Is British support for Ukraine compromising defence?

A recent National Audit Office (NAO) report has provided a detailed look at the UK’s £7.8 billion military support for Ukraine, raising concerns about the potential impact on the UK’s own defence readiness.

While the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has positioned itself as a key ally to Ukraine, with rapid equipment procurement and extensive training programmes, the report highlights potential risks to the UK’s military capabilities and financial oversight.

To respond to Ukraine’s urgent military needs, the MOD has accelerated its weapons procurement processes. This includes using non-competitive contracts and reducing testing requirements to deliver equipment quickly to the front lines.

According to the NAO report, by June 2023, the MOD had issued £1.27 billion in contracts that bypassed typical competitive tendering processes, allowing for rapid delivery but potentially sacrificing long-term safety and oversight.

In some instances, the MOD worked creatively, sourcing materials from unexpected places, such as using technical drawings from a tank museum to manufacture parts for Ukraine’s T-72 tank fleet.

However, reducing safety and effectiveness tests introduces risk. While Ukrainian forces have accepted this trade-off, the question remains whether the UK can maintain the same level of accountability without compromising the quality of its military aid.

Strain on UK military readiness

One of the key concerns highlighted in the NAO report is the impact on the UK’s own military readiness. As of mid-2023, the MOD had donated £171.5 million worth of equipment from UK stockpiles to Ukraine. However, the cost of replenishing this equipment is expected to reach £2.71 billion, as the MOD plans to replace outdated gear with more advanced technology over the next six years.

The MOD has significantly reduced donations from its own stockpiles, after determining that further transfers would pose “unacceptable risks” to the UK’s defence capabilities.

The report shows a sharp decline in equipment donations—from £130 million in 2022-23 to just £15.9 million in 2023-24—highlighting the difficult balance between supporting Ukraine and maintaining the UK’s own military readiness.

Training Ukrainian troops: a valuable but costly effort

The UK’s Operation Interflex, which trains Ukrainian soldiers, has been a cornerstone of the country’s military aid. By mid-2024, over 42,000 Ukrainian recruits had been trained in basic infantry, weapons handling, and urban combat tactics.

These efforts have been praised, with 89% of Ukrainian soldiers reporting that they feel better prepared for the battlefield after completing the training.

However, the NAO report notes the strain this training has placed on UK military facilities. More than a quarter of the British Army’s training grounds are now dedicated to Ukrainian forces, leading to a significant reduction in access for UK troops.

In 2023, British Army units had their bids for training sites rejected eight times more frequently than in 2019, due to the high demand created by the Ukrainian programme. Additionally, specialist programmes such as the Royal Marines’ training were relocated to the Netherlands to avoid compromising UK readiness.

Effectiveness of Training Under Scrutiny

Despite the positive feedback from Ukrainian troops, there are concerns that aspects of the training may not fully align with the realities of combat in Ukraine.

For example, the report highlights a lack of comprehensive drone training, a key element of modern warfare, due to UK civil aviation restrictions.

Furthermore, some reports from Ukrainian soldiers suggest that certain training modules did not cover the equipment they used in combat, raising questions about how well the training prepares them for the front lines. In response, the MOD has extended the duration of its infantry training course from three to five weeks and adjusted the curriculum to better reflect feedback from Ukrainian forces.

But questions remain about whether these changes are sufficient to address the evolving nature of warfare in Ukraine.

Financial oversight

The rapid pace of military support has also sparked concerns about financial oversight. While the MOD’s actions have been necessary to meet Ukraine’s needs, the use of non-competitive contracts, and exemptions from the usual scrutiny processes, raises the potential for inefficiency or waste.

Historically, the MOD has faced challenges in delivering complex procurement projects on time and within budget, and the accelerated timelines for Ukraine could lead to similar pitfalls. However, the NAO report did not find any direct evidence of waste or corruption related to the rapid procurement process.

The MOD has also stated that it is applying lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict to its routine procurement processes, in an effort to avoid past mistakes.

Balancing support

The UK’s military support for Ukraine is clearly vital, both in terms of the strategic importance of helping Ukraine defend itself and the moral obligation to assist in the face of Russian aggression.

However, the NAO report underscores the need for careful management of the UK’s own defence priorities. Balancing the urgent demands of international support with maintaining the UK’s military readiness is a complex challenge.

While the MOD has shown a willingness to adapt, introducing more structured management processes as the war has continued, it must ensure that long-term risks to the UK’s defence capabilities are not overlooked.