A recent report by the Council on Geostrategy recommends that the UK increase its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically within the First Island Chain, to contribute to ongoing deterrence efforts.

The report emphasises the importance of “pulsing” the Royal Navy’s Carrier Strike Group in the region following its scheduled 2025 visit.

The UK must contribute to a coordinated global effort to counter the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) geopolitical ambitions in the First Island Chain, according to a new report by the Council on Geostrategy.

This strategic region, which includes Taiwan and the South China Sea, is increasingly becoming a hotspot for Chinese expansion, raising concerns for international stability and security. The report calls for renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific as part of the UK’s upcoming Strategic Defence Review, according to a press release.

The Council on Geostrategy’s analysis highlights the importance of the First Island Chain for global prosperity and the potential consequences if China gains control over these strategic waterways and islands. The report warns of potential Chinese efforts in the 2030s to impose an inspection zone or a blockade preventing goods and people from entering Taiwan, a move that would significantly challenge international norms and the UK’s strategic interests.

The paper, authored by Gray Sergeant, a Research Fellow in Indo-Pacific Geopolitics, suggests a range of measures for the UK to implement. These include challenging Chinese violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), maintaining a Royal Navy presence in the Indo-Pacific, and preparing for coordinated economic sanctions in response to any further expansionist actions by the PRC in the region.

It also proposes, as headlined above, making regular deployments of the Royal Navy-led Carrier Strike Group in the Indo-Pacific and reducing the UK’s reliance on critical goods from China.

Former Minister for the Indo-Pacific Anne Marie Trevelyan, in her foreword to the report, emphasised the role of military deterrence and the importance of UK leadership in shaping the rules and norms in the region. She noted, “The military positioning in place with allies is intended to support and bolster deterrence in the region, but importantly, if that is not effective, to respond to secure British interests.”

You can read the report here.

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

34 COMMENTS

  1. The UK CSG should visit the pacific less since it might be needed to deter Putin. And we don’t have many planes anyway. And someone just gave the halfway resupply base away (Chagos islands).

  2. Let’s make sure we still have a carrier before we get excited. 🙄 Mind you, apparently France are looking to acquire a new carrier. How about nearly new, only one owner, hardly used.

  3. Applaud the sentiment of increased RN presence in the I-P, expressed w/in this summary of the Council on Geostrategy study/report, however would specifically recommend avoidance of CSG patrols in the SCS for an indefinite period. The RN simply requires more time to mature the capabilities of a CSG to confront and possibly contend w/ the PLAN. For example, would specifically await the following developments in the SSN realm:
    1.) Delivery and commissioning of 7th Astute class sub, and resolution of SSN/SSBN maintenance infrastructure issues.
    2.) Completion of Spearfish upgrade programme (may be nearing completion).
    3.) Upgrade of the existing stock of Tomahawk Block IV to Block V (suggest additional acquisition of both Va and Vb variants.)
    4.) Establishment of a semi-permanent forward base presence at HMAS Stirling.

    The same maturation process should be permitted for the CVs, DDGs, FFGs and FSSS.
    The bottom line is that the RN should be loaded for bear, before venturing into the den. The RN of 2025 may not be suitably equipped, however, the RN of the 2030s may well be prepared. Rant over. 🤔😳

    • Agree with all of this, and to add, essentially, if we wanted a greater more significant presence in the SCS we would realistically need more ships.
      I wonder about the options for naval basing with austrailia in the future, in a similar way that we do in bahrain atm.

      • 👍 Plan to utilize facilities at HMAS Stirling to support RN/USN SSN deployments is already incorporated in the AUKUS Pillar I plan. Arrangements for support of surface vessels may well be dependent upon the course of future developments in the SCS.

  4. Utter b******s. That’s the last thing our overstretched forces should be doing. The original tilt to the Pacific was just Johnson making noises post Brexit. France has territories in the area. Apart from Pitcairn with @40 inhabitants we don’t.
    Britain’s area of operations is already too large for the available force- Atlantic, North and South, Caribbean, Mediterranean, PersianGulf.
    I am not even convinced that CSG 25 has any real purpose.

    • First priority for RN has to be NATO Eastlant. The absolute minimum required is

      a) A hunter-killer submarine squadron in the GIUK arc, to interdict Russian subs aiming for the Atlantic shipping routes and to provide a patrol in the high North against hostile incursion from the Pacific. Minimum requirement 2-3 Astutes 4 SSK.

      b) An ASW North Atlantic squadron, to deal with any hostile subs deployed south of the GIUK arc. Minimum requirement 1 x T45 destroyer. 4 x ASW frigates.

      We can leave the Baltic to Germany, Poland, Sweden and others and the Med to the Italian, French and Spanish navies and other Med allies. But we have the principal navy in north-west Europe and can’t leave that to others, other than getting some limited assist from the small Netherlands, German, Danish and Norwegian fleets.

      Add that up, add on the SSN and frigate with the CASD, the out-of-area patrol frigates (T45 in Gulf and 3 T31s to replace the Rivers in OOA patrol), then the ships alongside or in extended refit and all we have left to deploy to the Indo Pacific is:

      Maybe 1 Astute
      Minus 6 SSKs
      Minus 1ASW frigate
      2 T45s, once PIP is complete

      The fact is that we can only deploy a Carrier Strike Group by taking subs and warships from Eastlant, the one area where we should, in light of our geographical position and defence interest, be making our principal contribution.

      It seems clear that the RN is simply ignoring the wider strategic imperative, to defend NATO waters, in favour of strutting the globe with its small Carrier group.

      NATO Europe’s support to the US Pacific fleet can only realistically come from the principal navies each providing 2 or 3 warships and taking turns to provide the carrier(s). We simply do not have the ships to do this on our own and are (a) leaving ourselves defenceless in home waters and (b) giving illusory promisory notes to allies in the Pacific that we will steam to their assistance in the event of conflict.

      • “…to provide a patrol in the high North against hostile incursion from the Pacific. Minimum requirement 2-3 Astutes 4 SSK.”

        SSK’s are of limited endurance, for this role.
        SSU’s would be more worthwhile to detect incursions from the Pacific.
        SSN’s are the gold standard for endurance to keep underwater.

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