An Independent Scotland in the World

In my first article in this series, I felt it was important to begin by laying out the sort of Scotland that I think independence can achieve; from there, we can move on to describe the context in which we think it will happen. I ended that article with a plea for a security offering that addresses the social and economic realities of our communities, so I want to begin this one with an attempt to understand the immediate external context.

The most important security relationship that an independent Scotland will always have will be with those closest to us, both geographically and in terms of security interests: the UK (rUK) and Ireland.

This is a straightforward and, for me, at least, obvious statement, but one which nonetheless bears repeating, as it never ceases to amaze me that people don’t expect me to say it. Because just as it is a healthier, wealthier, and happier Scotland that we wish to be defending, rUK and Ireland will be a vital part of that going forward – not only because of the familial, social, cultural, and economic bonds that will continue to flourish after Scotland regains its independence but because of the obvious mutual interest in securing our islands of the North Atlantic (IONA).

Written by Martin Docherty-Hughes MP, Member of Parliament for West Dunbartonshire since 2015 and SNP Defence Spokesperson since 2023, this article is part of our series exploring diverse perspectives on defence and security issues. While the opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the stance of the UK Defence Journal, we believe in the importance of presenting a variety of viewpoints. Understanding different perspectives is essential for a comprehensive grasp of complex subjects. For more articles in this series, please click here.

Three other immediate points spring to mind: firstly, the importance of ensuring ‘losers consent’ as the many Scots who voted against independence are able to see that they remain a vital part of our ‘common weal’. Secondly, the understanding that the wounded pride of a rUK coping with the loss of population, territory and prestige, which will inevitably flow from a Yes vote, will be an immediate source of tension and require a magnanimous and open-hearted attitude from Scotland’s leaders.

This is an understanding that is gleaned principally from the experience of Brexit we have all lived through in recent years. The relationship between Brexit and Scottish independence can often be overdone, but there is a constant and subtle interplay between both, which we don’t have enough time to examine fully in this article. Needless to say, as the Member of the Defence Select Committee who has mentioned the need for a comprehensive Defence and Security Agreement with the EU more than any other, I believe that a ‘Good Neighbourhood Treaty’ specifically with the rUK would be an important statement of intent for other international partners and a lynchpin in the building of a mutually focused security collaborative with our closest geographical allies and friends, but one where Scotland actually has a voice at the table to accompany our stake in the game.

This is also a reality which flows from an understanding of the other sovereign state we share our islands of the North Atlantic with: Ireland has an ambitious and opaque security relationship with the UK, which it has never been able to quite bring itself to publicly acknowledge. I do not believe that this will be the path Scotland will take for a number of understandable historical reasons, but it could also have the corollary effect of galvanising a more honest approach to security with three sovereign states instead of just two.

The first test of this new relationship, and the one that will hove into sight upon an independence vote, will be the negotiation to remove rUK’s Continuous at Sea Deterrent (CASD) from its base at HMNB Clyde. I do not wish this article to get too caught up in this debate, but instead, to acknowledge the part it will play in the negotiations for, and eventual international recognition of, an independent sovereign Scotland.

My party’s policy is well outlined and understood: we would seek the removal of the rUK’s CASD as quickly and as safely as possible. While there are some who currently advocate the Sevastopolisation of HMNB Clyde, the realities of this option would entail too great a loss of sovereignty for an independent Scotland and, arguably more importantly, would simply not be in the interest of rUK.

As I have pointed out on many occasions, in the history of the nuclear age, no nuclear weapons state has had the entirety of its arsenal surrounded by the sovereign territory of another state. And even if it is a friendly one, there is no way that this will be seen as an acceptable risk, as security experts such as Francis Tusa have argued.

The precipitous removal of CASD from HMNB Clyde to the Southwest of England – Devonport or Falmouth most likely – will become of immediate importance for rUK upon an independence vote. It will also be an important moment to recognise the changing reality of rUK nuclear politics: According to Matthew Jones’ excellent official history of the UK Nuclear Deterrent, one of the primary drivers of situating Polaris on the Gare Loch was satisfying American partners its proximity to a major conurbation: a reality which has significantly changed as the South West of England has developed, even if not as quickly as those folk I’ve spoken to there would like. Other advantages to rUK for this move would be a quicker ingress and egress into the North Atlantic, along with a more straightforward link with the Nuclear Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston in Berkshire.

The centrality to Scottish foreign policy of being a good neighbour in this regard will provide a strong foundation for what comes after that, and Scotland’s identity as a European state, anchored firmly in our North Atlantic neighbourhood, will inform everything that we do.

Geographically, it is essential to look at a map of Scotland’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to understand the change that independence will bring to our security posture and outlook. Scotland has 62% of the UK’s maritime area: a longer coastline than France, as well as borders with rUK, Norway, Denmark and Ireland.

Considering this new map, we see the centrality of three areas to Scotland’s security: The Greenland / Iceland / Scotland Gap, the entrance to the North Sea, and the emerging Northern Sea route from Western Europe to East Asia. It will be of absolutely no surprise, therefore, to conclude that an independent Scotland will see security, primarily, in maritime terms.

Here lies the potential for a most significant change to our security posture after independence. Since the Treaty of Union, Scotland’s primary contribution to the UK’s armed forces has been through the infantry. As the brother of an infantryman with experience of tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan, I understand how central that contribution has been. Yet, at the point of independence, an irrevocable shift will be necessary to ensure that our contribution to the security of our North Atlantic neighbourhood is a central pillar of our national interest.

From a maritime perspective, that means moving away from the UK’s strange Napoleonic-era hangover with bases on the south coast of England that lie far from potential threats. Not only would the opening of facilities on Scotland’s east coast be preferable, but the possibility of secondary bases in Orkney or the Western Isles would be a clear statement of intent – not only to allies or potential adversaries but also to those communities who will undoubtedly want to see a state more willing to invest in their communities than the current UK Government.

In a context where the UK finds itself currently reconciling immediate threats in Ukraine, the ongoing reality of Brexit, and the security gap it has created, not to mention the more self-indulgent fantasies like the Indo-Pacific tilt – it is more important than ever to stress the clarity of vision regarding an independent Scotland’s security interests within our North Atlantic neighbourhood. Consistent contributions to NATO SMG1, cooperation with neighbours through formations like the Northern Group or JEF, and work through the European Union to ensure the alignment of these aims with our economic security will be Scotland’s bread and butter, in the way that it similarly has been for the Kingdoms of Norway and Denmark.

The interaction between these three principal spheres of our security – the rUK / IONA, NATO, and the EU – will be Scotland’s primary concern. Therefore, continuing to develop a deep and informed understanding of all three will be the primary concern of a nascent Scottish foreign policy community. The role of small states in International Relations may be poorly understood in a UK context, especially given the blunders of the UK Government in recent history regarding their role on the international stage. However, there is ample material on how similar states to Scotland have used the international system to their advantage and have had a positive impact on the global community. The key to this success is a narrowly defined – but broadly understood – concept of the national interest.

In defining this national interest, we will be building on the demonstrable commitment of the SNP to the international institutions of the post-war consensus and to the laws and rights which sprung from that time. It will still be a surprise to some – although not those who have been paying attention since 2016 – that in the coming election campaign, it will be SNP leader Humza Yousaf, and not the leaders of the two Westminster parties, who can clearly state his commitment to the EU and NATO as the twin pillars of our security.

There has been a tendency in the past, beginning with the 2014 referendum, to frame an independent Scotland’s security offering in terms of what it cannot do rather than what it can offer – something I like to call the ‘aircraft carrier conundrum’ after one particular paper that spent a rather inordinate amount of time lamenting Scotland’s inability to field a strike formation that no similar-sized country operates, and which even the UK can often struggle to make relevant to the threats it currently faces.

One thing that I believe has changed since then that will make this conundrum less relevant to the debate, other than the ongoing decline of the UK’s defensive and security capacities, is the accession to NATO of Sweden and Finland: two internationally-minded but regionally-focused small states. The demonstration that their own niche capabilities and individualities of the industry can so positively contribute to the total strength of the collective has led many to extol the virtues that such states can offer – and this is good news for Scotland.

The more worrying aspect of international relations to emerge in the decade since the first referendum is a more unstable world order, with the emergence of a multipolar/polyvalent system of shifting alliances and temporary mutual interest sharing, which has made the broader West feel less secure in its place.

While I share many of these concerns, especially in the possibility of asserting universal values, this is a new reality which will nonetheless need to be adjusted to, and one again which I cannot help but conclude will favour states with a clear understanding of their own interests, as Scotland will. And with the potential for growing regionalisation in emerging economic and security politics, having a clear understanding of where our primary alliances and partners are will be paramount.

In sum, I think it is safe to say that an independent Scotland will not seek simply to be a mini-UK in its international relations, though that is not to say we will not seek to be different simply for the sake of it. I hope the building of a fruitful new security relationship will begin at the moment of independence, with a clear statement of mutual interests and values, defending our shared island of the North Atlantic and, from there, working with allies and partners in our immediate neighbourhood and beyond.

Click here to explore the ‘Scotland’s Defence: Perspectives and Possibilities’ series, an exclusive UK Defence Journal series by Martin Docherty-Hughes MP, SNP Defence Spokesperson.

At the heart of the UK Defence Journal’s mission is our commitment to journalistic integrity. Our role is not to dictate opinions but to present information in a fair and balanced manner, allowing our readers to form their own informed views. This series exemplifies our dedication to offering diverse perspectives in the realm of defence and security. Our aim is to ignite discussions and deepen understanding among its readers, irrespective of their stance on Scottish independence. The importance of exploring varied viewpoints in shaping an informed public discourse cannot be overstated.

You can read the rest of the series here.

Scotland’s Defence: Perspectives and Possibilities