability, with the will to go toe to toe with others, does prevent war! Simple! War is not won by fairness, there should be no fair fight in war and combat, war is prevented by strength and won by courage and good planning and logistics!
“War, what is it good for, absolutely nothing”.
Say it again, Edwin.
He’s a starr…
We have a major problem with defence in the UK. Due to the austerity peace dividend cutbacks we are left with next to no home defence capability and are increasingly if not solely reliant on the all or nothing existence threatening option of nuclear retaliation. The problem with this therefore is that at what point do we initiate a response with these weapons? Is it after a few undersea cables and oil platforms are destroyed, an airbase obliterated, or a couple of our few air defence destroyers and accompanying aircraft carrier with half our F35 fleet sunk? Is a nuclear response proportionate? And what happens after the on patrol Vanguard submarine has exposed its whereabouts and let off its handful of missiles? We cannot adequately defend our air space with anything other than a handful of aircraft operating out of then defunct air bases, and we certainly have no adequate ammunition re-supply capability, or the means to scale-ably produce replacement weapons and systems. If we don’t have any other form of conventional defence, much like a honey bee, then the only option is that nobody survives. What real choice is that? And faced with that choice the likelihood of not unleashing MAD reduces even further.
Due to these long standing cutbacks we have no real resilience, no home guard backstop, no civil defence capabilities and even if we have invoked nuclear armageddon and an aggressor decides enough is enough, what then?
Our nuclear capability is no more than a means of retaliation after an imaginable event. The policy fails because it assumes that we will always be left alone with no interference in our affairs because of the risk of a nuclear response. Real defence is based on credible and ample conventional capability able to deal with potential peer on peer threats. It is not sufficient to scale our forces on the basis of only ever barely carrying out police actions in third world countries, and even that is reliant on other countries. Only having the capacity to present a short term brigade expeditionary force after denuding what is left for the homeland is far from credible.
We have placed far too much emphasis on nuclear backstops in the hope or expectation that the US will appear over the horizon on a just-in-time basis. Defence must, in order to have any credibility, be able to defend our borders and infrastructure for years if necessary as well as be able to protect supply lines of vital raw materials. This includes upping our medical and care resources as they are just as important as front line troops, and that every citizen has a role to play.
Whether or not we retain a nuclear backstop is one question, but without a credible conventional defence and resupply capability it is a moot point if there is any real value in the expenditure on that one all or nothing system. Those costs could be much better spent reinforcing non-nuclear forces, and boosting national resilience capabilities, which incidentally also support our armed forces, if nothing else something for the them to come to!