Harpoon missile in-service support extension agreed

I suspect FC/ASW is likely to have similar costs to LRASM. I notice from the US 2021 DoD weapons budget that even NSM for the LCS program would be $2M+ each based on 15-18 per year buy rate through 2021.

LRASM hasn’t been qualified by anyone for surface launch yet and may never be by the USN, so it really isn’t an option unless the UK wants to be lead customer for surface launch, which seems very unlikely for an interim solution. Its only in EOC/IOC on F-18, B-1B and planned for P8 currently.

Additionally, assuming LRASM was for some reason chosen for surface launch, then NSM is less expensive at $2M+ (annual quantities of 15-18) versus LRASM at ~$3.5M (annual quantities of 48) – source US Fiscal 2021 DoD budget. Neither is cheap. I had also previously understood NSM to be more like a quarter the cost of LRASM but not so based on the Feb 2020 source I quote, where its only approx. a third less expensive.

I had previously considered the RN and RAF might go with a low-mid-high set of solutions for common ASM and land attack missiles but I am wondering if the mid-level makes sense, adding more logistics, training, maintenance. Gunbusters comment that the RN are moving ahead with using Sea Ceptor for ASM, along with the addition of Wildcat launched Sea Venom/Martlet, and possibly even surface launched SPEAR 3 would suggest we have the low end well addressed for what is the most likely of any surface threats. Its then a case of whether we adopt NSM/JSM or similar at all or just run with a Harpoon upgrade, as the simplest and lowest cost to implement until FC/ASW.

I hadn’t known LRASM wasn’t surface launched yet – thanks. I suppose that just leaves NSM unless they drop their ‘terrain following maritime land-attack capability’ from the list of requirements.

The mid level (NSM) makes sense as an interim which can be put on the Type 31s (once they’re finished on the Type 23s) as a last resort OTH heavyweight anti-ship capability.

If we then choose to procure JSM as an AShM for the F35s they can be used in combination with FC/ASW for the carrier strike group.

I had also been going down the path of NSM/JSM as both an interim and long term solution in addition to FC/ASW as they are different weight and range classes. Who knows maybe that’s what happens. But that was also with a circa $1M price tag. At a closer price point, I started to wonder how much sense it made having the mid-level solution.

It may still make sense, if we think the threat environment for the next decade justifies it, given others are paying for F35 integration costs, land and sea based aircraft being the most likely UK delivery platform for ASM against large warships. But its tied to Block 4 s/w so how long would we have it available before we have FC/ASW? That’s the large unknown.

Block 4 comes in 2024 at the earliest, though it may be delayed in conjunction with delays of the production schedule. So likely around 5 years. Which makes me think that they won’t bother and will just procure the bare minimum of 5 sets of 8 launchers for the GP Type 23s.

Though, do we know if FC/ASW will be air launched? I suppose it’s something that is being discussed at the moment. I know that France will likely want an air launched Exocet replacement.

Its interesting that the interim missile is actually specified in the RfP for 5x towed array T23 and not GP variants.

FC/ASW will definitely include air launch variant as it replaces Storm Shadow.

If LRASM doesn’t become surface launched, what will the USN use in the future as an AshM for their fleet?

In theory there is supposed to be the US Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW)/Increment 2 program for the long term US ASM solution. Its overdue to be started.

What we refer to as LRASM, aka AGM-158C, is supposed to be an interim urgent capability that was awarded to Lockheed without competition. That last part is probably the largest reason AGM-158C isn’t being qualified for surface launch, at least for now, given the howls of protest that would arise from Lockheed competitors and political opposition to lack of competition.

These are the US options that I’m aware of that might form part of OASuW/Inc 2:
LRASM (Lockheed)
NSM (Raytheon) – already on LCS, speculated for FFG(X)
Harpoon upgrade (Boeing)
SM-6 (Raytheon)
Sea Dragon

SM-6 gives a supersonic option, also a one missile to rule them all with a price to match. Sea Dragon is rather speculative as a submarine/surface launch ASM that the Chinese reportedly stole info on. Could be an existing missile like SM-6 or something new from someone.

I’d imagine SM6 has too small a warhead to be a primary anti-ship missile, and NSM too small a range. Thanks for the info, I’d assumed LRASM would be the next USN AShM for a while and not such a stop gap solution.

Is harpoon block 2 an option? I thought one of the requirements was a terrain following land attack capability?

Harpoon is not an option as RfP defines land attack capability. Also RBS 15 Mk 4 is in mix.

I wonder if that land attack capability survives the tender process though? Particularly as the tender also stated (italic bolding is mine) “It is anticipated that the I-SSGW capability will operate on X 5 Type 23 (Towed Array) frigates capable of concurrent Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and Anti Surface Warfare (ASuW) operations in protection of a formed Maritime Tasking Group, for a 10-year period.”

I could see using Towed Array T23 for ASuW with a CSG, although an aircraft delivered weapon might be better, but with carriers well off shore it doesn’t seem a good fit for land attack with the missile ranges of current candidates. But would we be spreading T23 TAPS too thin if we’re trying to escort a carrier group, a separate amphibious group/independent tasking group which would seem the most likely candidate for land attack missiles, while still supporting independent N. Atlantic T23 ASW patrols, all with a total of 8x TAPS. If we have a combined carrier strike and amphibious group, wouldn’t F35’s again be better for land attack.

I suspect they’re asking for the ideal, given a number of candidates support it. If quotes are too expensive, then a fall back of submarine launched Tomahawk for land attack and upgraded Harpoon if the latter comes in at low enough cost, possibly with better land attack capability than at present, might be the result.

Your reasoning makes a lot of sense, land attack missiles aren’t a whole lot of use int he GIUK gap! Potentially the SCS and Gulf though.
Harpoon Block II does have land attack capability, having incorporated guidance bits from JDAM and SLAM land attack weapons- according to Boeing. If that is the case, that’d be my choice for an interim weapon. If we’re going to keep the interim weapons on and fit them to T31 after introduction of FC/ASW, then I’d probably go with Nsm/JSM.

Harpoon Block II does have land attack capability, having incorporated guidance bits from JDAM and SLAM land attack weapons- according to Boeing.
I really like the RBS15, but it seems to not offer enough improvement for an interim system over Harpoon for the price tag. I may be wrong though.

OK, although I’m not sure I would assume even on an individual basis that its that easy to kill SPEAR 3 versus other larger sub-sonic candidates.

I don’t think anyone is expecting this level of missile or even Sea Venom to be ship killers. They might be, especially the latter, against small missile boats such as those used by Iran though, or would likely disable the craft/kill the crew. Against larger vessels, a saturation attack could well destroy all air defence sensors and the bridge, especially if the warhead works in conjunction with any remaining fuel to cause widespread fire.

I defy any ship to continue fighting after multiple Spear 3 hits, that have targeted specific points. You don’t have to sink the ship to achieve a mission kill. Granted, this may be different if you decided to use them against a carrier rather than a frigate. Mind you I suspect a swarm of Spear 3s attacking specific points on a carrier could still achieve a mission kill, such as targeting the catapult rails. If a single F35 can launch at least 16 Spear 3s at a ship and 50% are intercepted, the remaining 8 will still be capable of doing a lot of damage.

The issue would be how the missile is programmed to detonate when hitting the ship. I admit the small warhead is not in the same league as Harpoon’s 221kg. Spear 3 uses a similar warhead to Brimstone 2. It is a programmable multi-effects warhead formed around a tandem shaped charge. The shaped charge is design to punch through explosive reaction armour (ERA) and then a tanks main armour of around 800mm RHA. However, it can also be programmed to explode in a certain sideways direction or in a complete radial direction. It can also be programmed to detonate on contact or when detecting a void, once it has punched through a wall etc.

The other good thing about Spear 3 that it has carried over from Brimstone, is its ability to recognise a target and go for its weak spots, not to mention the inter-swarm communication. To target specific points is by using a combination of its millimetric M band radar and its imaging infrared sensor which forms a a high definition image of the target. This is how it can select specific areas of the ship to target and communicate it within the swarm, so each member is allocated an area and is not duplicated. As per Brimstone, it will then manoeuvre to achieve the attack. This could be by punching below the waterline, doing a pop-up to fly down the exhaust stack. Punching through a bridge window to detonate inside the bridge, or aiming for a vertical launch system, where there are lots things that go bang tightly packed together.

Against a ship, this small missile can punch above its weight. You could compare it to a boxer. The Spear 3 is like a jab. whilst Harpoon is the upper cut. It’s really hard to stop the jabs and they wear you down, whereas the upper cut will likely floor you. However, the uppercut is easier to defend against, so is more easily stopped. In this scenario is it better to send a swarm of small missiles or one large missile?

It was not easy to sink a battleship. The Rodney turned the Bismark into a colander even though it did not sink. But its first hit wiped out the conning tower. It’s not an issue about sinking ships is it though. It’s about disabling them.

Disabling ships only gets you so far

What?

Many people make your mistake .Don’t look at warships as ships. Look at them as a system of interlinked systems. If you take down a system you can degrade or cripple the whole ship.

Ignoring the obvious radars, guns, missile silos etc, just hit Wind speed and direction anemometers …those simple little whirly buckets that tell you the strength and direction of the wind…Warships can we can live without thoseyes? No? ….No You cannot.
Destroy those and the wind speed input into the EW Chaff launchers is gone so launching decoys is no longer computer controlled and automatic.Its manual and slow and thus leaving you vulnerable in reaction times to further attacks. Helo ops are degraded as launching helos and doing the calculations for wind over the deck V Helo takeoff weight all goes to manual.. Gunnery is severely degraded in accuracy with the chances of hitting the target dropping off rapidly.

You dont have to sink anything to make it no longer a functioning warship. Just hit critical systems which Spear 3 will give you the capability to do.

I absolutely agree with you, mission killing a ship can be as impactful as sinking it. I’m not arguing against that.

However, in a war of attrition, do you not think it would also be effective to have the capability of completely putting a ship out of service (if not sinking it) using heavier munitions?

Putting a ship out of action is the key. How you achieve that is obviously dependent on weapons available.
However damage is preferable to sinking. The same goes for the land battlefield where a wounded soldier is better than a killed soldier. Taking care of wounded troops and damaged ships eats resources and manpower so those resources cannot be used elsewhere.

A mission kill on a ship will lead to say using an ocean going tug to move it to port and manpower ashore to fix it. Until its removed from the operational theater to port it will have assets assigned to it to protect it and its crew. Even under tow a damaged ship its still a target as is also the now slow moving and maneuvering restricted tug. Hitting the Tug could remove salvage experts etc from the battle.

Look at the Falklands. Ships that took hits had other assets assigned to them to assist in fire fighting, damage control, crew evacuation and towing. Those assets then and more so now are scarce and finite. With the reduced numbers in the RN a task group commander could ill afford to take a FF/DD off the Gunline or ASW screen to assist a damaged vessel.

Hi mate, whilst it looks pretty likely that JSM will be procured for internal carriage on the RAAF F-35A fleet (can also be externally carried by Super Hornet too), it’s looking less likely that RAAF P-8A will carry JSM.

Mid last year the Oz Government announced the procurement of 200 LRASM, initially for the Super Hornet fleet. They also announced on the 30th of last month that the P-8A fleet will be increased from 12 to 14 and also officially announced that LRASM will be integrated (its been known for a while the USN is integrating LRASM onto their P-8A fleet),

Its pretty likely in the future the RAAF and RAN will operate multiple types of AShM.

The RAAF with LRASM and JSM (replacing Harpoon II), and the RAN with LRASM and NSM (again, replacing Harpoon II).

Cheers,

I think that’s not a bad set up to have I suppose- a pretty simple High/Low, Long range/short range, heavyweight/”light”weight combination for both the RAAF and RAN.
I would be surprised if we get everything tied together on multiple platforms in that way- that doesn’t seem to be something that UK armed forces do very often to be honest.

The MoD seem to be increasingly working on commonality across platforms in missiles. We shouldn’t expect identical missiles though, in the same way that NSM and JSM aren’t identical. We should expect commonality of software, seeker/sensors, engine, warhead, mission planning, communications, with the possibility for more.

The FC/ASW goal is air, surface and sub-surface launch. Each of those solutions might have a different outward appearance/variant but with the core commonality to help drive purchase and support (maintenance, training, updates/upgrades) cost reduction.

If the program is successful in its goals, the missile will replace Harpoon, Tomahawk and Storm Shadow in UK service and fill in gaps in capability such as air launch ASM from fighters, surface launch land attack, submarine launch ASM. Surface launch might support both canister and VLS, MK41 strike length for the UK, Sylver A70 for France, with the ability for MBDA to sell to Euro and world markets, most of which use MK41 at this level of capability. Air launch might even support F-35B internal carry, although I don’t think this is critical and worth compromising other attributes for.

The largest challenge for the program currently seems to be whether the UK and France can agree on either a sub-sonic or supersonic solution. If the partners can’t agree then its a question of whether the program can justify two missile types, with reduction on commonality on the engine and airframe at minimum. MBDA seems to have been showing both options for a while now as potential solutions for political reasons.

You make a fair point, and perhaps I shouldn’t be quite as sceptical.
At the same time though, we have Martlet and Sea Venom cleared for RN Wildcat only (not the AAC ones, which can only designate targets for AH-64); Hellfire on AH64 only (until/if Brimstone 2 is officially fitted) with no guided rockets for them at all; Brimstone is Typhoon only until/if it gets to AH-64, but doesn’t seem to be going onto F-35B because of the upcoming implementation of Spear 3 (even though their ranges and speed put them in different brackets of use); Stingray is on wildcat and Merlin, but there are no published plans to equip it to P-8A (or F-35B which will be our primary maritime strike platform for the CSG, although admittedly not technically an ASW platform).
I know we have constrained budgets, but at the lightweight end of the scale (which are probably the weapons systems we’ll be using the most), it seems to be a bit patchy…
As far as FC/ASW goes, I think they should bite the bullet and get both; there is plenty of justification for having a long-range, stealthy cruise missile and a (presumably) shorter range supersonic weapon. MBDA and the French/British missile programme is probably the most long-term successful industrial partnership we have, so I’m hopeful they’ll be able to hash this one out. I would be first to admit I’m not an expert, but I’d imagine that a lot of the systems would be common, with just the motor/propulsion unit and the external shell different. If the external dimensions are broadly similar for fitting in VLS and potential internal carriage on 6th Gen aircraft, then the guidance systems, datalinks, warhead, seeker etc. would have to be around about the same regardless.

We agree more than we differ on most of these points. I think the FC/ASW program exists, with the scope it has, precisely because the RN and RAF needed a more comprehensive suite of ASM and land attack capabilities in a modern missile and recognised this many years ago, along with the French.

I don’t think many would argue that Harpoon is the weapon we should choose for a new platform today, given a free choice. However, Gunbuster in his recent response to Challenger, outlines what integrating NSM would involve as an interim replacement for Harpoon, especially how long it would take even if we started today.

I agree that SPEAR 3 would be complimentary to a higher end missile. However, its not limited to use with FC/ASW or NSM. Consider, an attack combining SPEAR 3 to saturate, confuse, distract and destroy sensors along with Sea Ceptor (in ASM role) and upgraded Harpoon. Even just combining Sea Ceptor and Harpoon might be enough to overcome even a high end warship. Using SPEAR 3 alone, combining with Harpoon or with Wildcat launched Sea Venom might address land attack to help counter coastal attacks. If both SPEAR 3 warhead and EW variants could be supported from a cold launch Sea Ceptor installation with minimal hardware changes, then in conjunction with other weapons, that might bridge us to FC/ASW with a significant overall system uplift in current capability, but without time consuming and expensive engineering required.

I think perhaps you misunderstood my point regarding a political decision. What I meant is that ALL defence expenditure happens in a context of world politics and foreign relations. Defence budgets are always less than what services would like to spend, so we have to prioritise. Which means assessing weapon system procurement in the context of likely risk and especially where it ranks in terms of overall deterrence value.

In your Yemen example, we have Sea Ceptor, decoys and EW to counter air attacks. Going on the offensive we have real time options, but we also have other responses such as air launched attacks after the fact, not forgetting possible allied responses. So a Houthi missile attack while it might have higher likliehood of taking place, would have low risk of being effective. Looking at other actors, we need to assess how likely Russia, China or Iran would be to launch missiles against one of our ships in the next 10-15 years, there has to be a political context for that. Iran could probably saturate any warship in the Gulf with land launched ASM, but it would be a suicidal strategy for them. For Russia and China its an increasing possibility but with huge domestic and international political risks and ramifications for them. Hence the political assessment of risk levels observation.

Sorry GHF, I was reading out of context and was getting a bit ranty, – upper lip reset.

To be brutally honest I don’t believe Iran are stupid enough to directly attack one of our ships. They have learned it is better for them to you a proxy, as they are doing in Yemen. This is where it’s more likely for someone to have a go at a passing ship.

MInd you looking at the effectiveness of the missiles launched towards the USS Mason, we may not be overly concerned. It was likely targeted with Iranian Noor missiles, which are Chinese C-802s reverse engineered. Which in itself is “based” on the Exocet. Over a period of 7 days she was targeted by 9 anti-ship missiles. At least 4 of these missiles crashed in to the sea. The remainder we either taken out by surface to air missiles or due to countermeasures.

It will be the same with Russia I think, they will do a lot of sabre rattling, but will step back from the brink. It is China where I feel it will kick off sooner rather than later. The South China Sea (SCS) and the Japanese Ryukyu islands NE of Taiwan are the current hotspots. Just before Xmas there was clash between a Chinese “Coast Guard” vessel and Japanese Police boat. Then there is the territory grab in the SCS.

The Chinese are desperately short on food resources. Their land mass cannot currently produce enough food for 1.3 billion mouths. Fish makes up 1/4 to 1/3 of the populations diet. The Bohai Sea has been fished dry and the Yellow Sea is not much better. This probably explains why North Korean fishing boats are being found more regularly in Japanese waters. But why there are more clashes between Chinese fishing fleets and Nations fishing vessels surrounding the SCS, such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia.

The noises coming out of China seem to be saying that they will do anything to maintain control over this area. Granted fish is not the only reason. Under the SCS are untapped resources of oil and natural gas. China much like Japan are totally dependent on imported oil and gas, why pay for something when you can simply grab it, especially when nobody is willing to stop you?

If we are sending the Navy on a freedom of navigation trip through the SCS and making port calls around the area, tensions with the Chinese will be very high. It only takes one idiot who believes they are doing the right thing by the Party to step over the line!

No apology necessary. I do think a navy’s priority for ASM is tied to where they are most likely to operate and the associated threats in that region. Along with whether a country has any option to withdraw from a region, or not have a compelling need/requirement/commitment to go there in the first place in a hot war.

Constrained waters like the Baltic drive smaller ships and ASMs since the countries are all on top of each other and have nowhere to go. Perhaps why Sweden is one of the countries to develop a relatively modern ASM along with its Visby corvettes. Having a neighbour in Russia and a long coastline Russia must skirt to come south seems to have driven Norway’s NSM development along with its Skjold corvettes.

Japan, N. Korea, S. Korea and China are all on top of each other in the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan and East China Sea, although the sea space is significantly greater than that of the Baltic. Again all essentially home waters for the respective navies.

The UK and the US are fortunate in that a hostile ship-to-ship encounter, local to either country during a hot war, would be a relatively low probability, outside of the Bering Sea and points north of there for the US. So ship launched ASM need is driven more by expeditionary requirements. The priority for both is more likely to be air launched ASM from land based or carrier aircraft. Probably why we saw air-launched LRASM fast tracked for the US.

The dynamics between China and its neighbours is going to be interesting to watch. At present the easier objective is to attempt to intimidate SE Asia and India. For SE Asia especially, by attempting to control the SCS and on land by controlling fresh water sources and flows, directly or through proxies. Looking north, China will probably continue migration into East Russia. For now Russia, on the surface at least, seems OK with this. But the much advertised “best of friends” relationship between Xi and Putin and joint military exercises might be more a case of “hold your friends close and your enemies closer”.

In general I do believe the probability of a major conventional (as opposed to grey zone) conflict between Russia and/or China and the West is relatively low, particularly because of the economic impact to China if that happened. Russia is already experiencing the economic fallout from military adventures. But the probability of conflict is not zero. Perhaps most importantly, we might think we understand Xi and Putin when gauging risk, but we have little idea who might replace them or when.

Well yes, but then you would probably select NSM or RBS-15. No chance a Wildcat could act as spotter for Harpoon I suppose? That Seaspray 7000E radar looks good enough to stand off outside the range of most shipborne ASM.

Something is going to have to provide targeting for over the horizon missiles. Distance to the radar horizon for most escorts is around 30km. So beyond that we’re either relying on other ships closer to the target, air assets, space assets or some other intelligence.

Wildcat will need to provide targeting for its own Sea Venom anti-ship missiles. So it is at least conceptually possible for Wildcat to provide/confirm targets and perhaps take control for mid-flight updates on Harpoon, if its in the right sector and/or at the appropriate altitude to see targets at greater distances. UAVs might also come into play in future. Have to watch out for medium range SAM though that larger escorts are likely to be armed with.

Helos on RN vessels regularly practise OTH targeting. It has been and remains a core tasking on Harpoon equipped ships from the old B3 T22 to current T23 and T45.