HMS Audacious, a conventionally armed hunter-killer submarine, has completed a historic patrol of the Mediterranean, marking the longest ever deployment for any of the Royal Navy’s Astute-class submarines.

The submarine spent 363 days away from its base on the Clyde, maintaining a highly capable and silent nuclear-powered presence in the Mediterranean.

During the deployment, the submarine’s crew made the most of opportunities associated with planned maintenance and crew rotation, taking periods of leave and seeing family over the festive period. Commanding Officer of HMS Audacious, Commander James Howard, praised his ship’s company for delivering an unprecedented period of success on operations.

He said, “We have maintained a highly capable and silent nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarine at high readiness for almost a year. In doing so, we’ve operated at arm’s length from the UK, providing support to NATO and exercising with partners in the region. This has also proved that the UK has the capability to provide a stealthy, flexible, and proportional response to any situation, should that need arise.”

In March last year, the submarine sailed from its home at HM Naval Base Clyde at Faslane in Scotland to the eastern reaches of the Mediterranean in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. The boat had just completed Operational Sea Training, winning the Valiant Trophy for exceptional performance during its certification for front-line duties.

During the deployment, Audacious spent 95 days under NATO command, supporting the alliance’s efforts to combat illicit activity, people smuggling, and illegal trade in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Commander Howard also attributed the success to the support of the crew’s families and the submarine’s design. He said, “We could not have achieved this without the support of our families, and I look forward to being able to release my ship’s company for a well-deserved break at home.”

Tom Dunlop
Tom has spent the last 13 years working in the defence industry, specifically military and commercial shipbuilding. His work has taken him around Europe and the Far East, he is currently based in Scotland.

50 COMMENTS

  1. An amazing achievement and shows what could be down with the submarine force in a time of war. However I have to ask why such a deployment is doing to crew morale and it is really necessary in peace time.

    NATO is not exactly short on assets in the eastern Med.

    • Crew rotation Jim. The surface fleets doing similar operations like the T23 in the Gulf. It means we can make the most of our assets. Why bring them home when we can maintain them overseas for extended periods. It actually means its easier for the crews to plan their life’s. Its more stable and generally popular.

        • Yes. They rotate the crews, that’s what makes long deployments achievable without them all going insane. And the boat is supported from the engineering side overseas. And the crews get some runs ashore.

    • Such a deployment is why the UK has the best trained armed forces in the world! Morale is easly keistered by soldiers. They are not part of the namby-pamby woke movement

    • A useful & present lesson to anyone considering aggresion that we can deploy globally anywhere for extended periods. An Astute would spoil any warships day & stop seabourne trade.

  2. Heavens. We have so few subs that crews are pushed beyond their limits to keep the platform at sea.

    I understand the Americans put their people in Afghanistan theatre for 12 months, however, was that right?

    Almost 12 months in a tin can is something else.

    We need a larger personnel base and more Subs.

    • Crew rotation I believe David …

      Our Astutes really are incredible assets, few in number perhaps, but extremely capable.

      A single Astute is capable of crippling most Navies in the world.

      • I do understand crew rotation, no mention was made of the Captain; we might lose some matelots, can we afford the loss of the seniors?

        And then refocus on those matelots, we need the lot to stay within the service; we were all young once and perhaps a tad immature, however, time brings maturity and perspective – the loss of time served personnel leaves us at a loss.

      • The lesson from Germany’s naval experience in both WW1 and WW2 is that submarines are the best way for the smaller navy to boost its overall effectiveness. SSNs are vastly more capable than their WW2 predecessors and still hard to locate. Surface warships aren’t.
        Amidst the general gloom about more cuts, the possibilty that in time our submarine numbers may increase as part of the AUKUS arrangement gives reason to be optimistic.
        Think how formidable the RN would be now if we had used the money spent on carriers and F35 to build more Astutes.

        • But submarines cannot do things that surface vessels can. Submarines only really operate as a hammer. Can a submarine support an air interdiction, undertake amphibious operations, protect vessels from air attack, maintain the safety of enclosed sea lanes from pirates, protect form swam attacks etc Also the nature of a submarine means it must stay hidden, sometimes the best way to prevent something is to have a very obvious and clear capability smeared in someone’s face…that’s what a carrier battle group is…

          so yes a sub can do a lot but there is a hell of a lot it cannot do.

          • Indeed. I wasn’t suggesting an all submarine navy, just that we may have got the balance wrong over the last 20 years, something Ben Wallace started to consider.
            If your navy is focussed on amphibious warfare, echoing the experience of WW2, like the USN, then you need carriers, lots of them. The US can afford to do that whilst maintaining the world’s largest SSN fleet. We have pursued a policy of having a bit of everything which has led to not enough of anything. In a confrontation with China, I doubt the QEs with the likely maximum air wings they will get would make much difference. A fleet of 20+ SSNs would. Australia seems to have come to the same conclusion.
            The main lesson drawn from the Falklands war was the need for effective air defence including AEW. But an equally important lesson is the ability of an SSN to completely neutralize a surface fleet.
            Obviously, I welcome the AUKUS deal and what many hope it implies for our future submarine fleet.

          • Unfortunately I think it’s potentially almost inevitable. China is never backing away from Taiwan, to the Chinese it is part of China to the west it’s a vital part of the semi conductor industry that cannot fall under the power of the Chinese communist party.

            The other areas of conflict that come from a rising power challenging an established hegemony can possibly be avoided…the question of Taiwan not so much.

          • We need and were meant to have both the carriers and a credible number of SSNs. SDR98 stated that a force of 10 SSNs would be maintained (a reduction of 2 boats) which became 8 after the 2003/4 White Paper and then 7 a few years later. The reason as always is too many commitments and not enough money in the budget to pay for them. A return to ~10 boats would put the RN in a far stronger position, dropping to just 7 was always a cut too far.

          • ‘Think how formidable the RN would be now if we had used the money spent on carriers and F35 to build more Astutes’
            😯
            ‘The main lesson drawn from the Falklands war was the need for effective air defence including AEW’
            🤔
            Are you John Nott or a senior Army officer ?

          • Sorry if I wasn’t clear. The Falklands war, the only significant naval conflict since 1945, showed the vulnerability of surface ships to air attack. So the main lesson drawn was the importance of effective defenses whether shipboard missiles and guns, and the sensors that informed them, or CAP aided by AEW .
            But equally compelling was the ability of an SSN to neutralize an enemy surface fleet. Allowing UK SSN numbers to fall to 7 suggests the second lesson was at best under appreciated.
            Not Nott.

          • Well said. I agree on the submarinelessons and think with tomahawk capabilities at least some lessons were learnt.

          • …yet we were able to shoot down quite a few Argentine aircraft, never mind the aborts and too low-level attacks that failed to work due to good AA. Everyone points to air attack like it’s some big surprise, but at the end of the day we’ve managed defend “most” of our surface ships successfully for at least 80 years.

            Sorry, I understand what you say and agree with much of it, but this “Falklands shows that ships could be sunk by air power” gets my goat a little. Frankly, I am impressed our surface fleet can resist aircraft as well as it has.

          • I think most of us will agree that the UK needs a greater number of SSNs…it needs a fleet that is adequate and sustainable…if you look back the UK has in the past managed around one nuclear boat every 18months and we could probably get that again moving into the new SSN. If your boats last 24 years (which is the life of a UK built boat) so realistically the UK could have a fleet of 4 CASD boats and 14 SSNs.

            in regards to china the reality is the UK will never make much of a contribution…even with the strategic mobility of an SSN the tyranny of distance means any RN deployment will only be a token.

          • The way things are going, I wouldn’t be surprised if the U.S demanded we took all our subs down there (they have special qualities the U.S needs) in return for some of theirs screening the UK from the Russians.

          • The US cannot demand we do anything with our naval assets. We are a free and sovereign nation.

          • We have deployed a Carrier Group to the South China Sea before and could do so again. Not such a token effort.

          • Yes true but in reality graham china are not going to kick it off when the RN have just put an extra carrier group in the pacific and added around 25-33% to the available carriers ( The US could probably manage to put 2-3 carriers in the pacific depending on deployment cycles and warning). That would mean the tyranny of distance kicks in and the UK would need to generate the carrier group then move it to the pacific theatre..if generation takes around 1 month ( that’s the carrier and group at reasonable readiness), it would then take around 25- 30 days steaming to get in theatre) so in reality with a fair wind the UK carrier and group are not turning up for Two months. Where as one of our SSNs that is on patrol in say the North Sea would if it transited at high speed could be in the South China Sea within 15-19 days.

            Since china can pretty much generate a credible threat within 1 month by the time a UK carrier group in in theatre china will have either forced the straits in which case it’s game over for Taiwan and the US gives up or the US and allies utterly crush china and isolate it forcing the government to fall or most likely the US and china have a stalemate and already been in the first month of what would become WW3 ( this is though to be a most likely outcome as neither nation could afforded to loss and there would be no real off ramp and would effectively take it to a war of destruction).

            As WW3 between the major powers is Loss Loss the only bit of the UK contribute that massively in the pacific is what can be deployed very early in-helping make china think it cannot win and back down at the build up point or in the very early stages…when the carrier group finally deployed to the pacific or is still needed it would be WW3 and the UK would probably be focusing on other threats ( a china U.S. general war would force all powers to pick a side and we know the side Russia and Iran would pick).

            …it’s a more likely that the UK carrier group gets deployed closer to home to free up US capability to move into the pacific quickly…it’s a quicker transit for US navel assets in the Middle East/Indian ocean to move into the pacific and the UK carrier group to generate and take over with a small gap in time than the UK to generate and send a carrier group to the pacific.

          • Many fair points. However the deployment of a British carrier group out of home port sends a very strong signal, even if said group does not arrive in Theatre for some time. Similarly US carrier(s) repositioning and direction of travel sends a clear signal. Such signals may be enough to dissuade Chinese invasion of Taiwan – or they may not.
            But I have no doubt that US and UK carriers would be deployed towards the SCS at least as ‘a statement’.

          • Indeed, just the very fact the the UK has the carrier adds to the weight of military power on the other side of the equation..even if that is just to allow the UK to move its carriers into the pacific while the UK carrier group sits in the Middle East/eastern med etc. As china is alway going to be doing the can we win equation the Elizebeths just existing makes a difference. Which is in reality the whole point of a strong armed forces for a western nation…..ensure you never need it by having it.

    • They rotate the crews. Each boat has effectively two crews. This is a very good example of sustained operations far from home, and we are doing the same with surface vessels. HMS Montrose in the gulf being another good example beforesge came home. The River class OPV’S is another. And the ability to complete maintenance abroad is a stand our capability.

      • Hi Robert, @MS, @Jim et al,
        The article is perhaps somewhat misleading wrt ‘crew rotation’, or perhaps better to say not detailed enough.

        As a rule the only UK SM’s that operate two crews are our SSBN fleet. We have 7 crews for the 4 SM’s. The 3 ‘sea going’ boats each have 2 crews, with the ‘refit’ boat having only one. When the next SSBN goes into refit, it will lose one of its crews to the one coming out.

        SSN’s on the other hand usually only have the one crew, and unless the manpower deficit specifically within the submarine service has changed markedly, we don’t have enough to go to two crews.

        What normally happens is that a SSN operates a ‘5th watch’ system. The SM has a complement of say 120 people, but will only take perhaps 100 of said crew to sea, and will rotate the other 20 crew members around as they come into port for visits/maintenance periods.

        There are also a number of Senior Rates and Officers that are ‘black watch’ ie will do the entire deployment as they cannot be rotated as they dont have an opposite number.

        What generally happens is that during the longer periods in port (6-8 weeks or more) the crew will get the opportunity to fly home on leave for 2-3 weeks, half at a time. Audacious had at least 2 maintenance periods in the Med so the crew will have all gotten back to UK at least once.

        On my last deployment – 7 1/2 months to Westlant, ended up being away for the entire period. Perks of being ‘black watch’mate,

        I can see us going to 2 crews for a Aus based SSN if its out there for 2-3 years at a time. That would also get round the issue of work up for the new crew, and would be a cost effective way to utilise our SM and manpower to its potential. Until then, an SSN crew will just have to pull up their big boy pants and suck it up! Nobody said life on a SSN was easy…..

        • Thanks for the detailed explanation mate. I’d heard of two crews being used and persumed it extended now to the SSN boats for such long deployments. 👍Takes a special type to work in SSN’s. I did a 7 month deployment on an aircraft carrier and thought that was bad enough 🙈

        • And that answer is exactly why this site is of great interest! Various SMEs giving the gen and knowing exactly what is going on! Cheers deep (you strange underwater thingy person 😂)!

        • As usual a useful insight to the rest of us doing guess work. As the submarine advert says I trained on kit that doesn’t officially exist, completed missions that didn’t happen, been places u won’t find on a map. Because i went where I didn’t go etc etc.

      • Understand the principle espoused, however, isn’t it predicated upon control of in theater airspace and airbases, and sea lanes/ports to facilitate rotations? Not certain the Allies will enjoy that advantage, especially in a future SCS scenario. 🤔😳

        BTW, presume “beforesge” translates as “before she”, and “stand our” as “stand out?” Nonplussed on first pass through text. 😉

        • You do love your grammar 😄. We aren’t the only ones who rotate crew members. The RN has been doing it for a while now. And has the advantage of having many friendly overseas ports around the world. (Good soft power example) It gives the crews a more predictable year to plan family time. Or as predictable as it gets in the modern RN. The fatal call of life in a blue one isn’t far away!.

          • Do not disagree, the system yields benefits in peacetime. Question resilience during a conflict in Indo-Pacific theater (NATO holds sufficient territory/bases to guarantee access in Atlantic theater). If conflict develops as some project in the SCS, the Allies may be considered fortunate if resupply is available from Australia or Hawaii, if not, CONUS or Europe (presuming conventional weapons usage). If a nuclear exchange, all bets are off the table…🤔😳

          • I think if any conflict started in the SCS, it would be ‘all in’, and the RN base at HMS Jaffair (Bahrain) would become very busy. And also the British defence Singapore support unit. During Op Telic in 2003. (Iraq) Salalah in Omen became one of the main supply routes, and for pax transfers back to the UK.

          • Wonder whether Singapore, Brunei and/or Diego Garcia would remain functional (or inhabitable)? Would anticipate Taiwan, Japan, SK and Guam will not be viable. Not certain whether ChiComs will target Indonesia, Malaysia, and/or India.

          • I have really known idea mate. Let’s hope it’s a scenario we never have to live through. You would like to think the Wests response to Ukraine has given any nation pause for thought of the consequences. Both military and the huge impact on the global economy. One thing China does lack is experience. Coordinating a large military force is no easy task. And Taiwan is very well equipped nation.

    • The Americans did deploy personnel for 12 months to Afghanistan. This seems to be the norm for their op tours. Seems too long for me. My 6 month tour with a 2 week R&R at roughly the mid point was just right.

  3. It’s probably better to keep the ships where they are needed and ship the crews in and out. Lots of friendly bases to stop into around the med as well.
    So long as the boats are all basically the same and a decent handover is done.

  4. In no way is this a criticism of the hardworking sailors who completed this very long deployment, but why are we using state of the art attack submarines to do this work.
    In no way does this deter Russia in Ukraine, we cannot deploy to the Black Sea because Turkey would not allow it. Besides any Russian naval activity in the Med should be easily countered by our nato allies with coastlines in the Med.
    The thing that really annoys me though is using an Astute to police people smuggling, illicit trade and illegal trade. This submarine should be patrolling the North Atlantic tracking the Russian navy and protecting our undersea infrastructure.
    The whole deployment is a complete waist of precious resources.

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