Denmark selects SAMP/T NG with Thales Systems

I was about to ask the cost of such a system, I see you gave that already, thanks.

$500m x 4 to defend the Deterrent, Portsmouth, Devonport and those scarce P-8 doesn’t seem too high an investment considering they tell us we are on a war footing.

Sensible choice. Something the UK could do in some capacity. We’ve said it here before. Shared Aster inventories with the RN. No waste. Complimentary to the SkySabre system which maybe can be modified to take Aster. Particularly for deployable high end protection of key bases and infrastructure. You need to be able to defend your own fighting assets and people.

We are going for the latter judging by the myriad of missile programs going on at the moment. It is the only realistic defence, short of covering the UK and its infrastructure in SAM systems. The money is better spent on the big bat imo.

I think that arranging any kind of true homeland defence capability against ballistic missiles is simply out of reach for a nation like the UK. Places like Israel are small enough to warrant that kind of capability as it’s a more realistic task. Even then, their system has failed against relatively unsophisticated Iranian missiles. Nations like the USA have tailored their ballistic defence systems purely to cope with a small scale launch from North Korea, with the system’s capability to deal with even that threat in doubt. It should be asked whether such a system is worth the cost compared to the capability it would give.

As you say, would you rather rely on stopping the Russian missiles, or instead choose to make the return punch that much bigger.

I am more concerned with air and submarine launched cruise missiles than ballistic missiles.

With so few airfield and radar options available, it would not take much to blind us with a pre-emptive strike.

Their MPAs and long range aviation ( and the Mig 31) can lob cruise and ballistic missiles. Iskander-B type weapons could potentially be parked on the deck of one of their many ghost fleet tankers? Having something to deal with that level of threat would be sensible.

If the RN upgraded the AAW ABM abilities of its T26s and T31s and ordered a few more of the later it’d give a bigger pool of ships that could contribute to the coverage and defence of the mainland. Dual purpose ofvl sorts. Same with T91s, they could be linked into a GBAD network.

No not really, it all depends on which phase of the ballistic missile flight you want to intercept it at, but also where the target is in relation to the surface to air missile (SAM) launcher. The best part to intercept is the boost phase, where it has just launched and is full of heavy fuel, so is relatively slow. The transit or cruise phase is where it reaches its apogee or maximum height. Though for something like the aircraft launched Kinzhal, which uses a quasi-ballistic or flattened flight path. The maximum altitude it reaches is considerably lower that what it could have potentially reached. It does this to throw off tracking radars and the intercept solution for the SAM. However, ballistic missiles that go in to low earth orbit reach their fastest speeds, as there’s no air to cause drag, but they have usually used up all their fuel, some missiles have a separate fuel used to aid re-entry. It is during this phase that ballistic missiles that carry multiple re-entry vehicles deploy their cargo. Then there’s the terminal phase, where the unpowered single-piece missile, deployed warhead/s or re-entry vehicle/s falls on to the target. However, as it is now travelling through air, which gets thicker the closer to the ground it gets. It will slow down due to the atmospheric drag. On re-entry it might have been travelling at Mach 10 or faster. By the time it hits the ground it could be travelling between Mach 4 to 6. If it needs to do counter-manoeuvres, the additional turning moment causes more drag, so it slows down even more.

To take-out a ballistic missile during the boost phase, you must be either really lucky and stumble upon the launch or have the means of tracking the launch vehicle or been watching the activity around a fixed silo. Even then it’s highly unlikely that you’d have the assets in place to intercept an intermediate range or intercontinental range missile.

In the West, there is the US SM3 and Israeli Arrow 3. Both of these are exoatmospheric interceptors designed to take out ballistic missiles in the transit/cruise phase in low earth orbit. SM3 is the more mature system, but both have now been used operationally to defend Israel from both Houthis and Iranian ballistic missiles. Where Arrow 3 has been recognized as being the first operational anti-ballistic missile system, to intercept a missile that was in low earth orbit, fired by the Houthis (an enemy combatant). It seems both systems have shown to be capable of intercepting nearly 90% of the ballistic threats thrown at Israel by Iran, on the first action. Which then dropped to over 75% on the second, which was caused by the lack of ready use interceptors.

The next SAMs are the very high altitude interceptors, such as the SM6, THAAD and Arrow 2. Though Arrow 2 in trials did reach low earth orbit. These are classed as terminal interceptors and are designed to engage the warheads/missiles above 100,000ft as they fall down towards earth. All three have now been operationally tested. The idea is that if they can intercept above 100,000ft then if the weapon was carrying a chemical weapon, the height and winds would disperse the agent. This is also true for a nuclear/radiation based weapon, the height would disperse and spreads out any fallout, so its not concentrated in one area. But more importantly by engaging as high as possible, gives you time to send a second or even a third interceptor, if the first misses.

The next layer down are where you find the likes of Patriot PAC 3, SM2 ER and Aster 30, which generally can engage targets up to 80,000ft. These weapons are usually classed against tactical short range and some medium range ballistic missiles. Which is misleading. What they are actually saying is these weapons cannot intercept a passing ballistic missile such as an intermediate or intercontinental, as it is too high. What is true though, is that they can intercept a warhead, re-entry vehicle or single piece missile if its falling towards them. The problem a lot of these systems have is with the search/tracking radar’s elevation. A lot of these weapons will be falling to earth above the maximum elevation the radar beam can reach. Where most radar’s are set to look at a maximum elevation of +70 degrees. Meaning there is a 30 degree dead zone, the radar cannot see. Where you can find that some missiles overfly the radar too high for it to be detected, or the warhead/re-entry vehicle falls into the dead zone cone above the radar.

The new Ground Fire 300 radar used with the SAMP-T NG, normally scans the sky up to an elevation of +70 degrees. But according to the Thales blurb can elevate the beam to +90 degrees. Which I believe is done by mechanically tilting back the antenna array on the rotating mount. Thereby removing the dead zone above the radar. A system such as the SAMP-T NG will still be useful against both intermediate and ballistic missiles, that have deployed their warheads/re-entry vehicles against high value targets. But only so long as the SAM is deployed to that specific area. Otherwise, you will need something like Arrow 2 and 3 for not only very high targets, but also the passing ones. Hence why the US has deployed AEGIS ashore in Poland and Romania, which uses the SM3 as its interceptor. Surprisingly they don’t back it up with something like SM6?

A number of countries are now investing in very high altitude ballistic missile defence. Germany has bought Arrow 3 as part of their collaboration for the European Sky Shield Initiative. 24 NATO countries have signed up to the initiative including the UK. Both Belgium and Holland were talking about equipping their 4 new frigates with SM3. Though after relations have thawed with the US, they have gone quiet on this requirement.

Just had a look and P8s and E7 could operate from runways of about 1.6km though 1.8km might be better.

Sumburgh at 1.3 Kirkwall at 1.2 and Wick at 1.3 would all be potential alternative runways and potentially nearer to operations than lossiemouth. Kirkwall and Wick look quite feasible to be extended. Sumburgh less so. Scatsta also in Shetland at 1.2km would be much easier to extend but it looks to have been taken out of service.

It seems more of a when than if for Aster capability on the Mk41. But they’d probably go for CAMM or CAMM/Aster rather than full Aster. With CAMM-ER and soon to be CAMM-MR, there’s not much point in Aster 15 anymore so they’d only be using Aster 30. And whilst it is a better missile than CAMM-MR, the latter can be dual packed and is cheaper. Additionally the radars on the Type 31 don’t really allow Aster 30 to make full use of its abilities.

I’d imagine a likely missile configuration to be 8 cannister launched NSM. Then of the 32 MK41, 8 quad packed CAMM or CAMM-ER (whatever they decide is most cost effective), 8 dual packed CAMM-MR, 8 offensive missiles such as tomahawks, then the final 8 cells filled with whatever fits the mission best. At minimum that would still give them 32 short ranged defense and 16 medium ranged missiles. 16 offensive missiles and 8 cells for whatever they need. Given how cheap a Type 31 is I’m not sure if Aster is really required.

Sweden similar as Denmark on the Type 31, but Norway with the Type 26 will probably be the same as us and just fill the 24 VLS with offensive weapons as it already has 48 CAMM onboard. And the current design lacks any ship ASW weapons incase the chopper isn’t up, so a VLS fired ASROC or type 07 might be required, though personally I would prefer MILAS to be fitted to leave the VLS for other things.