On the 8th May last, 92-year-old Greek singer, Nana Mouskouri, sang Je chante avec toi, Liberté (I sing with you, Freedom). It was inspired by, and set to, the air of Va Pensiero from Verdi’s Nabucco, also known as the Chorus of the Hebrew Slaves.
Backed by the Orchestra of the Gendarmerie’s Garde Républicaine, and staged under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, it was her contribution to a concert for peace. The lyrics are powerful and emotional. The song addresses Liberty as a living entity for whom one would be prepared to die.
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Liberty is the first and foremost tenet of republicanism, because without Liberty you cannot achieve either Equality or Fraternity. Historically, we know that peoples and nation states that lost their freedom and independence did so because they failed to defend themselves. All nations’ defence relies on having military capabilities to deter an attack, or invasion, by a hostile nation. The principle is that the action proposed is too costly for the aggressor, having regard to the defender’s deterrent capabilities.
For a deterrent to be credible, the potential aggressor nation must believe that the defender has the will and the determination to use their deterrent capability. The best deterrent is, of course, the one that will deter without having to be used. The MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) policy of the Cold War worked, in part, as both the US and the USSR ruled out the first nuclear strike option and abided by a range of treaties which reduced the risk of a nuclear war.
In the 20th century the US came to Europe’s rescue five times, in the First and Second World Wars, with the Marshal Aid Plan, and in the Cold War. The fifth and final time it intervened, very reluctantly, was in the Balkans, after four wars in eight years in the former Yugoslavia. By the end of President Trump’s first term in office, everyone knew that Trump was deadly serious about Europe not relying on the US for its security. Trump threatened NATO member countries that the US would not support a member that did not meet NATO’s defence spending target, then at 2% of GDP. Trump rattled NATO’s cages so much that small countries that could not afford it were panicked into upping defence spending for the sake of spending on defence. In the meantime, Trump’s interaction with Putin alarmed the European NATO leaders. The US is no longer a reliable partner in European defence.
But then came the Russian extended invasion of Ukraine in Feb 2022 and, with it, Putin’s stated ambition to restore Russia’s 19th C Empire. The biggest problem for Europe, in the long run, is Russia’s stockpile of nuclear weapons. Significantly, in recent years, Putin has changed Russia’s commitment to the USSR’s no-first-nuclear-strike policy. In the event of being threatened with an overwhelming conventional (non-nuclear) attack by NATO, Russia may now use nuclear weapons, suggesting use of tactical nuclear weapons first.
Contrary to common belief, Art 5 (mutual defence commitment) of the Washington Treaty does not specifically commit the US to using nuclear weapons in the event of a war in Europe. Even before President Trump came to power, there was always a niggling doubt. Would the US actually risk a nuclear war if Russia overran, for example, one of the smaller Baltic States? Moreover, the willingness of Trump to concede 20% of Ukraine to Russia, even before the recent talks began, shows that Russia can invade a country in the 21st century with impunity. The Ukrainian territory Trump is offering to concede to Putin is three times greater than the territory (Sudetenland) Chamberlain conceded to Hitler in Munich in 1938.
Up to now the US has provided an effective nuclear umbrella for Europe. However, over the past number of years, the US has repeatedly indicated that Europe has to provide for its own security. Does this mean Europe has to provide for its own nuclear deterrent to Russia’s 5,449 nuclear warheads? Is there a non-nuclear option for enhancing European capabilities to deter a major nuclear power? The short answer is no. Until mankind can agree to the abolition of all nuclear weapons, Europe has to have a credible nuclear deterrent. If the US withdraws its nuclear umbrella, Europe will have to provide its own or, in time, risk being ‘Finlandised’ by Russia. After World War 2, Finland had to acquiesce to the USSR’s foreign policy.
What can Europe do without the US nuclear umbrella?
The UK and France have approximately 515 nuclear weapons between them. These are credible national nuclear deterrents, but not, on their own, a continental deterrent. Both the UK and France are agreeable, in principle, to make these assets available as part of Europe’s nuclear deterrent and to consider expanding their inventory. The UK is planning to add a squadron of bombers with tactical nuclear weapons. To reach even a third of the Russian arsenal of nuclear weapons, several other European states will have to step in and, in doing so, violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. There may be another solution, which would involve a deal with the US.
For many years the US has stockpiled 100 nuclear weapons in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey, making these countries prime targets for nuclear strikes. Having already taken this risk, would they take the extra step for Europe and accept operational control of nuclear weapons? During the Cold War, up to 1968, the US had nuclear weapons in Canada, which were under joint US-Canadian operational control. That is an interesting precedent for Europe.
In past discussions on European security between the EU and NATO, the understanding was that NATO had the military assets, but the EU had the money. When the Ukraine crisis erupted, this model was used effectively to support Ukraine. It could also be used to fund the nuclear consortium to develop and enhance Europe’s nuclear deterrent. SAFE, the Security Action for Europe fund, is already set up and functioning. While there has been a setback, when discussions between the EU and the UK broke down over the UK drawing from SAFE, the issue was not the non-EU member status of the UK, but the EU proposed enabling fees. I am sure that the other EU members of the consortium could find common cause with the UK to sort this out.
In conclusion, a consortium of seven European nations with nuclear weapons could form the basis for an effective European nuclear deterrent to Russia’s territorial ambitions. We must consider that if Russia invades even one small EU or NATO state and is allowed to get away with it, a weakened EU will survive, but NATO will dissolve overnight.












The French used to base 18 MRBM in silos at Plateau D’Albion so as long as there is remote areas it’s a possibility that wouldn’t mean the expense of SSBNs. There are plenty of remote mountain ranges in Europe.
Trident can be fired from the dockside and presumably the French missile could be placed in Silos.
Japan is a breakout state and could have a bomb within 18 months if they chose so a similar timescale might be possible for western European industry if there was a will and neither France of Great Britain was willing to share.
The bigger question is would the populace want an EU politician like Ursula VDL as the one with the suitcase?
Sweden had a covert Nuclear Weapons Program, it ran from 1944/45 until 1972. The project involved uranium mining, reactor construction, and, by the mid-1960s, analysts estimated Sweden was only six months away from building a bomb. The program was cancelled in 1968, with final termination in 1972, due to high costs, a strong domestic anti-nuclear movement, and implicit security guarantees from the United States.
Sweden possesses the technical expertise, industrial base, and nuclear materials (via its civil nuclear program) to develop nuclear weapons
I think most EU countries could make weapons grade materiel if they wanted too, at the moment there is no need, but that could change
Well politically it’s likely not close to happening but Germany could do it very quickly. Had there been the impetus and not lost so many of their scientists (and the debilitating effects of the war by then) they would likely have been the first to have had them after all. Ironically it was two German mathematician emigres here who made the whole concept feasible. The expertise is widespread, it’s only US pressure and assurances that stopped South Korea having one and the pressure to resurrect it comes to the surface from time to time. In this ‘new world order’ I fear many more will be considering their options. Seems to me as Canada was intrinsically involved in the original programme even before the United States ironically they have every right to develop one indeed now. One wonders how certain South American countries feel at the moment, particularly Brazil who are in the firing line of the US and knows the latter hates the thought of it competing as an economic superpower (with the connotations inherent in that power) on the continent. That’s a conflict of the future brewing well beyond Trump. Dismissing the rules based order is going to come back to haunt the US, it’s a matter of when and how I think not if.
You overlook two issues, both related to the lack of trust between NATO member states. Most obviously Greece will not accept Turkey having control of nuclear weapons, at least not without access to their own. And I suspect Poland will insist on joining the nuclear club if Germany does.
No… because no one is willing to pay for it.
I suspect it’s a matter of when for Poland they are a growing economy with a great historical tradition in education and science, in the top twenty economies now, and they are under serious threat. The Russian reaction mind doesn’t bear thinking about, another potential flash point. Humanity has a lot of tests ahead I fear.
The US did not come to the aid of Europe in WW1. They engaged in the last 6 month of the war after months of prep. and failing to ignore the lessons of its Allies. The combined armies in the 100 day offensive with the mobilisation of the battlefield i.e. tanks playing a part was the decisive factor in the war ending.
A bit more research would be in order rather than over blown statements of the US and its part in WW1.
It is partly true partly not. The level of US troops was not the one of French and English armies, this is true. They were equiped by France and trained by France and UK is also true. Though, they brought in manpower that was welcom. Keep in mind that French Metropolitan population was half of Germany by this time. Only UK brought parity. US brought overwelming manpower that decided the issue. So even if late, US involvement was welcom. We did not forget the timing but not the help as well.
The main reason for the pushback was the notion that the US rescued Europe on WW1 which is a fallacy and a constant US message they like to project. It does a great disservice to the hard won and lost battles that proceeded. In the end the 100 day offensive was the deciding factor and the accumulation of years of bitter mistakes and lessons learnt. The outcome for Europe even though potentially prolonged without would of been the same for the UK and its European allies. It’s worth noting that of the 2m men the US had in Europe only about half of them 1m actually saw action and that was not until mid-1918, a few months before the end in November 1918. Compare this to the size of the UK army which was nearly 4m and the French army of 2.6m men.
8 million persons in France was working in the army by the end of WW1. Not all of them were soldiers. About 20% of the population was enlisted then.
The political situation in Germany was the deciding factor, their last offensive was their last hope, the population were starving and revolution u preventable without an armistice. The influx of US troops only ensured fighting on was pointless and the Govt decided to save themselves and the very existence of their regime than fight on selling the idea by serving up the Kaiser.
Out of interest the US didn’t even have an airforce when they entered the war, their hastily assembled pilots flew French aircraft plus some British when available. Rickenbacker their top ace did so in two French types the first of which the Nieuport 28 was given to them because French pilots avoided them because its wings tended to shred their skin in any sort of dive. Indeed Rickenbacker only just survived such an incident. The later Spadd they got were rather better mind.
Have to add this WW2 coming to our aid meme is ridiculous sadly we far too easily fall into line behind this US rewriting of history. Had the US not been forced into the war they would would have ended the war at the most optimistic a regional power at best, but very probably a necessarily compliant or worse state of Germany/Japan or if not then Russia who would have effectively controlled the rest of the World and would have developed nuclear weapons (Germany was years ahead pre war) AND the means through rocketry to deliver them on America or anyone else. Of course such a scenario is unacceptable to US exceptionalism but the fact is not only did the environment post war enable the US to excel but almost all of it was based upon British and German advances. Indeed much of the US aircraft industry was on the edge of bankruptcy till Britain and France ordered warplanes pre war.
Good reply
Yes and yes. Expand French nuclear labs with new borrowed EU/German money. Allow European nuclear chemists etc to work in French nuke labs, go for 100 nuclear pits per year, add 600 nuclear French super/hypersonic 1000 mile range cruise missiles to the French arsenal. Stationned on multiple platforms in Nato’s North/East including attack subs it will be enough, can be done for 100 billion Euros and EU has the money and technology
The USA did little to encourage European countries to develop their own nuclear weapons after ww2. Indeed British access to the technology many British scientists had contributed to was blocked by congress. Only after Britain had shown its ability to build first fission and then fusion bombs did nuclear cooperation resume with the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement.
The US was generally keen to retain control of the West’s nuclear deterrent because it cemented their effective control and leadership of NATO. French and British weapons were deemed too few for inclusion in disarmament treaties.
The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to end the bipolar world order of USA and allies versus USSR and satellites. But with Putin eager to restore as much of the USSR as he can get away with, the need for NATO solidarity has returned. Sweden and Finland, neutral through the Cold war have joined NATO because they believe the threat from Russia is now greater than before 1989.
The current US leadership seems incapable of grasping the increased danger. Their ignorance of how 2 wars in Europe inexorably involved an understandably reluctant USA is bizarre. In an increasingly interconnected world, isolation is even more difficult than in 1917 or 1941.
As always with Trump, there is some justification for his irritation with Europe. The reduction of forces as a peace dividend went too far.
I don’t see a European nuclear deterrent as likely- national governments won’t surrender control of their existing weapons. Cooperation on future developments might be more possible. But by the time anything substantive is achieved, a future US administration might have moved away from its isolationist posture.
The US has armed forces stationed in 80 countries with 750 bases. The US is engaged in the Middle East via the Abraham Accords and defense of its Middle East allies in defending missile attacks against them. It has naval and ground forces stationed in several Middle East countries. The US just launched operations in the Caribbean and the Pacific against Venezuelan and Colombian drug cartels. The US has troops stationed in South Korea and Japan to deter North Korea. It is engaged in protecting sea lanes in the South China Sea and deterring China. I could go on. But since the US has 80,000 troops and nuclear weapons stationed in continental Europe but refuses to commit its blood to protect a non-NATO member when its strategic interest are not involved it is isolationist.
You Brits really are stupid and ignorant.
Well I’m not the one calling us Brits stupid when the article was written by a Citizen of the Irish Republic 🤷🏼♂️ FYI they are not even in NATO, pay zero for defence and rip your country off for Billions at every turn whilst singing “Oh Danny Boy”.
Come on you have to laugh at that one 🤣
Well said
You really are a clown, as no Brit was involved in the article! But your inbred hatred of Brits is a real issue for you since you found those Union Flag underpants in MrsPKClowns laundry pile…..
I hate to say this but how did this article get editorial approval ?
The basic premise to suggest that a solution to NATO getting a non US Nuclear umbrella is by just to circumventing the NPT restrictions regarding the control of nuclear weapons being devolved to Non Nuclear European NATO countries is quite simply ill informed and amateurish. It even overlooks the fact that despite what some folks think Nuclear weapons require maintenance and certain materials to be replaced on a regular basis and that means Uncle Sam.
I note that you mention that the US has zero real obligation to use its Nuclear weapons in response to article 5, well nor does France and they never have had. However NATO does have an existing Non US Nuclear Umbrella that is 100% NATO declared and its the UKs, we do have the option of using it independently in times of National emergency but it is NATO Tasking declared and has been since 1958.
As for NPT it’s the Treaty equivalent of a land mine, once you sign it you do not break it nor try to go round it. Which FYI at present the U.K, US and Australia are busily working out how to enable Australia to buy, operate and maintain Nuclear Submarines whose reactors are powered by Bomb Grade HEU and not breach the terms of the NPT by doing so. Hoops are being jumped through to write processes that will pass IAEA scrutiny just for submarines never mind trying to just hand over control of Nuclear weapons. Which is what you suggest !
To mention the NPT in one sentence and then suggest a way round it sounds great, but wow why hasn’t anyone else figured it out and done so in this last 70 odd years ! Simple reason is that the US will never hand over the keys to “made in the USA” bombs, nor will UK, France, Russia of China because its Pandora’s box and they all know it. The US even expressly forbids the U.K to discuss US/UK tech with France by treaty !
Article 1 and 2 expressly forbid Nuclear NPT powers from supplying weapons or tech to non nuclear countries to build their own. But it allows the transfer of usage but not control of such weapons to allies. Hence the US, France and U.K can allow others to use them but only if they maintain 100% physical overall control (thats why every US supplied Nuclear Tactical Bomb, Missile or Shell in the Cold War that was issued to NATO forces was US controlled).
If you actually want a separate non US NATO Nuclear Umbrella and not breach the NPT there is a far easier way to do it.
1. France joins the U.K and declares its Force de Frappe to NATO tasking and sits down with us to integrate our targeting plans, training, submarine refit and deployment schedules and essentially operates the 8 SSBN as one overall unit but with 2 separate control processes. With 8 boats you should be able to have 3 on patrol at all times 1/2 then 2/1 and repeat. Daft as it sounds you don’t need 000’s of Weapons for a realistic deterrent 3 boats with 16 SLBM each with 4 MIRV is 192 Bombs so that’s Russia reduced to …….
2. If some European countries want to expand on that then they each agree to provide extra funding so that France and UK can expand the SSBN force to 10 and jointly develop other delivery systems that could be operated by other NATO countries but remain under UK/French control.
Some countries are discussing contributing to Frances/ UK nuclear deterrents, but that is the limit probably. Only Germany could really afford to have is own but obviously won’t because it isn’t allowed, the EU couldn’t get it off the ground even if there was the will, can you imagine that sort of development money being distributed – look at FCAS between France and Germany!
The simplest way to fund it would be to allow the U.K. and France to move their Nuclear costs (in our case the DNE) into the 1.5% related Defence spending bracket of our agreed NATO spending Target (I’d shift Pensions and Diego Garcia costs as well).
That simplifies our cost burden and ensures Budget headroom for conventional Defence expenditure.
The way to get funding from other countries is to allow all the Non US NATO countries to use some of their 1.5% to help fund the expansion and sustainment of a NATO Nuclear Umbrella. And for those that don’t want to contribute I’d take a leaf out of Trumps playbook and tell them to learn how to whistle and cross their fingers at the same time !
One thing has to be clear and that is operational control / release is held by U.K and France !
Everyone who has ever had any involvement with our DNE knows that the core reason it is so expensive is because it’s been starved of investment for decades and any funding is done in short term non efficient way. If done properly with clear long term planning / targets it can be far more cost effective and produce far more !
uk at sea nuke deterrence means we take out moscow. europe does not need to match russian nuke stockpiles. a 5th eu funded boat would very welcome though.
In the immediate term, the best thing for European nuclear deterrence is we get T26 into service more quickly and in greater numbers, and speed up the Dreadnought programme before we lose a Vanguard at sea.
Buying a 5th bomber (that was the original plan when Polaris was greenlit) would be cool but unnecessary, esp considering we went the whole Cold War facing off a much more potent adversary in the Soviet Union with just 4 Resolution/Vanguard subs.
Longer term, we may need to develop an SLBM to that can carry the UK warhead for Dreadnought should the US political leadership (post-Trump) continue on its path of deinegrating and sidelining Europe and restricting support for UK Trident missiles. It’s not as outlandish as it sounds, there are a lot of economic nationalists in the US who really have no time for Europe, but obviously Dreadnought like most military programmes is a multiyear, multideacade project and the hope (if not now the expectation) is that the pendulum in the relationship will swing back and settle in the middle once more. In which case, US equipment support for Trident would be safe for decades to come/the duration of Dreadnought service.
Developing a UK tactical nuclear weapon might be desirable in future, as I don’t think US political leadership of any party can be relied on going forwards to authorise B61 use unless US forces in Europe have been attacked with Russian tactical nukes, but we could potentially just opt to integrate ASMP or AS4NG onto Typhoon/Tempest.
It has been the accepted wisdom in NATO planning since at least the 1960s that nuclear weapons do not deter conventional attack (unless perhaps you are French with the Force du Frappe, but that only applies to French territory, not all of Europe) and it is essential to hold a large conventional force in parallel to strategic and tactical nuclear forces to defeat a conventional attack from the USSR/Russia without resorting to nuclear weapons to defeat an invasion that could escalate through tit-for-tat retaliatory strikes to full-blown nuclear war.
Therefore, with US interest in Europe in decline, the best thing all European states could do in the immediate future is invest heavily in their conventional forces so that Russia will not be tempted to attack outlying countries that it would otherwise think it could isolate and invade without European response. Rebuilding conventional forces is also the cheapest and easiest option as it involves expanding upon existing, established force structures, training, infrastructure and European defence equipment production lines.
In Europe, we can build fast jets, refuelling aircraft, helicopters, ships, submarines, tanks, IFVs, guns, rifles, missiles, bombs, munitions. We have a European rocket delivery platform for expanding our space assets. We are perhaps reliant on US Elint and Sigint aircraft but this is a temporary occurrence, if absolutely needed to replace Wedgetail/Poseidon/Rivet Joint we have the technical expertise to do so (and regardless, going forwards into the second half of the century, we probably will look to replace those with a fleet of LO autonomous platforms anyway).
EU+UK GDP is 6x Russia’s (Italy’s GDP on its own is larger than Russia’s!) and our population is over 4x. And while, yes, Europe’s population is ageing, Russia’s is chronically alcoholic…we don’t even need to increase our spend to the levels Reagan did to bankrupt the USSR in the 80s to do the same to Putin, and we can definitely do it without feeling any hurt economically (it might even act as a fiscal stimulus for the eurozone).
Maybe the writer of the article could encourage Ireland to take their defence seriously? All of Europe needs to take their own defence seriously. It is very possible for Europe to have a more substantial nuclear armament but unsure on non-proliferation treaty. Maybe some jiggery pokery like AUKUS?