The British Army’s new attack helicopter, the Apache AH-64E, has been brought into frontline service.
Fifty Apache AH-64E Version 6 aircraft (rebuilt from the British Army’s pre-existing Apache AH1 fleet) have been purchased from the United States with 14 of them having been delivered to the British Army so far.
According to the British Army here:
The AH-64E replaces the Apache Mk.1, which entered service in 2001 and proved itself as a battle winning asset on Afghanistan and Libya. The Boeing-built AH-64E features new drivetrain and rotor blades to boost flying performance; improved sights and sensors; communications systems to share data with other helicopters, uncrewed aircraft systems and ground forces; and embedded maintenance diagnostic systems to increase aircraft availability.”
3 Regt AAC’s Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Simon Wilsey was quoted as saying:
“The AH-64E Apache is a 21st Century attack helicopter that is more lethal, agile, survivable and integrated and will enhance the way the Army fights. It is a central part of Future Soldier and the British Army’s warfighting capability. What is key to the AH-64E’s improved capabilities is its ability to integrate with other ground and air assets, allowing us to share information so that we can find and strike the enemy before our forces are targeted themselves.
Everyone in the Regiment – aircrew, engineers and groundcrew – is proud and excited to be at the forefront of bringing AH-64E into service. We have invested in the training of our people to maximise what we can do with such an advanced aircraft.”
The British Army say that 3 Regiment Army Air Corps, part of 1st Aviation Brigade Combat Team will be the first unit to field the AH-64E, with engineers and aircrew going on training courses in the USA to prepare themselves to operate the helicopter.
If we have 14 new Apaches does that mean we have 14 old ones not in use. If that is the case I know somewhere that would find good use for them.
Fifty Apache AH-64E Version 6 aircraft (rebuilt from the British Army’s pre-existing Apache AH1 fleet) have been purchased from the United States with 14 of them having been delivered to the British Army so far.
No mate they were returned to the US.
The article says “rebuilt from the British Army’s pre-existing Apache AH1 fleet”
I understand what the article says, yet on the army.mod website it states ‘Fifty Apache AH-63E version 6 aircraft have been purchased from the United States’. That to me seems to indicate that they are new builds rather than rebuilds. The army.mod article then goes on to say ‘The AH-64E replaces the Apache Mk1’ this again seems to indicate a new capability rather than an extension of capabilities. Possibly I am miss understanding the mod article.
Fifty of the original sixty four have been rebuilt to such an extent that they are in many ways new aircraft.
Janes reported that they’re new AH-64E airframes and hardware (where it differs from the Ds, which is essentially what our Mk1s were), with bits from our old ones fitted where they were still relevant/suitable/country specific.
I am very sure that the new Apaches are re-manufactured from the British Army’s existing airframes. But we get 50 AH-63E and we had 66 AH Mk1, so maybe there are 16 old helos left over – some will be in very poor shape.
At the beginning of the year 20 of the AH1 models remained in use at Wattisham.
Gary the AH1s will continue in frontline service but will gradually be replaced by AH64-E as they become available. At least this time UK PLC will not have a capability gap.
That’s correct, daily training out of Wattisham is still concentrated on the AH1 model. Only a couple of those Echo models have flown so far at Wattisham on short, local test flights although they are on the strength of 662. With a one for one donor airframe needed for each Echo model, those AH1 numbers will need to reduce further to provide the numbers for the full 50 Echo airframes.
The First airframes that were returned to Boeing were held in store and upgraded to AH-64E so as not to impact front line availability on the existing fleet. 67 Aphaches were originally ordered as mk1s. What with defence cuts nicely packaged as SDRs front line numbers were reduced.
I believe that the number of AH64 originally ordered from Westland had more to do with keeping them in business and was more than the Army actually could afford to operate.
I’m pretty sure that originally there were plans for a fleet of up to 120 Apaches, a mix of ‘A’ forming the majority and a smaller number of ‘D’s, whether having them built by Westland affected that or if was simply the case that the budget wouldn’t stretch that far I don’t know.
Original plan was for 99 Apache Mk1s, but we only bought 66. Defence cuts again.
There will be 32 in forward fleet.
12 at Middle Wallop with the OCU.
And just 6 spare, in maintenance, store, and so on.
The 32 furnish 4 squadrons, each of 8 Apache.
Previous strength was 48 forward fleet in 6 squadrons.
So there is the cut. I’m unsure if 653 OTS is still current, probably not, unless it uses other squadrons aircraft.
A cut you say – who’da thunk it…
Morning Daniele,
I think a sensible number of E models to buy would be 90, equipping 6 frontline 12 aircraft squadrons.
This would provide combat mass and give the squadrons sufficient numbers to scout for themselves, the upgraded Longbow and arrowhead combination proving excellent scouting tools.
They will also provide considerable maritime firepower for amphibious operations, one of the Longbow upgrades being Maritime search and track for instance.
Considering we are paring down to two Armoured Brigades, we had better increase our airborne firepower to compensate.
Yes, I agree with most your philosophy. But the AAC would need serious expansion in manpower and resources.
Each Brigade /BCT should ideally have an attendant AAC regiment in support.
Light years away from that I’m afraid.
Couldn’t agree more Daniele, each MEU of the USMC has an air group of circa 600 people or 25% of the MEU.
I do ink the army just keeps on saying it is reorganising, but actually isn’t.
given the size of the army I think the MEU model Mini BCT’s, is about right.
also believe these Apaches are around £15m each which is the bargain of 5he century given how much we spend on failed armour vehicles. We should double the order as from my perspective it is a game changing capability that will always be in demand.
Hi Pac.
“I do ink the army just keeps on saying it is reorganising, but actually isn’t.”
Of course it isn’t! It is just moving existing deckchairs around while reducing, as usual. There is nothing revolutionary in Future Soldier at all. Just the usual spin with promises of new equipment years away.
And this is the problem, the Senior Service has embraced the 21st century with open arms, as has the Airforce, both with bold visions of the 2030’s and ready for change.
The Army on the other hand still seems stuck in the past, with hard lobbying by General Mustache Blowhard (Retired), to keep his particular Regiment alive, even if it’s cap badge is only on one under strength Battalion…..
The Army needs to ‘get with the program’, it’s now so small it really does need to be re- organised along USMC lines, as a proper out of Area force.
Equipped and property funded for the job…..
Are we running an Army, or a Museum exhibit?
Oh god if only the Army would reorganise on USMC lines. Never happen though too many vested interests. Too many senior officers in too many cushy non jobs.
How would the Army look, organised along USMC lines? What would be the key benefits to combat capability?
Google USMC T.O.E.
David,
The British Army is not involved in littoral warfare. Why re-organise on USMC lines?
The senior officer comment does not advance your argument. When I was serving I did not spot a non-job.
Why would we want to reorganise the army as an out-of-area force? It’s primary role will remain reinforcing NATO in Europe, where everyone, including the yanks, thinks we have cut our forces too far.
‘Global Britain’ is a domestic political slogan, not a strategic military aim. Sure it has given the RN a temporary boost, but the reduction in army strength due to SFABs and Rangers has just weakened our deployable military power.
Morning Cripes, reinforcement of NATO, err with what exactly?
To plug a gap in NATO now would involve deploying almost the entire ( effective) fighting strength of the British Army.
That horse has ‘long’ since bolted, Cold wars over old chap, no need for an Army capable of plugging gaps and holding ground anymore, that’s yesterday’s wars ….. Or not!
Just like the mid 1930’s, Britain has disarmed to reap the peace dividends and what could possibly go wrong …. Yet another idiot with a short bloke complex, that’s what…..
Armoured capability has withered to the bone, it’s numbers crashed, equipment obsolescence etc, only suited now to defending the UK or a small token force deployed.
Let’s all hope Ukraine don’t really cook off, or we are all in serious brown sticky stuff, up to our necks.
I guess you are talking specifically about the Russo-Ukraine crisis? Reinforcing NATO in Europe, as Cripes says. Why do you think that is not something we, as as a leading NATO member would do? …and in our own back yard?
We have most of a Battle Group in Estonia, and a few hundred troops in Ukraine on training and advisory duties. Granted they are not plugging gaps and holding ground, but that could come next.
I would argue that the primary role for the British Army is ensuring peace and stability in Europe.
Fully agree that our armoured capability is now thin, but we do not need armour to defend the UK (against what and whom) – it needs to be ranged against hostile nations with armour.
Evening Graham, basically we can make very little contribution without call up of the Army Reserve and some recall of the reserve list.
Even with a relatively sudden increase of 30,000 odd reservists, we would require equipment for them, it simply isn’t there….
We are effectively throwing our Heavy Armoured capability away, two Armoured Brigades will in actuality mean a single 50 Tank force being available to deploy at short notice, unless we are on (god forbid) a general War footing!
So if we are talking reinforcement of NATO, it’s a single Brigade to fill a single gap, or break it down to Battalion sized elements, spread out so thin to be little more than a token force.
The Army is heading for it’s 73,000 target, effectively turning it’s back on Large scale warfare in depth, with all the equipment and support needed to deploy a division.
It is being adapted for small scale, out of area operations with about 3,500 for short period deployments.
I suppose it goes back to my original comment, reinforce NATO, with what exactly??
BOAR, its Armoured Brigades, Artillery and manpower is distant memory unfortunately, our only hope is prompt mobilisation and deployment of US forces to bail us all out of the sh*t if things went seriously wrong.
Perhaps, SDSR 2025 will realise defence spending needs to be ring fenced at 3% of GDP and we can start to build back depth, I won’t hold my breath…
Hi John, I do like your posts! Do you have an army background? For the regular army alone I reckon we can deploy one or two BCTs for a one-shot operation – or a force of 5,000-7,000 (ie a BCT) on an enduring op.
The Army Reserve (which seems to have changed its name slyly from the Reserve Army, (at Jan 2021) is 26,820 plus those in Phase 1 training and the (non-deployable) OTCs. You shock me by claiming that they don’t have any kit – since when? They always used to have kit.
Why do 2 armoured brigades (very old terminology) only have 50 tanks. The future army orbat has two Type 56 Regiments, so that is 112 tanks to insert in the relevant BCT(s).
If we were reinforcing NATO, say in eastern Europe, we would not send a mixed bag of battalions to be spread thinly. We would send as much as we could, as the crisis would be major. If we sent a force which included Reserve Army we should be able to send a total of two or three BCTs, not a trivial amount, but much less than we used to manage, I grant you.
The intention is still to deploy a modern networked Div (hopefully of three BCTs) by 2030 (some think that can be ramped back to 2025).
I don’t see that the army is configuring mainly or wholly for OOA – that means places like the Falklands, Africa and the Gulf area. I think our emphasis (especially now) is still on the European Theatre of Operations, which is very much ‘In Area’.
Whilst BAOR and its successor BFG disappeared some time ago, it does not mean that we are unable to reinforce NATO – we simply launch from the UK not from a plethora of Garrisons in Germany. NATO operations are front and centre as to what the British Army does, plus a bit of UN ops.
Afternoon Graham,
Fair points, my background is in industry with some interests in defence matters…
The actual deployable figures of the the Army reserve are somewhat lower than the numbers advertised, in reality, its probably more like 15,000, unless we are talking a War footing, and people are ‘encouraged’ to report, ready or not!
Re equipment, by that I don’t mean uniforms, webbing, personal weapons etc, I mean transport and the myriad of complex logistics, munitions etc, the things that make an army tick over and function as cohesive fighting force.
We used to keep very healthy War Reserve Stores, they have largely gone in the hollowing out that’s relentlessly took place since 1991.
5000 – 7000 on an enduring operation would be pushing it, unless we are talking RM involvement to bolster the numbers, in my option.
The old MBT issue, 148 tanks in two armoured regiments, you know as well as me that will mean one deployable at readiness and one in training etc with new recruits and folks off on leave, on courses etc.
Lets not forget we had 800 plus MBT’s before Gulf war one and we struggled to get 150 Chally1’s, theatre modified and into the desert!
Do we think that will improve with Chally3? My guess is same old sh*t, different day, but with a fraction of the assets.
We will be able to deploy a reinforced Regiment of 70 odd MBT’s by robbing tanks and personnel from the other Regiment, showing my age….
Unless its a general war situation and we scramble to recall and make everything serviceable quick smart!
In normal times deploying 100 plus MBT’s with a pool of 148 and two Regiments, is pie in the sky unfortunately, in my option.
When we shrink to 148 from 225 and two regiments from three, 100 is just not achievable in real terms, even if it is on paper.
The declared emphasis is very much out of area now, the deck being reshuffled in the Navy’s favour and RAF close behind, perhaps the current European crisis will turn that around again, who knows?
Interesting times…
All good points. The Reserve Army – I believe the numbers are as I stated but no-one really expects all of them to turn up for WW3, just as you could not expect to deploy 73,000 Regulars. In the past I think we have called up several hundred reservists for the larger operations.
I understand that some reservists are intended to be Battle Casualty Replacements or just to round out the Orbat of a regular unit to bring them up to War Establishment, therefore they will not have any more than personal kit. But the vast majority of the Reserve Army are formed units with vehicles, trailers, stores, radios, crew-served weapons, REME support etc. A Reserve Army Transport Regiment RLC would not be much use without its trucks and miscellaneous.
On reflection you are right that 5,000 to 7,000 would be pushing it for an enduring operation but only if the norm for tour intervals (one 6 month op tour, then 2.5 years of normal jogging) was adhered to.
It is 112 tanks in 2 units, not 148. If both units were required, both units would go – people would be called back from leave and courses etc. I don’t doubt that we could deploy 112 out of 148 shiny new tanks if required. Why couldn’t we?
In Gulf War 1 we deployed about 220 Chally1’s and yes it took a lot of effort and most of those tanks that did not deploy were brutally robbed for spares before the deployment from Germany. The tanks were not designed for desert ops so had to be modified – that was an enormous job and the work was superbly well done by the manufacturer, mostly in Saud Arabia, aided by REME.
I can’t say if Chally 3 is desertised, so who knows about that one.
The news headlines don’t point me to a focus on out of area right now – we are far more likely to send sizable land forces to eastern Europe than the Falklands, Africa or the Gulf.
Evening Graham, I only hope the current situation brings about a change to increase the size of all three Armed services to a sensible level.
We are currently massively understrength for an unthinkable conflict on European soil.
Only Poland has woken up and smelled the coffee, 300 plus of the latest M1 Abraham’s will give them a capable armoured force.
I would seriously hope Chally3 will be fitted for operations in all climates, especially the desert … The only place we have deployed armour in any number in three decades.
I admire your hopefulness regarding deploying two Armoured Regiments, alas, I don’t see it happening, if you deploy both, you have zero reserve. The folly of a 148 MBT fleet….
It would have to be general war for that to happen.
Our only hope is the promise of systems like Spear3, hundreds of them heading into an Armoured division, each with a high degree of accuracy and probability of a kill, de-conflicting with each other and searching out high priority targets via AI software.
Coming on from all points of the compass
(a single Thypoon potentially carrying 16 alone) and launched from 80-90 miles away, you won’t see them coming and you won’t shoot down a fraction of them as they slice down vertically at their targets.
It’s the future of Armoured warfare and a potential enemy is going to need many hundreds of tanks to push through the opening stages of an attack. The losses will be very considerable…
Unfortunately that’s still some way off, if the balloon went up now we would have little choice but to depend on our American friends and the ultimate sanction of our nuclear deterrent.
Hi John, I doubt that the Ukraine crisis will bring the politicos to increase the size of our armed forces although the navy will get a smalll uplift in frigate numbers over the next few years – guess it wasn’t just 2017 that was ‘The Year of the navy’ – the gift that keeps on coming.
Very true that we (army more so than RAF) are massively understrength for a conflict in Europe and the army’s AFV fleet is small, old and largely unmodernised. Also worrying is our lack of artillery, and its age.
Full marks to Poland.
Poland, Germany, Finland (albeit non-NATO) and the Baltics, with Italy to some extent, must step up and massively increase the size of their forces and readiness – they really are in the front line. I hear that Sweden is pondering on abandoning its neutrality. It is for those countries to bear the brunt of a European war – we should use our army for NATO flank protection and as a Reserve based in the west of Germany. Not sure what the French will do – Macron is a curious character.
We have deployed armour a lot in the last 30 years and not just in the desert (Gulf War 1 and 2) – also to Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia, and now to Estonia. Our army actually deploys to conflict zones a lot and exchanges fire with the enemy (unlike the navy or the RAF’s Typhoons).
If a major conflict required two (Type 56) tank regiments to deploy at full strength, then we would deploy those 112 tanks. Currently that would leave 115 tanks not deployed as we declare active holdings of 227 CR2s (depite the fact that we bought 408). In the CR3 era then deployment of 112 tanks, means 36 not deployed which will be a mix of those in the Trg Org, Repair Pool and War Maintenence Reserve (to use an old term, probably called Attrition Reserve now). So I don’t see why you think otherwise. Besides we didn’t lose any CR1s or CR2s to enemy action in combat before; CR3 will be even better protected so we are unlikely to see massive losses to enemy armour.
I hear that the RAF’s Spear 3 will not be at FOC on Typhoon until 2028 although it successfully first trialled in March 2016, and I hope that its warhead is powerful enough and clever enough to defeat tanks with add-on armour and APS systems. Maybe we need the RAF to more than make up for the army’s shortfall in numbers by making devastating and frequent stand-off attacks on enemy armour in not just the second echelon of massed enemy but in the first echelon as well.
We will certainly rely on our American friends (again) to help Europeans win any major European conflict. It will all have gone horribly wrong if there is nuclear release.
I think cutting the regular army from 82,000 posts to 73,000 weakened the deployable military power. The re-org is just window dressing.
I don’t really agree John,
The blowhards (serving and retired Generals) lobby to preserve their old Regiment as each and every defence review hoves into view, but usually fail. Most infantry regiments in place today have been born of amalgamations or have suffered scrapping of battalions over the years. I doubt there are many infantry capbadges older than 30 years.
I wonder what ‘out of area’ now means, post Cold War? Was Op HERRICK an OOA op as it was outside NATO’s traditional area of interest, except that it was (or rather, became) a NATO operation (ISAF). The British Army has always deployed on operations either under the NATO banner or outside it (ie UN or purely national such as Op CORPORATE), so are you advocating something different?
How does the British Army’s role chime with the USMC’s role?
Morning Graham,
My main point being that the Army is still stuck in a rut. Despite decades of cuts and reductions across the range of capabilities, it’s determined to carry on having a crack at everything.
We end up with 73,000 troops trying to do too much and spread ‘far’ too thinly.
The Navy and Airforce have embraced the future and are striving to incorporate advanced technology and fundamentally change, while the army appears to be stuck in a nightmarish groundhog Day of obsolete equipment and failed procurement that goes back decades.
I mentioned keeping our MBT capability to defend the UK in a rather tongue and cheek way, the reality is with a total procurement of 148 Chally3, in two Armoured Brigades, it’s so far below critical mass, it’s almost becoming an irrelevance.
What’s the answer, root and branch reform, decide what we can and can’t do and really concentrate on the things we excel at.
I mentioned the USMC because it’s specifically designed, organised, equipped and focused on out of area operations, this (we are told is specifically what the Army is being recognised for).
So (where possible), don’t buy equipment that can’t be air transportable, look into the operating principle and workings of MEU’s, to see if this can be copied, adapted and employed.
I’m trying to take a pragmatic approach based on a very small professional Army. Personally I think the Army should be balanced with a full time strength of 115,000, together with the new Army Reserve structure and all the required modern equipment to underpin it.
It isn’t unfortunately…..
Morning John, I don’t disagree with much of what you say. I remember Options for Change defence review in summer 1990 reduced the regular army to 120,000 which caused shock and outrage. That was the number deemed to be appropriate for a post Cold War army. There has been no doctrinal reason to reduce numbers below that figure, just money-saving defence cuts. Still – we are where we are.
It is not quite fair to say that the army has not embraced new technology – there has been the aspiration for digitised/networked forces for a long time and soem progress, the army does have drones, does have an anti-cyber capability. The AFV procurement side has been a disaster, as you say.
When I served AFVs had a Base Overhaul every 7 years or so and it included fitting of the latest upgrades – it is informative to see how many technology insertions Chieftain had in its service. Lack of timely upgrades nowadays is baffling – why did WCSP take so long that it was scrutinised and scrapped? Why did CR2 upgrades not get done, such that we now go for a small number of CR3s.
The army has embraced change doctrinally – but there have been far too many attempts at producing a future structure and sticking to implementation.
We will get 148 CR3s sometime in or a bit before 2030. If they equip 2 tank regiments, that is 112 in the front line, the balance being in the training organisation and held as Repair Pool/attrition reserve. That is a very low number as you say, which feeds my view that those tanks should be held as a reserve (in the west of Germany) for European operations and not deployed forward at an early stage. Of course, they can also be used for Gulf War 3 if that ever happens.
The root and branch reform has arguably happened and resulted in the army moving to a variety of BCTs – Danielle has critiqued some aspects of the structure envisaged, in particular the sparseness of CS/CSS (enablers) in some BCTs.
You want to go further towards role specialisation for the army – ie concentrating on some roles and dropping others. That is embarrassing for Global Britain to do, and is not something the RN and RAF are doing, so why so the Army?
We need to redefine OOA or confirm the old definition still stands. I take it to still mean ‘outside the traditional geographic area of NATO’. If we construct the army only to do OOA in future (ie relatively light airportable forces) then we won’t have forces that can do anything in Europe – NATO will be seriously unimpressed, particularly as eastern Europe is in crisis and the Balkans could flare up again in future. We could not assign forces to NATO if they are OOA-specific and NATO would sanction us, may even kick us out.
It would be a one-dimensional army that has equipment that is totally airtransportable. I cannot see the point of a light/medium role army that does not do anything in the NATO area of operations.
Maybe I have missed something fundamental here?
I did read an article (maybe Wavell Room?) that the US BCT concept caused headaches in Iraq. Because, even though owning all the assets organically, the HQ units didn’t have the bandwidth to handle the combined arms stuff and look outside of their AO to the bigger picture of other BCTs operating simultaneously alongside (and I presume often overlapping with) them. The larger Divisional HQs and suchlike are more geared up to be able to do this.
As is often the case, having the tools but not the organisation can be as debilitating as having the organisation without the tools..!
It remains to be seen if we’re reaching a point where the British Army has neither, but I see the Apache order as broadly positive news.
yes – read that article as well, the good thing for us is a) we can learn from this and improve the CnC element b) we are used to working on a smaller scale and having to work (beg) for help so may not be as much of an issue c) we have it the other way round with big HQ’s and not enough doers.
I think it would be beneficial on so many levels and if you look at the IDF – they are innovative because they have to be.
the whole UK regular force is now 25% smaller than the USMC and if they can deliver on the level they do, then I am sure we can.
if we take the best from around the world and ruthlessly introduce to the MOD then we could be a world leader again within 10 years.
One thing that rings true across all of the above is that for whatever reason the MOD does not get value for money from many of its suppliers, when compared against the benchmark for each sector.
all the above have lower budgets than the MOD and deliver more against their budget on a like for like basis.
Time for us to be really brutal here and ask why we are paying £5-10m for each Ajax when Finland pays £2m for a CV90 and whether that cost difference is worth it or why a French Jaguar or Griffon is being delivered on time and to budget at Euro 1m each giving a great capability that frankly we would love. With the money we have wasted on FRES alone we could have ordered 1000 of these +.
makes you think – when a benchmark is applied
They are usefull kit but not actually as much use in a China/Russia peer war. Yes they are tank destroyers but they would be smashed from the sky rapidly by an enemy that shoots back rather than in the sandbox
The same can be said for virtually any piece of kit Andy.
Its getting a balance and for me they are vital.
If we are talking peer/near peer then the one obvious omission in the UKS arsenal is a ballistic defence shield for the UK.
Alongside CASD this should always be the no1 priority and cannot be done by typhoons.
everything has its place, but for me the apache has so much utility and the price it is currently available at makes it really worth going for imo.
I have to disagree on both counts. Attack helicopters aren’t a peer conflict weapon; the Gulf wars demonstrated that amply enough. As reconnaissance assets and harassers, they do alright, but Apaches sent against even moderately well armed targets were shot to shit. If the Iraqis could defend against mass Apache assaults, what do you think a Russian battalion and its supporting assets would do? Spend the money on new mobile artillery.
As for a ballistic missile defence shield, its one of those things that sounds good but isn’t actually required. Of the threats we face, just two pose a ballistic missile threat, both of which are deterred by Trident. The investment needed to procure a missile defence system on the required scale would basically require giving up all expeditionary capability
That’s fine. But if we are to get involved with a peer or near peer then a BMD is essential
It’s also the first thing that Russia and China have done.
As for the apache iraq story that is down to bad intel and a bit like sending a load of tanks into the open against said apaches which also happened in Iraq but is often forgotten.
Everything has its place and the proof is in the pudding the apache fleet has gone though it’s hours so isn’t definition an asset type that is heavily used.
I would of course buya whole load of fires this shouldn’t be a this or that discussion but a complimentary
Perhaps UAVs will replace this and we are ahead of the curve. But it certainly doesn’t feel like that.
Unfortunately all of these discussions have to be this or that. In an ideal world, we would of course have every capability, but the reality is that we have a finite budget and we can only afford to keep significant numbers of the most versatile and capable options. The alternative is to keep a pitiful amount of loads of assets with no sustainability.
Going back to Iraq, one particular incident featured a massive 33 Apaches committed to a single target. Only 1 was shot down, but the other 32 were heavily damaged. After that, they only deployed with air dominance and in support of ground forces.
Combined arms is obviously the way to go, but the Apaches proved to vulnerable to be used without heavy support. At that point, fast air and mobile ground forces can accomplish the same thing, while being less vulnerable, having better staying power, and being more versatile.
I do think a naval BMD system would be a good investment, but it’s far from a priority. Unless we get a significant budget increase, it remains a nice to have.
Callum, where do you get your information that Apaches were shot to shit. Also Apache is not a recce asset – it is an attack helicopter. Attack helicopters are very much a peer-on-peer weapon system.
Gulf War 1:the US experience: ‘274 AH-64’s were deployed to the KTO. This represented 45% of the Army’s AH-64 fleet at the time. AH-64’s flew over 18,700hours with a readiness rate of over 90 percent. One AH-64 was lost to enemy fire, but its crew was recovered’. Source: https://www.leyden.com/gulfwar/apache.html
I can’t recall the original source I read, but the incident on the 24 March is easy corroborate, it’s included on the Apache’s Wikipedia page.
I wouldn’t go banging on about those reliability numbers. The US had to fly in every spare part in their inventory and ground the other 55% of the fleet to do it. https://web.archive.org/web/20160217061757/http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/90s/ns-puav-19920701.html
It is a worry D. Particularly against the background of the Harrier force being long gone -so no RAF close air support. A challenging task for the AAC to provide this with just 32 airframes operationally deployed airframes.
Yes. And Army Wildcats number just 34!! In total. That’s not even just the forward fleet. Shared with the RM too.
An utterly ridiculous number for the importance of aviation.
The RA and AAC should be prime enablers. Instead, they’re neglected while cap badges survive.
The 2015 cuts if I recall removed several AAC squadrons alone.
I think the establishment is one Apache squadron, not a regiment, per combat brigade.
We generally follow the US army organisation on helicopters. Each US army division has one Apache regiment of 3 squadrons, either used en masse by Divisional HQ or allocated one squadron per brigade.
Their squadron establishment is, like ours, 8 front line out of 13, the remaining 5 being squadron, war and attrition reserves.
To support our measly army of 4 field brigades and the Royal Marines, would require 38 front-line Apaches plus 37 in OCU and reserve, a total of 75.
It looks like an excellent buy but as usual, the numbers are far too small. I think we have reduced the numbers in reserve considerably and plan to support 3 brigades rather than 4.
With only 50, here are none spare for the RN carrier and none to equip any Adaptable Force brigades.
Morning Cripes.
Yes, of course. I was stating the ideal. Back in BAOR there were 3 AAC regiments totalling 9 squadrons. 1 Reg per Division, 1 Sqn per that Divisions 3 Brigades.
With the even greater importance of air support the AAC has shrunk rather than grown in importance, which should also have happened to the RA.
Nowdays of the 2 AAC Apache Regiments, 3 AAC supports 3 (UK) Div, so that is 12 and 20 Armed Bdes/BCT, and 4 AAC supports various units ranging from DSF to 16 AA and 3 Cdo.
Still, the army does not lack money. 11 billion so far committed or pissed up the wall on Boxer, Ajax, FRES, WCSP, an on and on!
On Adaptable force, I have not heard the term used for some time by Army or MoD, not sure it is still current.
What is left of “Adaptable Force” is now in Regional Command, 1 UK Div, 6 UK Div, and the Field Troops!
Cheers.
Thinking about the Apache TOE, it must be on the lines of:
3 Regt
12 Arm Inf Bde – 8 frontline of 11
2p Arm Inf Bdr – Ditto
4 Regt
16 Air Assault Bde – Ditto
RM/SF – Probably 6 frontline of 9
OCU
Eventually 7 (initially more while the aircrews get trained up).
That totals 49, so likely 30 frontline, 7 OCU and 13 in squadron/wartime/attrition reserve.
The reserve component is very low compared to RAF or US Army models, but I think the AAC and the army in general have always been ‘economical’ with reserves due to financial oressures.
50 is about as thin as anyone could cut it! None for the LP Infantry brigade, none for the carrier, none for any additional brigades scraped together when operations require.
You are right about ‘Adaptable Force’, it came into vogue with the 2015 (?) SDR but seems to have disappeared in the current one!
I rather liked the term myself, it meant the units not brigaded in 1 and 3 Divisions – public duties, Northern Ireland, overseas garrisons etc, that could be formed into additional field brigades in times of need.
Hi Cripes.
Adaptable Farce was actually 2010 SDSR. And it did include 1 UK Division as that “Division” had at the time 7! Infantry Brigades.
“Reaction Force” was 1,12,20 Armd and 16 AA Bde.
2 of which according to the army were deployable as they had CS/CSS regulars to make them so. Looking at Army graphics at the time most likely 51st or 7th.
Statements from Army/MoD 2015 on soon watered that down to a “deployable light Brigade” though the 2015 review removed the CS/CSS elements in yet more cuts making this “brigade” very light indeed and useful for what without engineers, artillery, Medics, REME and signals.
3 Cdo and 16AA also had their CS/CSS reduced in 2015.
They would have probably stolen them from other elements if it deployed but that should not be happening!
The 8 in each Apache sqn is nailed on. The reserve/OCU/spares numbers I quoted top of thread I got from a Tweet from someone who seemed to know the current set up. I believe previously 12 Apache were at Wallop, now, unsure.
Numbers always go down. We started with 66 Apaches. No way would we ever end up with more.
Hi Daniele does the capability provided by the wild cat complement and cover the reduced apache airframes numbers ?
No, I don’t think so.
Wildcats for the army are fewer than Apache!! Which shows how ridiculously expensive Wildcat was.
Mate, they should have gone for a bog standard A109- probably half the price to do much the same thing.
Or….Blackhawk! I read Indonesia is getting 30 something for 600 million. Polish built.
Apparently our FMH requirement is for 44.
So the budget could easily acquire that and more.
Until we gold plate it and MPs put their oar in.
oh yes – nice call!
MPs need Blackhawk for Diplomatic Protection, convoy escort and route signing…
Oh… you mean those MPs, aha.
That’ll be the day David. 150 Provost Aviation Company RMP! With 4 Blackhawks!!
I had a dream!
You’re right mate, and their capabilities don’t even come close to Apache. They can mount GPMG and maybe M3 0.50s in the doors, and I think they can lase a target for the Apache’s Hellfire Romeos that only have the laser guidance. I don’t even think they have a data link, for passing on targetting information.
That’s it, the sum of their offensive and scouting abilities. They’re not even close to a capability equivalent to Apache, even if there were more of them they wouldn’t be able to do the job required of them.
Time to give forward scouting and targetting tasks to drones, AH-64E can cotnrol them anyway, so make the most of keeping manned platforms out of harm’s way.
Your headline, like that of the Army’s press release, doesn’t tally with the details in the text. ”Work is going at pace to bring the Apache AH-64E, the British Army’s new attack helicopter, into frontline service.”
Having them in the UK and flying does not mean they’re in service.
Just to clear up the confusion on new/ refurbished…
The Helicopters are brand new airframes, reusing some refurbished components from the D models.
The Long bow radar ( upgraded) and arrowhead turret, plus certain dynamic components….
Hopefully their effectiveness will be augmented by UCAV in the future, though it’s still not clear if that means a co based rotor UCAV, or fixed wing, working with whatever comes out of Mosquito / Sea Vixen programme.
If we find the Geo political situation continues to worsen as we move further into the 2020’s we can always easily order (or lease/ borrow) more, as they are now standard US Army spec …. At last common sense has prevailed!
Am l correct in thinking the training squadron at middle wallop has closed? If so is that temporary, will it return with the E model?
No, I believe 673 is still there.
Thanks John- great summary, interesting view.
Did the AAC have to offer up most/all of the AH Mk1s (ie D models) to Boeing? They will be stripped for parts for the E models – what happens to the carcasses – scrapped in the US?
Good question Graham, I’m not sure…
I understand these have new rotors, does anyone know if they fold?
I don’t believe so, standard US Army spec, so whatever they have….
The new composite blades are lighter and expected to have twice the lifespan. They can be folded.
The updated Longbow can better spot and engage maritime targets, the US army did focus on making version 6 as its known more suited for maritime environments.
Yes, I think the maritime features are significant for UK littoral strike ambitions. The Royal Navy are already on the case.
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2021/june/07/20210607-apache-prince
That makes more sense if it’s taking the expensive newish bits of kit and putting them on new airframes. Thought it was nimrod all over again lol.
It does seem to be a good bit of kit at a fair price. Does the 15m included the usual spares, manuals etc or is it just airframe cost?
Would 250 Apaches be better
than all are chellenger tanks
upgraded
An Apache cannot hold ground though.
Infantry need some sort of Armour supporting them, so I’d never support one instead of the other myself.
A few more disadvantages of replacing tanks with Apaches – procurement cost, maintenence cost, training cost, ammunition capacity, limited loiter time, scant protection …
The question that should be made is: are Apaches necessary when you have drones?
An Apaches as good as it is could not take multiple hits from an RPG and continue to fly, and operate. The Challenger that was damaged in Basra was pulled out and back on line within a day or so I believe, If im wrong please correct me.
Well to be fair I’d like see around
500 challengers too
Double the order. The APACHE is without doubt one of the UKs most effective and hard hitting weapon systems. Need more thn 50.
“Double the order. The APACHE is without doubt one of the UKs most effective and hard hitting weapon systems. Need more thn 50.”
Unless they are under SAM range and altitude they don’t stand a chance against a capable enemy.
That is why US Army is equipping theirs with Spike to be able to fire in reverse slope.
Alex, The army are the masters of flying tactically, nap of the earth etc. So many attacks especially with the Hellfire are pop up, shoot and scoot. I doubt the enemy would spot an Apache hovering in the treeline up to 11.1km away, prior to missile release.
Compare Apache to Eurocopter Tiger.
Eurocopter tiger requires complicated very laborous maintenance schedules and suffers less than 40 availability in Australian , German and French service.
Apache. Desugned from the outset to be serviceable in the field and has +65% operational availability.
40% availability. Sorry. Wish there was an edit function.
Nice that we finally got these. I heard the Afghan Taliban got theirs early and love them.
I dont think we left any Apache behind for the Taliban. Correct me if Im wrong. Ive not been able to find any information confirming that.
Blackhawks. Kiowas yes but not Apache.