The Ministry of Defence has formally withdrawn Initial Operating Capability for the Ajax armoured vehicle programme, an extraordinary step that underlines the scale of the crisis surrounding one of the British Army’s most troubled procurement projects.
Speaking to the Defence Committee, Defence Secretary John Healey said ministers had not been given the full facts ahead of earlier decisions, describing the situation as a serious failure of transparency within the programme.
“So Luke Pollard, Minister for DRI updated the House quite properly last week. I am furious that vital information was withheld. It’s clear we didn’t have the full facts in the lead up to decisions about the initial operating capability. That IOC has been withdrawn. The Army is no longer in charge of this programme. A new senior responsible officer is now in place. I have been clear that we must back it or scrap it.
The work is being done at the moment in order to put us in a position to make that decision. And whilst I really want to see the way that we procure for the future being more innovative and more rapid, first and foremost will be my concern for the safety and protection of our forces personnel.”
Initial Operating Capability is normally a one way milestone in defence procurement. Once declared, it signifies that a platform is safe, usable and capable of limited operational employment. It is exceptionally rare for IOC to be withdrawn after being granted, as doing so effectively acknowledges that earlier assurances to ministers and Parliament were unsound.
In the case of Ajax, the decision reflects the depth of unresolved safety concerns. Long standing problems involving vibration and noise have affected soldiers during trials, with reports of physical symptoms linked to prolonged exposure. Despite multiple rounds of modification and testing, the issues have not been conclusively resolved, raising doubts over whether they stem from integration problems or more fundamental design limitations.
The withdrawal of IOC also represents a collapse of confidence in programme governance. Ministers have accepted that decisions were taken without full access to safety data, meaning the threshold for operational acceptance was crossed without a complete understanding of the risks involved. As a result, responsibility for Ajax has been removed from the Army, and a new Senior Responsible Officer has been appointed to take control of the programme.
What a stinging (perhaps unprecedented) public rebuke directed at those responsible for accepting a vehicle in this apparent condition and then potentially misleading ministers about it’s suitability for service – or are the politicians playing the old ‘Westminster blame game’ here? The fundamental problem with this vehicle seems equally obscure for we members of the public at least. There is video out there that raises serious questions regarding the quality of assembly achieved at the new UK factory, while others state the vehicle hulls received from GD in Spain have themselves been poorly constructed.
Wherever the truth lays unless the issues effecting Ajax can be satisfactorily addressed in short order then vast amounts of time and money have been wasted and our Army is left facing a genuine crisis.
If the Army, D & ES and GD don’t properly react now they are done for…and quite rightly so.
Place all newly built Ajax and variants into Ashchurch for long-term storage and rework at a pace that is realistic and cost-effective. Halt all Warrior drawdown activity and upgrade with existing armour packages plus new countermeasures for some units.
Could the UK rely on the US to help with a stopgap vehicle? Is there any mileage in pursuing the Tracked Boxer with other interested parties? Is there an opportunity to build CV90 in the UK? If so, we could be looking at deploying a fleet by 2030? Could Ajax turrets be fitted to Boxer as suggested on this forum?
Maurice, your post reads as if you are confusing a recce vehicle with an IFV. Ashchurch does not do rework – it is simply a vehicle storage facility. The question is ‘who should do the rework?’ assuming the vehicle is not binned. Can we trust GDUK, the OEM, to do it as they thoroughly failed to build a good vehicle in the first place and then implemented fixes that clearly did not properly work.
If Ajax is binned, which I doubt, the only alternative which requires relatively little money are to continue with Warrior in the interim recce role (not a good option, fraught with many obvious problems). There is no money to procure a new replacement equipment of any design.
Bin Ajax ( it seems terminally overweight and badly constructed) and give Warrior a minimal refresh ( mainly automotive etc just to keep them going) and tell Army that’s their armoured recce vehicle for the forseeable future given the lack of money for anything better now.
Oh bless them both, they have been misled…….lied to. Well now you know what it feels like to be citizen of this great country! “We are ramping up defence spending and moving our procurement to a war footing.” Yes Prime Minister what ever you say mate. Enjoy your trip to see your new besty Xi.
John Healey said: “The Army is no longer in charge of this programme. A new senior responsible officer is now in place.”
That clearly implies that the SRO is in charge of the programme. The previous SRO, Chris Bowbrick, was not in the army; he was a senior Civil Servant.
He was the patsy for this moment, the passing of the buck. The issues go back further, so who were the other SROs? Others chose this vehicle, and surely the Army Board have a say in advising ministers on what choice of asset to spend money on?? Ministers were Fallon and Hammond according to Jim.
Also, the ATDU, I used to agree with Ian that they’d have fully tested Ajax and found faults.
Who commanded ATDU?
Were the faults found passed up the COC?
If none were found, why is the vehicle like it is now?
This whole thing stinks of corruption and incompetence.
A pity, I supported the vehicle, and in some ways still do as it’s cannon and ISTAR, so important bits, are reportedly excellent.
Righto GD continue to market Blackjax and a IFV both variants of Ajax! How are they able to do this given the reputation Ajax has? Have they identified and sorted the problems because nobody is going anywhere near it otherwise! If this is the case then surely Ajax problems have been identified and should be fixed at GDs expense!
And so it goes on, if GD have to pay to fix it them it makes sense to keep it. If its the Tax payer then depending on cost it might be cheaper to fix it. Real question how long will a fix take and can it be done?. There is nothing the Army has to step in the roles, we gave away or scrapped kit before Ajax was ready.
As for replacing it, with what? who pays i bet its not GD. We all know there is no money for a whole new fleet of vehicles unless some thing else is binned or delayed. Its the same as gifting all AS90’s before a replacement was even ordered. Its a UK MOD problem save a penny in short term to have to spend massively more in the long term. Best case GD have to pay to fix it and can do in under a year, worst case its binned then what? Buy some thing else while robbing Peter to pay Paul, crazy situation.
I still feel its too big, too loud for recce, is was an idea from the early 2000’s that seems no fit the modern battler field, a lesson in bespoke gould plated built to order kit yet again, buy off the self at least you know it works if other are using it. A new boss it just moving the chairs about with out really address the root problem of GD making crap shoddy kit.
Bin Ajax let the lawyers fight it out in court. What’s need is a fast small agile vehicle for recce not a 40t light tank. We have joined CAVs and will be integrating Patria 6X6 so as a common base vehicle we could go for the patria trackx with a Moog RSW for armament. It’s lightweight and very agile and low profile. Would be a real successor to CVT. And as not many orders for it we would be top of the list of production so no long lead time build. All other options like cv90 have big order books. For engineering and medical support we could also look at FFG’s ACSV which offer a great variety of tracked engineering vehicles both have productions lines and are used by scandi countries so lots of interlopricy which then.
Continuing with Ajax is like building a house on quicksand, it can be done but what’s the point. Any penny further spent on it is a penny wasted on another project. We have warrior in large numbers and there is already research done into upgrading it. There’s also the dessert warrior which is a low risk upgrade option as we exported them. The Ajax turrets could be looked at being installed on another platform if able. It seems mad for the politicians to be slating previous people in charge of the programme to then not actually cancel it themselves. I wonder if in a few years we will all be saying we had the opportunity to cancel it in 2026 after wasting more money on trying to “fix it.”
A lot of Ajax issues go back to the turn of the century when the Army were supping deeply the Kool aid of omnipresent, omnipotent forces. ‘Dominating the digital battlespace’ presented by primarily US defence companies like GD, LM etc. The Army bought into these lines hook, line & sinker. Trying to produce the ‘ultimate’ ISTAR vehicle.
Sadly, of course reality is a little different. As threats evolve so do solutions. Just like WW1 when the UK invented the ‘TANK’. Ukraine has shown proliferation of multiple, high volume, low cost systems like FPV drones which cause most of the damage. This was acknowledged by CGS Roly Walker during his recent speech. Bizarrely though he went on about GD praising them? On a project that is eight years late, fails to meet any reasonable standards of safety and is hemmed in by restrictive use orders! Just exactly what do GD have to do to be critiqued? It seems the tail is wagging the dog here. Roly also seemed to indicate that GD would be supplier of choice on every new contract? The One Team approach has led to an unhealthily system of non competitive contracts & Development being placed ‘on the Nod’ It should be scrapped immediately
A full rescue for Ajax entails full suspension & Hull redesign and replacement, New road wheels and amour to accommodate CRT’s. The implementation of configuration control, skills, inspection and quality systems in GD.
Addition of MIPS, resolution of battery & power, turret issues, Autoloader issues £3+ Billion! and four years?
Meanwhile the world has moved on, technology has passed Ajax by in its envisaged role. You could buy 12,000 drones for the cost of one Ajax! Which offers better reconnaissance and bang for buck?
The Army have created this disaster themselves by their ignoring ATDU, DSTL advice and trying in effect to cover up a failed design and platform. Bullying soldiers into promoting and using a vehicle that has caused disabling life changing injuries. It appears there has been collusion with ex service personnel from DGS and senior officers all the way down to REME, ATDU, DE&S now employed by GD. These roles bear a proper investigation as timing of decision making and agreement or acceptance of Ajax seems suspiciously closely related. I am not a great believer in Multiple coincidences. If there are indictions of malfeasance I public office or the forces, Courts Martials and criminal proceedings should follow. This would include any personnel in contractors proven to be involved.
This may be the nuclear option but is really the only option left. The programme and GD have had multiple opportunities to resolve and correct the issues. GD say the vehicle is the most tested and safest in the fleet. Clearly this is a lie. If these issues are not resolved we just accept US contractors can do anything they want, ignore the specification, safety, performance and supply any old tat! trouser billions in profit and walk away – Then come back and charge billions more to put sticking plasters on problems.
Any future contracts should be to a British company with British R&D, Design and production.
GD have lied and failed on too many contracts to be allowed to continue as a key supplier to the British forces they should be blacklisted with immediate effect.