Recently, thirty Challenger 2 tanks, part of the UK-led NATO Battlegroup, participated in Exercise Winter Camp in Estonia.

Soldiers from NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battlegroup, including UK, French, Danish, and Estonian forces, demonstrated their combined arms capabilities in punishingly cold conditions during the two-week exercise.

The King’s Royal Hussars (KRH) led the eFP Battlegroup Estonia Rotation 11, which culminated in Exercise Winter Camp. Alongside the Challenger 2 tanks, a Danish Leopard 2 tank squadron also participated in the exercise.

Since 2017, the UK has deployed an armoured battlegroup consisting of Challenger 2 tanks and Warrior infantry fighting vehicles to Estonia on rotating six-month tours.

The deployment, known as Operation Cabrit, is based in Tapa and includes around 800 to 900 personnel.

Colonel Dai Bevan, Operation Cabrit Commander, said,

“Exercise Winter Camp has been necessarily demanding and complex. It is the cementing of the eFP Battlegroup’s cold weather credentials. It is what they have been building up to since their arrival in Estonia in September.”

You can read more here.

Tom Dunlop
Tom has spent the last 13 years working in the defence industry, specifically military and commercial shipbuilding. His work has taken him around Europe and the Far East, he is currently based in Scotland.

97 COMMENTS

  1. I’m very much hoping our announcement of no more tanks to Ukraine signals that we will be uplifting the numbers of challenger 3 to be procured. Even if the tanks are not deployed in a formation they are useful to have as a reserve and at £800 million for 148 adding 50+ more on his hardly breaking the bank. We should probably actively try and procure tanks sent to Oman just in case as well when the offload them.

    • Hopefully that will change and we’ll commit far more CR2 to Ukraine.

      I think that announcement was purely to correct the reported incorrect comment by the Ukrainian ambassador that the U.K. had doubled numbers. In retrospect, you’d expect any new tank donations would first be announced first by either the PM or Ben Wallace.

      • I suspect it may revolve around a commitment to make up losses with new ones rather than an increased total number. Perhaps lost in interpretation.

        • I don’t mind the order, just the time it takes for stuff to actually get over to Ukraine… though that is an issue more with other countries rather than the U.K.

    • There’s a good article by Simon Jenkins in the Guardian regarding the lack of a clear strategic defence policy which hinders decision making and ultimately impacts force structure.
      In a nutshell, we are all over the place, spending inordinate sums of money on high-end equipment but without ever realising the means to deliver the full capability required.
      For example, if we want to be a premier maritime power, we don’t need a large land army. Conversely, if we think our national security is best served by land forces deployed in continental Europe, then do we need carrier strike in the South China Sea. It’s obvious we don’t have the willingness or financial means to do everything but keep trying and continually come up short.
      BTW no good having more CR3 if joint fires is not equally supported and so it goes on.

      • It’s fairly obvious we are not going to have a large army,hence all this training in the Baltics that’s going to be our bit IF the Orcs decide to be even more stupid! Central Europe will be left for the rest of NATO to defend.

        • You would think that the 800 million other people in NATO who all have land boarders would be able to easily look after Central Europe if the small island off the northwest coast of Europe can look after the Baltics and skandanavia on it own.

          Never understood why anyone thinks we need a large army to guard the EU’s eastern boarder when they can easily do it themselves.

          • Totally agree, UK priorities are Navy, Air Force, Army. We don’t expect say Poland to keep an eye on the North Sea/Atlantic/GIUKGap etc. By the same straw we shouldn’t be overly concerned about not having a huge army.

          • Agreed.

            On another note that isn’t unconnected to the overall argument here is about our army’s role therefore and the equipment it needs to achieve those goals. Specifically It confuses me somewhat, mostly in discussions on this forum really, which resurfaced in my mind when reading an article today that the US latest Bradley vehicles are designed to do recon, fight and support infantry and act as an armoured taxi. Which confuses me as the experts here keep telling us Ajax is just a specialised recon vehicle and isn’t there to do those other things and certainly is NOT they insist an IFV. If we are so limited in our expectations of the army and it’s role and size, why are we so wound up with what appears to be a one trick pony vehicle even if it does end up working as planned. .

          • Ajax is a recce vehicle that replaces Scimitar – not sure why that should be so odd. An armoured recce vehicle takes a crew of 3, has advanced sensors and optics to glean information, and some smart communications sytems to pass the information up the chain. It is equipped with a cannon for self-protection and opportunistic engagement of enemy recce (If ordered). It is therefore not capable of carrying an infantry section – a different vehicle does that (APC or IFV) in a different part of the battle space.
            What is the problem with that? Do you expect a fighter jet to haul cargo as well?

          • The Ajax is but one of a number of vehicles designed on a modified ASCOD chassis. As a baseline, Ajax is some 10t heavier than ASCOD, with a max gross weight up to 42t. Which is due to the additional armour and larger engine the Ajax series use. The armour requirement was higher than STANAG 4569 level 6, (better than Theatre Entry Standard Warrior) which is proof against 30mm APFSDS rounds. Hence the spaced armour down the vehicle’s sides.

            Ajax = armed reconnaissance vehicle with a manned turret sporting the CTAS 40mm autocannon. It has a crew of 3. But has space in the rear for 1 or 2 dismounts depending on who you read. This is designed to replace the Scimitar CVR(t)

            Ares = Armoured specialist support vehicle, has a crew of 3, and can carry 7 dismounts. Who can be reconnaissance (sniper teams), engineers, air defence, or anti-tank troops. For protection/support it uses a RWS mounting either a 50 Cal, GPMG or a GMG. This is going to replace the Spartan.

            Athena = Armoured command and control vehicle, with a crew of 5. This is going to replace the Sultan.

            Apollo = Armoured repair vehicle with a crew of 4.
            Atlas = Armoured recovery vehicle with a crew of 3.
            Argus = Combat engineer reconnaissance vehicle. It has a crew of 2 and can carry 4 dismounts.

            There are two more possible versions using the Ajax chassis, one is an armoured ambulance to replace the Samaritan and FV430 vehicles. The other is a select fires overwatch vehicle, that combines the role of the Swingfire anti-tank vehicle with precision fires, possibly using the Brimstone missile. There was once talk of a third variant used for infantry support, mounting a 120mm gun, similar to the CV90-120. Though this was shelved.

            It is entirely possible that the Ares could be uparmed with a non-penetrating turret mounting an autocannon. Such as Nexter’s unmanned T40 series turret, mounting the CTAS 40mm. This would turn Ares in to an IFV comparable to Warrior (3 crew plus 7 dismounts) but with better armour and firepower.

          • You have to remember at the Time that Ajax was Born, Warrior was Going to Be upgraded. Bradley has developed into a single Platform to one does all because it had the numbers. Bradley like Warrior is at the end of life. its successor is still wet on the nib of a pen

          • Worth noting that the Cavalry Bradley and the Infantry Bradley are in fact two different vehicles, the M3 (for the Cav Recce version) and the M2 (for the Infantry carrying version).

            Ajax is not a IFV in the same way that the M3 Bradley CFV is not an IFV: It’s intrenals are not laid out in a way that allows it to carry a section/squad of infantry.
            Just like the M3 and M2 you *can* build an IFV on the chassis of Ajax (hell: Ajax is built on an IFV chassis: It’s an ASCOD), but to do so you start to compromise on the sensor and systems management suite in order to fit more troops in the back. The more “IFV” you make you’re Cavalry Recce vehicle, the less it works.

            The reason people constantly point out that Ajax isn’t an IFV is because it’s not a simple case of stuffing 7 guys in the back of it. You can’t do that, the space isn’t there. You have to take the equipment that makes it a scout vehicle OUT, and put seats and stowage IN, and then it won’t be a scout vehicle anymore?

            Now if you want to argue that it would’ve made sense to build an IFV on the same chassis as Ajax (again see ASCOD), then I’d agree, or if the Warrior production line was still open new build a scout version of Warrior. But as it stands, we’re not buying IFV’s, so….

          • Good point Jim. They have had seventy years of being defended by the U.S. taxpayers so why would they bother I ask myself. One of the other unlooked for achievements of Putin’s ‘special operation’ has been a mighty kick up their backsides. Or has it?

            I agreed with the late Prof. Anthony King. The U.K. should model its defence forces on the U.S. Marine Corps. We have a pioneering record in unconventional warfare and mobility at sea; geography handed the U.K. First Prize in dominating the sea lanes leading to and from Europe from the Arctic to the coast of Africa. Our expeditionary record wrote the book on maritime force projection. And we are seriously good at dirty tricks. Leaders in AI and Cyber too. There is too much cash being spaffed on the wrong strategic objectives.

          • We don’t have a large army but as the 4th biggest defence spender in the world, we need to be able to contribute to the defence of Central Europe.

          • We do they shelter under our nuclear umbrella shared with France. So we do more than our share.

        • We have not had a large army for many years.
          Threat requires a significant (doesn’t have to mean exceptional) capability allied to political will to use that force. Russia remains a significant threat in the eastern end of Europe, notwithstanding dubious quality of equipment, poor logistics, poor tactical handling of units, poorly trained conscripts etc.
          We have NATO responsibilities to provide land forces ready to deploy in counterpoint to Russia. We cannot turn our back on Central Europe.

          • I’m not saying we turn our backs on anyone,but it does appear at the moment our battle groups are focusing on the Baltics in particular with the cousins, Poles etc concentrating on Central Europe.

          • Just one British Battlegroup is in Estonia in the Baltics with 2 sqns of tanks (30 tanks). The rest of the army could go anywhere else, such as Central Europe.

          • Or the point being that we have a numerically small army so it has to be very, very well equipped to get enough offensive and defensive capability out of it?

          • Agree we should contribute towards NATOs flank defence however just as Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria are not going to be sending ASW frigates into the North Atlantic to help secure the GIUK gap ditto the UK shouldn’t be expected to deliver a large multi divisional combined arms force to their defence. If the EU nations could defend themselves on land and air that allows the UK to concentrate on its key attributes and return to a powerful navy. Priority 1. A strong air force optimised for air defence, interception, strategic air lift and maritime patrol activity. Priority 2.
            Leaving the army small but highly capable, circa 90-100,000k strong (not 60-70k) to be able to deploy rapid reaction forces, special forces, elite infantry and armoured battle groups upto brigade strength. We shouldn’t be expected to resurrect BOAR and be able to deploy whole armoured divisions.

          • I was ‘a NATO soldier’ for 34 years. It is up to individual members as to how they structure their forces, and self-interest will be at work. It is understandable that a landlocked European country will not have a navy and will focus on army and air force, for example. We are a maritime nation so should have a strong navy, but not just that. We are a global country which has always done expeditionary warfighting and overseas peacekeeping, so we need a capable army. This is not about Poland and Germany looking after Poland and Germany – and no other NATO member coming to their aid. We aid each other – it is a mutual aid treaty organisation.

            No-one is talking about resurrecting BAOR which comprised a Corps of four armoured divisions – and a brigade in Berlin during the Cold War! We now have a structure with one warfighting (armoured) division – thats not much for a country that is the 4th biggest Defence spender in the world, but we could not expect politicians and Treasury to allow the ‘heavy metal’ side to be any bigger. We have other elements too – SF, 16 AA Bde, the other division etc.
            I consider the army should comprise 120,000 regulars as Options for Change decided.

        • If the Orcs invaded a NATO country in Central Europe, it is for the whole of NATO to respond – and that includes the UK.

          • I don’t believe I said any different! I merely pointed out at the moment our battle groups appear mostly in the Baltics.

        • The review offers a fair rebuttal but is not totally correct either, particularly about the F35 – LM own the the IPR for the software and without that it’s just another aeroplane. We are unable to control the schedule for upgrades required for UK weapons for example.
          The point I was making from the Guardian article was about the lack of a cohesive policy which undermines defence strategy and procurement, leaving us without a fully joined up capability because there are always inevitable gaps.

          • I find Simon Jenkins articles normally quite insightful and at times provocative but he has nothing worthy of note to say in that particular piece. Indeed he undermines his own credibility in defence matters by mentioning his involvement in SDDR 2010, which by the some margin is the most incoherent cost cutting exercise of defence ever undertaken by a British Government.

          • I should have added he is therefore in part responsible albeit in a small way for the damage done to U.K. defence that will take 20 years to recover from.

          • Very true, although I don’t think for one minute he was suggesting he was blameless. He was trying to articulate (badly in some readers opinions) the very issues that you suggest will take 20 years to put right.

          • If he could provide a narrative about why as an island nation our maritime defence is not optional but absolutely essential he would go some way to blow away the BS surrounding the idea that the army must be put back in force into Central Europe at the expense of an already threadbare navy and airforce.
            Instead we get talk about ‘super tanks’, 42 oversea bases and what a waste the carriers are.
            In fact typical U.K. journalists output.

          • He hasn’t got a clue which is presumably why he was asked to sit on the 2010 review! Nuff said, time to move on and put UK onto a better defence altogether. Why is 3% too much of a slice of the GDP cake? We are in the Air Maritime front line.

          • …and you think the army isn’t threadbare?! Now being cut by a further 10,000. No AFVs bought for 20 years. No serious upgrades done. Lack of artillery. 60-year old FV430s still in service. 50-year old CVR(T)s still trundling around, unreplaced by Ajax. Warrior upgrade cancelled, so 35-year old unimproved Warriors still in service. Tank fleet falling to 148 vehicles. Over a year to recruit a new soldier.

          • I think you need to read carefully what i said again. I am sadly very aware of the state of the British Army, which in some instances was self inflicted by very poor decision making by the Army leadership over the last 20 years.
            However, robbing Peter to pay Paul is not a credible defence policy and putting the Army back in force into Central Europe is not realistic or required, That is the role of our continental NATO partners and the Germans in particular need to up their game.
            We do require an increase in spending to say 2.5% or possibly higher to ensure all three armed services are suitably equipped and manned but given the amount of waste in the MOD I would not want to give them too much without some efforts at reform. But the emphasis has to be as a maritime nation on the RN and RAF with the army providing a credible reinforcement role to NATO.
            I would start with making what we have work by providing suitable spares, ammunition and reinstating maintenance budgets that have been slashed.
            What has been given to Ukraine obviously needs replacement.
            For recruitment and retention the personnel at the lowest level need a good pay rise, decent living and training accommodation with adequate downtime.
            Unfortunately I am not expecting our current Government to provide very much from the list above because they just require sound bites to satisfy the 24 hours a day media circus.
            Poor old Ben Wallace!

          • but given the amount of waste in the MOD I would not want to give them too much without some efforts at reform”

            Other than the AXAJ, WARRIOR, MRA4 (while ago now) I am struggling to think of any big money pits?

            Yes there are a few smaller mess ups but not in the way there used to be.

          • Thanks mate for the answer. Just that I thought it strange that you mentioned the RN and RAF are threadbare but not the army. The army is in the biggest mess of the 3 services and I agree that the equipment fails have largely been self-inflicted, but not the cuts to headcount which have been made by politicians or the poor recruiting which is Capita’s fault.
            I am not suggesting robbing Peter to pay Paul, ie to starve the RN and RAF of funds to boost the army’s budget. All 3 services need strong resourcing.
            Also, I am not suggesting reinventing BAOR – I do not think that a Corps of four armoured divisions (up to 900 tanks) based in Germany is needed or affordable. But two regiments of tanks fielding a total of 112 tanks is ridiculously little.
            But it was said, even when the USSR was disintegrating that the most significant threat to the UK would be a resurgent Russia. The army’s warfighting ‘armoured’ division should be constituted, structured and equipped for deployment to central/eastern Europe, the defence of which is the business of all of NATO including the USA and Canada and not just a task for Poland and Germany.
            We are a maritime nation so I am all for a strong Rank 2 bluewater navy. We also have an army that has always been focussed on expeditionary operations in Europe and elsewhere. The RAF should provide air defence of the UK and support the other two services.
            Having served for 34 years (I left in 2009) I fully agree with improvements for personnel.

          • The carrier conversations were totemic in 2010.

            Not just in defence but every time anyone was called in to justify some spending the conversation veered round to the carriers.

            We were all heartily sick of this deflectional approach.

            Totally agree the 2010 review was absolute nonsense as is costing fortunes to put right.

            The biggest problem with 2010 was every can was kicked even further down the road so not only was military capacity hollowed out but that industrial capacity to upgrade military capacity was also hollowed out.

            So now we have to rebuild industrial capacity to rebuild military capacity….which costs even more money!

          • I can’t see us ever having true ‘tank factories’ rather than the Assembly Halls we have today.

          • How did a newspaper journalist (and a past Editor) with no military experience get to shape SDSR 2010, I wonder?

          • Welcome to real life! O to be an academic or journalist in that perfect joined up world without politics or economics.

          • So did he actually give any examples of where its not joined up? I would read it myself but I try and stay away from the most politically biased media outlets as they have an agenda.

          • Not explicitly no. That is a point I made in this forum, reading between the lines, and from other debates on here regarding cancellations, cut backs and delays etc.

        • What made me laugh, apart from the reference to the “ever powerful defence lobby”, was the disclaimer…

          “This article was amended on 5 March 2023. A previous version described the mythological warrior Ajax as a god.”

          Of all the factual inaccuracies this was the one he was bothered about correcting. As another Homer might have said… “Doh!”

      • Sounds like the usual juvenile nonsense. There is no “either or in defence” there are strategic objectives within means and everyone on the planet has the same issue of conflicting demands, yes even the US, it’s called economics.

        • Well yes, but economics is surely about how much of your GDP you wish to spend on defence and that in itself is an issue, true.
          We are debating what you do with the money provided. The predominant view is that the UK is failing badly in that regard. And whether you call Ajax a tank, or an armoured vehicle or even a God, the point being made was that it is £5.5b that doesn’t really provide you with a huge advantage. Better to concentrate on capability that can serve our interests better perhaps and do it properly rather than picking random sweets from all the jars in the shop.

          • Simon Jenkins is well suited to the Guardian- “always wrong, about everything”.
            At the heart of the UKs defence procurement problems is the loss of sovereign industrial capability, especially for land systems. Armoured vehicle and artillery production has been largely closed down so that when a replacement for CVRT was ordered, there was no domestic supplier left to build it. Even then, BAEs offer to build the Swedish CV90 in Britain was rejected in favour of GDs Ascod. The attempt to construct this in a wholly new facility has been plagued with problems. But even if things had gone well, this was a very expensive contract to deliver principally a reconnaissance vehicle. The average cost over all variants is more than £9m. In contrast, France kept its state owned manufacturer Nexter and was able to deliver Griffon and Jaguar vehicles far more cheaply than Ajax or Boxer. Nexter managed to integrate the CTA cannon without the problems both LM ( Warrior) and GD(Ajax) have encountered.We have rightly ensured that naval shipbuilding is sustained. We have to do the same for land systems. Whether this is a new state owned çompany or a long term co-operative arrangement with private industry as we have for guided missiles doesn’t really matter.

          • I don’t know: there is quite a lot of rational debate on here.

            There are a few who like to throw rotten tomatoes all the time!

          • JM, the thing is, the “predominant” view is uninformed nonsense. Every defence body on the planet has cock-ups, the MOD are probably not as bad as the US and not as good as the Dutch. We have had some good programs and some turkeys. The hysterical press would have you believe that we only produce turkeys, that is nonsense. As for the commentators on this blog, I wouldn’t be surprised to learn that 90% were on “suicide watch”. As my prof’ used to say, risk management 101, context is everything.

      • Sounds like the Guardian not unexpectedly is following the theme of Healys presentation to RUSI 2 weeks back.

      • Correction the Army is all over the place. The Navy and Airforce have been pretty laser focused on their force structures for over a decade. The army spent that time trying to build an APC that was lighter than air while able to survive a nuclear detonation.

        • Is it really! CR3 ordered and ahead of schedule and on budget (not enough) Ajax supposed to be sorted although obviously miles late but still within budget,Boxer ordered,late but is it on budget? no doubt some one will let us know😄

      • Disagree that Jenkins article was good in any sense. There is a clear strategic defence policy and it is that we concentrate on the Air-Maritime. If NATO cant hold the Russians on land it will be because we have ignored the Sea, Air and Home base and let them outflank us North and South. China Is the greater threat. How safe is the South Atlantic going to be or the Arctic?

          • The UK monitors the military balance of power in the South Atlantic very closely. With the USN and allies undertaking a policy of containment the PLAN would have to deploy a sizeable carrier task force to carry out any mischief alongside the laughably bad Argentinian armed forces.
            Any PLAN task force would be met by a QE battle group. With astute or 2 in tow. The PLAN have no answer to astute class ship killing power.

          • You obviously do not understand soft power projection by debt. “Monitors”? Yeah right, “battle group”? Even more yeah right 😂

      • I take the point but in what World can the policy makers and forces let alone Simon Jenkins predict what sort of war we will have to fight. Even the Americans can’t cover all the options we need to work with allies to try to build an overall combined force that covers all or as many options as possible, we need to have flexibility. Being an island guarding the Atlantic approaches the navy has to take priority but it needs aircraft to support it too or it’s a sitting duck. Beyond that we need to at least contribute to a land force defending Europe or otherwise the time they get to France the navy won’t be a significant factor anymore. So Jenkins contention though right in identifying focus is required is flawed if he thinks we can just concentrate on one job.

      • Surely there’s enough bright and committed people in the UK government, MOD, military and think-tanks to sort all this messiness out?
        Come-on 🇬🇧, pull your socks up! 😂

      • John,
        Not seent he article but I am puzzled by Jenkins’ stance.

        Surely the whole point of an SDR/SDSR/IR/Defence Command Paper is to set out a clear strategic defence policy?

        We have a Rank 2 blue-water navy, one of only two in the world and are NATO’s second most effective navy. So that surely makes us a premier maritime power.
        Why does that have to mean we don’t need a large land army? Does having a premier navy mean that land threats have disappeared? Well, we certainly haven’t got a large army, but I think that is by happenstance not because it is dictated by having a premier navy.

        Our security is provided by multiple layers and multiple components operating in multiple locations – not by a preponderance of one domain force at the expense of another. Where does thJenkin’s premise leave the RAF, if we have a premier navy – should that be small just as the army is small?
        The threats to our nation, to our BOTs, to our military alliance are manifold – we need a mix of credible capabilities in every domain.
        We are the 4th biggest spender on defence in the world – we should be able to do quite a lot, and not have to role specialise.

          • He was once quoted as follows:

            “I’ve always believed that the administration of the Falklands by Argentina is the best solution for all sides, but with the current situation I fear this won’t happen in my lifetime”, Mr. Jenkins tells his interviewer Adrian Sack.
            La Nación recalls that already in 1998, from his prestigious column in The Times and addressing the forceful new Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair, Mr. Jenkins proposed that British possession of the Islands be reconsidered, among other reasons because Britain couldn’t keep on spending the “ridiculous sum” of 114 million US dollars annually to maintain a 2,000 strong garrison in the Falklands.

      • Seems to me that we lack politicians with ability, wisdom & vision looking out for the national & international good. We just get “bed-blockers”, wannabes out for themselves, their wealth, with no grasp of running a country or serving the public. Corrupt & in hock to whoever funds them. Hence vital equipment is run down to dangerous levels. Boris & Truss being extreme examples.

      • I don’t think we’ve had a strategic review worth printing in thirty years, probably longer. Our decision making is awful, our ordering inept and our funding pitiful. The Royal Navy has some first class ships but all the major vessels lack full equipment capability; the Royal Air Force is the smallest it’s been since before World War 2; the army has no idea what it’s doing with three major re planning exercises in fifteen years.

        If there is no increase in funding in the budget we are going to have a whole series of roles around the world that we are fully able to do.

      • Is this the same Simon Jenkins who thinks that the Falklands should be run as a colony of Argentina?

        https://en.mercopress.com/2003/03/31/simon-jenkins-claims-falklands-for-argentina

        Extract: “I’ve always believed that the administration of the Falklands by Argentina is the best solution for all sides, but with the current situation I fear this won’t happen in my lifetime”, Mr. Jenkins tells his interviewer Adrian Sack.
        La Nación recalls that already in 1998, from his prestigious column in The Times and addressing the forceful new Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair, Mr. Jenkins proposed that British possession of the Islands be reconsidered, among other reasons because Britain couldn’t keep on spending the “ridiculous sum” of 114 million US dollars annually to maintain a 2,000 strong garrison in the Falklands”.

    • I don’t agree with the article but the premise is right, defence policy has been driven by we need a £100bn a year military on a £50bn budget.
      There needs to be a realistic assessment on what we want each branch to do and then what budget is required to do it.

      If the UK is not willing to give the budget and I say willing as it can afford it if it chooses too, then don’t try to have all capabilities.

    • Wallace has said that we will consider more tanks to Ukraine but not at the moment.
      Not sure how not sending more tanks now will increase the numbers of CR3 to be procured.
      Why do we need to procure Oman’s 38 CR2s?

      • If we could purchase the Omani CR2s, then I’d imagine they would be shipped off to Ukraine. Which then doesn’t affect our force or reserve numbers. Similarly if Jordan was to gift Ukraine their CR1s, even if only a 100 could be made serviceable. That would make a sizeable force better or at least comparable to Russia’s T72 force. Not sure it will happen though!

    • Believe Big Ben will move out smartly to initiate contracts to expend a significant proportion of the MoD budget increase slated to be announced by Messrs. Hunt and Sunak next Wednesday. Assume that more CR-3s, delivered on an expedited timeline, will be one item on an extensive shopping list. 🤔

    • £800m for 148 was a number drawn up by survey team Looking at the existing Chassis that were in or stored around the 227 chassis. there was concern over some of the Older batch of the 1st delivery discounted due to there general age, which Numbered some 66 Chassis. there are 30 in Canada at the training centre. so you start to see where the 148 come from. Oman could be a option for chassis but if we got to 150. still only 2 divisions

  2. The big takeaway from Ukraine is that absent sea and air superiority land supremacy is almost impossible.

  3. I read a story that Germany is looking to buy hundreds of boxers from Australia. I assume doing so on top of the ones built in Germany to speed up delivery.

    • Believe that when I see it. Schultz and the Germans in general have been slow to deliver armaments already promised. How many Leopard 2s have actually been delivered to Ukraine from Germany?
      All 14 yet?
      At least with the UK committing to now donating 28 C2s hopefully that might nudge Germany to be a bit more generous.

      • Germany has been slow but don’t forget the challengers haven’t actually been donated either yet, none have been shipped to Ukraine. I read they won’t be until July.

      • I heard that only 4 Leo2s have arrived in Ukraine.
        The 28 CR2 figure is wrong – the Ukraine ambassador apparently mis-spoke.

          • Yep, just like Zelensky handing over a fighter pilots helmet to the UK Speaker in Westminster Hall. I don’t blame him at all.

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