Russian ballistic missiles remain by far the primary threat in Russia’s deep-strike campaign against Ukraine, driven by shortfalls in Patriot interceptor stocks, according to a Western official.
Speaking on the war in Ukraine, the official said Russia’s deep-strike campaign was continuing, with “the Iskander, Kinzhal and Tsirkon ballistic missiles by far the primary threat due to Patriot stock shortcomings.” Of those, the official said, the Iskander was the one that mattered most.
Asked by the UK Defence Journal whether a trend could be identified in the frequency or type of munitions being used, the official said there were clear patterns, particularly in Russia’s use of long-range aviation. Because that was governed by a maintenance profile, the official said, there was “very broadly speaking a seven to ten day cadence in terms of the use of long-range aviation” and its air-launched cruise and ballistic missiles.
By volume, the threat was drones, and Ukraine was intercepting most of them. Ukraine’s interception rate was “around the 90% mark,” the official said, though jet-powered variants were proving harder. “The Geran-5s are causing Ukrainians increased problems, because it’s jet powered, and therefore some of the interception mechanisms Ukrainians were using are more challenged by that,” the official said.
The hardest problem, however, remained ballistic, “The key difficulty for the Ukrainians are the ballistic missiles,” the official said, naming the Iskander, Kinzhal and Tsirkon, and noting the Oreshnik had been used only sparingly. “Really, it’s the Iskanders when you boil down to it. That’s the munition that causes Ukrainians the greatest pain, because of their inability to intercept, and of course, Patriot stockpiles are low.”
July’s strike waves have borne the assessment out. In the overnight attack of 5 to 6 July, Russia fired 351 drones and 68 missiles at Ukraine, mainly at Kyiv, and Ukraine’s air force acknowledged that none of the 29 ballistic missiles used were intercepted. Air force spokesman Colonel Yurii Ihnat told Euronews the interception “success rate is low, to put it mildly,” and said Moscow was exploiting a serious shortage of PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors. On the night of 18 to 19 July, Russia launched 41 missiles and 125 drones in what Ukraine’s acting foreign minister described as the largest missile barrage against Kyiv since the war began, according to Al Jazeera, which reported that ballistic missiles had been used against the capital on at least seven occasions in July.
President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly appealed for more Patriot interceptors after the attack, and US President Donald Trump has said he is prepared to grant Ukraine licences to produce Patriot interceptors domestically, though details and timelines remain unclear.
The Iskander-M is a road-mobile short-range ballistic missile system with a quoted range of around 500 kilometres, flying a quasi-ballistic trajectory with terminal manoeuvring that complicates interception. The air-launched Kinzhal, carried by MiG-31K aircraft, and the Tsirkon, originally developed as a ship-launched hypersonic weapon, extend the threat set, while the Geran series of one-way attack drones, derived from the Iranian Shahed design, provides the volume in Russia’s strike packages. The US-made Patriot, particularly with the PAC-3 interceptor, has been the principal Ukrainian system capable of engaging ballistic targets since the first batteries arrived in spring 2023.
The official said Russian target sets shifted over time, ranging from Ukraine’s military-industrial complex to the recent targeting of grain shipments from southern ports, and warned the focus was likely to turn again with the seasons. Ukraine was “only three, potentially four months away from that flipping again back to Ukrainian energy” infrastructure for what the official called “the usual winter campaign against electricity and gas infrastructure.”
Russia has mounted a concerted campaign against Ukraine’s power grid in each winter of the full-scale war, striking generation, transmission and gas infrastructure with massed drone and missile salvoes. The attacks have at times caused rolling blackouts and forced Ukraine to import electricity from the EU, decentralise generation and harden substations, while air defence around energy sites has drawn heavily on interceptor stocks.
Ukrainian deep strikes were meanwhile becoming more effective in range, volume and target set, the official said, and Russia was struggling to defend against them. That inability was “notable, given the relative paucity in air defence” across the growing number of sites Russia had to protect, the official said.
Ballistic missiles are the biggest threat and some how in a £300 billion equipment plan we managed to assign just £750 million for Ballistic missile defence and not even looking to purchase a single launcher. The British army can never be a credible fighting force without this capability.
JIm, you seem to be talking about Britain, whereas the article is about Ukraine.
Perhaps the deployed British Army is liable to be attacked by enemy BMs so needs a capability to defeat them…but arguably so too should we provide protection for at least part of the homeland (still no ABM defence some 82 years after we first experienced multiple BM attacks for real).
Mate, I think BMs are now a fully credible threat to both the UK and deployed military units, be they Navy, Army or RAF. Iran has shown even though the ones they are using aren’t terrible accurate. They are sufficient to meet their goals, especially when aimed at airbases or ports. Especially when used against large bases with concentrations of both flying and ground units stationed there, e.g. Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base being a prime example. Where 10 were used in the attack against US Forces, where 8 were intercepted, but 2 got through the defences. Not forgetting how these attacks were coordinated with drones and cruise missile, to further complicate the air defence picture, i.e. when drones were used to take out the mega expensive THAAD radar prior to the attack. This airbase had THAAD, Patriot and C-RAM protecting it.
I think it is becoming crucial for deployed units to have a muti-tiered response to air threats. As good a Land Ceptor and Starstreak is, there needs to be both a cheaper and greater magazine depth means to counter drones. But also a terminal anti-ballistic capability is now a must have. The cheaper solution is available off the shelf, which is a radar guided SPAAG, using proximity fused air bursting ammunition. The ABM solution is the problem, due to cost. Sky Sabre/LandCeptor’s combat management system is based on the one used for Israel’s Iron Dome. Which was originally designed to counter aircraft, drones, cruise missiles and unguided rockets. But can it cope with ballistic threats? Poland in collaboration with MBDA developing the CAMM-MR, which is hoped to fill the gap between Patriot and the standard CAMM. So perhaps, along with the additional mass, it may be more suitable for ballistic missile interception? Which if it is, could then be integrated with Sky Sabre, to give a localised anti-ballistic missile capability for deployments. Or the MOD need to bite the bullet and purchase SAMP/T.
Not a British Army role mate, as stated many times now.
If the homeland is attacked, as Graham references below, then the RAF is the more likely service that would own and operate the assets.
If the Field Army ( being mostly in the ARRC ) is attacked then yes they too could do with ABM defence.
I cannot see HMG funding one let alone two services with such assets.
SDR 2025, discussions in the House of Commons, and, indeed, NATO itself indicate that Britain is relying on NATO for ballistic missile defence. An April 2026 article in the Financial Times points out the folly of such an approach.
‘…military experts question whether neighbouring Nato members could be relied on to use scarce and expensive interceptors — costing $3mn-$20mn — on incoming missiles that are not directly targeting them, particularly if they too were under attack….there is no formal agreement on shared missile defence.’
If Britain is unable to meet its NATO commitment of a formed two division army corps (and this country is unable to meet that commitment), why would we expect NATO countries to use their scarce anti ballistic missile defences to protect us?
Monro, what NATO assets are currently providing BM defence for the UK?
You think that we are unable to provide two formed divisions to the ARRC? We clearly would supply 1st and 3rd divisions if ‘the balloon went up’ but they would have deficiencies, more in equipment than manpower. When has it ever been different?
‘NATO Ballistic Missile Defence’s mission is to protect NATO’s European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threat posed by ballistic missiles. Key elements of NATO’s missile shield include the two U.S. Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania along with U.S navy destroyers out of Rota, Spain, and an early-warning radar in Kurecik, Türkiye.’
nato.int July 2024
‘Nato’s Allied Air Command (Aircom), based at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, oversees the command and control of the alliance’s ballistic missile defence systems.
The Aegis Ashore site in Romania has been operational since 2016. Its role is to protect Nato allies in Europe from potential missile threats originating from the Middle East.
The Redzikowo site, along with the one in Romania, is a key part of Nato’s ballistic missile defense system.
The ceremony marking the site’s formal transfer to Nato control was attended by Polish President Andrzej Duda and US Navy Admiral Stuart B Munsch, who highlighted the strategic importance of the Polish system.
“This capability strengthens Poland’s role in our employment of Integrated Air and Missile Defence,” said Allied Air Command Commander General James Hecker.
Aegis incorporates Thaad (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) and Patriot missile systems, and provides an additional layer of protection by intercepting threats before they reach their targets.’
BFBS Nov 2024
‘…I can absolutely assure the Committee that we can provide a trained divisional headquarters and certified and assured brigades—16 Brigade, 7th Light Mech Brigade Combat Team, and an armoured brigade—but there will be capability gaps in our ability to get there and our ability to sustain it for time…’ General Sir Patrick Sanders evidence to H of C Defence Committee Sept. 2023
Nothing has changed in any material regard since last quarter 2023 so that’s it…
For all out war, with no harmony guidelines, as Graham says, the Army would deploy with more.
Since that quote the Army has been reorganising 1 UK Division to make it more deployable, and more assets of the Field Army have moved to the ARRC, which once complete will give the UK its first “Corps” since BAOR. But, with issues.
1 UK Division Divisional HQ I understand is also now deployable.
Project Wavell is continuing with units moving between commands to flesh out 1 UK Division.
Where problems remain is the usual rob Peter to pay Paul where units robbed from one Division are not replaced, and as we know there are gaps in several areas.
3 UK Division.
12 Armoured Brigade.
20 Armoured Brigade.
3 DRS Brigade. ( Just lost a chunk of its assets )
101 Operational Sustainment Brigade.
7 Signals Group.
25 (CS) Engineer Group.
1 UK Division.
7 Light Mechanized Brigade.
4 Light Brigade. ( Lacking own regular CS and CSS )
1 DRS Brigade. ( Nicked a chunk of 3 DRSB assets )
102 Operational Sustainment Brigade. ( Thin, compared to 101 OSB )
12 (CS) Engineer Group.
ARRC “Corps” Troops.
2 Medical Group.
1 Aviation Brigade.
9 DRSB Brigade. ( A “paper” Brigade at present with no units assigned according to a FOIA request I made )
1 MP Group.
104 Theatre Sustainment Brigade.
1 Signal Brigade.
8 Engineer Brigade.
7 Air Defence Group.
“Nothing has changed in any material regard since last quarter 2023 so that’s it…”
Yes, but the Army is not just composed of “material” and other existing units have been transferred to the ARRC command.
4 Brigade lacks – A CS Engineer Regiment, a RA Regiment, a RLC Regiment, a RAMS Regiment.
The CS Engineer Regiment gap might have been filled already, as 35 RE moved from an EOD role to a CS role recently, as a part of 12 CS Engineer Group which has also changed name. That Group supports 1 UK Division and 7 Bde already has 32 RE.
The issue could also be solved if they decided to re-role either 29RA or 24 RE to support 4 Bde from the UKCF.
A wider problem remains the lack of ISTAR assets, with a single Regiment of ISTAR, 5 RA, and single Regiments of MUAS and TUAS in 32 RA and 47 RA. These cannot surely be split amongst the 3 DRSB that now exist, all supporting different elements of the ARRC.
No point me detailing the lack of modern armoured vehicles, GBAD, Ajax, Boxer, virtually now 155mm SPG, all well known and in time will be closed.
Very well put and interesting; thank you.
The Corps that we have promised is supposed to be NATO’s premier land warfare formation. The British part of that should comprise two divisions, at the very least one tracked and one wheeled, each comprising three brigades, with each brigade containing three all-arms battle groups.
In an ideal world, armies fight more effectively in ‘foursquare’ formations, four brigades to a division, four battlegroups to a brigade.
As you may know, it is very difficult to make use of a division with only two fighting brigades and a recce brigade, for reasons of depth. The divisional commander usually tries to ‘make do and mend’ another brigade out of bits and pieces to give at least a semblance of operational depth, but, in practice, against a peer adversary, that is almost certainly a recipe for disaster.
We are selling NATO short. That has not gone unnoticed. Our Prime Minister, accordingly, cut an inconsequential figure recently in Turkey; a telling vignette as to the regard in which our allies on Continental Europe now hold us.
As to our ability ‘to get it there and sustain for time’, that requires yet more in the way of resources.There is no sign of those additional resources being forthcoming. The government, as we have seen, has other priorities, willing the mission, as usual, but not the means.
Ominous.
Fully agree on the 2 Brigade point.
They conveniently moved the goalposts a while ago on that. Indeed, our Divisions should, and used to have, 3 manoeuvre Brigades.
I understand that 2 would be forward either side and the third in depth to provide a reserve.
With only 2, problematic.
How is that is really an effective Corps with almost no artillery and air defence?
Unless NATO attaches to it it is mostly a reserve Corps or a jow intensity area coverage.
Well it’s got big gaps, no one is denying that.
My point to Monro was that It exists.
Understood.
SDR 2025, discussions in the House of Commons, and, indeed, NATO itself indicate that Britain is relying on NATO for ballistic missile defence. An April 2026 article in the Financial Times points out the folly of such an approach.
‘…military experts question whether neighbouring Nato members could be relied on to use scarce and expensive interceptors — costing $3mn-$20mn — on incoming missiles that are not directly targeting them, particularly if they too were under attack….there is no formal agreement on shared missile defence.’
If Britain is unable to meet its NATO commitment of a formed two division army corps (and this country is unable to meet that commitment), why would we expect NATO countries to use their scarce anti ballistic missile defences to protect us?
Fortunately for us NATO Allie’s Patriots can’t and don’t cover the UK against Incoming ballistic missiles as they are only terminal interceptors. The only system providing BMD to the UK mainland is AEGIS ashore in Poland and Romania operated by NATO staff directly and the UK makes the third biggest financial contribution to pay for this system.
If anything we should be providing less divisions to NATO and focusing on ballistic missile defence. Better to deploy one division with BMD than two without.
The Financial Times article, though, does seem to miss the point that the tactical responsibility for NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence lies at Allied Air Command and Britain alternates with France in providing the Deputy Commander of that Command.
Regarding our commitment to NATO of a formed two division army corps, the key role of that army corps id conventional deterrence, which is why it is so important that Britain is able to meet that commitment (currently it cannot).
‘As a bare minimum, it is the role of the Atlantic army to replace the strategic nuclear deterrent as the instrument with which the attack option is foreclosed to (Russia). But that is a bare minimum. In a modern strategy the Atlantic army must provide for the West a sense of security to a degree that will encourage it to act and react in respect to global events with confidence. That forecloses to ‘Russia’ the options of intimidation, blackmail, and political leverage.’UK defence updates…
‘…even if one believes that an attack on Western Europe is not a very likely scenario,…that Army not only serves (Russia’s) legitimate security interests, but it also exercises an influence on the Atlantic Community that could be in the long run as fatal as naked aggression. The (Russian) Army…is a powerful political instrument. It is a vital element in the modern strategy of (Russia)’
‘I doubt that one can place in priority the value of strategic nuclear forces, naval forces, theater nuclear forces and conventional land (/air) forces. In fact I am quite sure that one cannot…’
‘Most important of all, national strength grows from the moral strength of a people and the value they place upon their freedoms’
.
LAND FORCES IN MODERN STRATEGY by LIEUTENANT GENERAL DE WITT C. SMITH, JR. US ARMY 1977
No-one in Westminster is talking about the value of Britain’s freedoms…
Monro makes an unassailable point regarding the NATO dependency trap. Relying on continental allies to burn through limited, multi-million-dollar Aster or Patriot interceptors to protect UK airspace during a peer-level crisis is a massive strategic gamble. Jim is completely right to worry about the numbers, but the problem is even worse for our land forces. While the Royal Navy is at least upgrading the Type 45s with Aster 30 Block 1 NT to provide a maritime BMD umbrella, the British Army has zero organic, theatre-level ballistic missile defence for a deployed corps. We are effectively fielding a force that would be completely blind and defenceless against tactical ballistic systems unless a US Army Patriot battery happens to be parked right next to them
Patriot and Aster have no range to cover UK airspace while based on continental Europe.
Completely true on the geography. A continental Patriot battery obviously can’t intercept a terminal ballistic missile over the UK mainland. The dependency trap is more about our forward-deployed forces. If the British Army deploys a corps or division under NATO, we are entirely dependent on allied batteries on the ground to provide that top-tier ballistic cover. Without them, our land forces are completely exposed in a contested environment.
We have zero defences against modern SRBMs.
The much over vaunted ASTER can take down SCUD type missiles if they are obligingly fired in their direction. Against fast crossing M8+ targets? NFC.