Britain’s combat air force is at a turning point. The National Audit Office’s report on the UK’s F-35 programme confirms what many in defence and industry already fear: years of delay, indecision and ambiguous planning have left the RAF and Royal Navy with shrinking fast jet mass, overstretched platforms, and no clear path through the next decade.
This failure has roots in the 2021 Integrated Review and its 2023 refresh.
These were meant to be strategic resets. Instead, they delivered unfunded ambitions, incoherent fleet targets, and repeated deferrals of critical procurement decisions, particularly regarding F-35 fleet size, Typhoon sustainment, and the delivery runway for GCAP.
Yet this is not a failure of ambition today. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) sets out a credible, necessary vision: rebuilding sovereign industrial capacity, fielding integrated multi-domain forces, and reasserting the UK as a serious defence power.
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But without hard decisions on numbers, contracts, and timelines, the Royal Air Force’s fast jet force could fall below 100 aircraft within 15 years, far short of the approximately 160 needed to maintain NATO readiness, maritime strike, QRA and sovereign defence. We can still recover, but we must act now, not in the next review cycle.
Typhoon Tranche 1s are already being retired. Tranche 2 and 3 aircraft, which were delivered between 2008 and 2019, will begin to reach the end of their designed operational life around 2035, with a significant portion due for phase-out by the early 2040s. GCAP, while technologically ambitious, will only enter service from the mid-2030s and will likely take years to reach operational maturity.
That leaves a dangerous capability gap. Without a clear bridging plan, the UK could face a decade-long hole in fast jet availability, unable to respond to high-intensity threats, provide surge capacity for NATO, or credibly deploy from carrier decks.
F-35: Finalise the Fleet and Commit to the Mix
The UK must now commit to its long-standing objective of acquiring 138 F-35s, but do so with a fleet composition that reflects operational reality and strategic value. The right mix and sequence is clear: 56 F-35Bs and 82 F-35As, 12 formidable front line squadrons.
The F-35B fleet should support four front-line squadrons (48 aircraft) for dual-carrier operations, with additional jets for attrition, training, and conversion in order to sustain sovereign carrier strike capability. Meanwhile, the lower cost, longer range, and higher payload-carrying F-35A should be acquired in sufficient numbers to generate six land-based squadrons, including the UK’s contribution to NATO’s nuclear burden-sharing posture and an operational conversion unit.
This mix provides Britain with two decisive combat air capabilities:
- Stealth penetration strike and ISR: day-one operations against advanced air threats and in Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) environments
• Credible NATO-aligned nuclear and conventional deterrence: based on an aircraft with lower sustainment costs and higher availability
We must commit to this order now, not release piecemeal commitments which inflate future cost by disrupting economies of scale and reducing production efficiency. Industry too must bear some of this financial risk, but can only do so when presented with a clear and sizeable order.
By making this commitment now, the UK can restore certainty to its industrial partners, relieve pressure on the carrier fleet, and ensure its fast jet force remains interoperable, lethal, and credible well into the 2040s.
Typhoon: Retain, Replenish, and Export
Typhoon remains a formidable air dominance and multi-role platform. But it is close to the end of its service life. To maintain force mass, the UK must retain 50–60 Tranche 2/3 Typhoons until at least 2038. More importantly, to prevent the collapse of sovereign jet-building capability before the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) ramps up, we must order 40–50 new Tranche 4/5 Typhoons by 2028.
Germany and Spain are already doing this. If we fail to act, we risk losing design integration, export momentum, and thousands of high-skill aerospace jobs. Typhoon is still exportable. It remains a pillar of Europe’s defence ecosystem, and the UK has recently signed a preliminary multibillion-pound Typhoon deal with Turkey, reflecting renewed confidence and support among Eurofighter nations. But if Britain shows no confidence in its own product, why should prospective buyers?
GCAP: No Repeat of Tornado to Typhoon
GCAP is vital to the future defence and security of the UK. But it will not be possible if there is a 10-year vacuum in domestic fast jet production. The last time the UK allowed a gap of this kind, between the end of Tornado GR4 production and the ramp-up of Typhoon, we saw a dramatic erosion in sovereign engineering capability, loss of key skills, and the offshoring of vital subsystems. That mistake cannot be repeated. GCAP must represent a continuation of sovereign fast jet production, not its resurrection.
That means:
• Contracting long-lead components by 2027
• Securing low-rate production by 2031
• Delivering the first front-line aircraft by 2035
This “always-on” model is not just about avoiding job losses. It is about preserving system integration expertise, radar and sensor innovation, digital twin development, and high-spec composites and propulsion capability. If there is no work for UK engineers throughout the 2030s, there will be no capability left to bring GCAP to life, no skills to integrate, no IP to protect, and no base to scale.
Let Typhoon Fly as a Symbol of Britain’s Identity
One decision, powerful in symbolism, would reinforce the UK’s commitment to sovereign aerospace capability: convert retired Typhoon Tranche 1s into the next Red Arrows display jets.
The Hawk T1 fleet has retired. Rather than outsourcing or borrowing aircraft from allies, the Red Arrows could continue to fly British, with Typhoon filling in while a decision on the British-built modular AERALIS trainer is finalised. A fleet of 12 demilitarised Typhoons would reinforce the export image of UK platforms, align with efforts to market Typhoon and GCAP abroad, and showcase RAF fast jet excellence to a global audience. The cost of maintaining Typhoons in this role would be significant, but we should expect defence primes who stand to benefit from expanded export markets to step up financially. If we are to be a defence export-driven nation, we need industry to front more of these costs.
This idea is not nostalgia. It is strategic branding. And it matters, especially as the UK seeks to reassert leadership in the combat air export market. Whatever direction is taken, we cannot ignore the need for a Red Arrows stopgap and must work energetically and collaboratively to find a solution.
Delivery Is the Difference
The UK’s defence establishment knows what is required. We need an integrated combat air force, a credible carrier fleet, a sustainable strike force, and a sovereign pipeline for the next generation of fast jets.
The 2025 Strategic Defence Review gives us a blueprint. It embraces integrated capability, long-term industrial sovereignty, and British leadership on collective defence. But it must be backed by action. The past fourteen years show us what happens when strategy lacks delivery.
We must now do what the last government failed to do: commit to the full F-35 fleet, invest in Typhoon retention and bridging procurement, and keep GCAP on track with no industrial or capability gap. This is not just about combat aircraft. It is about jobs, readiness, and credibility. The window to act is closing. The risks are rising. The decisions must be made now, before ambition, once again, outruns delivery.
Cut F35B even more, sure that will end well….
Certainly could be disempowering for carrier ops. I mentioned a 50/50 B/A split at worst below but maybe 90 B and 50 A’s, might be better if there’s to be both?
Agreed, the wrong mix for, “day-one operations against advanced air threats and in Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) environments”. Wouldn’t need be more than 48 F-35A’s. 52 F-35B’s is totally in-sufficient for two carrier operations!
That F35-F35A split doesn’t look right. There’s the possible need to fill up the two carriers at any given tine and have some as buffer. Why not a 60+12 for 72 B’s and same for the A’s. Why stop at 138, add a few more if needed?
Will the UK also look at getting cannon pods for the B’s now they’re getting the A’s if the cannon and ammunition is the same?
Wouldn’t be surprised if we don’t get ammo for the As…
Wake me up when this government actually order some jets, transport aircraft, helicopters, ships, submarines, armoured vehicles, guns for the RA, SHORAD, MRAD, booms for Voyagers, and so on.
I agree with the piece, but HMG have no interest in defence, look at this lot. Masters at talking, but of actually doing?
The scoreboard for this decade stands at 53 Jackal E, 14 Archers, maybe around 20 Stormshroud Drones, and 3 classifed high altitude ISTAR assets according to Jim. ( Janes )
Anything else I have missed to add?
Wrong in so many ways.
We committed to F35B as the only affordable way of regenerating carrier fixed air capability. Whether the size and cost of the carriers was sensible is a separate question but there is no doubt that a catobar solution would have cost even more.
The F35 problems – far higher than expected unit cost, high and growing sustainment costs, and poor levels of availability – have affected all versions of F35. The glacial progress on block 4 and the linked delay in integration of planned UK weapons has reduced the effectiveness of the carrier fleet but may be solved in due course. But committing to the A variant, which was never the plan, makes no sense at all. It would undermine the GCAP programme, damage sovereign industrial capability and make us even more dependent on LM over whom we have no control. It is surprising that someone with Baileys background doesn’t grasp this.
We do need to restore lost combat mass and sustain that until GCAP starts to deliver. The obvious solution is to order more Typhoons, taking the active fleet to at least 160.
Using T1 to provide an interim successor to Red Arrow Hawks is probably a non starter. No other display team uses such powerful and costly aircraft.
“56 F-35Bs and 82 F-35As, 12 formidable front line squadrons … The F-35B fleet should support four front-line squadrons (48 aircraft)”
Apologies but the MP seem to have lost contact with reality when calculating that 138 F-35’s can sustain 12 squadrons. As the NAO reports, the availability of the UK’s F-35s is proving depressingly low – with all too many hanger queens, aircraft robbed for parts to keep others flying, aircraft in deep maintenance, aircraft being upgraded, aircraft undergoing major repairs, and older aircraft that can no longer be upgraded being relegated to training duties only. The UK has got 2 frontline squadrons from buying 48 F-35’s and expects to get a third from 72. A final buy of 138 probably equates to four or at a stretch five frontline squadrons given that some aircraft delivered in the mid-2030’s onwards will just replace obsolete aircraft delivered in the mid-2010’s onwards. Even ignoring all this, the MOD doesn’t have the many £billions needed to provide base facilities, pilots, maintainers, spares and weapons for 12 Lightning squadrons.