The First Sea Lord used the International Sea Power Conference in London to issue one of the starkest assessments of the UK’s maritime position since the end of the Cold War.
His core argument was clear: the strategic advantage that Britain and its allies have long held in the North Atlantic is under threat, and without rapid transformation the Royal Navy will struggle to keep pace.
He began by grounding his warning in the fundamentals of maritime power, stressing that geography, seaborne trade and alliances remain constants that shape every serious naval calculation. As he put it, “virtually all our trade, virtually all our data and virtually all our energy flows, either above on or under the sea”. The UK’s location is central, with the Norwegian coast and the narrow approaches to the Atlantic forming what he described as a lifeline not just for Britain but for NATO as a whole.
Alliances, he argued, derive their strength from difference and debate rather than uniformity, saying “we are stronger because we are together, not because we see the world in the same way… our strength comes from our differences”. But that foundation, he suggested, will only matter if allies act quickly and decisively enough in a deteriorating global environment.
The speech’s pivot was unambiguous as the threat picture has shifted, and the change is structural. “The world is becoming an unstable place”, he said, before highlighting Russia’s expanding maritime posture. Moscow has increased incursions in UK and NATO waters by 30 percent in two years and continues to invest heavily in its Northern Fleet. The spy ship Yantar is only the visible part of the problem. “It’s what’s going on under the waves that most concerns me”, he warned.
His bluntest line followed. “The advantage that we have enjoyed in the Atlantic since the end of the Cold War… is at risk. We are holding on, but not by much.” That judgement is not likely to fade from policy debates.
Rapid advances, especially in autonomy and artificial intelligence, mean that guessing the future is futile. “The pace of technological change will never, ever be as slow again as it is today”, he said. The Navy’s answer is to build for speed and adaptability rather than fixed assumptions.
This is the logic behind the hybrid warfighting navy and, in particular, Atlantic Bastion, which he described as “our bold new approach to secure the underwater battlespace against a modernising Russia”. The programme links autonomous sensors, crewed platforms and digital networks to detect and track threats across vast ocean spaces. The First Sea Lord emphasised that industry has invested heavily alongside the Ministry of Defence, adding that the UK’s leadership in maritime autonomy reflects both commercial opportunity and strategic necessity.
Early sensors will enter the water next year, and the concept is already drawing allied interest. Norway has signalled its intention to integrate its future Type 26 frigates into Atlantic Bastion, a move he welcomed as evidence of the shared stakes in North Atlantic security. “We need allies. Together, we will build a network… and we will remain in control in the Atlantic.”
He linked this to wider transformation plans across the Navy: autonomous escorts under Atlantic Shield; experimentation with fast-jet launch from carriers under Atlantic Strike; and the continued reshaping of the Commando Force for the High North. These steps, he insisted, are not speculative. “If this all sounds like science fiction, it is not. It is science backed. This is not future technology. This is stuff that is here now.”
The Royal Navy’s new warfighting readiness plan for 2029 launched as he spoke. It is intended to harden leadership, accelerate decision-making and strip away internal bureaucracy. “War fighting is the difference between deterrence and vulnerability”, he said, underscoring the rationale. The Royal Navy has moved beyond incremental reform and is attempting large-scale structural change in the face of a resurgent threat and accelerating technology. His closing call left little room for ambiguity.
“We are moving out because we have no choice. The alternative is not worth thinking about.”












It’s shitty click bate headline grabbing statements like this that get me.
If their was any truth in this statement then the first sea lord should immediately resign and there should be a public enquiry.
The actual truth is the North Atlantic has never been so secure for Britain since 1905.
In the Cold War we faced 400 Soviet submarines. Now Russia barely has 3 SSN’s operating in the west and the Atlantic along with the Mediterranean and Baltic is a NATO lake.
And we have zero operating SSNs and 1 frigate deployed up north
We have five SSN’s with a sixth joining shortly. You don’t just count warships at sea in a navy, on that metric Russia has no navy.
I said operating didnt I? Out of that 5 we have not the 6th which is years away from deployment, 1 is in long term layup, 2 in protracted refits, 1 is waiting on a drydock to be available and the newest Anson has just come back into port.
Yes and my point was Russia has only three SSN’s total operating in the west vs our 5.
Our navy should only match the threat environment, we need to stop biging up the Russian navy. Ours alone is superior much less the rest of NATO.
The threat pissed by Russia is largely a privacy nuisance threat that SSN’s and frigates are ill prepared to deal with.
How many SSN’s and Frigates does it take to stop a Russia spy ship in international waters conducting surveys?
More than 1 of each, were not engaging them with firepower so we have to herd them out of the areas we dont want them and a single ship cant do that.
So you want to downplay the russian threat and watch our armed forces continue to shrink then.
The countries in the East of Europe, close to Russia, are increasing the size of their armies and stockpiles of battlefield systems; not just because it is critical to NATO but because these capabilities are intimately linked to their own personal defence. They are not massively increasing their fleet sizes to send to Atlantic because that is not their domain. The Atlantic and North Seas are not only critical NATO lifelines but also intimately linked to the defence of the United Kingdom. If we’re not going to take ownership of that then who else is best placed to do it? The proposed defence spending increases could enable that but not if UK defence money is liberally peppered about trying to match other allies in their own domains while denuding our own.
If only there was an allied nation with the most powerful navy on the planet and more money than god that also saw control of the Atlantic as key to its own security, we could perhaps share the burden in some form of international alliance structure. We might call this alliance the treaty of the North Atlantic and create an organisation to oversee it.
Then together we could stand up to Russia’s three active SSN’s and that one spy ship that likes to hang around cables. 😀
We could also provide a combined tug boat force to escort Russia’s SSK’s as they evacuate the Mediterranean.
Hi, Jim. Yes, I agree but these days, when we’re talking about “NATO”, I feel that there is an orange painted elephant in the room that we have to tiptoe around and make contingencies for.
I also mostly your optimism with regards to Russia’s much vaunted capabilities.
– “mostly share your optimism.”
I agree when it comes to the Estonian boarder, the US may not show up, Russian submarines sinking ships in the Atlantic is a much bigger issue for the USA than us. Europe imports little over the mid Atlantic, the USA almost everything.
As the American’s found out in 1942 to their horror, America is only a fortress if the UK is holding the GIUK gap against a hostile actor. If that changes then almost Americas entire population and economic base is just a few short miles from the threat.
I think there are ground for concern regarding the United States Navy. Firstly, Trump’s recently released security strategy is grim reading from a European perspective. Secondly, the Chinese navy is numerically superior the USN and is almost entirely concentrated in the Asia Pacific Region. There may be a time when having significant naval forces outside the Asia Pacific is no longer viable for the America.
If we form our war planning around the basis that the US will not be involved then we won’t be caught out if that comes to pass. Also, if we demonstrate that we are capable without the US then figures such as Trump can’t use American dependency as stick to beat Europe into submission.
For once a credible statement!
Too little resource and £££££ to deal with a real and verifiable threat.