Ellida – The future Multi Role Support Ship?

Got that. However we still have a big hole called HMS Ocean replacement. I fear but am sure they intend to put the assault helos on the QE class which is dumb (if they are LHP then they aren’t fleet carriers and they will be further inshore at greater risk). We are not going to get another Ocean but we could build a few more ‘Ellida’ to compensate.

Any thoughts on the ‘Mexican’ labels?

The QEs will never operate as LPH. Simply too big and unable to operate in littoral waters. The only hope woukd be to put MV22s on them because the additional speed and range would allow a QE to launch assaults whilst in deep water.

I read yesterday that the planned retirement date for the Ospreys is 2030. Can’t believe that is true and even if it is a plan, don’t see it actually happening, but is that actually even a proposed date anyone else has heard mentioned? Certainly puts into perspective any discussion, as decidedly improbable as it is, of us procuring any.

Its incorrect. At this point there is no definitive out of service date)although some have been bandied about) The USN is just introducing the COD version into service, and the CV22 is proving to be exceptional in the special forces role. Despite early problems which are far better understood these days, the Osprey has evolved into a remarkable military tool which isn’t going anywhere for a long time yet! The Pentagon is currently working on software upgrades which display information to the pilot in a better manner including an engine health indicator because the MV22 often flies at low level in dusty conditions.
With Japan now looking to purchase 17 and Indonesia looking at 8, the export market is growing…….The cost price for the Indonesian order has been quoted as being $1 Billion US dollars. Actually a little shocking that Indonesia can afford to buy them and the UK can’t?????

Agreed on Ocean.

Mexican labels???

Ohhhhhh I get it!

No idea, I’m Mithrander, the Grey Pilgrim.

Tolkien a total genius.

“Tolkien a total genius.”

Tru dat bro…. tru dat.

Prof Hugo Dyson was a member of the Inklings club that used to meet at the Eagle and Child in Oxford. Tolkien and CS Lewis were also members. On hearing a reading of Tolkien’s latest effort, Dyson remarked ‘oh no, not another f—–g elf’. I am afraid, that I have always shared his opinion.🙂

JRR did have a bit of a hard on for his Elves right enough, they could even walk on water (well snow).

Is that what they are I was wondering, it makes everyone look like bandits…. which I suppose is a fair analogy.

Not really a recent hole given that Ocean and Illustrious were replaced by QE and POW. Even compared with 1990s the two CVs provide greater rotary capacity than four smaller flat-tops.

Beach landing by ships directly is even more impossible if you accept the anti ship missile threat. If you dont like the idea of landing craft, you’re not going to put an LST in there!

The defence against that threat is escorts or go home.

It’s also nearly irrelevent because so few beaches are suitable for it and the damage it does to the ships.

LHD/LPD/LSD has been the optimum way of amphibous assualt for decades.

With FSS confirmed as seperate and the next big thing, this MRSS is a decade plus away. By then it’ll morph to a couple of (RN) LHDs and some small (RFA) LPDs. Its what they want and gives both task froce and dispersed capabiltiy. All the rest of it is smoke and mirrors and talk to try and get there – hell, the LSS Bay is literally just a Bay with better aviation, pretty much an LPD(H) by anyone elses classification. Its just a shame (actually damning indictment) that the Albions lack their hangar…

You may have misinterpreted my perception of the threat if you are comparing landing craft to LST? I’m not saying the landing craft are vulnerable, its the motherships they operate from that are. This isn’t an idea I invented. Its the observation made by the USMC Commandant wrt to the Wasp/America LHDs and San Antonio-class LPDs. Hence the USN LAW program, to try to reduce the number of threat scenarios requiring these large ships, operating relatively slowly, relatively close to shore. LAW also provides greater flexibility.

The idea with using LSTs is that they are continuously moving up until they land, making targeting harder. They rapidly discharge equipment, stores and personnel then leave, to avoid presenting a fixed target for a long time period. We also avoid concentration of targets by using larger numbers of smaller, less expensive ships, so we can afford losses. Lose an Albion-class or similar before off-loading and it may well be a mission kill.

The key to addressing ship damage from landing is to leverage their low cost, so damage is acceptable in the context of the more important requirement to support the primary task of delivering the payload ashore.

Agreed you need escorts with AAW capability, which is likely to leverage T32 as an intermediate frigate. May well need additional higher end escorts to counter peer air-delivered threats. However, still smart to present a limited target opportunity.

The USN LAW program isn’t a perfect proxy for UK requirements due to different needs but it captures some of the concepts. USN cost target is $100/ship. Costs for MRSS would probably be higher, commensurate with higher capability, but it would be critical to prevent cost creep. Hence the likely use of a commercial platform, with relatively short life before re-sale for civilian use as a ferry in less affluent nations.

https://news.usni.org/2020/11/19/navy-officials-reveal-details-of-new-100m-light-amphibious-warship-concept

This was an earlier article including NAVSEA briefing slides.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33299/navy-wants-to-buy-30-new-light-amphibious-warships-to-support-radical-shift-in-marine-ops

No, I got the idea you think docked down ships are vulnerable and that LSTs going to the beach is better.

Thing is, a docked down ship vs one at 20kts is exactly the same thing to a missile doing 1000+kts. A beached LST is at zero kts too and allowing for tide and unload is likely to be so for a long time.

Plus as before, you just cant beach at many places and doing so risks the ship (and cargo). Ok if you’ve hundreds or even thousands but going from 2 LPD/3LSD to even 10 LST doesnt change that, noting we didnt do it with the LSLs in 82 for both reasons.

The docked down ships out at sea are also much easier to defend than LSTs on the beach. For a start they’re out of most arty and direct fire range – doesnt eliminate fires entirely but cuts about 80+% of it out.

The current USMC commandant is a crank, and once they’re gone, so will the idea, although I agree that some balance and some smaller ships to allow forces to be in multiple place, may be a decent idea.

The LST idea also seems to omit having what 60 years of experience has taught us is critical, and thats helos. Unless you plan to operate them in penny packets on the same ship that beaches. Where are their fuel and munitions and maintenbacbe facilities going to go in a beachable sized vessel?

A large mother ship offshore, with good clear horizons for threat detection and engagement, and then lots of landing craft snurgling at wave height to be able to land anywhere, seems far better. The larger ship also poses major efficiency advantages in manning and supporting aviation – both of critical importance to us.

So sorry, I dont see LSTs as relevant, they got replaced by LXDs for very good reason, including habitability and endurance as well. Noting the Chinese are moving away from LSTs to LXDs as their current and next generation ships.

The US may try to have it all, but LAW looks like another disastrous LCS dead end.

A docked down ship and one at 20 knots aren’t the same. Its harder to find, acquire a target solution and maintain a kill chain on a moving target. Particularly one not in a predictable location until close to its objective, assuming its objective can be determined before it lands. A beached LST is clearly a target, which is why the intent would be to use smaller ships with smaller loads to avoid the need to spend a long time beached, its core to the concept.

No one is planning opposed landing, so tube and rocket arty and direct fire threats aren’t relevant to either case. Although were it the case, then ships are going to have to be a long way offshore based on the way arty development is going and its likely proliferation to non-peer nations.

Rotary lift would be supported for lily pad operations only, no hanger or maintenance services. Not convinced about adding re-fueling or re-arming either but might be persuaded otherwise. Rotary lift would operate in mass from the carrier(s), potentially also supported from other ships in the force such as Tides and FSSS. There would be your efficiency advantages for support. The carrier would have to be a long way out to sea, so today’s fleet of Merlins and Chinooks aren’t ideal to rapidly transit the distance to shore and beyond. A solution such as V-280 would be much better. Perhaps one reason why MOD are formally interested in the FLRAA and FARA programs.

A problem with a large mothership is that it doesn’t organically support lots of landing craft, so landing the large armoured force it can carry will require a lot of trips.

I don’t expect to convert too many if any to the modern LST concept I outline, but I appreciate the discussion and thanks for making your points.

I would suggest that we have to be careful about pointing to what Russia and China do in their fleets when comparing to our requirements. I believe their amphibious (and carrier) capabilities are targeted more to threatening neighbours than NATO in Europe or the US in the Pacific. Our fleets have to be capable of deterring them though, so their ambitions don’t grow.

If LAW does go the way of LCS then it will at least be cheaper! Gilday seems to be committed to making the LCS as least usable for the missions originally planned, they will just end up costing the full price of a frigate for something less capable.

Yeah they are – the link between location and objective is the same, indeed a dock ship can stand-off giving uncertainty as to where it is and where it’s craft are going, an LST literally has to head directly to it and stay there. If you can find an LPD and strike it vs the defences, you can do exactly the same to an LST even closer to you.

Lots of small ships equals huge manning and maintenance liability – we can barely manage a few large ships, where is all that coming from?

Again, in a lot of places LSTs cannot beach. What do we do then? How constraining is that and how canalised does that make us?

If you are hand waving an oppositon away, then what is the problem in the first place? What is this solving? LPDs 20miles offshore are clearly far safer from en weapons than LSTs on the actual beach.

Experience has shown that organic helos are far more efficient at lifting than adding nugatory transits requiring more fuel. If youve shuttles of helos then your offshore group is effectively tied to position anyway and vulnerable in your scenario.

It feels like you are ignoring the lessons of 70 years of amphib operations and going back to 1944. The forces that fought 1944, when given a chance, replaced large fleets of small ships with smaller fleets of large ships, putting aviation in the same place as the people and kit it was to move, and likewise people, their vehicles and landing craft in the same place. Concepts which have worked extremely well when used.

This one size fits all of direct unload was done and evolved from. Even in the days we did this, troops were actually landed by landing craft from mother ships (LSI/APAs) because a ship carrying troops in an efficient scale needs to be larger.

If anything China and Russia are doing the opposite surely – China is building a more ocean and globally deployable fleet vice the Taiwan strait, which is exactly what we want to do.

Looking at 1982, the LPDs were basically at the beach anyway and their landing craft were vital to unloading the stores the force needed. We had 2 LPD, 6 LSL and upwards of 20 merchant ships carrying troops, equipment and vehicles. Some of the those merchants were huge.

Converting that to an LST force would be what, 30 ships, 40? All of it has to exist in peacetime and be manned.

I just dont see any advantage, indeed it seems far less flexible and capable but more expensive and vulnerable (easier to protect a few large ships that can be fitted with self defence systems axtive and passive).

“…to an LST even closer to you” – You seem to keep focusing on an opposed landing and also on an LST having to stay beached for a long time. I already explained why those aren’t relevant for my proposal. You also seem to believe that all targets are equally easy to locate and target. If that’s so then nothing I say is likely to persuade you otherwise.

The LST 120 I used as an example has a crew of 22, a Bay has a basic crew of ~70 plus any RN complements, Albion a crew of 100’s. LSTs don’t drive larger personnel numbers, actually the reverse for the much simpler ships I am suggesting.

I could keep addressing your points, but you are relying on past experience to be an accurate predictor of future operations. I disagree and it doesn’t seem likely that either of us will be persuaded by the others arguments, so I’ll leave it at that. I do however appreciate your responses.

As I said before, I am not making it opposed – you are as you are convinced the LXDs when operating as motherships to landing cract, will be attacked and sunk and so we need a distributed force that can go direct to the beach. Who is doing that attacking if there isnt an opposition force? Why are we even conducting a military operation if there is no en force?

Thinking an LST at 20kts moving to beach to unload and then wait for the tide (and all that will take time however much you may wish it didnt) is hard to target is naieve in the extreme. Thinking a beachhead isn’t vulnerable to arty attack in an age of 50km gun and 100s km missile arty is also naieve (if the en is that further away then that is likely to quickly change, which is measured in minutes using air). It’ll be risky enough landing troops from dispersed and individually small landing craft, let alone having an actual ship right there.

We saw in 1982 you can avoid en land forces, but air attacks started that day, and frankly a better opposing land force would have gone all or nothing to march out from Stanley and put San Carlos in gun range and then smashed us.

Air will find these LSTs just as quick as they can find the LXD offshore, EW will find them even quicker. Please explain why you think a bunch of LSTs steaming at 20kts towards a beach are going to be missed by an enemy which may have satellites and almost certainly has some airborne radar which can transit at 300kts plus and look out 100s of nm. If those capabilities can be handwaved away (ie. defeated in some manner), why is the LXD which is further away still vulnerable?

There is no effective difference except resources can be concentrated to defend the LXDs whislt an armada of LSTs is much harder to cover.

LSTs in numbers do drive manning up. Not least as a lot of the extant large ships crewing is C4ISTAR, defensive weapons and hotel overload pers to support embarked forces and aviation – all you’re doing is penny packeting that about which is less efficient. An LST with 100-200 troops on it for the duration of UK to target is clearly going to need a much bigger crew to look after them. What facilities will the LST have to support their welfare for what could be a couple of months transit/stand-off?

You keep saying you could address points, but are saying that to ignore some of the difficult ones – for instance what if geography doesnt support beaching (as is the case most of the time)? What about unloading merchant ships (that bring all the logistics, bombs bullets and beans) ? where are the heavy landing craft to do that coming from? What is used in riverine or shallow waters areas (estuaries, deltas, fjords and inland waterways such as the Shatt al Arab etc) – noting the UK relies on the LPD and LSD shifted landing craft to provide close support to ops as far upstream as water goes – an LST wont be doing that clearly. Where are the RM’s ORCs coming from in this structure, what acts as their base/maintenance/hotel ship?

Past experience literally is the best predictor of the future.

Nothing has changed in littoral warfare – missiles have got a bit longer ranged, a bit more accurate, but so have defensive ones – there is no paradigm shift here that suggests the evolution from LSTs to LXDs has become flawed. Noting LSTs were actually purely vehicle landing ships and there were a ton of LSI/APA/AKA and even LSDs doing their functions because they was better suited to landing troops.

That is where the LPD and LPH was invented – by the very people who had vast experience with LSTs.

I’m afraid you just seem obstinately wedded to your idea despite having no credible rationale for it. I’m sorry to rain on the parade, but whilst I could see a logic for a handful of LSTs to augment a LXD based force, for niche circumstances where they offer value, the flexibility and efficiency of large ships consolidating the troops, their equipment, landing and raiding craft and well defended actively and passively – seems more than outweighing any vulnerability when docked down. Noting neither of the LPDs in the Falklands was hit, but 2 LSLs were when used in precisely the role you advocate – taking troops direct to a landing location and necessarily dispersed from the concentration of defensive assets.

OK let me see if I can address all your points. BTW I did outline my rationale in a different post under this article, in case you hadn’t seen it – https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/ellida-the-future-multi-role-support-ship/#comment-559494

1) When I reference “opposed” I am talking about relatively local forces, either at the beach or close enough to it to attack assets with rocket or tube arty, including your examples. If such threats exist where we wish to land then they need to be neutralised first, this is where we use carrier air power. If they are in such strength that this is impractical then we land elsewhere. For reinforcing Norway, which was my primary requirement in the linked comment, we would be landing well before opposing forces arrive anywhere close to the area.

2) The carrier air power with AEW detects and keeps opposing air surveillance and air threats out of range of the ships and landing area; this is what 1982 lacked.

3) The future threat I am anticipating is long range missiles, including sub-sonic stealth, supersonic and in time maneouvering hypersonic weapons, with targeting provided by LEO satellite networks. Not today’s intermittent satellite coverage but 24/7/365 pervasive. I agree everything will potentially be seen by such a surveillance network.

4) The intent is to minimise the time any vessel is stationary or close to it under these circumstances to make targeting, establishing and maintaining the kill chain harder. LSTs need to get in and out quickly, so they cannot be large because of the time to off load. Caimen 90 is 30m, LST 120 is 120m with about 2x the beam, both will be targets. I am not wedded to the LST 120 its just an example. Maybe my hypothetical vessel could be smaller, depends on trade offs. Clearly the requirement for both is managing landings around tides.

5) How many troops are hosted and for how long depends on the mission. All troops might be embarked on the LSTs, increasing crew numbers as a consequence. Or split between LSTs and the carrier/supporting ships, or all based on the carrier/supporting ships. Merlin and/or Chinook would airlift personnel from the carrier/supporting ships, either to the LST or direct to shore, while still keeping the carrier well offshore.

6) You have stated that geography doesn’t support beaching most of the time. I’ll take your word for it, although I wonder how LSTs are still in navies to this day and how they have stayed for so long if they are so restricted in their use. It also doesn’t mean there aren’t locations where LSTs do work in a target region, so options may be reduced but not eliminated.

7) Unloading merchant ships depends on what size force we’re working with. On the one hand you suggest that we would need large numbers of LSTs to replace STUFT and then suggest we also need heavy landing craft to offload from STUFT. I’d suggest an intermediate position in terms of LST numbers, plus use of davit launched LCVP from LST for off loading merchant ships. If the STUFT fleet is so large this is impractical then I presume we will have allies for such a large operation. With only 10 LCUs we would be constrained in off loading a large STUFT fleet on our own anyway.

8) Riverine or shallow waters areas would still have support from LCVP. Orcs from T31 or lifted off deck of LST. Both LCVP and ORCs might also be supported from T32, with appropriate davits.

I’ve probably missed something but this is going to have to do.

A few general observations.
a) What I am defining is expected to survive in potential conflicts for the next 40 years (per my original post linked above). The surveillance and threats look to change significantly in that timeframe, with markedly different capabilities than we are used to. That is what drives my questioning our current solutions. No easy answers though IMV.

b) I’m not suggesting LST 120 is the answer. Its just the closest proxy for the type of capability I am suggesting. A stern landing ship, forward superstructure with large deck space aft might be a better layout. In any case, my concept is not fully formed, so I would be surprised if there aren’t some weaknesses to it.

b) I would be cautious about leveraging too much from 1982. For example had we had AEW, even with no extra Harriers in the force, we might have prevented any air attacks. And then Bluff Cove would have looked like a perfect solution, not to mention avoiding the lost ships. Conversely it turns out we were fortunate not to have lost ships to torpedoes, through no act of our own. But we don’t see that aspect discussed as much because nothing bad happened.

You’ve summed up my instincts too. Guess we have to see what we get although I doubt the guys pushing them round will be consulted.

I would suggest that it is technically possible if you are prepared to accept the compromises. The more roles you squeeze in the bigger / more compromises you have to make. Comes a point when all you get is a lot of not much – if you get my drift.

Of course there are a number of roles that would normally fit well with this type of hull, so put a couple of variations on a theme into service rather than try to squeeze all of the roles into a single design would be my preference.

Cheers CR

I think that we are probably thinking along the same lines. Mixing stores requirements(especially munitions) at any level with all that seems to be required of them (raiding/helo/landing) strikes me as somewhat barking!
If we need several variations, then is that not the same as specialist requirements/vessels? So if that’s the case, surely a dedicated specialist vessel is a better option, if obviously the more expensive one!

I agree that we are probably thinking along similar lines. The good news is I think that BMT are also thinking along these lines.

A family of vessels based on a common theme actually saves quite a bit of expense. The main advantage of developing a family of vessels is not so much that the designs are precisely related, rather the design team can carry the experience across from one variant to the other.

Of course, if you then go ahead and build the ships you can save more money by using common equipment, engines, pumps, radars, electrical systems etc. Changing the hull shapes and sizes, may not necessarily be a significant cost driver if you can carry the experience through the entire design and production processes. This is what the National Shipping Building Strategy is about. It is a basic and fundemental truth of engineering – experience counts.

The MRSS / FSSS programme could see the RFA well equipped with a cost effective fleet of vessels. There will be comprmises, there always is, but a family of ship designs would be a good way to go I think.

Cheers CR

Hi Deep, not so sure we are really short escorts although we do lack some capabilities. Its interesting to see US CSGs seemingly routinely deploy with significantly fewer escorts than just the UK component of CSG21, although I will grant you that The Sullivans offers BMD which we do not currently have. Consider Theodore Roosevelt CSG in the SCS recently with its low escort numbers – https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/140151

That said, CSG21 is really practicing how we might operate with the complexity including logistics for a larger force in a more high risk scenario. The more the merrier for this type of deployment/learning I suspect.

I agree that we are short on helicopters and especially relevant platforms across the services currently. UxVs are such a large range of capabilities that some will be easier to implement, while others will be more challenging. For instance, full autonomy is very different to man in the loop base station control for something like Reaper.

Hi mate, agree that this escorts issue is a bit of a conundrum. The usual make up of escorts for a US CG consists of 3/4 AB and a Tyco. So in hull numbers the same as ours. Unfortunately the difference is in the capabilities of the units. All call it 4 US units are multi role, can do AAD/ASW and LR Strike. With our units, 2 do AAD, whilst the other 2 do ASW and limited AAW.
For RN Plc to bring the same number of capabilities to the party, we would need to up our escort numbers. I have had a similar conversation with @GB on this issue, and it’s as broad as it is long when trying to compare capabilities v numbers.
The issue of having fewer numbers around also cropped up, and, the numbers are probably commensurate with the perceived threat level at any given time.
I’m sort of coming around to his view in that we have a broader balance to our capabilities weo AAD. It will be interesting to see what the muted T83 eventually brings to the party, I suspect it may will be more multi role then anything we currently have.

Hi Deep, I tend to agree that the ABs are showing their age. Once they get SPY-6 and SPQ-9B (and the latter’s replacement) along with active seekers in ESSM and SM-2, so they can ditch the illuminators, they’ll be in a much better place. Currently I’d be concerned about them handling a saturation attack of surface skimmers. Likewise the USN seems have been a bit complacent about the modern submarine threat, but hopefully the Constellation class will address that. Agree on T83, we need something more capable than a T45 if a sub gets past the ASW screen.

The question is where is the money coming from? The NAO review stated the current equipment budget was unaffordable and that resulted in the cuts of earlier this year. That unaffordable budget did not include these vessels.

Hi Steve,

understand where you are coming from here and it is a major problem.

we now have so many capability gaps that they are all coming at once, however £300m for a fleet that needs to be replaced is a pittance in the long run.

having said that you are probably right, and we will end up with less, costing more because we are inefficient and the doom loop will continue.

In fairness it will Never stop until all forces start proper fleet management. If Eddie Stobbart can do it why can’t the UK military…