General Sir Richard Barrons has cautioned that the British armed forces are presently facing significant operational challenges and require a financial infusion of £3 billion to enhance their military capabilities.

The retired general has appealed to Chancellor Jeremy Hunt to allocate funds in the forthcoming budget to replace the weaponry and tanks provided to Ukraine.

His concerns have been rooted in the view that the UK’s armed forces are presently in a precarious state not witnessed since the Cold War. He told The Express:

“We must begin the recapitalisation of the army now, today, and this requires an immediate annual boost of £3bn.

The Russian problem will remain for a decade. If China remains our long-term challenge, Russia is a speed bump which we simply must get over. We have an army that can issue PPE and drive ambulances but is in no state to fight.

We are at a point where the world is much more threatening while our armed forces are at their most broken since the Cold War… they are refusing to acknowledge the world we live in by deliberately keeping defence broken at the most critical time for a generation.”

General Sir Richard Lawson Barrons, a retired British Army officer, served in various staff and field posts in the UK, Europe, and the Far East during his early career. He also worked at the Ministry of Defence and in education before serving on his first tour of duty in the Balkans in 1993.

Barrons then served in Northern Ireland, as a Military Assistant to the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the Chief of the General Staff, and in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He was promoted to major general in 2008 and later became Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff.

 

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

210 COMMENTS

  1. I hope the British Army gets a cash boost, but I suspect it will not be as large as they would want. I hope they spend it on off the shelf items, rather than Gucci bespoke. Some ground launched SDB for the MLRS would be a good (& affordable) choice. Raising the number of Challenger 3 from 148 to 200-210, might also be a good idea.

    • I suspect most of the extra money would be needed to go to stuff behind the scenes, such as getting the ammo stocks up or spare parts etc. From endless stories of equipment in storage being used for spare parts in peace time, it’s pretty clear that in the event of a war things would not work for long.

      • If the Army gets any extra money out of HM Treasury, they will need to prove they spent it wisely. They cannot afford another Ajax fiasco.

        • Spending upto the decision to go with the Ajax was a mess, but the actual issues with the platform itself don’t appear to have costed the MOD anything other than time. But no doubt there will be a public enquiry about it at some point and the real info on the costs will come out.

          • Apparently there have been 1200 contract amendments on the Ajax programme. It’s now wonder it’s umpteen years late.

          • But is it over budget? I’m asking I have no idea on the answer. I know it’s late due to the various issues, but can’t remember any stories of it being over budget, putting aside the money wasted getting to the point of ordering it.

          • Think its a firm price contract, so it can’t go over budget, unless MoD force contract amendments (ie change the spec).

          • Tracked Watchkeeper? Role procured for, in Air Supremacy over Iraq and Afghanistan, fulfilled by rent-a-drone: the baseline model that gold plating push-me-pull-you respecification, after every Maytime project officer crop rotation, messed with. Pushed into a desperation ‘look, see, it was operational’ deployment which racked up 146 mission hours while the Toms were drawing down presence and packing boxes. Nothing learned! Dysfunction carried over into AJAX. Our soldiers deserve better. Needs more Sen NCOs and WOs on the specification and build monitoring team not a Janes’ All the World’s collection of Lt Cols without portfolio ticking off every cap badge. Still want to see every 3* and 2* Army commander spend the same number of hours as the most injured tester in a ‘coming good’ AJAX’ and put their pink bodies and hearing biology where their career ‘wunderwaffen’ mouths are. Tommy Atkins is not blessed and deserves better than the collection of cap-badge retentive, let’s revive 1(BR) Corps and BAOR, donkeys they have.

          • It is something of a myth that senior officers spend much of their time plotting how to retain capbadges and wishing to revive 1(BR) Corps and BAOR – and are donkeys. The cap badge thing is restricted to a handful of retired senior officers once in a blue moon when there are major cuts imminent – and everyone knows we don’t have the soldiers or equipment to revive BAOR – and there is no political will (or money) to do so.
            There are many reasons for the Ajax debacle, and only some are due to incompetent, idle or disengaged officers.

          • I do feel like there’s like a sliding scale of “how much I care” about cap-badges. With JNCO’s, lower ranking SNCO’s and Junior Officers being very I don’t care; Senior Officers (Lt Col and above) rarely being very fussed, and then there being this middle grade of Majors and WO2’s who get their knickers very much in a twist.
            Usually older ones who’s careers will never take them beyond the Regiment….

          • Thanks Dern, I agree. But there is this perception that senior officers spend a fantastic amount of time lobbying to preserve their capbadge when cuts are looming, to the exclusion of all else. In reality, most senior officers know not to be difficult, negative or obstructive and that they will be ‘marked down’ if they bang on about this.

          • It’s because it’s the old retired guys with nothing else to do, who write their MP’s, and get on the case of their old buddies who are still in. “I can’t believe you’re letting them disband the old regiment!” XD

          • Yep, its the old retired Generals – and they get nowhere with their letters to The Times and the Telegraph.

          • I’m not sure where the responsibility lies, but 1200 changes to a contract are almost inevitably going to foul it up, whoever initiated them. Like everyone else I am all agog to find out if it works and who pays the excess.

          • Nick, I said that it was (allegedly) 1200 MoD requirements not 1200 Contract Amendments – a massively different thing.

            I only ever heard of one sizable Contract Amendment (CA) for Ajax, that being in 2016, but there may have been some smaller ones too.

            When I was a PM at AbbeyWood, my own Project, admittedly a piddling little £60m project, had no Contract Amendments.

            If a CA is proposed by MoD, then MoD pay any extra costs arising. Rare for a Contractor to raise a CA, but if they did, they would pay any additional costs.

            Having said all the above, many would argue that 1200 Requirements at the outset of the project was far too many. Happy to discuss that point further.

          • I think we are both on the same page in that too many changes to a contract, or too many requirements in the original contract agreement, are almost inevitably going to lead to problems. I have never run a UK MOD contract, when I was in the business all mine were for export, so I bow to your knowledge.
            It is interesting to see that Wallace now says that the changes made mean that the beast will be allowed to go ahead, although Francis Tusa reckons all they are doing is mitigating the symptoms rather than actually fixing the cause of the problems. It will still be interesting to follow over the next few years.

          • I don’t think we have yet heard the full story of MoD allegedly setting 1200 requirements at the outset and whether the inexperienced contractor found that a help or whether it stifled their initiative and creativity.
            I have not heard of a raft of contract amendments over the years, just the big one in 2016.
            The technical fixes to alleviate mainly noise and vibration problems are a different story – we have heard nothing about how GDUK solved the problems, just that they seem to have done so, otherwise the vehicle would not have been allowed to resume User Validation Trials/complete them.
            I have not seen Francis Tusa’s piece – where is it. If the mitigation is good that is essentially all that matters.

          • Re Tusa, I haven’t read his piece in full, I must subscribe to whatever website he is on. He was quoted by both the Times and the FT.
            And for the full story I think we have to wait for the results of the investigation currently being fronted by a KC.
            PS. Tusa’s website is Defence Analysis, I must give it a look.

          • The KC’s enquiry is focussing on the legal issues as I understand it.

            I would be interested to hear about the 1,200 MoD requirements that were set out at the outset.

            MoD chose a really useless company to make Ajax family.

      • CR2 was introduced into service in 1998. Since then many parts suppliers have ceased trading or no longer make a certain part. Its a massive problem. It’s why there is recourse to cannibalising of out-of-service tanks.

        • But the reason for that is stealth cuts. Unless something has gone seriously wrong at the MOD, they should have the original technical diagrams for all the parts, which means they can be built if funds were used. Might not be cheap but possible. However much easier to just cannibalise parts and hide the problem.

          • MoD is unlikely to have tech diagrams for parts of a tank. MoD off-loaded its Design Authority role to the OEM way back, probably about mid-80s. So BAE will have this.

            Obsolescence management is part of the responsibility of the MoD Equipment Support Manager at DE&S and it is quite an art. There are several options to dealing with the situation whereby a part that is no longer/can no longer be made by the original supplier:
            a. Delete the part from the build standard if it/the capability that it supports is no longer required – and amend drawings.
            b. Seek an alternative supplier that has an identical or similar part.
            c. Contract with an alternative supplier to make the parts, either as is or a modern version.

            The very, very last resort if all the above fails is to cannibalise from out-of-service tanks. It should be used very rarely, very sparingly, be strongly controlled and meticulously documented.

          • It’s also worth remembering that the British Army ordered neraly 400 CR2’s and now operates only about 227. When you have nearly as many tanks in storage as you do in service using them for spares isn’t as mad as it might seem when compared to the difficulty of keeping a buisness running just to supply spares for one brand of vehicle.

          • Yep. We ordered 386 CR2s to form the tank fleet for the post-Cold War army – that was judged to be the right number. – as was an army strength of 120,000 (a reduction of 40k on the Cold War numbers).
            Then Cameron cut Defence massively in the 2010 review diue to the global financial crisis – there was no reduction of the threat, just a ‘need’ to save money, hence the tanks cut to 227 (and AS90 numbers and troop strength……).
            Those 227 became the active/in-service tanks – and the balance (386-227) were shoved into hangers at Ashchurch; later supposedly some 80 of those were scrapped.
            Obsolescence management is the role of the MoD Equipment Support Manager (I was ESM for the tank variants and the withdrawn CR1s in 2000-2002). Many ways to deal with the situation where spares are no longer made – Obsolescence Management – the absolute last resort is stripping them off other tanks. It is not mad, but is the last resort only when all other techniques have failed. Cannibalisation is strictly controlled and meticulously documented by the ESM.

      • But only 227 CH2 are in service and with 14 off to Ukraine we will only have 213.
        4 regiments would require 300+CH2/3 which we don’t have.

        • With respect we don’t have any C3’s at the moment. You don’t need 300+ tanks to field four regiments. We had 15 in 1990 and six not so many moons ago. Four is the minimum if we want to match our neighbours. But why just seek parity with our allies? Send a message to the tyrant! Tanks, ships, aircraft. We’re ready.

          • The 3:4 ratio of tanks in the frontline regiments to total tanks is something the MOD have come up with not me.
            2x T56 regiments has a total fleet of 148 and 3 regiments have a total fleet of 227. Both figures are roughly 3/4.
            Last time we had 6 Tank regiments was almost 20 years ago and even then half of them were T44.
            I understand CH3 isn’t in service but CH2 numbers directly correspond to the max number of CH3.

          • In addition to tanks at UE you need tanks for the Trg Org, Repair Pool and Attrition Reserve.

            CR3 isn’t in service, as you say – it has only been 18 months since Contract Award – first tranche come off the line in 2027 and all fielded in 2030.

            We have 227 CR2s (less 14 to UA) – we are having just 148 converted to CR3.

          • To field four Type 56 Regiments you need 224 tanks at UE and a good number for the Trg Org, Repair Pool and Attrition Reserve – say 290-300 in total.

      • We could supplement those orders by buying the new panther tank or that tank that south Korea has which is fairly new 100 of those would be enough

    • We re committed to 2 regiments of armour (which recent events in Ukraine have shown to be too few) We will field a force of less than 150 tanks which once you account for training vehicles and stuff would leave us lucky to deploy operationally 120 or less into a warzone. We are in some ways lucky… it looked very much like we were going to do away with heavy armour at the last SDR (or was it the one before?) The war in Ukraine has quickly dispelled the arguments proposed by those that believed armour was no longer necessary on the battlefield. The problem is that we have no more Challenger II hulls suitable for conversion to Challenger III. To build anymore would require us to restart the Challenger production facilities closed for years and that is just not an option. No, the best we can do now is either buy an entire generation of tanks off the shelf from the Germans in the shape of the Panther KF41 which is a great platform and would make us one of the most advanced tanking nations in the world. However that would be a very difficult political decision and I think probably to difficult to sell to Parliament or the country. Perhaps if we built them here? Far more likely and probably more practical is for us to get by with 2 regiments while we develop (alongside some of our allies, all of whom will be looking for a new MBT within the next 10 years or so) a new MBT perhaps the Chieftain II and put it into production as quickly as possible although as quickly as possible is still over a decade I expect and possibly more.

      • Agree for the most part, but you’re a glutton for punishment. Given the strain on the fiscal budget we will find ourselves in for the next decade, I suggest the best option is to forego more development programs and buy of the shelf. Tempest will suck up a lot of the defence procurement energy available, so ready made will provide cheaper and faster alternatives, with no loss of quality. Let’s save ourselves years of arguing, wasted opportunities and potentially a poorer outcome by buying Korean or German.

      • Two regiments is 112 tanks, assuming they are Type 56. I don’t recall heavy armour being nearly disposed of at SDSR or Defence Command Paper although there were some who were talking along these lines to the media, including Ben Wallace.
        We have 227 CR2s less the 14 going to UA, therefore we have a pool of 213 tanks from which we convert 148 to CR3. Don’t know why you are saying there are not enough CR2s for conversion – there is a substantial surplus (213-148).
        We will not buy Panther KF41 – we are buying CR3 – am I missing something?
        Chieftain II – what the heck is that?

      • Hi, I agree would it not be better to just decide to change platforms/tanks and not upgrade challenger 2 and move over to the Panther KF41 and hopefully we will not be the only operator of it .
        it is a shame they did not look at the lynk instead of Ajax !

        • Issue is per unit cost, and it was worked out and compared. if you took the CH3 Budget you would get 50 New Tanks of Lep 2 status time you get parts and service kit. and we could continue to upgrade other Ch3s as and when a Budget arrives.

  2. If, and only if, there is an increase in the Defence budget, where are the recruits coming from? I don’t see people queuing at recruitment offices round here. Those eligible and interested have already signed up so who is left?

    • Disband some of the ” historic” infantry battalions and re role the existing men for additional artillery, engineer and logistics units.
      Reduce the number of men and horses guarding the royals to about 200 men, and a few officers,just enough for a bit of pomp.
      CTA40 seems a duff idea to me, only the French are using it, and unless Ajax works or the turrets fit on Boxer it looks a dud. Just fit 30/35mm or 40mm bofors ( with 3P that the RN is using on Type 31) to an off the shelf turret.
      If ( if ) Ares works build 300 as an IFV in the UK, if not tracked Boxer built in the UK with enough turrets to swap around with wheeled Boxer.
      Licence build K9 thunder and add C3 turest if needed to a UK built K2 Hull. Double the number of C3 to 300 that way.

      Deeper weapons stocks, more logistics units to actually support the troops and as many PSM on MLRS as possible.

      More Skysabre and a joint Army /RAF purchase ot Sampt NG , enough for UK defence and an expeditionary regiment.
      It would probably take a decade to rebuild.

      • The Lithuania army has a useful looking Boxer IFV with a 40mm canon. Or we could get a tank destroyer variant with a 105mm gun and ability to transport 6 troops. Useful capability. Both would be off the shelf and add some fighting power to armoured infantry units.

        • Mate,

          I couldn’t agree more we need lots of it and as soon as possible. We should definitely increase the number of conversions too every chassis that is capable of being upgraded (maybe we could field 3 regiments then though I doubt it) and we should consider increasing the rate at which we purchase F-35B’s (leveraging our Tier 1 status for quick delivery) and perhaps most of all we must make GDUK meet their contractual obligations in regards to AJAX. It must be delivered in working order or our money back which amounts to billions of pounds? Ajax has left out entire Mechanised battle Group model for the UKLF in tatters.

          We are entering into a period of great uncertainty. America is no longer the reliable ally we have always respected. It is not the people of America but the leaders they elect are not statesmen they are reality TV characters and could as easily leave NATO as support the world order they established. However all this plays out our position can ONLY improve for being militarily strong and the consequences of military weakness do not bear thinking of. invest in the military, build as much of it here as possible… it is a win/win

      • ARES only takes 4 dismounts and has no cannon and no turret. It would cost a lot of time and money to convert it into an IFV for an infantry section.

          • Ajax family replaces CVRT.
            Ares replaces Spartan.
            Spartan was used to carry specialist sections like engineer recce, air defence, anti tank, and small groups of infantry in the recce regiments.
            Ajax isn’t an IFV.

          • Thanks, yes, I knew that Ajax isn’t an IFV. My IFV comment was in reference to Ares not having a turret but carrying (I thought) 7 personnel, and therefore being an APC. I didn’t realise it was only carrying 4!

          • Some reviews are badly written leading people to think it can carry 7 dismounts. No it is 4 dismounts plus vehicle crew, presumably of 3 (commander, driver, MG gunner/rad op).

            It is described as the APC of the family as that is what it is – it is armoured and it carries personnel. But it is not an infantry APC carrying a section (thats where Boxer comes in). It is a recce vehicle variant not an Infantry Troop carrier. The 4 dismounts are specialist teams such as Engineer recce, AD missile team, A-Tk team.

            ARES replaces Spartan, the APC variant of the CVR(T) recce family.

            APC does not always mean a vehicle carrying an 8-man infantry section. It certainly doesn’t when it is a recce vehicle variant.

          • Thanks for clarifying, I was indeed reading an article that claimed 3 crew and 7 dismounts- leading me to believe it was a “full-size” APC.
            Given the vehicle’s size I’m amazed there’s only room for 4 dismounts- they must have a LOT of armour and gubbins inside. They’re about the same size as Warrior in terms of external dimensions, I thought?

          • Wow, and I thought that Military Today wasn’t too bad a website..!
            I am baffled how we managed to take an APC/IFV platform (ASCOD) and somehow make it that much smaller on the inside that you have to remove 3 people- even with extra armour. What would the British Army’s new tracked IFV look like if we’re taking that approach?! We’d need a Namer-style thing based upon CR2 hulls…
            Yes, I’ve heard that Boxer will fit into our mechanised infantry units, which isn’t the worst thing that could happen in my view. Especially if we can get a turreted version too. As a gap filler until we can get some kind of tracked vehicle programme (I know everyone talks about CV90 or Redback, but we’d be mad not to go with ASCOD2 now that we’ve got Ajax and family), I’m happy enough.

          • I like Military Today website – but I think they have copied in some duff info from somewhere.
            I am as baffled as you as to how a large vehicle can only take 4 dismounts, not that has been procured as an infantry carrier – perhaps there is a lot of internal stowage.
            The army’s new tracked IFV? Are you saying we have contracted for the Tracked Boxer IFV for our Armoured Infantry battalions? I had not seen a press release to that effect.
            I still think we should have persevered with Warrior upgrade – it was at least 80% done. We lost the £430m we had spent on that and now have to buy Boxers at over £5m a pop – just hoping they are tracked, turreted and have a 40mm stabilised cannon – but I bet they won’t be. I am talking about the AI bns, not the other ones for which wheeled Boxer MIV is acceptable.
            Boxer to be just a gap filler? Not sure anyone thinks that.

          • I think I may be using wrong terminology and suchlike.
            There is currently no new tracked IFV as far as I know, but I expect the army to want one. I don’t think they’ve gone for tracked Boxer, and I remain to be convinced by that to be honest. All I was saying was that if, when funds and opportunity allow the British army to go shopping for a tracked IFV, they put that much armour on it that a Warrior-sized vehicle can only take 4 dismounts- an IFV capable of carrying a section would be massive!
            I wasn’t against a Warrior upgrade- the Bradley is still fighting on for a while yet. Key things would be powerpack, a stabilised gun, sensors, and maybe an ATGM. All of which is eminently achievable on the Warrior chassis if you don’t cock the project up. But, now that Army has chosen to drop it, I think that Boxer should be a gap filler for the AI batallions, until the funds allow Army to procure a new tracked vehicle. As you say, Mech/medium weight infantry and Boxer go together perfectly well- and they can take the “gap-filler” Boxers off Armoured Infantry once tracked IFVs arrive.
            As a solution to that (presumed) future IFV (and APC?) purchase, ASCOD2 makes most sense to me, given our work on Ajax.

          • Joe, don’t worry about getting the terminology wrong – not everyone was in the army!
            Our future IFV was to be the upgraded Warrior but that plan was cancelled (bad decision in my book). So Boxer is to be procured to replace Warrior in the armoured infantry battalions. [Boxer was already on order for other parts of the army].
            I have no info on the type of Boxers that are replacing Warrior – ideally they should be tracked Boxers with a 40mm stabilised cannon, but I doubt that is what we’ll get. The worse case scenario is that they will be wheeled Boxers with just a bog-standard MG.
            Please don’t consider the ARES variant of AJAX to be any sort of base for a tracked IFV – its not – 4 dismounts, no turret, no cannon, horrendously expensive as is or in some way converted. There are plenty of proper tracked IFVs out ther and many like the CV90.
            Gap fillers can have a horrible habit of becoming long term solutions when money gets tight for a true replacement.

            We have long been used to: tracked, cannon-equipped IFVs (Warriors) for the Armoured Infantry who operate with tanks; lighter armour for Mechanised Infantry (various PM wheeled vehicles (previously Saxon, Mastiff etc but now Boxer); soft-skinned or lightly armoured vehicles for light role infantry. No need to change this winning formula.

            I am not greatly convinced we need an ASCOD 2 for a future tracked IFV, just because we will have a much modified ASCOD in service (Ajax). We need to buy kit off the shelf for the next decade – the army needs to recapitalise (especially its its heavy metal) quickly and have no worries about developmental programmes going wrong or slowly.

          • Mate there is no such thing as a tracked Boxer it is a wheeled armoured vehicle which will be the new workhorse of the infantry. The new tracked armoured vehicle platform is Ajax or at least it is meant to be Ajax. Now someone in chat has suggested that Ajax is back on track. I really really hope that is true as our heavy maneuver elements will be in a total mess without it. I have not heard any good news on the Ajax program and had pretty much given it up for lost and was looking at possible alternatives. At least if we are forced to buy a stop gap measure off the shelf we can buy a proper IFV version of something as there are no plans to replace Warrior and that in my opinion is a mistake. (The Ajax IFV version can only carry I think 6 or is it even only 4 dismounts?) Whatever Warrior should have got an LEP to operate alongside the new Chally III and if Ajax is a bust I really do not know what we are going to do.

          • Hi Stuart, I had not heard of tracked Boxer until a couple of months ago – here is few links:
            https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/landwarfareintl/eurosatory-2022-new-kmw-boxer-variant-adds-tracked-mobility/

            https://www.kmweg.com/systems-products/tracked-vehicles/boxer/boxer-tracked/

            https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/boxer-tracked.htm

            however it is a Private Venture by KMW, not ARTEC, and has little to nothing in common with ARTEC’s wheeled Boxer.

            We have ordered a large number of wheeled Boxers to meet the MIV requirement, but I am not clear as to whether we have yet ordered the tranche of Boxers which replace Warrior – so no idea whether it wlil be the wheeled ARTEC product (and no idea if it has a stablised cannon etc) or whether MoD wil buy the KMW tracked Boxer – just know they are buying Boxer for the Armoured Infantry.

            I am very aware that our next recce vehicle (or recce/strike) is to be Ajax – and that it is tracked – quite a different subject but there are many on this site who seem to think the Infantry should have ARES or a stretched ARES – and I have been making the point that the Infantry don’t ride in a recce vehicle (or variant thereof).

            I am surprised you had not heard god news about Ajax – there has been much good news since early Dec – it completed User Validation Trials following various fixes and is on its Reliabilty Growth Trial. That may take a year or 2 and may need some more fixes (hopefully not). It shoudl have been fielded in 2017. MoD has decided that the stop gap is to retire CVR(T) asap and temporarily convert Warrior to meet the recce role. You couldn’t make it up.

            There is no Ajax IFV version – there is an APC version called ARES – but it does not carry infantry – it carries specialist small teams of up to 4 men ie engr recce, a/tk team, AD team.

            I agree that it is a mistake not to complete the Warrior upgrade (LEP) programme known as WCSP – and to buy some sort of Boxer – just hoping it won’t be the bog standard job with only a MG instead of a stabilised 40mm cannon.

          • Thanks for the clarity, that’s relaly helpful!
            Well, I guess we’ll have to wait and see what we actually get. In some ways, with Russia expending so much of its military force in Ukraine, they’re less of the threat to us for now (converntionally), however this makes it the perfect time to re-generate the Army, with the lessons we’re learning from Ukraine.

          • Good point about Russia being less of a threat to us – story goes that they have suffered 60,000 killed and 140,000 wounded and have lost thousands of pieces of major combat equipment. But Russia has a habit of bouncing back after a poor cpmbat experience such as their experience of warfighting in Afghanistan in the 70s. We need to regenerate the army and make it much stronger in terms of quantity and quality of manpower and heavy metal platforms.

          • But at present the light protected mobility battalion’s are running around in foxhound that takes for 4 dismounts, so they are actually configured for this. It’s just at present they would be going into a peer conflict in a vehicle designed to protect against IEDs and be used in asymmetrical type conflict. Not saying the way the light protected mobility battalions are set up is any anyway idea…infact it’s forced by a less than ideal vehicle…

          • Foxhound is a light protected mobility vehicle that replaced Snatch LR. It is therefore well suited to light protected mobility battalions…and it is ‘only’ £925k a copy. Those battalions will not be at the forefront of a peer-peer armoured conflict (thats the job of the warfighting div with its two armoured BCTs and the Deep Strike/Recce BCT) so do not need to be provided instead with much heavier, tracked, more expensive vehicle. Horses for courses.

            We have: armoured infantry (currently in WR) for warfighting alongside tanks; infantry in PM vehicles for lower threat environments and light roledd infantry for the very lowest threat environment.
            We have bought enough ARES for those in the warfighting div operating well forward who need the best protection and mobility – ie engineer recce, ATk teams and AD teams. It is not an infantry carrier.

          • I suppose the question is do we need a balance of battalions which is 18% peer war fighting for a modern battlefield, 27% low intensity, 36% not deployable in any risk environment, 9% ceremonies and 6% parachute.

            not saying we don’t need light roled infantry and protected mobility, we do, but that balance is pretty off kilter at present, with only 18% of the infantry battalions focused on peer high intensity conflict. Do we really want around 66% of our infantry battalions focused around low intensity security and stability ?

          • Well done for working out the ratios. I guess a lot depends on cost of equipment and likelihood of use.
            Money. Armoured Infantry units cost a lot more to equip than PM units which cost more than Lt role Inf to equip. Money is tight so only a few bns will be AI.
            Likelihood of use. In the last 30ish years the army deployed armoured forces on kinetic operations warfighting against armoured units twice – Gulf War 1 and GW2. All other campaigns were largely stabilisation, counter-insurgency and peace support operations which did not require the heaviest of AFVs.
            You must think that, going forward, there is a very high likelihood of peer high intensity conflict, and that a much higher percentage of the infantry (than 18%) would be required for this. I could understand that if we are going toe to toe with Russia in WW3 or there are more desert conflicts on the horizon, but are these scenarios likely?

          • To be honest Graham I’m a firm believer in the best way to not have to use an army is to have a very good and bloody obviously good army with clear intent. so I think especially is a man that looks at intent and how much he can get way with. Let’s be honest most European nations show little intent….Italy..bugger all..Germany ifffy at best…France once even stuck its fingers up at NATO of the major European powers the UK has alway been the NATO that showed the most intent to defend against first soviet and now Russian aggression. But to really express that intent we need to show we can deploy a very effective division + other battle groups + an air mobile brigade + an amphibious brigade. I’m. Not saying go all BAOR.. but I think we need more than 6 infantry battalions that could go toe to toe..I think we are so very close to war with Russia,,,it’s not yet inevitable but Putin needs the west to be an enemy and he will look for any weakness of intent and potential overstep the line and force a war, What we need to do is get the strike brigades up an running as quickly as we can that can go alongside the armoured brigades as well as invest in more precision fires. If we have to sacrifice some light role infantry battalions or protected infantry to get that then I think we should…as we are not going to be doing as much asymmetric stabilisation work as we have been..but we do need to show and explain with no uncertainty our intent as a nation and what the red lines are to the man who had a lot of nuclear weapons and thinks we are lacking in intent and political will. I honestly think if we miss step and show week intent we actually could be going toe to toe with Russia…I think Putin needs an enemy and would miscalculate our intent unless we shove it down his face.

          • I agree with your view on the larger European nations being less than wilco on more than one occasion (and the smaller ones being insignificant in a big fight).

            Our warfighting division has a glaring weakness – it does not have three true and similar manouevre brigades. 12 and 20th Armoured BCTs are OK (but odd that 20x has three mech inf bns and 12x has just two), provided they get IFVs to work with tanks and not some feeble Boxer without a cannon. But the third brigade, 1st Deep Recce Strike Bde has no Infantry! Unbelievable! So it cannot seize and hold ground.. and it cannot assault the enemy in close combat. Without Infantry it is vulnerable to enemy tanks and infantry.

            I count that we have only 5 mech inf bns, not 6. But there are PM Inf Bns in 12x and 20x too.
            I think all brigades in 3xx should have infantry (mech and PM mix) and all brigades should have a Strike capability, but a true one with the ability to destroy heavy and medium armour and strngpints at long range.

            I think 1xx is interesting, a fair mix of capabilities for operations and other tasks outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

            As for ‘the strike brigades’ they were binned. We were to have two, each a mix of Ajax and PM Inf in MIV Boxers. It was an odd idea and strange to seemingly use Ajax as firepower for Boxers which lacked cannons, rather than in doing their recce job well forward. The strike weaponry seemed to consist only of the Ajax cannons and Infantry Small Arms, Javelin/NLAW & 81mm mortars – so they had limited range and only a modest (quantity) a/tk capability.

          • DSR isn’t a fighting Brigade, it’s a divisional Artillery and Recce Group, with some similarity to the old American Armoured Cav concept + a lot of arty.
            (See the old Orbat before they went Combined Arms Medium Wheeled Stryker forces here: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/11th_ACR_Vietnam.png )

            *Edit* Remember that the US calls it’s Cavalry Regiments “Squadrons” and it’s Cavalry Brigades “Regiments”
            There are no PM battalion in 12 and 20 under Future Soldier. Just the 5 Boxer Battalions and the AR Battalions supporting them.

          • Thanks Dern. DSR might like to think of themselves as a fighting brigade as they have weapons and the means to bring them to bear, but they are not a manouevre brigade, as the other bdes in the warfighting div are – that was my point. It is a structural weakness.
            DSR can only be used for one purpose – it lacks flexibility and without infantry it cannot seize and hold ground or even protect itself from enemy infantry adequately.
            I favour three manouevre bdes (although four would be better!) and Strike assets being allocated to each manouevre brigade to give them maximum punch, rather than concentrated in one bde.
            I also think Ajax is a fairly hopeless Strike vehicle as it has no anti-tank capability – it should stick to recce or get some ATGW – bring back a modern version of CVR(T) STRIKER as an AJAX variant – criminal that hasn’t happened!

            The big question is which version of Boxer is being bought for those Boxers working with tanks in the two armoured BCTs. They must not have less firepower than WCSP would have provided ie 40mm stabilised cannon.

          • It’s not a question. The version of Boxer that is being bought is this version:
            https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/46/Boxer_MIV_on_2019_Army_Combat_Power_Demonstration_%28ACPD%29_-_10.jpg
            That was decided ages ago.

            Again what do you mean by “Strike” Assets because that can be taken in about 4 ways. Especially since you seem a bit inconsistent in your own use of the word, arguing that “strike” asets need to be distributed among other units, but also that Ajax, the main vehicle in the DSR Brigade, doesn’t have enough Punch. I also disagree about DSR isnt’ a one trick pony, it’s a very heavy divisional screen with a lot of deep fires support, that can both fight for, and defend against, information.

            If you think a 40mm has “no Anti-Tank capability” I suggest you look up some of the videos of the Ukranians using BTR-4’s with their 30mm’s to effect on enemy armour.

          • That version of Boxer with a Kongsberg RWS PROTECTOR RS4 was announced on 22/12/20 for the MIV programme.

            https://www.joint-forces.com/defence-equipment-news/38805-kongsberg-protector-rws-for-uk-boxer-miv

            What I am talking about is the question of the weapons fit for the Boxers that are replacing Warrior.

            Strike – I have certainly misunderstood Carter’s concept. Thanks for your other post that explained it so well. I clearly have my own idea about what Strike should be – and perhaps I am in a minority of one!

            If the DSR is employed as a Divisional screen, and only as such, that sets and locks its position in the battlespace – sounds like a one trick pony to me – our third brigade in the div should be a manouevre brigade. Not arguing against a divisional screen – I was very familiar with its use in Germany – just that we need a divisional screen and a genuine third manouevre brigade. The reason we haven’t is down to the bean counters.

            Thanks for the point about the use of BTR-4 (an amphibious IFV) cannon against armour (T-72, I think). UA is up against it and will try anything but would we doctrinally want Ajax recce vehicles to engage tanks?

          • The version that was announced for the MIV program is the version that is replacing Warrior mate. The only units in the British Army that will operate Boxer are the five Armoured Infantry Battalions in 12 and 20 X.

            It’s not so much a one trick pony, as a heavy recce screen that can also do some heavy fighting, and, since it also has *all* the divisional aritilery has some serious fires punch. It’s a novel idea, and excatly how the British Army would use it is open to debate but, not to flog a dead horse, the US Army’s Cav Reg concept used to be able to fight and hold ground, despite not having infantry organic to it. Essentially using it’s armour and speed to be able to deny crucial terrain and hold it until all arms formations could relieve it (or block choke points, delay etc). The big difference that strikes me (pun) is that the US ACav Squadrons consisted of 2 Companies of Light Tanks, backed up by 1 Company of MBT’s, while ours are a bit more aenimic, with 2 Regiments of Ajax backed up by 1 of Jackal.

            Do I think doctrinally we’ll have Ajax engage MBT’s? Probably not. I imagine the doctrine will be “call for the M270 GMLRS” or “Deploy Jav team” but equally that’s not the same as having no AT capability.

            *Edit* Would I like 3 Manuver Brigades AND the DSR Brigade? Yes. And my “Gold Plated” (ie budget no issue) orbat I drafter pre-Future Soldier, even included one.
            Compare my Pre-Future Soldier guess of what 3 Div would look like in Future Soldier:

            With what I’d have wanted in a perfect world.

            But the fact is the funding isn’t there for a formation like that, and we need to make the best of the assets available, and in that respect I think the DSR is a good compromise.

          • Thanks Dern, I thought that we were still waiting for the order for those Boxers specifically to replace Warrior.

            Kongsberg’s data sheet show the following as possible weapons fits for the RS4 RWS:
            Browning M2 and WKM-B (12.7 mm), M249 (5.56 mm), M240, UKM-2000C and M134 Gatling (7.62 mm), MK19, MK47 and H&K GMG (40 mm grenade launchers with airburst option), various Non-Lethal effectors. The RS4 allows for M240 (6.62 mm) coax kit or various ATGM integrations. 

            Any idea which weapon(s) we will get? Certainly each Inf section has lost its 30mm cannon (and the prospect of getting a 40mm cannon if WCSP had been implemented). So what do the Infantry lads think about that? (and losing tracked propulsion too). Boxer feels to me like a MG-equipped APC and that feels like going backwards to a time when we had no IFVs, just APCs (432, Saxon, even Saracen!).

            Thanks for the info on the US Army’s experience and your own previous thoughts on the warfighting div.

            I wonder if the MoD OA community has done any wargaming of this new div?

          • NP.
            Sadly no. Or more accurately yes, as they are being bought in batches as per our other thread below, but Boxer is only going to AI, nowhere else.

            I suspect HMG, GPMG and GMG will be fitted but that’s just a guess based on existing inventory. As for what the infantry think? I don’t know, I don’t imagine they’re pleased but I don’t know anybody in AI atm.

            I’m sure they have, especially with 1 DSR. If there’s one thing the British Army loves it’s planning and wargaming.

          • Hi Dern,
            The original 2019 order for Boxers had only 85 Infantry carriers. Assuming about 13 wagons to Trg Org, Repair Pool and Attrition Reserve – that is 72 going to units. Assuming the PC has an infantry carrier and not a C2 vehicle – that equips just 18 Platoons ie two battalions.
            There was an order for a further 100 vehicles placed in Apr 22, said to be split into Inf carrier, C2 and more ambulances.

            They haven’t ordered enough for 5 AI bns.

          • Hey,

            That’s right, they haven’t ordered enough for 5 AI Btns yet, the plan is eventually for 650ish Boxers split between the four types (PM, C2, Ambulance and Recovery). As you alluded to they’ll be ordered in batches, rather than as a whole, so there is hope that maybe one or two of the battalions further down the line might end up with a 30mm on Boxer, but at present, alas, no plans for that, just more of the agreed on MIV-PM spec, and given the MoD’s finances I don’t see that changing any time soon. (Hopefully we get enough for the 5 tbh, and I suspect the Boxer-Budget is the reason why one AI has 2 Battalions and the other has 3).

          • To be fair, there’s almost no Light Role Infantry left in the British Army. I think it’s 8 Battalions, of which 2 are in 16 AA and 2 are on Overseas Postings, leaving only 4 Light Role Battalions in the Field Army by my maths.

          • But if you look at the way the Ukranians are fighting, LPM Battalions are actually a good idea:
            Disperse, hide, with lots of small fast vehicles, then if you need to move, concentrate, pile into your light vehicles, floor it, then disperse. If you loose a vehicle it’s only 4 blokes not a full section.

            …I’m sure they’d prefer IFV’s, but it goes to show that it can be made to work with vehicles designed for Afghan and Iraq.

  3. A start can be eliminating pointless job roles in the armed forces and civil service and making companies pay for their mistakes. I know the former will only be a fraction of the budget, but it is still a start.

    • There can always be “efficiencies”, but if you wait for them, you’ll wait forever. And efficient can be bad. Efficient means well tuned for what we think are the current needs. No slack means no redundancy if anything goes wrong and nobody to try different things out when current needs become future needs.

      So who decides which are the pointless jobs? It’s really not a start. We need to state clearly that efficiencies aren’t an excuse for not properly funding the military.

      • So who decides which are the pointless jobs? Very true. I was thinking about jobs like diversity and inclusion staff and reducing, and consolidating departments to reduce managers in certain organisations.

        • Yes, there does seem to be a bit of a problem at the moment with government “woke” agenda (apologies for use of the word, but for me it encompasses a lot of things that sit outside the armed forces primary aim of either preventing or fighting and winning a conflict). The question is, for the armed forces, how significant is the “woke” element. I suspect we don’t know the half of it but I also hope that it is just a smattering of topping and of no particular substance. It was somewhat alarming to read about the female RAF officer whose superiors tried to enforce positive discrimination. I also understand there is a “drive” to hit 30% of females in the armed forces and I also understand one of the fitness tests was altered when they were trying to increase female recruits. I also believe a significant number of female recruits are being “medically discharged” which conveniently hid the fact that they become pregnant during thier service.
          I do wish there could perhaps be a refocus of energies back onto solely war fighting capabilities. (I think if from this vantage it’s then seen as having women or other such groups in certain roles gives us a critical edge, then crack on with it, fill the army with women if this is what will win a conflict.) I fear though that there are a lot of very cleaver people who simply do not want that to happen, and who very cleverly talk about things such as being “future ready” and the importance of a large foreign aid budget, to hide the fact that the current armed forces are becoming hollowed out. In a way the Ukraine war has been a blessing, as it makes it much harder for these people to argue that having an army that can go toe to tie with an enemy isn’t essential or is somehow a grubby thing of the past.

          As others have said, I imagine a lot of the money will go on spares, munition stocks and other such behind the scenes items.

          My question is, what will be cut to pay for this. There has been talk about a “peace dividend” and further talk suggesting that this has paid for healthcare since the cold war. The implication I take from this is that healthcare would be cut to pay for it, but realistically I do not see how they can do this.

          • The Peace dividend was taken 33 years ago under Options for Change. Bit odd to take another one during the biggest war in Europe since 1945.
            Female soldiers who get pregnant do not have to leave the army.

          • You seem to misunderstand what I’m saying. There was talk of “clawing back” the peace dividend, as opposed to taking another one. I was speculating on the feasibility of this. Although I have read papers that essentially argued that the “peace dividend” never actually existed, for one reason or another.

            You are partially right, female soldiers who get pregnant do not have to leave the army, but they are not allowed to serve in active warzones. I couldn’t find the article which mentioned the medical issue being under different terminology to hide the scale of the problem, but did find a similar one from the rag that is the daily mail talking about female soldiers getting pregnant and leaving Afghanistan. Didn’t bother to read the whole article but there may be some interesting tit bits in there: https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2560032/amp/The-maternity-military-How-nearly-100-female-soldiers-sent-home-Afghan-frontline-getting-pregnant.html

            I believe there was something similar on one if the subs but can’t remember the details.

            Now it may be that all of these items are relatively minor in the grand scheme of things, and have minimal impact on the strength of our armed forces, which is my hope.

          • John, thanks for this. I am still reeling from your comment that some say the peace dividend didn’t exist.
            I lived through Options for Change (1990) which re-set our armed forces following the end of the Cold War, generating a very tangible peace dividend.
            Total manpower was cut by approximately 18 per cent to around 255,000 (120,000 army; 60,000 navy; 75,000 air force). The UK’s nuclear civil defence organisations, the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation, and its field force, the Royal Observer Corps (a part-time volunteer branch of the RAF), were both disbanded between September 1991 and December 1995. Seats of Regional Government bunkers were sold off.
            To put a little more flesh on the bones –
            Army – the troop strength in Germany was halved. The RAC cut from 18 regts to 10. Many Inf Bns cut, including the loss of three Guards Bns.
            RAF – Bucanneer, Phantom and Victor scrapped, 3 Nimrods scrapped, Bloodhound SAM scrapped. 5 RAF stations closed. All RAF in Germany withdrawn. Brimstone cancelled.
            RN – DD/FF reduced from 50 to 40.

            But it did not stop there. There have been 6 SDR/SDSR/Reviews/Command Papers since then, all of which have further reduced manpower and platform numbers – ie more peace dividends! Apparently we must now live in a safe world!

          • Yes the idiot end of history brigade have a lot to answer for….if the west had not been up it’s own we are so brilliant arse it could have looked back and seen that the greatest time of risk it’s after the collapse of big multi ethnic empires. The collapse of the USSR was always going to end in blood and war it was inevitable as it always has been in human history. The west should have been getting ready for the inevitable.

          • …and yet it has been said by the well-informed ever since 1991 that a resurgent Russia would be the most troubling threat for Europe.

          • Diversity for sake of pleasing someone’s political agenda, that way of thinking vastly lowers standards by deliberately overlooking competent candidates in favour of some ‘under-represented’ demographic, pure madness.

  4. Funny how I posted this today in another thread.

    I posted this some days ago. I’ve been banging on about the purchase of the K2 Black panther (and partnering with the next-gen K3) along with K-MLRS and to consider the Redback IFV.

    The workshare alone would make this a desirable option and create a solid base for continued production going forward. Not to mention an earlier entry into service date.

    After all, there is an ongoing war in Europe right now and NATO is asking them to supply munitions to help restock our dwindling supplies.
    Two South Korean defense firms have shipped their first tanks and self-propelled howitzers to Poland less than two months after the $5.76 billion deal was inked.”

    UK Team Thunder moves forward with plans for British variant of K9 Self-Propelled Gun

    “Business leaders and engineers from five defence companies in the U.K. visited the manufacturing facility of the world’s most proven K9 Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) in South Korea to progress plans to compete for the U.K. Mobile Fires Platform (MFP) programme.

    The companies include Lockheed Martin U.K.; Leonardo U.K.; Pearson Engineering; Horstman Defence; and Soucy Defense. Hanwha is leading the team to bid for the MFP programme to procure up to 116 self-propelled guns for the British Army.

    During the visit, the delegates took a tour of the K9 production line in Changwon, about 300 kilometres south of Seoul, to learn the manufacturing details, indicating the potential for a K9 facility in the U.K.”

    • So an extra £6.2 Billion plus a very possible large workshare for Black Panther, K9A1 self-propelled howitzers, Redback and K-MLRS.
      We are donating £3.2Billion to Ukraine this year and possibly next, why not give them more Chally 2s and three instead?
      Ukraine would have a steady supply as we take on UK Black Panthers to replace them.

      “Hyundai Rotem also passed through the “door opened by Poland” and offered very good conditions to Warsaw. Thus, on July 27, 2022, the Armaments Agency of the Ministry of National Defense in Warsaw signed framework agreements with the Korean Hyundai Rot for the purchase of 1,000 K2/K2PL tanks and with the Korean Hanwha Defense for the purchase of 672 independent K9A1/K9PL self-propelled howitzers.

      Less than a month later, on August 26, the first executive contracts were solemnly signed in Morąg. These include the purchase of 180 K2 tanks to be delivered in 2022-2025 and 212 K9A1 self-propelled howitzers to be delivered in 2022-2026.”

      • It’s not an invalid argument that we actually bin that challenger and look for a complete reprocurement.

        for:
        1)we get a whole new tank that will have a long production line for replacement and growth in numbers of needed.
        2) we could secure good work share and even get a European production line in negotiations ( although we are a bit player in heavy armour so maybe not).

        against:
        1) sovereignty, we would loss sovereign control of the tanks and design…we would be forced to accept another nations rules…Poland and a lot of other nations found this out the the hard way with Germany.

        I think basically for the UK we could keep our heavy armoured force sovereign for at least one more generation and that was the primary consideration.

    • Also worth noting.

      20 FEBRUARY 2023

      Indian Army orders 100 additional K9 howitzers
      “The Indian Army has ordered additional 155 mm/52 calibre self-propelled howitzers (SPHs) known as K9 Vajra-T designed by South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace, the company told Janes.

      A Hanwha spokesperson told Janes that the company has received an additional order of 100 K9s from India, which is in process now.

      “[An order of] another 100 numbers [of K9s] is being discussed and can be closed within 2023. We [Hanwha] are already in touch with our partner Larsen & Toubro (L&T) [regarding the order],” he said.”

    • IMHO this is a smart idea. The UK just doesn’t dabble much in industrial technology anymore since PM Thatcher moved you guys more into financial and business services innovation, thus British land systems, as a whole, as gotten progressively out-of-date, especially in engines, transmissions and suspensions.

      It would be wise for the UK to partner with countries that have a strong industrial base and there probably isn’t a better non-German partner out there than South Korea. You do have America, but their industrial technology is kinda meh and overpriced. Not in the price range that’s sustainable by a middle country like the UK.

      South Korea is #1 in cell phone manufacturing, #1 in OLEDs, #1 in shipbuilding, #2 in chips, #3 in car manufacturing, #4 in construction equipment and #5 in steel. They have pretty much all the strong civilian industrial base needed to have a strong military industrial complex. Unless you want to be beholding to German industrial design and manufacturing capabilities or expensive American, South Korea might be the best alternative partner.

      The only issue would be distance, but if you buy enough quantity and are willing to pay the appropriate licenses, then Korea will be willing to build factories in the UK and Eastern Europe, which would build a core European / UK supply base. This is already happening in Poland. Furthermore, the UK can contribute with technologies of its own, including in software, chip design, turbine design, armor innovations and fine tuning engine and transmission designs (i.e. Korea’s STX and Perkins already have an agreement to fine tune the SMV1000, which will replace an MTU 1,000 horse power engine used in the K9, by 2025).

      IMHO, there is much that South Korea and the UK can accomplish together in the field of military land (and even marine) systems if they pursue a substantial, and mutually beneficial, relationship.

      • Like South Korea, the UK has a great deal to offer. It would be very wise given the current climate for both countries to work closely together and find a suitable way forward.

  5. £3b to do what though. What is the army meant to be doing. Just it has a couple of useful bits and other units are cobbled together as light infantry is cheap. Support units for them?

    • That’s the big issue lots of light protected mobility battalions ( that lost their role after Afghanistan) or light role infantry ( role..hanging around in the UK) bugger all armoured infantry for a peer on peer engagement.

  6. Ok let’s take the bull by the horns! Stand by, stand by many may not like my solution! Reduce the “line” aka light role (no vehicles, no plan and no role) Infantry Battalions by at least 5.

    Concentrate on re filling the CS and CSS, with an emphasis on OS depth fire and AD! Get some depth and sustainability to the formations we have and stop pretending we have 2 deployable divisions!!!!!! Retain the third tank regiment before it changes to irrelevance and sort out the BCT planning! Big supporter of the BCT thought process but a big believer (nowadays) that they need to live, train and fight as an organisation! Let’s get away from separate Battalions and Regiments and move to a flexible BCT with all arms being based and living/training together! There’s so much that needs to be done but I fear it’s to big a step for the ones currently in head shed positions as they have very large pensions and “advisor” jobs in industry to worry about!!!!!!! Cheers!

    • A bit like reinventing the wheel mate! In BAOR each Engineer SQN etc were always attached to a battle group and that’s where they stayed for exercises/ Ops the lot.

    • Agree the number of infantry battalions is not the issue…it’s the type of infantry battalions we have…as far as I can see is it 11 light role infantry battalion + civil duties battalions what are they all for really ? Even the light protected mobility battalions…almost 200 less soldiers than an armoured infantry battalion and running around in foxhound ( which was procured in reality for asymmetric conflict). Yes you need some light role battalions but really these should be based around your air mobile needs and training needs..with a bit of civil duties. The army needs a bit of refocus on what it’s for:

      1) one combined arms division worth the name and as good as anything anyone can deploy within an agreed time frame
      2) its air mobile brigade for stability operations and rapid response
      3) maintaining an agreed number of battle groups as part of its NATO commitment.

      It needs to do those three well and if a battalion does not support that function in some way….it needs repurposing or going.

      • 2 garrison in Cyprus and rotate with 2 more.
        1 is Experimental.
        4 are SFAB.
        4 ( or is it 5 ) are S Ops Bde.
        2 are Gurkha ( one in Brunei one with 16AA )
        Others UK Garrison and Public Duties Bns.

          • OK. I think that only two Guards battalions are on Public Duties at a given time, but may be wrong – the others will be doing ‘real soldiering’.
            Its really not surprising that we have a lot of types of infantry – infantry is a very flexible arm and has lots of very widely varying tasks. That is really not a problem.

          • Yes public duties are 1st bn Cold stream guards, 1st bn Irish guards (both odd sized battalions that don’t fit any of the light role, protected or Armoured battalion sizes at 594 personnel) 5th bn Royal regiment of Scotland ( but it’s a very odd size at 110 personal…then their are public duties companies, Coldstream, Irish and Scot’s guards.

          • Bizarre but true. In 2012, Post the 2010 review the fifth bn RRS was reduced to a battalion of 1 company. It even has its own HQ. It was not disbanded and turned into a company to maintain the Argyll and Sutherland regimental traditions.

            The RRS is a classic cap badge mafia issue. Each battalion maintained their old regimental identifies and regional ties as well is individual uniforms and especially dress uniforms. Just for fun it also maintains not 1 but 3 regimental bands.One of the really big political issue with the formation of the RRS was that it was to be an all kilted regiment to at create some savings…so the battalions formed from the old lowlands lost their trews…it was a big issue.

          • 5th Battalion doesn’t exist anymore, it was disbanded.
            Balaklava Company preformes the same function as the Incremental Coy’s from the 2nd Battalions of some Guards Regiments, it does some public duties and maintains the traditions of 5 SCOTS, while personnel rotate through from the other 4 (now 3) SCOTS Battalions.

            But Jonathan is right, the Capbadge Mafia in RRS is really strong, that’s why they all still try to keep their old regimental names, while the Rifles did a great job of blending everyone into their new identity. *looks at 1 SCOTS*

          • I recall this old trick of sometimes reducing one of the battalions in a Regiment to company strength from years back.

          • It’s 1 Guards Battalion under Future Soldier, with the incrimental Companies forming a “Public Duties Battalion” alongside it.

    • You speak my language, been asking for this for ages.

      CS and CSS all the way, manpower from less LI bns as you say.

      Even another single RS, RE, RA, RLC, RAMC Reg and REME Bn equals a brigades worth of CS/CSS for 4 LBCT as just one example.

      I fear too many cap badge mafia in the head shed though mate.

    • I think there are only about 4 or five left anyway:
      2 RGR and 1 Royal Irish are Air Assault supporting the Paras
      1 RGR and 1 Lancs are Overseas (Cyprus and Brunei)
      Irish Guards, 1 Royal Anglians, 3 Rifles, and 3 Scots are re-rolling to SFAB
      1 Guards unit is on Public Duties
      1 Scots, 2 PWRR, 2 Lancs, 3 RGR and 4 Rifles are now Rangers
      That leaves:
      Coldstream, Grens, 2 Scots, and 2 Rifles in Light Role in 4 Light BCT, and they’re only Light Role until the budget is found for LPMV’s for them.
      I suppose we could cut 4 LBCT entirely?

  7. For those who want the extra money, make sure you if you get it to do your part and don’t bloody waste it on poor decision making, poor management and carelessness! Basically more upfront ministerial oversight and accountability on everyone’s part. 🇬🇧 needs to get sharp!

  8. Yes have some money as long as its spent in the UK PLC and spent well.
    The Army is probably the worst offender for buying gucci kit from foreign manufacturers with little if any UK input into design or compatibility.
    Rumours abound that the Army also wants a new rifle and is looking to buy that in from abroad instead of using a UK manufacturer. WTF! If you cannot buy your own arms industries Small Arms what hope is there?

    Its appears to be all “We need it now! Buy it from here!” and it happens because the Army leadership have no coherent plan or idea about what they need to be able to do as an organisation.
    Light? Medium? Heavy? All of those? You now have a hodgepodge of all of those roles with kit that cannot do the jobs.
    If it decides that Medium/Heavy is the thing how will it get anywhere ? Its buying Ajax and Boxer that the RAF will struggle to move in large quantities quickly so it will be reliant on friendly ports and the Point/Stuft ships to move anywhere.

    And yes the Regiment/ Battalion system isnt helping. To many retired regimental old school ties with to much influence with politicians when ever a difficult decision needs to be made. Airbourne is on a good thing with his comments. Build organisations to fight as fully organic BCTs. That will help to reduce the time it currently takes to reinvigorate Army units post deployment and get the time down to a similar level that it takes the RM to do the same thing.

    • The army has always had, and needed, a suite of light, medium and heavy capabilities, and used them all operationally.

      How does heavy and medium forces move strategic distances? As they have always done. Mainly by sea on RFA or STUFT shipping. As you have said. Nothing new here. You seem concerned at the availability of a HNS port. Why? When has that ever been a problem?

      I have heard the view that BGs should live together, but not BCTs before. Good idea but the Defence Estate is not configured that way. Much new barracks has just been built with traditional unit integrity, could things be altered at reasonable cost. Having said that Merville Barracks points the Warwick much, but not all, of 16 AA Bde, on one site.

    • Gunbuster. I hate to be the bearer of bad news but apart form a few niche companies making precision or specialized small arms. E.G. Accuracy International. The UK has no companies making small arms. Enfield has gone and so has Stirling Armament. We have no choice but look for foreign options as there is no viable UK PLC alternative. There has been very little incentive given by the govt or the market in the UK to produce small arms either military or civillian on a large scale. Even then if a rifle was produced it sould be some form of derivative design of an AR15 or somewhat.

      We let the small arms design and production capability die many years ago. We have nothing now and to build this back up wiuld take considerable amounts of time and money. Money HMG probably wont want to spend when there are already priven off the shelf alternatives.

      • When HK does the work on the SA80, is that performed in the UK or Germany? I was under the impression it was in the UK.
        If so they could probably produce their rifles under license in the UK similar to how it worked for the FAL.
        I know the contract would be relatively short but I don’t think they employee huge numbers of people to manufacture and assemble the rifles they are so modular these days. The police and a steady pool of upgrades could maintain UK based jobs, I don’t think we will see the UK build a new assault rifle from scratch though.

      • It’s even worse: all planned future naval guns are imports from Sweden or US. Ch3 will have a German gun and the Ajax one manufactured in France. Machine guns that used to be made here under licence are being bought direct from FN in Belgium.
        We really do need a UK arsenal capable of making everything from small arms to land and naval artillery. Far too much of the defence equipment budget disappears abroad. Years of poorly thought through privatisation from Thatcher to Brown have led to this absurd situation.

      • Manroy was bought by FN, so it is not a stretch for Manroy to make a FN design rifle in the UK. Defence contractor Muller, has made Pistols in the past under contract. They could probably churn out a licence built foreign rifle design.

        • John, you are correct, but I think Gunbuster was referring to a British-designed and made weapon. Not a license-built weapon made in a British factory. Setting up a license production would be relatively easy. But in terms of organic small arms development, we don’t really have anything that can compete. We are completely dependent on European or American small arms manufacturers to sell us items.

          BAE sold the site, which arguably marks the death knell of British small-arms development. Making the UK dependent on HK for the servicing and development of parts for the SA80.

          Manroy seems to have been fully folded into the FN Herstal company and Muller there seems to be little information on apart from the fact that they are machining firm who have worked on defence contracts in the past but mainly focuses on civilian applications.

          Any likely contender would be NSAF Ltd(HK UK division)
          FN
          Or other American manufacturers.

          If the Army Special Operations Brigade contract is anything to go by it looks that any manufacturing of British-made small arms licensed production or otherwise looks to be dead in the water.
          Most of the companies listed on the tender were procurement agencies and not manufacturing concerns. This probably meaning buying foreign is the Army’s strategy as the domestic base for production, maintenance and all the other logistics to go with the new rifle just is not there in the country.

          • Ted, yes you are correct, when the MOD tenders for a new small arm, the tender goes out to UK importers, Viking Arms, Edgar Brothers etc & not directly to the manufacturer, the importer then is responsible for the export & import licences and arranging for re- proofing for imported weapons from the US, all the maintenance publications (AESP’s) are produced by the importer.
            This will be the case when the MOD decides to replace the L 85 towards the end of this decade, so there will be no manufacture in the UK.

        • In the recent spat with Belgium blocking the sale of a specialized press needed for nuclear components, it was reported that the tit for tat threat by UK to cancel an order for machine guns would cause job losses in Wallonia. But FNUK ( ex Manroy) website lists a number of machine guns and 5.56 rifle amongst its products. An order at scale should insist on UK production.

  9. Quote from today’s Daily Mail who are reporting that Patrick Sanders has threatened to resign if earlier cuts to the army are not reversed.
    “An MoD spokesman said: ‘The Defence Secretary has made clear for years now about the need to modernise our Army to ensure it keeps pace with our allies.
    ‘That’s why at the spending review in 2020 he achieved an extra £16 billion… Reinvesting, learning lessons from Ukraine and growing industrial skills takes time.
    ‘We are on track to start to see new tanks, personnel carriers and air defence systems by the year after next.’”

          • Are you saying globalists and a publicly acknowledged policy of globalisation is “a conspiracy theory”?

          • Globalisation is a recognised as the growing interdependence of national economies as consequence of increasing trade in goods, services, and corporate investment. It’s a natural result from encouraging free-trade and not pursuing isolationism.

            However, when people starting describing others as “globalists” it’s as an accusation of being part of a plot to remove national sovereignty and to create an anti-democratic NWO: usually references to WEF and Davos subsequently follow.
            (If you’re ignorant of this, then be thankful that you’ve not run across as many conspiracy nutters as I have.)

          • the problem comes when the free trade west hits its head against a set of mercantile economies who only play the game of free trade in a skin deep way to win geopolitically. That’s a big problem question to be honest that I don’t think we have any idea how to deal with. The USSR were easy..they just smashed themselves against the free trade west and lost…China and so an extent Russia ( before Putin lost his marbles) found a new way..say the words…smile sell the stuff cheap…rake in the currency…use the market to destabilise western industries and build their own.

          • Yes the Chinese learned from the West’s defeat of the USSR; that a rich affluent economy can win you a war without firing a shot. So they’ve gone all-out on using the West’s own weapon, capitalism, against it. But not free-market capitalism in a liberal democracy, but capitalism that is subservient to an authoritarian goal.

            Some western politicians may have believed that this engagement with authoritarianism would slowly undermine it. A larger version of Merkel’s diplomatic approach to Putin’s Russia – how laughable that appears now… and that should serve as a wake up call to our involvement with China.

            Corporations of course just care about the bottom line. They should have been alarmed that they couldn’t operate in China without establishing a local subsidiary which they could only hold a minority share, but to which technology and patents had to be shared. Sadly many still continue to do business in China despite the ongoing Uighur genocide…
            But if they only care about money, they should beware their exposure, as China is deeply indebted both at the national and local level. A Chinese default would cause chaos across the world. Overnight their local subsidiaries would collapse along with their entire supply chains.

          • Yes I also think at some point China will do what all authoritarian/totalitarian mercantile states do..they will reach for the sword.

          • “..a plot to remove national sovereignty and to create an anti-democratic NWO: usually references to WEF and Davos subsequently follow…”
            Do you even listen to what being said by WEF?

          • Yes, and it’s just a talking shop/ think tank with zero power. Like all such organisations it has good ideas and it has bad ideas.

          • Those people who get branded as “globalists” don’t refer to themselves as “globalists”.
            They tend to refer to themselves as internationalists or free-traders. Globalism isn’t a policy or doctrine, like socialism or libertarianism, so people don’t identify themselves as “globalists”. In simple terms, I like eating ice-cream when it’s hot, but I wouldn’t call myself a “vanillaist”.

  10. Without trying to muddy waters on this issue there are some things that can and should be fixed without too much difficulty especially as we are out of the EU. What ever money is spent on kit is pointless unless recruitment and retention is addressed. One area I believe is more than urgent is promoting the benefits of taking the kings shilling. I can only speak from an army perspective but the same may apply to the other services. When it comes either the trades or professions the training you get really is second to none and of course it is free. I myself became a chartered Surveyor thanks to the Army and I can assure compared to those who trained in civilian life I knew more ( and I believe made me more efficient) than my civilian equivalents. I also joined the then TA and all the ex army troops from what ever trade etc all seemed to know more than there civilian only counterparts.. It is time the MOD faced up to things that a military career may not be a whole working life career as it was 40 years ago. But it does still provide a huge benefit to society in general when military life is over and the benefits should be two way which is never really promoted. The reputation of ex miltary is almost a no no thanks to bad PR which is sucked up by employers too often. Belive me many employers would benefit from the military can do attitude. We have such things as Life long learning policies yet the MOD just seem to dump ex service people. Perhaps silly laws are in the way. I my self would happily advertise for ex military only need to apply( although I do find away around it but have to be legally careful Grey areas?) If changes were made there them miltary life may be more attractive to the younger generation. Please do not call me a snob or whatever I respect all. I have herad but would beed to be corrected if wrong that an RAF pilot has to start from the bottom if they want to fly in civilian life I would have though ( with no experience to back it up) but if you are say a 4 engine trained RAF pilot then all you should need is a type conversion course? Please tell me I am wrong.. I also fully accept there should be more help for those who have difficulty returning to civvie life but that is yet another subject BUT part of it. As they say the MOD is “Not good enough”

  11. The Future Soldier plan looks logical and is already under way. It does make the traditional regiments look an awkward fit.
    Major upgrades to equipment are in hand and funded:
    Upgrade of 148 Ch2 to 3 standard
    Replacement of CVT by Ajax ( payment and growth trials resumed)
    Replacement of Warrior and FV430 with Boxer( initial order increased but supply chain problems affecting delivery timescale.)
    These programmes will take years to complete but the organizational structure is planned to happen quicker.
    So what should the priority be if another £3b could be found? Air defence, static and mobile needs increasing; artillery needs a major upgrade.( I believe funding is in place for some of this.) Upgrading more Ch2s would give a useful reserve or allow a 3rd heavy BCT to be formed. Reversing the planned reduction in personnel numbers would be a sign that the era of ever smaller forces is over.

      • For example, the proposed 7th light mechanized BCT has units from 11 different regiments. If the BCT is to be the basic structure of the field army, why retain regimental identities with their top heavy officer hierarchy. The simpler an organizational structure, the more likely it is to be effective.

        • The BCT is the building block, the smallest formation with mostly all Arms and Services (and self sufficient for CSS) represented and able to conduct combined arms manouevre. 7th BCT ( I make it 12 units) is unlikely to deploy with its ‘peacetime’ Orbat – it will be a pick and mix affair, with some units being detached and some troops being attached if they don’t exist in the peacetime structure (such as scarce specialists). So the Bde will probably never deploy with 12 different units.

          I am not sure why you think Regimental identities are unimportant – this is a big deal for the army. Pride in one’s regiment or Corps is fundamental.

          I also do not follow your point about top heavy officer structure. To take an Infantry battalion – each platoon needs a platoon commander – each company needs an OC, 2IC and Battle Captain (if that term is still current). Fire Support Company similarly needs platoon commanders and an OC and 2IC. The Bn needs a CO, 2IC, Adjt, Asst Adjt, QM, Tech QM, etc.
          If and when this battalion is configured instead as a combined arms Battle Group then it might (depending on the mission) lose one rifle company and might gain a squadron of Sappers and a Tp/Bty of artillery in Direct Support. There is no scope to lose any officers when configured in BGs – which officers do you think are unnecessary either in the battalion or the Battle Group – or in the brigade as a whole?

          I do not see the structure as complicated. In what way do you think it is. In my 34 years I never considered army structures complicated. It is very flexible and I do not see any officers are unnecessary, either in the peacetime/barracks Orbat or that configured for deployment.

          • He said “Units from 11 Regiments” not units total to be fair but he’s still wrong:

            Light DragoonsScots Guards4 SCOTS1 YORKS2 ANGLIANS1 RIFLES4 Royal Artillery/105 Royal Artillery.Maybe he means “Soldiers from Capbadges” in which case you’d add in soldiers from their various corps, but it would be way more than 11 there since in addition to those present on the surface level orbat (REME, RLC, RAMC), you’d also have to factor in all the randoms like AGC-SPS, RADC, Royal Sigs, Int Corps, etc

            Battle Captain is indeed still current.

          • Thanks mate, great answer! I think those who have not served think everything in the army is complicated – structures, atts & dets, AFV terminology etc.

        • That’s always been the case though? The Regiment never was intended as a unit that deploys as a single force, even in it’s earliest form.

          Also there are not units from 11 different Regiments in 7 BCT, it’s 7.

  12. We need to rebuild our defence manufacturing at the same time, relying on long global supply chains is a risk during conflict.

  13. Yet another in a long line of retired brass spouting ‘something must be done’ when they have their feet up at home in front of the fire. Instead of waiting until your pension hits the mat, say something when it might make a bit of difference. You might be banging your head on a brick wall with this lot but most people do not realise the parlous state of our armed forces today, or the appaling conditions of accommodation that some have to live in.
    Stick your head over the parapet when you might still have a bit of clout!

  14. Hollowing out our defensive forces us part of the same programme for the NHS, Police and other services. All in the name of ‘austerity’ which itself is a metaphor for allowing the reduction in taxes for the wealthy. Most of whom saw an increase in disposable income since 2008 unlike most of the rest of us. While increasing their taxes wouldn’t necessarily release mountains of funds for our essential services, which should the majority of the country suffer the ravages of effective pay reductions while they get away with exporting billions to offshore tax havens? The armed forces and other emergency services are as much in their interest as the rest of us, so they should be paying their fair share. And fair share does not mean configuring the tax system so they can avoid paying more tax! Given the current state of world affairs we need to be ramping up defence expenditure, especially on consumables like weapons and ammunition. Austerity economics means driving down the cost of labour, fine over a short term, but it cannot sustain an effective economy and society for the long term.

  15. I do think the armies organisation issue and what its mission is need sorting out as much as it needs more money if you just pumped in 3 billion at present it would get pissed away. At present and I may be wrong out of its 30+ infantry battalions only four are armoured infantry that you would really want in a peer conflict. The majority’s are light Light protected mobility battalions ( smaller than armoured infantry battalions at 580) that are more protected against IEDs and irregulars than mechanised infantry you would want to deploy In a peer ground war. Or even worse light role battalions that don’t have any organic transport.

    So maybe what the army needs to do is actually clearly show what’s needed in creating and focusing its infantry battalions into what could be deployable battalions that would all be able to fight a peer ground war. As at present it looks like we have around 12% of that battalions that would be deployable, with half the rest suitable for deployment in a medium risk environment and the rest not deployable at all. Even actually having a universal size of infantry battalion would help instead of 500-700+.

    Then show what long range precision fires it needs as well as some basics like how many CH3s will it need to maintain two type 56 armoured regiments to realistically cover training fleet management and potential non combat and combat loss over the live of the CH3).

    In truth the RN is pretty focused on showing what it needs, what it will do and why as is the RAF…the army..I’m honestly not sure it’s senior leaders are able to really say what it’s for at present…this may be the backlash of so many years trying to manage what was a very confused set of missions in Afghanistan and Iraq that moved from policing to high intensity fighting against an asymmetric enemy to long term policing and anti terror work..let’s be honest the protected mobility battalions are really designed for the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan…the trouble is normally the army would have some time to get its game head on and re-orientate to peer on peer missions but suddenly we have war in Europe with a high chance of contagion.

    • You say the Army’s mission needs sorting out and rapidly conclude that it is solely warfighting against a peer opponent with a strong armoured division. Yet that is the raison d’etre of just the heavy metal part of the army. There are tasks for troops in protected mobility vehicles and Light role troops. Very hard to craft a single mission for the army, as they have to undertake or be prepared to undertake a myriad of tasks.
      The high level structure needs to be able to reflect this highly varied tasking and should not continually be changed just because there is a new CGS in town.

      • Hi graham not saying we don’t need light role but is the mix correct only 18% of our infantry regiments are focused on a peer high intensity war. In reality the light role troops cannot be deployed anywhere there is even a moderate asymmetric risk…personally unless a battalion is either special duties, civil duties, air mobile etc I think the lowest level should be protected mobility…if it cannot safely travel what’s the point ?

        I also think we need a far high number of battalions focused on peer or close to peer warfare..hopefully boxer and the strike brigade concept will allow this. After All there are lots of potential conflicts where we would not want to send an armoured brigade ( or could not ) but are well beyond the intensity you would want to send the present protected mobility battalions.

        I don’t think this is the armies fault I just think it’s become warped due to prolonged deployment based around stabilisation. It’s become what it needed to become over that last decade a force focused on asymmetric warfare. Now it needs to change and prepare for conflict in Europe or conflict with peer expeditionary forces elsewhere.

        • Peer high intensity conflict happens very infrequently, the kit is very expensive and many feel the heavy lifting for armoured/manouevre warfare should be done by the US and large continental armies (eg. Poland, German, France). So I am not surprised that 18% of the Infantry is in that category, and hope this reflects that required for a single deployable warfighting division.

          I was not in the infantry so others are better qualified, but to introduce a historic note – on Op Banner – light role infantry were deployed to this asymetric environment and were often driven about by RCT soldiers driving wheeled APCs, and themselves operated Makralon LRs etc.
          Point is that light role infantry could still do the job of restoring public order, counter insurgency and counter-terrorist in an asymetric environment – and protection was provided.

          Light role troops are often deployed on tasks where no asymetric threat exists or where protection is provided by a HNS – when I was in Sierra Leone in 2002/3 on a training mission we had personal weapons but also back up from the SL Army. No PM vehicle is required for MACC tasks, as you say.

          I just don’t think you can lose light role infantry (who lack PM vehicles) from the Orbat.

          The Strike brigade concept is largely dead in the water – the two Strike brigades are in yesterdays Orbat and the closest we have to that now is 1st Deep Recce Strike brigade. I think all warfighting brigades (of whatever weight) should be able to do Strike.

          • “Strike” in the Strike Brigade concept was a very weird thing and definitely not something all warfighting brigades should be able to do.
            Effectively the idea was that it would be capable of self deploying over very long road marches in semi-hostile territory, it was effectively born out of Nick Carter watching the French Success of their lightning war in Mali, on wheeled vehicles, and wanting to replicate that in the British Army. So he concentrated all Heavy Protected Mobility units, which at the time where on Mastiff, into two brigades, and looked to replace Mastiff with Boxer, that way, being wheeled, they could do really long road Marches, French Style and still fight on the other end.

            The problem is that the French have not only VAB and VCBI (which Boxer would be replicating in the “Strike” Brigades), but also EBRC’s and AMX-10’s and there was nothing in the UK inventory that could even approximate those. So Ajax got pulled in, half the Ajax regiments would retain their formation recce role, the other would become “Medium Armour”, to provide the Boxer units with some firepower that the EBRC’s and AMX’s provided the French. This brought it’s own problems though:
            See while Ajax and EBRC both have the same CTA 40mm gun, so in theory provide the same firepower to their wheeled medium infantry units: EBRC is wheeled, and can do the multiple hundred miles of road march with minimal maintenance like VCBI and Boxer, Ajax is tracked… and that means it can’t.
            So Strike from the outset was kind of in a rough spot: Designed to do long road marches ahead of the Armoured Formations, but shackled by it’s integral firepower that would need tank transporters to keep up. What effectively it ended up being that each Armoured Brigade would have had a Strike Brigade as a close forward Screen I think, but it got cancelled.

            So what’s the issue with wanting “strike” in all warfighting brigades? Simply put it’s impossible. You want Armour? MBTs and IFVs? They won’t be able to do “strike” because they’re too maintenance and logistics heavy, it’s the Ajax conundrum.
            1 DSR has very little of the old Strike Brigades in it’s DNA except for the word “strike.” It’s primarily and Artillery Formation, all of the Divisions Artillery is focused there, along with a considerable amount of the divisions Recce Screen. I pointed out the similiarity of it to the old US Cav Regiments from the 80’s earlier to you.

            Anyway, this idea that Light Protected Mobility or even Light Role Infantry can’t be used in near peer conflict is a bit rubbish. Of course they can, and they would. There would have to be a higher casualty tolerance, and there’d probably be some thought put to mobility (counter to popular belief Light Role do have some self lift capacity, even if it is a truck with seats bolted to the back). But especially defending, or in urban environments there is no reason for Light Role not to be of use.

            As for Light Protected Mobility, as I said, look at some of the stuff coming out of Ukraine, they are putting LPM units to some really good use, so I don’t think, even though Foxhound and the like are designed for Afghan, that they are inappropriate for near-peer fighting either. They’ll protect from shrapnel and small arms fire, and often, that’s all you need.

          • Dern, many thanks for this. I have read articles about Strike v1 (ie Strike as per the two Strike brigades concept) and none have explained it as well as you have. Carter has gone down a long way in my estimation – his thinking was unoriginal and his concept (modified from the French version) was unworkable for the reasons you state. My understanding of Strike was clearly very wrong.

            If there is a Strike capability at work in the DSR (now without Boxer-mounted Infantry but with a shed-load of artillery) it means that Strike now consists of location and identification of key targets by Ajax (who might opportunistically fire their 40mm cannons if targets can be over-matched and they don’t mind giving away their positions!) who then call in artillery to mallet those targets. This has all sorts of problems, in fact so many that it too is also verging on unworkable.

            I think Strike should be redefined as the attack on high value targets (eg. heavy and medium armour and strong points) at Long Range using precision artillery, heavy mortars and LRATGW…and that each manouevre brigade (and there should be three in the div) should have that capability. I think thats a lot better than Carter’s idea of Strike.

            I fully agree that Light Protected Mobility or even Light Role Infantry can be used in near peer conflict. It has to be – all hands to the pumps, especially with our small army. In the mid-80s, 24 Inf Bde in Saxons (which you might call a PM vehicle) would have deployed to 1 (BR) Corps as the Corps Commanders last-ditch reserve with each of its 3 battalions fielding 24 Milan FPs each – a potent anti tank force. I am sure there are better and more modern examples.

          • if your defending your own dirt light role infantry is actually not a bad option…as a deployable battalion in the army of an island that is away going to do expeditionary type roles…it’s probably not so useful…we do need some but if they don’t have a specific use then they probably need repurposing.

          • And yet it has proven useful over and over again. We deployed Light Infantry constantly, to Northern Ireland, to the Falklands, to Sierra Leone, to Afghan, to Iraq (yes, there was light infantry in the initial invasion orbat).

            Light Infantry is *the most* deployable unit type in the Armies Orbat. It has a very light logistical tail, it can be on very high notice to move with minimal prep time, it costs very little to send, and it can deploy by any means: Road, Rail, Air, Sea. From an expeditionary viewpoint, Light Role is incredibly useful.
            The difference between tactical and strageic mobility 🙂

      • I think it’s related to section size depending on the vehicles used. The armoured infantry, light protected mobility ( foxhound) and heavy protected mobility ( mastiff) all have different numbers in a battalion (although I may be wrong)

        • Kind of, but also kind of not.
          In a Warrior the vehicle has a dedicated 3 man crew (Driver, Commander, Gunner), that are tied to the vehicle, because the vehicle will go into combat with the section, it’s their main source of firepower.
          In a Foxhound the vehicle has a crew of 2, but the commander will dismount and continue as the section commander, while the driver may, or may not, stay with the vehicle.
          So although the Warrior section+crew is 10 people and the Foxhound is 8, the Foxhound actually has a larger dismount. Just to illustrate how small the difference between the two is:
          A Armoured Infantry unit on Warrior will have 3 Warriors per Platoon (+1 in Platoon HQ but we’re not counting that for now), 3 Platoons per Coy, and 3 Coys Per Battalion. That’s, by my count, 27 warriors. Each with 10 men, that means 270 men.
          Foxhound is orbatted in the same way, so 27 Foxhounds, each with 8 men is 216. Suddenly the difference isn’t so big is it? So why is a Armorued Infantry Battalion so much bigger?
          Now Light Role: At full strength a section is still 8 men in a light role unit. So how do we get from 760men in a Armoured Battlion to 580 men in a Light Role Battalion? A lot of it is the back end. You need more REME, more RLC etc etc to keep an IFV going than you do to keep what is, effecitvely, a big pick up truck running, and it’s even worse when you look at Light Role, as all you need to maintain are a few MAN SVs.

  16. Its Amazing how all these Billy Big Nuts only Moan about the state of the Army, ONCE THEY HAVE LEFT and the mess they helped Create in there Procurement miss management

  17. Is this true-

    International Defence Analysis page

    It has been confirmed that the British Army has officially rejected several systems, incl. Nexter Caesar, Elbit ATMOS, BAE Systems Archer, & Rheinmetall HX3, from their MFP program, which is meant to replace the AS90. The remaining options are believed to be the K9 or Boxer.

  18. The root of the problem of the UK’s weak defence forces is that the British public have always been anti-military: they like military history, commemoration and all that crap, but have a negative attitude towards having a professional fighting force, as well as the conscription necessary to achieve mass on the battlefield.
    Hence, British defence policy relies on someone else doing our fighting for us, until we finally get our act together and produce a strong military force. If we lose a war, it’s not remotely an existential threat to us. Like the United States, geographical isolation also means we can choose when and where we can go to war, and on which side, luxuries denied Central European nations e.g. Finland in 1941, the only democracy to fight on the Axis side in WWII, against a dictatorship as evil as the one she was allied with. 🙄
    So the short answer is, as long as the Ukrainians are defending Western Civilisation against the Barbaric Asian Hordes, we’ve no incentive to sort out our act regarding defense: only long ‘real wars’ that we have had to fight produced the kind of professional military leaders, men such as Cromwell, Marlborough, Wellington, Kitchener, Haig, Montgomery or Slim, who understand that only mass armies can win, or at least prevent wars.
    At least we have Ben Wallace in the right place, to stop things going completely to ratsh1t regarding defense policy: unlike previous governments, no-one else amongst the amateurs he works with has any military experience, or much life experience for that matter.
    Supporting Ukraine was the only decent policy decision Boris Johnson ever made during his much-missed tenure as Prime Minister, despite the fact that he was happy to flog off some of London to some lovely Russian people prior to that. 😜

  19. Firstly, this kind of warning has been ‘issued’ many times, over many years, by many different people. No one listened then, and no one will listen now, gloomy reading, but that’s the gloomy reality.

    Secondly, the British Army alone, needs that £3bn, which unfortunately they will not get.

    Thirdly… well there isn’t a third item. There are 1000’s of items and issues, that plague the UK armed forces.

    None of them will be addressed by the current government, nor by the next government, as the the armed forces have been starved of funding, and plagued with sub-contractors for too long now.

  20. There are no issues with the army, all tou need to do is;

    1) wear better ear defenders so you don’t hear the sounds of complaint

    2) Isolate yourself from the rumblings of discontent

    Then you can’t hear or feel any issues so it’s all sorted.

    Pathetic. The troops deserve better

  21. When you think a £3b investment needed, is a near a Months Budget for the NHS.
    You Realise that level wont solve the problems which makes the EX numpty a Tool and a Blunt one

      • NHS Budget is now around £19B a month and 75% of its operational budget goes on Cancer Treatment, only leaves 25% for everything else. So its to Bring some context to the Conversation when the MOD top Brass Blew £150m on Taxi’s £3b extra would vanish in a Whiskey Glass. and not solve any current issues.

          • No NAO reported that the MOD had spent £150m on Taxis, not white fleet Taxis for brave little men who cannot get on the Tube, because the Wife has the company car

          • Errr, what? Who am I defending? I am just questioning the accuracy/source of your comment that this £150m on taxis was spent by senior officers – I am sure you will provide details, now though.
            Very insulting that you think I wasted taxpayers money, and enjoyed doing it, in my 34 years service.

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