Can Europe build a credible nuclear deterrent without the US?

On the 8th May last, 92-year-old Greek singer, Nana Mouskouri, sang Je chante avec toi, Liberté (I sing with you, Freedom). It was inspired by, and set to, the air of Va Pensiero from Verdi’s Nabucco, also known as the Chorus of the Hebrew Slaves.

Backed by the Orchestra of the Gendarmerie’s Garde Républicaine, and staged under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, it was her contribution to a concert for peace. The lyrics are powerful and emotional. The song addresses Liberty as a living entity for whom one would be prepared to die.

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Liberty is the first and foremost tenet of republicanism, because without Liberty you cannot achieve either Equality or Fraternity. Historically, we know that peoples and nation states that lost their freedom and independence did so because they failed to defend themselves. All nations’ defence relies on having military capabilities to deter an attack, or invasion, by a hostile nation. The principle is that the action proposed is too costly for the aggressor, having regard to the defender’s deterrent capabilities.

For a deterrent to be credible, the potential aggressor nation must believe that the defender has the will and the determination to use their deterrent capability. The best deterrent is, of course, the one that will deter without having to be used. The MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) policy of the Cold War worked, in part, as both the US and the USSR ruled out the first nuclear strike option and abided by a range of treaties which reduced the risk of a nuclear war.

In the 20th century the US came to Europe’s rescue five times, in the First and Second World Wars, with the Marshal Aid Plan, and in the Cold War. The fifth and final time it intervened, very reluctantly, was in the Balkans, after four wars in eight years in the former Yugoslavia. By the end of President Trump’s first term in office, everyone knew that Trump was deadly serious about Europe not relying on the US for its security. Trump threatened NATO member countries that the US would not support a member that did not meet NATO’s defence spending target, then at 2% of GDP. Trump rattled NATO’s cages so much that small countries that could not afford it were panicked into upping defence spending for the sake of spending on defence. In the meantime, Trump’s interaction with Putin alarmed the European NATO leaders. The US is no longer a reliable partner in European defence.

But then came the Russian extended invasion of Ukraine in Feb 2022 and, with it, Putin’s stated ambition to restore Russia’s 19th C Empire. The biggest problem for Europe, in the long run, is Russia’s stockpile of nuclear weapons. Significantly, in recent years, Putin has changed Russia’s commitment to the USSR’s no-first-nuclear-strike policy. In the event of being threatened with an overwhelming conventional (non-nuclear) attack by NATO, Russia may now use nuclear weapons, suggesting use of tactical nuclear weapons first.

Contrary to common belief, Art 5 (mutual defence commitment) of the Washington Treaty does not specifically commit the US to using nuclear weapons in the event of a war in Europe. Even before President Trump came to power, there was always a niggling doubt. Would the US actually risk a nuclear war if Russia overran, for example, one of the smaller Baltic States? Moreover, the willingness of Trump to concede 20% of Ukraine to Russia, even before the recent talks began, shows that Russia can invade a country in the 21st century with impunity. The Ukrainian territory Trump is offering to concede to Putin is three times greater than the territory (Sudetenland) Chamberlain conceded to Hitler in Munich in 1938.

Up to now the US has provided an effective nuclear umbrella for Europe. However, over the past number of years, the US has repeatedly indicated that Europe has to provide for its own security. Does this mean Europe has to provide for its own nuclear deterrent to Russia’s 5,449 nuclear warheads? Is there a non-nuclear option for enhancing European capabilities to deter a major nuclear power? The short answer is no. Until mankind can agree to the abolition of all nuclear weapons, Europe has to have a credible nuclear deterrent. If the US withdraws its nuclear umbrella, Europe will have to provide its own or, in time, risk being ‘Finlandised’ by Russia. After World War 2, Finland had to acquiesce to the USSR’s foreign policy.

What can Europe do without the US nuclear umbrella?

The UK and France have approximately 515 nuclear weapons between them. These are credible national nuclear deterrents, but not, on their own, a continental deterrent. Both the UK and France are agreeable, in principle, to make these assets available as part of Europe’s nuclear deterrent and to consider expanding their inventory. The UK is planning to add a squadron of bombers with tactical nuclear weapons. To reach even a third of the Russian arsenal of nuclear weapons, several other European states will have to step in and, in doing so, violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. There may be another solution, which would involve a deal with the US.

For many years the US has stockpiled 100 nuclear weapons in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey, making these countries prime targets for nuclear strikes. Having already taken this risk, would they take the extra step for Europe and accept operational control of nuclear weapons? During the Cold War, up to 1968, the US had nuclear weapons in Canada, which were under joint US-Canadian operational control. That is an interesting precedent for Europe.

In past discussions on European security between the EU and NATO, the understanding was that NATO had the military assets, but the EU had the money. When the Ukraine crisis erupted, this model was used effectively to support Ukraine. It could also be used to fund the nuclear consortium to develop and enhance Europe’s nuclear deterrent. SAFE, the Security Action for Europe fund, is already set up and functioning. While there has been a setback, when discussions between the EU and the UK broke down over the UK drawing from SAFE, the issue was not the non-EU member status of the UK, but the EU proposed enabling fees. I am sure that the other EU members of the consortium could find common cause with the UK to sort this out.

In conclusion, a consortium of seven European nations with nuclear weapons could form the basis for an effective European nuclear deterrent to Russia’s territorial ambitions. We must consider that if Russia invades even one small EU or NATO state and is allowed to get away with it, a weakened EU will survive, but NATO will dissolve overnight.