Last week’s deadly Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attack against the MV Mercer Street vessel has highlighted the increasing insecurity towards vulnerable merchant shipping operating across the Arabian Gulf, and around the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman in particular. 

Highlighting the seriousness of last week’s attack, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Sir Nick Carter held a meeting with his Israeli counterpart over the weekend to discuss the situation. The Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab subsequently accused Iran of a “deliberate, targeted, and a clear violation of international law” following the drone attack. 

This is the fourth such incident on an Israeli-linked vessel across the region since February – all widely attributed to Iran. In the wake of this weekend’s COBR meeting to discuss the crisis, the Prime Minister has deployed a special forces team to the region to help collate evidence of the attack, in addition to potentially coordinating a military response. 

However, the window of opportunity is slipping by. Leaving a response much longer than a week will appear indecisive to Tehran and thus interpreted as weakness. Over the weekend both Israel and the US presented the UK with irrefutable evidence which laid the blame squarely on the Iranian regime.

Whilst a host of policy options remain available for the UK government, including a targeted military strike aimed at the Iranian infrastructure used for launching the UAV attack from, it seems that the most likely course of action the government will take is an offensive cyber-attack. This will most likely target the Iranian UAV programme itself, in order to mitigate against further attacks. 

However, there are further policy options available, and all should be considered within the context of Britain’s regional allies.  Whilst the Royal Navy retains significant assets across the Arabian Gulf, most notably within the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) based out of Bahrain, it is to these alliances and like-minded regional security actors to which the UK should seek to form a broader coalition, in order to counter the increased malign activity by Iran. 

One such ally is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), itself a member of the eight-nation IMSC. Whilst the Royal Navy-led Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is currently navigating the turbulent South China Sea, it is due to return to the Gulf later in the autumn, docking along the way after the lengthy journey back across the Indian Ocean. 

The UK should take this oppourtunity, whilst likely docked temporarily in Oman, to conduct maritime training and exercises with member IMSC nations, including the UAE. This would likely consist of a higher frequency naval patrol action, whilst also sharing best practice where appropriate within the informal maritime alliance. 

Crucially, given the regional proximity and shared security threats emanating from the Iranian republic over the Gulf of Oman, this should seek to include a greater emphasis on countering UAV attacks – pertinent given the nature of the rising threat level in this environment. This is even more prescient when considering the UAE’s recent experiences in countering the significant UAV drone threat from the Houthis in Yemen – the insurgency itself Iranian controlled and supported. 

However the UK government decides to respond – and respond it must – it should do so in consultation with regional allies and partners. In modern warfare and statecraft, operating without allies is a severe detriment. In security partners including Israel and the UAE, the UK can ill afford to operate alone in this deeply contested security environment. 

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53 COMMENTS

  1. Iran responds to strength see killing of Soleimani the head of their Quds force. They ranted and raved and ended up throwing a few rockets around like that they had already being doing and just calling it revenge ! To quote ‘If they put one of yours in the hospital you put one of theirs in the ground’

  2. It’s like a red rag to bull doing that. Got it be smart. Iran is full of a young population who aren’t that keen of the government. Got to try and punish the rulers economically and make the people of Iran hate them to the point they rise up.

  3. I wonder if those 2 ships that Iran sent to Russia a couple of weeks back will make it back to Iran. I don’t think the UK will act but Israel I imagine will be weighing up options.

  4. Only issue with sending the CSG back to the gulf on the return leg, how good is the CSG defence against drones?

    Don’t want to waste million pound missiles against cheap swarming drones. Can CIWS cope? Would this have been a useful application for Martlet? Frickin lasers?

    • Drones are not fast or particularly stealthy. Especially the commercial derived ones Iran is using.

      PHALANX is more than capable when paired with an EO tracker, but so would spotters posted on deck 24/7 with shotguns and NVG.

      It’s not a complex threat, but rather an airborne derivative of their loved swarming boat tactics.

      • Not sure about shotguns or small arms. Watched a documentary 3 or 4 years back pitting an ex army sniper with a state of the art US sniper rifle against a relatively static drone a mile or two away. It took him for ever to register a hit. It would certainly take phalanx or similar I suspect reliably at any real range. The documentary itself came to the conclusion after testing various solutions that lasers under clear conditions at least was very effective but needs to be complimented with specialist radar and optics for detection and microwave or other disabling electro magnetic counter measures to ensure all weather defence. Though state s of that nature exist, they demonstrated one from Israel, I think we are some time before powerful specialist military level systems become the norm on our ships. As for high end military lasers I’m disappointed we have heard nothing about Dragonfire for years despite promised demonstration programmes of a prototype for last year.

    • CIWS and 30mm can deal with them easily.

      You can also add in all the sneaky beaky kit on the Electronic Warfare front that can disrupt down links and command signals.

    • It depend how many – in case of small drones – and in larger ones if they have missile that can be launched outside AA range.

      A swarm of 200 small drones against the CVF will probably be at least mission kill if EW fail.

      • Yes it’s their stand off range that concerns me I’m not sure we are clear what the present state of affairs is and it’s ever changing. So even a strong potential defence might be far less effective even in 5 years or so. Very concerning when you have an Iranian State itching to flex their muscles in this regard knowing retaliation is a complex choice for an opponent especially if proof of origin can not be made convincing. Other States will be looking on too to learn about, both the tech and the lines opponents will/will not tolerate.

        • I am concerned about both, but more by the small ones if they are successful.
          3 Phalanx cannot stop 200 small drones say each with a 4 kg explosive. Imagine even 50 of them exploding in bridge, radars , entering funnel and even nearby the Phalanx’s.

          It would not sink he ship probably, but it would be a mission kill.

          • If we have copied the americans I believe there is usually a combat info centre buried deep in the ship that can do anything the bridge can do. Not ideal but if they did do that at least the ship and combat could still be controlled

    • In some respects they have two very good assets for detecting drones. The Crowsnest equipped Merlin and the F35B. Both aircraft operate X-band radar that uses a small wavelength emission. Being a smaller wavelength means they are better at detecting small targets that have a small RCS, i.e. small aeroplane engines etc. Once detected the issue is what to use to knock them down?

      Iran has unveiled a number of so called “suicide” drones. They are little more than scaled up model aircraft, although some are now jet powered.

      https://www.israeldefense.co.il/sites/default/files/styles/full_article_image/public/_Uploads/dbsArticles/%26NCS_modified%3D20170322103010%26MaxW%3D640%26imageVersion%3Ddefault%26AR-170329752.jpg?itok=bR3ViTzm

      https://www.arabnews.com/sites/default/files/styles/n_670_395/public/26/10/2016//drones.jpg?itok=0tq9lzaP

      The one the Saudis recovered had a basic daytime video camera, though they may have a night time and IR version available. For ground station control they have used a 3g/4g or satcom data-link.

      You could go all Scifi and use active countermeasures such as radio frequency jamming to block the command and video signals. You could also use the ship’s PESA/AESA radar to illuminate it on high power and overload its control circuits, but somebody may be listening and measuring you effective radiated power output? The F35 may be able to do this as well? The back up plan will be good old 4.5″/5″ airbursting rounds followed up by 30mm, 20mm, 7.62mm and 50 cal. It would be a criminal waste of money to use a Sea Viper or Sea Ceptor to knock one of these drones down. Sad to say, but if we had a T31 with its 57mm gun using either the 3P or ORKA shells. It would be an ideal weapon for countering these drones!

      • Yes X band helps with discrimination.
        In the end will have to use what will have, even Aster. The Type 31 will be better since with more guns, but they have only EO directors.I don’t know how fast are those acquiring the target issued from main radar. Presumably a laser range finder will measure the range after that.

        • The Thales NS100 radar operating in the S-band supports ship based gunfire targeting. Therefore, the T31’s 57mm and 40mm weapons will use the NS100s for target tracking and a firing solution. If these guns are to be used in a CIWS role, they will have to use the NS100 as EO does not provide sufficient all weather targeting. If the RN opt for the fully leaded version of NS100, it will also come with a second radar incorporated within the NS100. This is the Scout Mk3 which is a continuous wave X-band radar using a frequency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) waveform.

          A FMCW waveform is notoriously difficult to detect. The more up to date version of FMCW is called interrupted FMCW (IFMCW), whereby the spectrum of frequencies between maximal and minimal within the frequency operating range are given digital addresses. Thereby allowing the radar to generate a pseudo random hop sequence, that jumps from frequency address to frequency address. Hence why they are sometimes called low probability of Intercept radars. They generally operate over a much wider bandwidth using significantly less power than a pulse radar. This type of waveform allows the radar to search for and track very small targets – such as drones. Unfortunately the Scout Mk3 is not an AESA radar, but uses a flat planar array. The Scout Mk3 will give you range, velocity and bearing information. I’m not sure if uses beam switching, therefore determining height may be a problem, hence why it’s a 2D radar, though Thales says it can provide low level air coverage.

          In the full fat version, Thales also incorporate a EO/IR sensor in the NS100 along with a IFF radar. These may be some of the reasons why the NS100 was chosen over Artisan. Apart from it being a more modern AESA radar compared to Artisan’s PESA, the full fat NS100 is a true all in one radar system (Though an AESA version of Scout Mk3 would be a major enhancement).

          See below for a link to the Thales NS100 datasheet:

          https://www.thalesgroup.com/sites/default/files/database/document/2019-11/NS100-V04.pdf

          • How NS100 which is rotating set can continuously update the data on a target for the gun system? i can understand that in ship to ship, ship target have much more inertia and are not maneuverable enough, but in air is different.

          • It’s pretty simple but complicated at the same time. As the AESA array is mechanical rotating it does not just transmit along its boresight as per traditional radars. It does forwards, backwards, upwards and downwards scanning. As its uses individual transmitter-receiver modules (TRMs) instead of phase delay circuits that PESA uses. Its sweep/scan (pushing the beam) rate is bloody fast. For example, it can do a raster scan (something like a top left to top right, down a bit, then right to left, down a bit, left to right etc in ever decreasing lines in less than a 1/10 of a second. It can do it slower or faster depending on the target’s range.

            So that was at one specific point in time in the radar’s rotation. The radar is rotating at 30rpm or once every 2 seconds. A phased array in general has a horizontal field of view of 120 degrees, therefore it has a dead zone of 240 degrees, which is then rotating as the radar rotates. Now, as the radar is rotating and tracking the target within that 120 degree window, it will continuous monitor the track as the target approaches. This is then stored in memory, where an algorithm continues the track as a prediction. As the radar sweeps around, the leading edge of the 120 degree window searches for and finds the target, then updates the location in real time. For example, if a static target was detected on the extreme right hand edge of the window, it would take about 1.25 seconds for the extreme left hand edge of the window to find it again.

            Clearly this solution is not as good as a dedicated fire control radar, or a multi-panel phased array. As it has to use prediction algorithms to maintain the target’s location and track when its travelling through the radar’s dead zone. This is doubly more so against really fast targets, such as something travelling at Mach 3 (1020m/s) or faster, due to the distance it can travel in 1 second. Is this enough to generate a firing solution against an air target for a T31’s 57mm and 40mm guns, yes – depending on its speed! As they will be firing the 3P HE shell, which uses a proximity fuze, there’s a greater chance of damaging the threat. But if the threat is travelling any faster than Mach 0.5 (172m/s), the Sea Ceptor would have engaged it anyway.

          • slow small drones can have unpredictable flight paths a bit like a fly. There is also intermittent propulsion for some faster drones.

    • Drones ie a single and the size of the one used are no threat to a Warship, the Modern Navy uses single jammers and blockers to disable drones. and the RM Snipers are trained to shoot them as well.

      it will be the swarming kind, but again there payload and range is still limited. the one used had a small Anti Personel Load, rather than major damage

  5. I wonder if the MoD’s will get away with their failure to sufficiently arm RN ships or will an Iranian satuation attack by drones or fast attack craft in the near future expose their penny pinching gamble with the lives of sailors.
    The USNavy, despite the orginal fanfare, in the face of the Irainian capability, have now realised their mistake with underarming the Indepence class Littoral Combat Ships. The USN have decided decommissioning, decades early, is a cheaper option than trying to upgrade their defences. The article “The Littoral Combat Ship Can’t Fight” in Forbes described the LCS problem as follows, “Perhaps worst of all, to keep down the roughly $500-million-per-ship cost of the hulls, the Navy chose to arm them only with light weaponry—guns and short-range self-defense missiles.”
    The RN does not have this option. No T23 and some T45’s have no CWIS. The 2x 30 ml guns they do have cannot fire programable rounds,so immportant in defending against swarm attacks. No T23 or T45 have any weapons covering their aft arcs of fire.( This is precisely where the Iranian backed Houthi rebel’s attacked the Saudi destroyer.) At least adding Sea Ceptor to T23 and T45’S helps. Installing Bofors 40 ml guns would also be a real improvement at minor cost.

    • “ No T23 and some T45’s have no CWIS. The 2x 30 ml guns they do have cannot fire programable rounds,so immportant in defending against swarm attacks”
      But the T31 57mmm and 40mm guns do fire programmable rounds😉

      • Are you suggesting that perhaps the RN had given some thought to the weaponry being placed on the T31? Heavens above!

      • I thought all the t45 had ciws? if not why not as the MOD had loads being used to protect bases in afganistan. the harpoon I can understand being moved around but not ciws

        • Hi Andy, yeh, I think they do. I was being a bit sarki . Maybe the potential Israeli target ships might like to rent-a-phalanx on board when they are in the Gulf.

          • I see the experts below have deep knowledge of drone ECM etc. Jamming and electronic radar death rays seems to be the way to go. Model aeroplanes have certainly come on a long way. Time for me to retire to the fringes…😉

      • The best AA gun in Falklands was Argentinian Oerlikon GDF 35mm.

        Italians should make a strales version for their 5″ gun to destroy medium drones long range without need of spending missiles.

    • God Yes. Had that for years and it was admitted the capability exists, but no details.

      Recently the whole point of the new National Cyber Force is to conduct offensive cyber.

  7. Almost everyone is talking kinetic kill systems.
    Its the sneaky electronic kill systems that will be stopping drones.
    Years ago when the Iranian proxies first started to use remote control boats they where used close in to shore.
    Why?
    The remote control portion was a radio signal with limited range and the vision system used to see the target and aim the boat was… A video phone app! They literally had a mobile phone fitted to the front of the boat to see where it was going.
    The use of jammers has put paid to those close inshore attacks against military targets. Civilian ships unfortunately don’t have jammers.

    Unlike an RAF Reaper, Protector or Guardian drone which uses a secure Sat data link these small drones are using the regular RF spectrum and are using just radio data link signals. They are eminently jammable and you can also triangulate onto the control source which is likely to be fairly close by if its a VHF or UHF data link link …

    Once the triangulation is done which could be achieved in seconds… you would need something like a quick reaction M3+ missile that can hit a target such as a mothership out on the VHF horizon where it is controlling the drones … (I wonder what the RN has that can do that… 🤔)

    When a drone is identified be it on radar, by sigint or EO scanner or trackers, you can apply a jamming signal right down the throat of the thing and not only jam it but fry its electronics (same as the much vaunted F35 electronic attack capability using its radar). With enough power and an AESA transmitter you can target and fry lots of targets in seconds using multiple beam steering.

    There is a recent piece on The Drive-Warzone describing the new active electronic attack capability that the USN is introducing.
    The RN keeps its EW cards close to its chest so what the RN capabilities are is not for discussion

    • Hi Gunbuster,

      People forget that soft kill methods often result in hard kill effects. These simple drones will be lost to the controllers once the link is jammed.

      Also, I read sometime ago (just before CSG21 sailed) that MBDA had supplied the RN Wildcats with pre-IOC versions of both the Martlet and Sea Venom missiles. So life could get very exciting for anyone launching a drone attack against the CSG.

      Of course there is always a risk and there are gaps in capability, but as you have pointed out before you work arounds to those, and the RN is very good at the sneaky beaky stuff.

      Cheers CR

      • I think a fair example of this is the 3 separate attacks on the USS Mason by the Houthis off Yemen. It was reported that over 3 days up to nine Noor/C-802 (Exocet copies) anti-ship missiles were fired at the ship. The ship used a combination of passive and active countermeasures along with ESSM and SM2 to intercept the C-802s.

        What has not been published is how each element of the ship’s defence performed. On the first day two C-802s crashed into the sea. Was this down to the ship’s countermeasures or did the C-802s just perform badly? We will probably never know. The second and third day had the ship banging off everything to protect itself. Some of the C-802s were intercepted by the ship’s ESSM and SM2s. Whilst both the active and passive countermeasures seemed to perform as they should. As they described the C-802s verering away from the ship (classic ECM) whilst some others crashed into the sea.

        The USS Mason was targeted whilst in sight of the Yemeni coast. I would also expect that the ship was seeing a lot of sea and air traffic in and around its location. Therefore, the air warfare team would have been very busy monitoring everything. If these missiles were then fired as the ship was sailing along the coast, they would have had very little time to respond. being illuminated by the ground based search radar probably didn’t help lessen the stress levels. Therefore, the crew used everything at their disposal to protect the ship. The after action report would have been a very fascinating read, but I’m really glad their systems did the job as required and protected the ship. We have very close ties with the US Navy when it comes to both electronic countermeasures and electronic surveillance. Both the T23s and T45s have benefited from a long history of jointery in this field between the two services. I am confident that the CSG21 ships will perform just as admirably if the cack hit the fan.

    • Yep, one of the suicide drones that the Saudis captured intact was controlled by a 3/4g phone data-link. You could also use a satphone, such as the Inmarsat network to easily control a drone over a very long distance. There have been some model airplane enthusiasts that do this in a competition as part of their hobby, they even live stream video 4K data using a GoPro, so the picture quality is awesome. They run these events much like glider competitions around a set courses.It ahs a very large following in Germany and Poland.

      Both of these phones systems use commercially standardized operating frequencies that are widely published. Jamming these is no problem, as for the last 10 years in Afghan every platoon on patrol carried a number of jammers just for these frequencies plus others that were commercially used.

      A major issue would be when they start using narrow beam transmissions to control the drone, rather than the widebeam/omnidirectional currently being used. If the drone’s receiver uses a phased array antenna, jamming becomes a whole lot harder. You can use a massive pulse at a specific frequency to try and spoof the receiver, but it is dependent on the distance of the drone from the controller, but also the angle at which the antenna is tuned. This is where a ship’s AESA radar will have to be used in the direct attack method of overloading the drones electronics with RFI. Smashing 100 Kilowatts of RF down a 2 degree beam against a lightly shielded target, will be enough to give anyone a bad day!

  8. Remember the Drone attacks on Gatwick. what was deployed is now a standard kit defence, as the guy who lost his £3000 drone trying to film the QE and POWs in pompey harbour.

  9. If electronic measures fail an “over sized shotgun” type system would seem to be a good option here. The rounds fired would be much cheaper than missiles or 20mm phalanx rounds and one shot could take out multiple targets.

    Business opportunity for somebody! Not that the MOD would be interested mind, wouldn’t do to equip anything properly…

    • The 4.5″ and 5″ firing canister rounds would be an interesting spectacle. But just as when you’re doing clays for sport. Shotgun pellets have a really short range, i.e. less than 100m effectivity. Fired from a larger gun would increase this range, but controlling the dispersion to get enough mass of pellets to hit the target at say 1km is going be hugely difficult. Not sure the Weaps guys would be too keen fitting a choke to the 4.5/5″ guns, especially if was then needed to fire against against a land target for instance? Both 20mm and 30mm HE shells have extremely low explosive contents, even the 40mm shell has less than a kilo of high explosive. However, by combining a HE with a fragmentary case, means you can then use a proximity fuse to detonate the shell next to the target, thereby not only enveloping it it with the shell’s fragments, but also hitting it with the blast pressure wave. Thus, giving you a very good chance of damaging or destroying the target. The BAe/Bofors 40mm and 57mm 3P “all target ammunition” will be ideally suited for this role. Then there’s the BAe OKRA “one shot one kill” round. Currently only available for the 57mm gun. It is a guided round that can either home in to a target from a laser designator or use it own imaging infrared sensor to home in on the target. Mind you if the 5″ get the HVP guided round, then the possible engagement range is over 30km, happy days!

  11. What is the primary advantage of Drones ? is it that they are less detectable on radar because they are small ? or swarm attack tactics (too many to shoot down)? It seems Iran and the Houthis have effectively used them to attack Saudi arabian oil facilites and a now a tanker. Experts who observed the Nagorno-karabakh conflict said they were game changer and were lethal to Armenian AFVs.

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