Senior defence figures have warned MPs that the UK procurement system is too slow and rigid for the pace of modern conflict, calling for a shift toward prototype warfare and rapid frontline experimentation.
Giving evidence to the Defence Committee, Air Marshal (Retd) Edward Stringer said the UK remained locked into a model of defence acquisition built around large, long-term programmes, rather than quickly iterating new equipment and adapting based on battlefield feedback.
“We need to work out what prototype warfare looks like,” Stringer said, arguing that current processes were still oriented around lengthy specification writing, complex contracts and decades-long disputes over requirements.
He suggested defence should take lessons from the software sector by embracing the concept of a “minimum viable product”, rapidly deploying early versions of equipment to frontline units and using service personnel to refine and improve them in real time.
“Create a minimum viable product and get it out to the frontline,” he said, adding that “clever young troops” should be empowered to trial new systems and feed results back to industry.
Stringer said this approach required government to reshape its industrial strategy away from selecting “winners” and instead focus on enabling the conditions for innovation, including access to energy, computing power and predictable investment environments. He told MPs that existing strategies were built on the assumption that capability could be defined years in advance, but warned that the speed of technological change made that approach obsolete. “You are trying to define exactly what you need and then to find a way of building it over the next 10 years, and that is not going to work,” he said.
Stringer pointed to the Strategic Defence Review itself, saying it recognised the difficulty of predicting future requirements over a decade-long timeframe, and argued the UK needed systems capable of producing solutions almost immediately before they are needed. “You need to be building a system that can build it possibly only minutes before you actually need it,” he said.
Sir Hew Strachan supported the argument, noting that in wartime the procurement cycle historically compressed dramatically. “Even in the two world wars, the whole procurement process is months,” he said, describing a continuous feedback loop between the front line and industry which he argued had been lost in peacetime defence planning.
Strachan also warned that Britain could not rely on fully sovereign capability in every area and would need to “spread bets” across allies, while recognising that US support could not be guaranteed in a major conflict with China. “We still will not get it if the US is engaged in a major war with China,” he said, arguing that American industrial capacity would be prioritised for US requirements.
Pressed on whether foreign-owned drone firms establishing production in the UK strengthened sovereignty or created vulnerability, Strachan said: “It could be either.”
Everyone in the MoD is happy with the current procurement system, no one in the MoD is capable of delivering an agile innovative system.
This is what happens when an organisation is almost entirely staffed by public schools boys whose main qualification is the ability to run fast and know which fork to use.
The only way you will get a rapid role out of autonomous systems is to create a new service branch.
The Army and Airforce are completely not cut out for this. The navy to its credit has made major strides in autonomous systems and basically replaced manned minesweeper. The current army “thinking” is to hand out a few quad copters to infantry units and say job done. It won’t loose a single cap badge to make way for autonomous systems. This is a service who recons a £10 million armoured vehicle with a sensor mast is a super advanced way to do reconnaissance.
Tell me you have never read the last 30 years of procurement acts without saying you haven’t read the last 30 years of procurement acts. The system is law and those working have no choice but to follow the law.
Hey Jim, Don’t feel you have to hold back there, I should tell us what you really think 🤔😁
The idea that everyone in MOD is happy with the system is absurd. Time and again they keep trying new things, but we’ve had review after review on procurement and on defence in general and every time the consensus is that procurement isn’t working. Nobody is happy with the way it is. Over the last couple of decades we had, the Smart Procurement Initiative, Currie, Levene, Gray, Better Defence Acquisition, half a dozen defence reviews, and I’ve lost track of how many NAO and parliamentary reports. They all said the same thing: we need faster, smarter, better procurement, and not one of them said they were happy with things as they are. The only people who actually like it are the Treasury as it gives their top excuse not to fund Defence.
First MOD need to divorce detailed requirements from procurement for most purchases, better to talk about the problems that need solving that the specific solution. I think there’s a recognition of this already. Second to fund initiatives properly including contingency commensurate with risk. No sign of that one. Third to accept there’s always risk and that projects will fail, and that doesn’t mean that an obligatory increase in governance must occur after every failure. No acceptance of that either. Fourth it’s better to have competent people in charge so it won’t go wrong, rather than senior arses to kick when it does go wrong. Still not on the cards at all.
And finally, yes! Stringer has it right. Minimum viable product followed by spiral development. However, that can only work when paired with continuous build or upgrades. If you accept at the beginning that MVP might also be the project end point and you won’t keep iterating as part of the same funded project, you’ll fail. People are only willing to accept a lack of gold plate if they are sure there’ll be a chance to add it later. Otherwise you will always get the expensive Gucci order up front: that is buying stupidly, slowly and more expensively. Just like we always have.
It boils down too is everyone wants a different system but doesn’t want the consequences of a different system. If you want the MoD to take more risks that means more projects will fail. Commercial risk does not disappear if you call things prototype warfare. Taking more risk also means more risk to life and limb. A failed projects or a lost life or serious injury will be used by opposition politicians for political advantage. Thats not going to magically stop.
The idea that you can magically upgrade things cheaply also isn’t going to fly. The big cost is intergation and the big risk is also integration. Just ask the Danish navy. In the case of stealth, its a fundamental physical property that you can’t make significant changes to.
I’m not sure taking more procurement risk always leads to greater risk to life and limb. I think you underestimate the military risk of not taking procurement risks, of never trying something new, of playing the game of an ever shrinking steady as she goes policy.
You are right in that the opposition will grab hold of every opportunity to take political advantage of failure. That’s modern politics and it’s up to government to persude the people of that. I also agree upgrades aren’t always cheap. They are often are so expensive, it’s better to do continous build, upgrading the specification of new platform purchases and jettisoning the earlier ones than upgrading platforms you already have. But if you design your platform to be upgradable, you should be able to make that the exception rather than the rule. That particularly includes open architectures and integration.
The system is like it is to minimise risk.
Ultimately this is key. We aren’t talking tech firms rolling out software that might crash or leak a bit of personal data, we are talking weapons of war, that if they don’t work as expected can kill or seriously wound people. In Ukraine scenario they are at war, and deaths are going to happen either way and so rushing stuff to the front line in the hope for success works, but we are at peace and the media would rip apart the MOD if it fielded stuff that didn’t work and much more and rightly so, if people are injured because of it.
The idea of agile is great, but has to be balanced on reality of the risks.
Steve below sums it up very well.
Following the Haddon-Cave investigation and the consequences it enforced within the MOD. The MOD has become risk averse, especially when it comes to the possibilities of litigation. The favourite phrase is as low as reasonably possible (ALARP), this is one of the governing decision makers used by the MOD to make sure that when a “system” is introduced in to the services. That the number of injuries and fatalities due to the new “system” comes within an acceptable band. Obviously Ajax has fallen foul of nobody holding responsibility wanting to raise their head above the parapet, to cause waves with the program (LMF)!
However, if the risk appetite is high enough, things can get done quickly. A good case for this is the integration of Storm Shadow on the Su-24. Which on Typhoon took 5 years, whilst on the Su-24 took 6 months. Admittedly the Su-24 can’t make full use of the Storm Shadow’s capabilities whilst in flight.
The thing is Jim, as we all well know, the primary reason the MoD exists, is too ensure the UK defence industrial complex is fed with billions of pounds, year in, year out and senior politicians, military leaders and civil servants have lucrative non executive jobs in tbe industry to go too when they retire.
A by product of this slow creeping system, almost an afterthought, is provided defence equipment for the armed forces.
Hi John, I would disagree with some of your points. Especially about the part that the MOD is funding the MIC just for seniors to get post service executive jobs. I am ex-military and in the MIC, and no I’m not in an executive role, but do have a level of responsibility. I have been on the front end of project/program development and delivery, that were subsequently cancelled due to a lack of continued funding or a change in priorities. The MOD is not a cash cow, we face a very high degree of auditing and must clearly demonstrate actual progress as scheduled. To such an extent that if we don’t meet the deliverable date, we get financially penalised. Which also has a knock on effect if we want or bid for any follow-on work.
Fair play mate, however the Leonardo helicopters fiasco is a typical example of my point.
It has sod all to do with providing the best helo for the Armed Forces and ‘everything’ to to with a politically forced solution.
That said, that particular lamb is obviously bound for slaughter, as the MoD try and force the square peg through the round hole with the underfunded equipment plan..
The UK policy on procurement is easy. we do not buy any thing for nearly 2 years, every thing is fine nothing to see here. No rush we have years to sort stuff out and cheuqe is in the post.
Creating a MVP in software development gets it into the hands of the end users slightly sooner than a gold-plated one, but it still isn’t a quick process.
Some of this misses, to me, one of the most glaring absurdities. The MIC love long drawn out procurement, reason? Long term profits that are guaranteed. The culture of the MoD has been molded around that for decades. Also entrenched lobbying of half wit politicians enforces the culture of slow witted dimwits. As does the brass stuck in Waterloo and Trafalgar mode.
They cannot adapt. End of.
Hey, thanks !
YAMW
Agreed. MIC always comes first.
Yep, every time, the rapid cost effective AH64E buy was a notable departure from the norm.
If we wanted Leonardo to build them, I guarantee they would still be squabbling about the cost and contract, nothing would have been built yet….
Would you send your sons and daughters to war in or with unsafe systems and equipment? A lot of stuff is driven by safety. Western Europeans are safety mad. Unless that changes, nothing will change.
I agree with what he’s saying but would probably drop the word ‘minimum’ and change it to ‘viable product’ I can Already see the dangers of the politicians and the treasury hiding behind that wording. I also think the MOD should only go with options that are ‘off the shelf and ready’ and only with countries that are A – friendly (maybe not American for a while.) and B – willing to allow us to build in the uk with full licensing autonomy to modify then sell to whoever we like and build up our industry that way. (Maybe claw back abit of credibility too.) but the most important part is actually purchase and build in mass then add gradual improvements to it. Which we don’t do. Type 31 is a perfect example of this: cost effective, supports uk industry, large international export interest. can be gradually upgraded ie VLS, Hull/towed sonar, more AAW ability. RN and MOD “Shall we build it and call it Type 32!?….No let’s go straight to type 83 and make it 3 billion a ship with lasers and rail cannon!
Everyone likes rapid development, but there is a very thin line here which you cannot cross. History is full of new equipment being rushed to the front line and then failing and then costing lives
Also the absolute last thing you need is to have to employ key Engineering staff to the front line to sort complex problems out, and then run the risk of loosing them.
There is no money left to procure anything its all gone in some persons trouser pockets. The system needs to change.
Jon, I agree with you.
[Full disclosure – when I was an Equipment Support Manager at DLO Andover in 2002/3 I dealt with DE&S a lot – I was receiving equipment into service to support, that they had procured. I also sat on the Bid Review Panel for FBRV (Future Beach Recovery Vehicle) reviewing at least half a dozen Bids from Industry. Then when I left the army in 2009 my first civvy job was as a contractor at DE&S for 2 years – I had 3 different short-term freelance contracts (lead Solutions Manager for the Armoured Vehicle Support Transformation project; 2IC to Programme Manager for the UOR Vehicles Office; PM for the Casualty Locator Beacon). I am not sure how much experience of DE&S various other posters have!].
DE&S staff is comprised of: both senior and junior civil servants (CS), far more of the latter than the former; military officers and some WOs; freelance contractors. I did not spot that the vast majority were ex-public school boys and indeed what school someone went to before the age of 18 would have precious little bearing on their ability to do a job 5-45 years later. The problems with MoD procurement, past and present, are well known and your brand of ‘old school tie’ would not be a factor.
I agree that pretty much no-one in the MoD could possibly be happy with the current ‘standard’ procurement process and many initiatives and changes have hapened over the years which have not solved the main problems. In contrast, the UOR process is great – very fast but can cost a lot.
The whole subject of Requirements is interesting. The Requirement for the RFC’s first fighter aircraft was written on one sheet of foolscap.
I find the claim that the army Requirements staff at DRAC set 1,200 requirements for each and every variant of the Ajax programme absolutely astonishing. When I was serving, the preference was for output-based statements ie ‘the gun has to defeat the frontal armour of BMPs at x thousand metres’ and Industry had to supply the solution…not that ‘it must have a CTAS 40mm cannon’ – just make it fit! The most important requirements being written into a Key User Requirements (KUR) document with the overall document being the URD, User Requirements Document…as far as I can recall.
Interestingly the KUR for AS-90 consisted of just 4 essential requirements written on a single page of paper – this time A4! There is a reason for that if you are interested.
I wish Stringer’s example had not come from the software sector as that is very niche. Perhaps better to have come from heavy industry manufacturing cars perhaps.
Our defence procurement process is way out of date and totally unsuitable for modern conflict. It takes years from a request for a piece of equipment to be brought into service and then some of the kit is unfit for service (Ajax). Undoubtedly financial constraints play a large part and governments do not like spending money on defence. Politicians are happy to put British troops in harms way but not happy to give them the best kit available. Drones, Artillery and missiles with a massive stockpile of ammo are the keys to winning any future conflict but cannot see our forces getting them. The Royal Navy and RAF are equally deserving but treated just as badly.