Third new British P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft arrives

That ‘back end ‘of the F35 keeps 25,000 people in job’s.

No doubt, Robert, but really the “crown jewels” of aircraft design and production is the nose section. That’s where you find the really highly skilled work (like integration of systems) – and that’s why the Americans kept that bit on their side of the Atlantic!
Indeed, it’s because Warton made the nose of the Tornado and Typhoon that makes it the leading design and manufacturing centre of military aircraft in western Europe.
Unfortunately, though – in the home of the Comet, VC10, BAC1-11, Trident – our blundering politicians gave up our leadership of civilian airline manufacturing to the French years ago.

Well, we make the wings for every single Airbus, and most of the engines, two pretty important components. ? We make 10-15% of every single F35 that will be made, over 3000, that’s big business, plus some very important avionics like the Defensive aids is British.

Hi Robert,
Airbus is a Franco-German led organisation, centred on Toulouse – and for the moment, they sub-contract the wing design and assembly to their UK factories.
When it comes to airliners, France is the leading manufacturing power in Europe.

We made a huge mistake selling our 20% stake in Airbus.

Which politician signed off selling our share ?

that was TB and enabled BAE to go large in the US

TB should have ensured the 20% remained in the UK. Either sell to RR and provide some sort of back door finance or find a way for the uk government to do it. There is no way France or Germany would have diluted their national share of airbus.

@Alan Reid

I agree it was not properly explained. So here goes.

The issue was mainly around certifying them post Haddon Cave.

The problem was (a) that each aircraft was individually built by hand somewhat at the whim of the team building it and (b) the aircraft where then modified by successive generations of maintainers and fitter for the RAF as they moved through different kit and roles.

None of this was properly documented or in most cases documented at all.

The issue with

(a) was that each aircraft was unique. Some identical skin seams had two rows of rivets some had three. Some penetrations were reinforced in one way some in others. None of it documented.

(b) each aircraft then had holes cut and drilled and bits riveted on by the RAF over the years. All slightly different and none of it properly documented.

So the problem became how do you sign this mess off? Each airframe was individual.

At the beginning of the project, in the mists of time, this was under military rules so a senior guy could just get all pompous and tell someone junior to sign on the dotted line. Fast forward 2010 there was a process to be followed, post Haddon Cave.

As each aircraft was unique each aircraft required type certification.

So at the end of the project BAE was working though the 8 airframes 3D scanning them and x-raying everything.

Now that is OK to get them in the air but think on this:-

Every time you modify the group of aircraft you need to re type certify all 8 of them – now that would be a very expensive long term headache.

Actually the ONLY solution was the one offered by BAE to another customer was a new build Nimrod where they could all be produced exactly the same and certified as such. By the end the credibility of the project was in tatters – time to move on.

As ever the problem was a drawn out project, to save money short term. The drawn out nature of the project meant the rules changed. If it has been in service before the rules changed then it was grandfathered in. It wasn’t so it wasn’t.

That was what ultimately sealed MRA4s fate.

I read somewhere that the simple truth was that the airframe was proving too small for the necessary equipment and didn’t allow for future upgrades.

Hi Supportive Bloke,
I think you make some very good comments – but I feel you’re projecting reasons why you think cancellation was merited from today’s perspective – but these are not the reasons expressed during 2010.

In Hansard 16/06/10: Only four months before cancellation, and the year after Haddon-Cave …
In a response by the Minister: “Nimrod MRA4 deliveries began in March this year and under current plans initial operating capability is expected to be achieved at RAF Kinloss by October 2012, with some ad hoc capability available before this date”. There is no intimation of potential cancellation due to certification issues at MAA.

SDSR 2010:
“The withdrawal of Nimrod MRA4 and Harrier, as well as the reduction in size of the Tornado fleet, will mean that Kinloss and two other bases will no longer be required by the RAF”.

Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, “The decision to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 was not taken lightly by Ministers and Service Chiefs. Severe financial pressures meant we had to address the Department’s spending and tough decisions had to be taken. This project was delayed and overspent; cancelling it will save £2bn over ten years”.

I understand that MAA had the same concerns in certifying an even older airframe (from the 1960s) – the Air Seeker Boeing KC-135 – but certification was still
signed-off!

You’ve come up with a very good reason to justify cancellation – but the evidence suggests that in 2010, the actual reason was bungling and muddle, and panicked cost-cutting in the MoD.

Some people still tell me the Nimrod MRA4 was too unsafe to fly, here’s one displaying at the International Air Tattoo during 2007 – in front of thousands of spectators (myself included)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOPX4W5vI2c  

I’ve responded in detail with a few links.

The moderator is sitting on it as it has a few links in it. I don’t appear to be cleared to link!

To add to your story, Boeing were asked to put the Loral 1017 ESM Pods from the Nimrod AEW on the Boeing E3s for the RAF. After at first Pod was sent to Boeing for a trial fit and than a second and eventually a 3rd they determined that each Pod attachment to the Nimrud’s wing was different and were effectively hand crafted.to fit individual aircraft. The Pods had been manufactured at BAe Woodford

The problems started early on in the project.

BAE took an airframe stripped it took the wings & wing spar out.

They then measured it and made wings for however many X MRA4 planes they had to upgrade.

Stripped the second one – wings did not fit. Because every fuselage was slightly different.

So each MRA4 wing was then coach built to fit.

At that point the X different type certificates thing became inevitable. And because there was not enough of the original aircraft left its type certification could not be grandfathered over.

I don’t know where the ESM pod was to be fitted but if it was to the fuselage I would not be surprised. If it was to the wing I would be worried.

The fact it was 789 million over budget and nine years late was an indication of the problems encountered……

It was ‘only’ that little over budget because BAE cried ‘Force Majeur’, blaming the wing fit fiasco, so HMG then obligingly reduce the number of MRA4 planes to fit the remaining budget.

Which kind of works until the budget goes negative.

It is quite interesting that some of the BAE Nimrod team deny the wing fit story vehemently.

Some of the BAE Nimrod team tell the wing fit story on loop……

Hi SB
I never did get those links that you attempted to helpfully post (but were moderated?) ….. but I had lost this one of my own, now rediscovered ….
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/bae-systems-nimrod-mra-4.32010/
It’s an interesting debate by BAE people suggesting that the “wings did not fit” story is a myth ……..

Alan…..we will invest millions on tempest….. then pull out after ordering 100 and get 6…..

Saunders-Roe

Gloster, Blackburn…..

Morning Alan

I sympathise with your position. I don’t know if P8 is inferior as I’m not knowledgeable on the technical side of these things, but I’m pleased that we have them because after the Nimrod affair was the choice not P3, P1 or these? As dedicated MPA/ASW options and not a converted type like the Hercules.

I read these and the P1 are the quality assets in the current field of options, so pleased we have them, and also the interoperability part with Norway, Australia, and the USN.

Agree re interoperability with NATO allies but the Kawasaki P1 is reported to be superior MPA. with better sensors, longer range, better in flight endurance and resilience via 4 engines vs 2.

Hello Alan-nice to hear from you too. I dont know the finer details of the Nimrod saga so accept what you say. It is just that on the face of it and with the history of its development, it was probably a bad idea from the start-maybe another airframe? Thanks to you and Ian for adding to my list. I will try for one more but in the interim don’t include Panavia, Sepecat and BAC as being obviously hybrids!……Gloster!!! 🙂 🙂

and no one has even mentioned the Nimrod AEW….it didn’t happen just once, but twice…albeit different reasons and circumstances

Britten-Norman!!

Martin Baker….still around making ejection seats! The MB5 was a really impressive aircraft!

It was a scandal that we ever went down the MR4A road. It was apparent from the outset that there were going to be a lot of problems with the airframes, and there were. Certification was the tip of the Iceberg, system.integration proved so difficult we were still battling with it as the 2010 Defence review was held, the IOC was in reality far further away than anyone dared to admit, indeed,, some believed it could never be fully achieved. Add that to the physical problems being encountered with the design and assembly and you had something that should never have been started, and certain senior figures were painfully aware of that.
It was an action replay of the Nimrod AEW project, another chronic failure at a ridiculous cost to the taxpayer. We all loved the Nimrod, but the airframe was no longer viable going forward, a determination to buy British completely ignored that fact.
We should have gone for the P8 from the start, instead we wasted billions which could, and should have been spent on ensuring our service people had the best kit in sufficient numbers to do the job.

Hi Paul, A scandal to invest in the British aerospace industry – and its workers? A scandal to upgrade an aircraft that had provided sterling service to the UK for 40 years?
A troubled programme no doubt, but evidence to the Parliamentary Defence committee indicated these problems had been overcome. And anecdotally, a member of the test team told me the aircraft was working at the time of cancellation.
But certainly a scandal to chop-up with JCBs an aircraft on the verge of entering service, and perhaps a dereliction of duty to then leave the UK without an MPA capability for ten years.
In my opinion, evidence suggests cancellation of MRA4 had little to do with certification delays at the MAA, or outstanding technical concerns.
Just a few weeks before cancellation, in a letter from Liam Fox to David Cameron: “Deletion of the Nimrod MR4 will limit our ability to deploy maritime forces rapidly into high-threat areas, increase the risk to the Deterrent, compromise maritime CT (counter terrorism), remove long range search and rescue, and delete one element of our Falklands reinforcement plan”.
This and other evidence in the public domain confirms the MoD was bringing Nimrod MRA4 into service, and its eleventh hour cancellation can only be described as an astonishing volte-face – even by Whitehall standards.

Hi Alan, this wasn’t an ‘upgrade’. It was a new project utilising old fuselages designed and created may years previously, mated with a host of completely new parts including the wings…… Investing in British industry and workers is great if the finished product does the job, but in this instance an awful lot of problems were kept under wraps, and the costs soared…..To say eveything was working is a bit like saying when we pressed the switch a light came on, was eveyhing working as it should? No, sadly it wasn’t, we have a habit in the UK of delivering platforms with headline systems that aren’t even working Tornado F2 – no working radar, Type 23 Seawolf system installed but not operable, Type 45 – Sea Viper only came online many months after the first ship ‘ Daring was commissioned to name a few..
The Nimrod design was in modern terms ancient. Yes the MR2 gave sterling service, but was approaching the end of ots operational life. It was built at a time when no consideration was given to inflght refuelling, and our subsequent attempts to give it that capability led to a loss of life, and when another aircraft was partially dismantled it became obvious why……
Denying the UK a maritime patrol capability was incredibly stupid. But we had options, and made the wrong choice, albeit no doubt with best of intentions.

Hi Paul, You’ve covered a lot of ground in your reply.
From MRA4, we’ve strayed into air-defence interceptors and weapons-systems on warships.
But seeing as you raise the subject: nearly all new weapons systems have issues, for instance, the superlative Typhoon was grounded for a year shortly after its maiden-flight because of concerns over its flight-control system. But thankfully, siren voices to cancel the project, and buy American or French instead, were rejected – and the aircraft is today a great success. Likewise, but for cancellation, MRA4 would probably have been patrolling these shores for the last ten years – and everyone would be extolling it as a great asset!
The development/into-service circle for MRA4 would have been 14 years: 1997 to 2011. You might not like it – but that appears not untypical of European defence projects. And you might not agree, but I feel it’s important for UK plc that we keep the capability to develop advanced weapons systems – whatever the difficulties involved.
I don’t dispute that Nimrod MRA4 was a troubled project, but to have stuck with it – and got it to work, and then only to cancel it on the verge of entering service was absolutely ludicrous – and indefensible.

I take your point Alan, the MRA4 raises as much strong feeling as TSR2 does!

Another part of the reason for cancellation of the MRA4 would have been the enormous cost of upgrade, on a 9 stong bespoke fleet, it would have cost another fortune!

All modern military aircraft require expensive avionics updates every 10 years to counter component obsolescence, so a mid life update for the MR4A would by now be gathered pace and a ‘seriously’ expensive understanding it would have been.

The fact is, it should never have been started, the MOD and BAE Systems should have discovered the showstopping airframe issues during the initial investigation and it should have stopped then and there.

The whole thing was a cock up of mind boggling scale!

The problem we have today Alan, is that our Armed forces have shrunk to the point that we simply can’t procure expensive equipment in the numbers to make it viable , purely for domestic consumption.

We are on the right tracks with T26 and hopefully Tempest, bringing in foreign investment and boosting numbers.

With regards to Tempest, It’s vital to avoid the infighting and pointless duplication of Typhoon, with its four assembly lines and partners withholding key funding and stalling development, choking off export prospects etc.

The Tempest project must remain streamlined and run on rails ….

The Franco German project will have serious issues of funding and German objections/ intransigence (blocking many export opportunities and slowing development), I think the Germans will be just as problematic for the French, as they have been for the Typhoon project.

Hi John,
Some of your comments may perhaps be merited, but I think they benefit somewhat from hindsight. Just to recap, the main thrust of my argument is that having finally developed the capability – it was bonkers to then cancel it in 2010, and subsequently hand-over yet another £2.5B to Boeing. I don’t remember the cost of a projected avionics upgrade featuring in the decision to cancel – that is simply another projected justification for cancellation from 2020. There is much evidence in the public domain to suggest the real reason for the demise of the MRA4 to have been little more than panic-stricken cost-cutting in the MoD days before the publication of SDSR 2010. Some later arguments to support cancellation appear greatly more sophisticated than is justified by the eleventh hour bungling evident in Whitehall.

Let me reassure you, John, I do appreciate economies of scale, and you misunderstand my argument if you think I’m against multi-national collaborative projects – although I certainly don’t see the Boeing P-8 in those terms.

In respect of major projects for military aircraft design and manufacturing, it became necessary for the UK to adopt this approach from the late-1960s onwards. The philosophy behind Tempest is not new ………… I am a little disappointed though at your description of the Germans as intransigent and problematic. In the production of the Tornado and Typhoon, Germany has been a stalwart partner of UK aerospace. Tempest is a hugely ambitious project and it could certainly use German funding and engineering expertise – and an order for 150 units for the Luftwaffe!   

Once again, good to debate with you, and my apologies for some typos in my earlier response.    

According to the RAF all nine will be delivered by November 2021. I’m amazed by that if it is still true. great though.

https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/first-poseidon-aircraft-delivered-to-the-raf/