A new paper from the Council on Geostrategy argues that Britain can expand its long term influence in the Indo-Pacific by using its alliances, training strengths and regulatory expertise, the organisation stated.
The Primer, written by former Royal Marine Brigadier Rory Copinger-Symes CBE, frames AUKUS as central to the UK’s long term contribution to regional deterrence and highlights what it describes as Britain’s position as a trusted partner for the United States, Australia and Japan. It presents elite training, soft power and specialist regulatory knowledge as areas where the UK can strengthen its value to regional governments.
According to the release, the paper sets out how the UK can secure practical partnerships by matching military engagement with diplomacy. It identifies participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, further maritime security cooperation with India under the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and a consistent alignment of actions with stated intentions as avenues for building influence among states seeking room between Washington and Beijing.
The report follows the Carrier Strike Group 2025 deployment and the publication of the Strategic Defence Review. It states that the UK faces decisions about how to maintain a steady presence in the region and recommends clearer articulation of long term defence commitments. British submarine rotations under AUKUS, expected to begin in 2027, are given as an example of sustained engagement alongside future advances under Pillar II.
The Primer calls for clarity in the UK’s strategic messaging, focusing on collective deterrence and safeguarding freedom of navigation in contested waters. It argues that effective deterrence against Chinese claims requires supporting partners such as Malaysia and the Philippines to develop their own capabilities. The proposed Indo-Pacific Open General Export Licence is presented as one mechanism for aligning exports of strategic goods with that goal.
The document reflects on the gap between British rhetoric and its available forces and concludes that alliance cohesion and reliable engagement matter more than matching the scale of United States or Chinese fleets. It cites the CSG2025 deployment as reassurance to regional partners who have concerns about American reliability.
Copinger-Symes is quoted saying ‘Britain’s Indo-Pacific strategy cannot rely on episodic deployments alone. It should be underpinned by a wider ecosystem of influence that only the UK can uniquely offer.’ He adds that ‘in light of shifting global dynamics, particularly the PRC’s rise as a central strategic competitor, Britain should navigate its Indo-Pacific defence strategy with careful consideration.’
He also argues that through sustained engagement the UK could contribute to a stable Indo-Pacific and establish enduring partnerships.
Historically, the UK has had a strong grip on naval activity in the area and reinforcing the commitment makes sense. However, it can only be achieved by combining principal powers in the region. South Korea should be encouraged to participate alongside a more determined Japan. I would still like to see a permanent carrier stationed there built and operated by a consortium of member countries, and not being solely dependent on Americans for flight platforms. Additionally, semi-permanent RN frigates would help to cement the long-term commitment in the face of Chinese expansion.
“Historically, the UK has had a strong grip on naval activity in the area”
As in when we still had HK? Or at some other point in fading sepia history?
Unless UK is serious about stationing significant assets in the area I am not at all sure what can actually be achieved if Suez canal is required. The first thing the Chinese would do is to engineer another Ever Given type incident maybe with some RPG’s fired into it so a fire took hold on the EVs and the ship sank blocking Suez. It requires zero imagination to know how that could be set up and how many weeks it would take to clear that mess.
So it is the long way round. By the time anything has left UK for that we are at best reinforcements and at worst too late to the party.