In a series of written questions addressed to the Ministry of Defence, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence John Healey sought updates on the procurement and deployment of the Boxer RCH 155 Self-Propelled Howitzer for the British Army.

The inquiries were answered by James Cartlidge, Minister of State for the Ministry of Defence, who provided comprehensive insights into the programme’s current status and future plans.

John Healey MP posed several questions, including:

  1. Steps to Accelerate Delivery: “What steps his Department is taking to accelerate the delivery of the Boxer RCH 155 Self-Propelled Howitzer.”
  2. Planned Procurement: “How many Boxer RCH 155 Self-Propelled Howitzers the Army plans to procure.”
  3. Programme Value: “What the value of the programme to procure new Boxer RCH 155 Self-Propelled Howitzers is for the Army.”
  4. Service Entry Date: “When the Boxer RCH 155 Self-Propelled Howitzer will enter service with the Army.”

In response, James Cartlidge MP outlined the collaborative efforts between the UK and Germany to expedite the delivery and enhance the capabilities of the Boxer RCH 155.

Britain to purchase Boxer-based RCH155 artillery systems

He stated:

“RCH155 will be developed through a jointly led collaborative procurement between the UK and Germany. Working collaboratively on a joint assessment and qualification plan will exploit the combined capabilities of each nation’s test and trials centres enabling faster delivery at less cost. The certainty of platform choice also enables us to advance early acquisition of ammunition and other critical enablers in the assessment phase. Concurrently, we will continue to explore opportunities to accelerate delivery of RCH155 to the Army, where possible and in line with the new Integrated Procurement Model.”

Regarding the specifics of the programme, Cartlidge added:

“The assessment phase of the programme will determine the most appropriate manufacturing approach and confirm the number of platforms required by the British Army. The Army aims to achieve a Mobile Fires Platform Minimum Deployable Capability within this decade.”

Furthermore, he highlighted the programme’s financial and strategic significance:

“The joint programme is potentially worth upwards of £3 billion and marks a step change towards a deeper industrial and wider defence relationship between the UK and Germany.”

Lisa West
Lisa has a degree in Media & Communication from Glasgow Caledonian University and works with industry news, sifting through press releases in addition to moderating website comments.

87 COMMENTS

  1. So Mr Cartlidge clearly answered just one of the 4 questions put (Qn3). Even then he did not detail what the split of the £3bn was between the UK and Germany.
    That is par for the course.

    I suspect the order will be for well under 100 units, given the reticence in providing an answer to Qn2.

    • To be fair I’m not sure they are very far down this process at all. They don’t seem to know what they need let alone how much it will cost etc. He just put a minimum value on that. No maximum for Q3.

      Might be an idea for the Army just to say how many they want. I can see the current Government agreeing to just about anything vaguely reasonable. They have committed to additional funding they now want to be seen spending it.

      I think there are many people on here thinking we are still in cuts .. cuts .. cuts mode. Personally I think we are in spend .. spend .. spend mode (within reason) and we need to focus on priorities.

      • We are still in cuts. Planned manpower reductions are still proceeding, with only the Lib Dems promising to reverse them.

        Tories are taking tough ehikst still cutting. Promised extra spend is unlikely to close the preexisting funding gap.

        • Manpower issue is to do with effective recruitment not funding. Lib Dems policy on anything is irrelevant. Tories are boosting the budget and yes some of that money will go to finishing projects which have overspent. Welcome to the real world. That happens with my budgets as well.

          • The limitation on manpower is not principally or even secondarily to do with recruitment. The numbers sought are determined solely by the establishment figure set by HMG.

            The Army’s establishment of 82,500 was cut unilaterally by this Tory Governmrnt, without any rational explanation, to 72,500 – a whacking big reduction of 10,000, the equivalent of two manoeuvre brigades.

            Of course recruitment falls off as a result. the general impression among potential applicants is that the army has become a bit of a busted flush. That suits HMG and the Treasury just fine, they don’t need mega recruiting levels just now, as they still have 2,000 surplus troops heading for the exit door.

            It would niot be surprising to find that Capita has been told to go even slower on recruitment this year, in order to Balance the budget.

            I’m surprised that you dismiss a party calling for a restoration of army numbers, that is precisely what the US, NATO, non-NATO allies and the army itself want to happen. The odd man out is the Conservative Government surely?

            .

          • So the Army states it want to increase the numbers by 10,000 – if that is it’s priority which personally I doubt it is. The cost of manpower PA is negligable in the scheme of things The key issue for the Army is what kit does it need to order now the purse strings are relaxing.

            Blaming HMG for everything is an easy target. In the last 30 odd years we have been moving from a cold war military to a peacetime military and now we are edging back again. There is much to do and priorities need to be set and personally I would start by looking at the kit with long lead times.

          • If the Army increases it’s manpower the priorities should be:
            3 Extra RLC Regiments
            3 Extra RAMC Regiments
            1 Extra Light Gun Regiment
            Extra Signals and EW regiments
            Extra AAD regiments
            A multi-capbadge ASOB support Regiment
            Then worry about extra kit.

            In that order.

          • Any future artillery must be on mobile platforms with the reach to outreach any potential adversaries.

          • You’ll never be able to fully outreach any potential enemy indirect fires.
            (Also, while I’m happy to have this conversation, not sure what I said that warrants it?)

          • I’m not sure you can outreach any opponent with fires…that’s a state you will never either get to or guarantee…what you need to do is ensure you are able to not be there when the enemy reacts.

          • Spot on. Always CS CSS first.
            That’s 4x sorted. 😀
            Very interesting idea on the ASOB Support Reg….
            I know the Bde uses one of RS Reg Signal Sqns, 225 ( Bahrain ) from 15 RS I think. But that’s as far as I know.

          • ASOB support Regiment is a “nice to have” which is why it’s so low down the list. A dedicated SORT would be a perfect example: Not necessary and could be tasked orged, but would be nice to have and would make a few headaches go away.

          • Agree with all of those, but I think added onto that, lower in the list returning to 3 armoured regiments is important as well and I think I would put the AAD regiments just below the RLC regiments not low down….with the RAMC regiments I think there needs to be a significant increase in reserves..as this is the place very good partnership with the NHS needs to work.

          • The “returning to 3 Armoured Regiments” is part of the “Extra kit” I put at the bottom of the list.
            AAD is needed, but at the moment the AAD we have is probably enough to cover the 3-4 maneuver elements we actually can deploy.
            For RAMC, I have to disagree. For starters the RAMC currently has 335 Med Evac Regiment, 306 Hospital Support Regiment, and 9 Multi-Role Medical Regiments that are all reserve units; the RAMC is very well established in terms of Reserves, especially for Field Hospital type establishments.
            What is missing is brigade and battlegroup echlon regular medical support that bridges the gap between unit RAP’s and Field Hospitals, and enables activation and deployment of regular formations in any sort of realistic timeframe.
            Of all the UK’s regular Brigades, only 16, 12, 20 and 7 have this kind of formation, 4, 1, and 11 are lacking in this regard and just have their unit RAPs (scaled at roughly 10 medical personnel per infantry battalion) to rely on.

            NHS partnerships are an extremely mixed blessing. On the plus side it provides Reservist (and certain regular) posts with a theoretical pool of talented individuals. On the other hand calling up that pool becomes incredibly difficult during a time of national crisis. Are we going to realistically be able to strip the NHS of Doctors, Nurses and Paramedics to man the Reserve MMR’s if Russian cruise missiles are impacting Newcastle, Colchester and London? Probably not. (The same happened in reseverse during Covid, where the RAMC found it very hard to surge NHS capability because many of it’s practitioners where already working to the NHS).
            The other side of it is: the NHS doesn’t have the same requirements that the Army has, and provides a very different standard of training than the military does. This makes cross-over between military and NHS (especially at the CMT-EMT level) really problematic.

          • Agreed. Nice mention of a few little known units there. I’ve still got 84 FMED RAMC listed at the old CVHQ RAMC national units at Strensell. Are they still about or am I out of date?

          • Probably long gone then, they were still about 2014 or so.
            “FMED Field Medical Equipment Depot.”

          • Spot on that man. 84 MSS with 9 Reg RLC. I’ve just joined the dots… I had them noted too without linking them with 84 FMED, thinking they were 2 separate orgs.
            I’m years out of date on this one. 🙄😆

          • Hi Dern that is interesting, cheers, so just to get my head around the hole..what your saying is that effectively about half the regular brigades have no role two capabilities and essentially just go from role 1 RAP to role 3 field hospitals..so I see what you mean about the hole in capability…sort of makes bit of a mockery of the pre hospital emergency care element of the operational patient care pathway if that’s the case.

            Re the joinery around the NHS I still think it can be a lot lot better…considering that effectively the NHS is the provider of role 4 and beyond care…it has got better in the last decade ( meaningful joint working did not exist 25 years ago)…

            Around the CMT-EMT level..I agree it’s practically more difficult around reserve…as you say there is more very specific training..but not only that the NHS tends to run hot in these roles and there are never enough crews anyway and you cannot suck off capacity…as emergency care is not something you can drop.

            But I would say that could be changed if the the NHS has the urgent and emergency care capacity it really needed dropping a few missiles into to the demand would create a few major incidents but little long term system stress ( and it’s the long term system stress that really ramps the risk to life) …and would not really impact on overall demand and capacity management…when you consider an individual systems urgent and emergency care capacity will manage around 100,000 Emergency cases and 500,000 urgent cases a year for a population of around half a million if you then throw in a few major incidents mass casualty events ( say 100 patients each ..it does little..as as system just bends around the event…yes people would die who could have been treated, but that’s always the case if capacity overwhelms demanded in the moment and that’s common now TBH).

            I do think the CMT-EMT should be more joined up Because although there is a difference in training and focus..what you cannot beat is practice..and on a good week the unit I worked in could give you 10+ stabbings and 10+ major trauma cases..( including plenty of traumatic amputations and poly trauma)…training is important but it cannot replace ongoing experience ( we are even working to set up a military personal volunteer first response car…gives us extra capacity gives the CMTs experience).

            Re the role 3 reservists and needs of the NHS over army..again I think there needs to more thought in the cases of national emergency ( a peer war)…you have to remember most of the NHS secondary care demand is planned care not emergency care..so actually we can and should be able to flex the planned care elements…and surgeons and theatre teams spend almost all their time do planned care not emergency care..so there is massive flex if we consider it a national strategic capability.

            I would not use the pandemic as a general model as it was was a very particular stress..that only occurrs because of the way pandemics work on the system and cannot be compared to anything else…you could throw any number of mass casualty events at a system and it would not have the same impact as a pandemic ( infact they only events that would compare or be worse around capacity and demand are mass chemical or nuclear attacks which would create a higher demand spike and have the same or worse impact on capacity):

            1) uncontrolled patient numbers…the potential for a pandemic organism with say an R0 of 4-5 and a 1% mortality rate to generate patients and casualties is staggering if it gets out of control ( it could infect the bulk of your population and kill half a million in a month or two).
            2) infection prevention control measures..essentially half you capacity..at the time you could see uncontrolled patient numbers.
            3) your staff get it and you loss your staff at the same rate the pandemic creates cases and casualties.

            But what it does give a clear picture of is how well out systems would manage manage an even more impactful biological, nuclear or chemical event…you up the R0 of the organism to the same as some of the more contagious organisms ( 10-15) with that one 1% death rate and the system ( well all national systems) collapse..or you up the mortality rate to say 10% ( some of the nastier virus and bacterial infections can hit 50-75%) and again the system’s collapse…personally I think we need to a system that can manage the stress of a pandemic with an R0 of 10-15 and a mortality rate of 2%…so three-four times worse that covid 19 as that’s a realistic possible event).

          • Why would we want more light guns? they are crap, short range and take up too much man power and why is AAD near the end when we have the worst/weakest air defence for years?

          • The cost of manpower isn’t negligible as you need to count pensions injuries and thw like. These are costs that go on for decades after your service

          • HMG is to blame..the buck stops with the politicians who have accountability and set the strategic direction… as for transitioning to a Cold War…if the politicians had listened to those that understood geopolitical trends..they would have known ( and did known ) that by 2000 the theory of the end of history that drove disarmament was a busted flush and any further reduction should stop..by 2010 they knew that a new Cold War was likely…by 2014 our enemies had come out in the open..and started significant rearming programmes and offensive programmes against the west…we were well into the very worst of a Cold War by 2014….but they pretended that the “ end of history”could still somehow work and did not really wake up until a war in Europe smashed their delusional state.

        • I agree with Ben to a degree. Everything is about ‘exploring’ or ‘assessing’. Nothing definite like ‘We will need and these will delivered by’

      • Graham, the truth is seeping through the cracks, Putin is now off the leash with a mandate from the Russian people (regardless of the process by which he got there) and there is a genuine concern as to what happens next. Artillery has played a critical role in the Ukraine War and by contrast, has exposed just how pitiful the current RA weapon status has become. I would suggest Germany is equally eager to introduce this Boxer variant in quick order.

        • Glad you mention Germany – surely we don’t anticipate taking on Putin alone at any point. We need to be aware of our expected contribution to NATO with it’s resources to push Putin back should the need arise. Will the contribution from the UK be more from the RAF and RN than the Army.

      • The Army’s Requirements Manager for MFP (Mobile Fires Platform), which replaces AS-90, will have produced his Requirements documents a very long time ago. It should doubtless include mention as to how many artillery systems are required. The documents will be classified and so not in the pubic domain.

        • There is a long route, surely, between the production of that document and the MOD procurement. Priorities need to be set, options need to be considered.

          Also I wonder if things might have changed in the last couple of years.

          • There is a long period between writing the Requirement and the end of the procurement (delivery of equipment to IOC). 10 years is often typical if design and development occurs ie it is not a MOTS or UOR procurement.

            Sometimes the Requirement changes (Threat changes, doctrine changes etc) and is adjusted after Contract Award, and the contract is amended – hopefully this does not happen several times. I understand that the Ajax requirement changed just once, in 2016.

            I don’t see that much has changed in the procurement world since I left the army in 2009. My first job then as a civvy was 2 years spent at Abbey Wood on three different short-term contracts.

      • i heard its no more than max 116 units, better than just 79 AS90’s, if it was 116 i’m not sure what regts would get it as the MLRS fleet is set to double. might see units stood back up that were disbanded at most 2

      • See Daniele’s post, envisaging 1RHA, 19 Regt RA [and hopefully 4 Regt RA] to get Boxer SPGs. Then, don’t forget, there is a number required for the Trg Org, the Repair Pool and the Attrition Reserve.

    • We discussed likely users a few weeks be k mate. 1 RHA and 19 RA are a given.18 or 24 guns each?
      But having gone for the wheeled, mobile Boxer solution there is no excuse whatsoever to not equip 4 RA too, who support 7 LM Brigade.
      Previously, we expected K9 thunder which is too big and tracked, so not suited to a Light Mech Bde.
      Boxer RCH155 is.
      So I’m looking for 3 Regiments worth and around 100 guns.

      • I allowed my natural pessimissm to dominate and should not have done. I’m so used to our Forces being screwed over by the politicos and HMT who often never fund the full number of equipments required.

        And I do mean ‘required’, not ‘wanted’ by the army’!

        BTW, it all seems quite strange that folk very strongly assumed that a tracked SPG (AS-90) would be replaced by K9 Thunder, especially in the light of abandoning tracked IFVs in preference to wheeled equipment, plus there a lot of Boxer fanboys out there, including in influential positions.

        • This may be the exception that proves the rule Graham but for, possibly, a short time only the politicos might be in favour of splashing the cash and boosting the military. As the saying goes catch them doing something right!

          • The politicos decided to do an IR Refresh in 2023 to ‘learn lessons’ from the Russo-Ukraine war – they concluded that no increase in manpower or platforms was required. They are tone deaf.
            Tories won’t splash the cash in their last few months in power – they want to do another NIC cut instead to ‘buy’ votes. When in Governent, new Labour programmes will probably not permit an early increase in defence funding.

      • Mate over on the “British tank shows off firepower in Germany” Ron’s posted an orbat idea, I kind of picked it apart a little bit but it might be of interest to you.

  2. It’s a joint program where everything is made in Germany and designed is owned by a German company and all export version will be built in Germany. The only thing I’m yet to see to confirm it’s 100% German is the obligatory Union Jack that German and American defence companies like to paint on shit they are selling us to really rub it in and so what ever useless Tory of the day that happens to be SoD this week can stand in front of it with their thumbs up and show everyone how it’s all about British jobs.

    Don’t get me wrong I love helping the Germans develop stuff for the export market especially when we get to send a big f**k you to a British company with an existing solution that we are already using.

    I love this government, I see now why they fought so hard form Brexit.

      • At the moment the Government are running a peacetime military. That seems to mean different things to different people. Some seem to want us on a war footing whilst others seem to think we should have been on a war footing for the last 40 years. Probably helps if people say what they want the Government to achieve and then judge if they have fucked it up?

    • That’s the irony all these collaborative efforts are really foreign imports wrapped in a British flag or if we are lucky jobs bottling them together. I think we need a new term for what it is when we actually design and build a joint project so we can tell the difference, but then the Govt wouldn’t want us to recognise the difference would they. It’s like when they call it foreign investment with the add on ‘faith in Britain’ when foreign companies buy uk competitors even when they then proceed to decapitate them and move production abroad.

      • Our missile programs are very much joint and our aircraft programs excluding the US are as well.

        It’s the land vehicle side that’s not, that’s completely down to the army, the army top brass is far more interested in preserving cap badges than industrial capability largely because almost the entire army top brass comes from the Para’s.

        US defence contractors also like to offer very cushy consultants jobs.

        This is the reason that the army is now in such a bad way and the navy and RAF are in a decent way.

        Point in case BAE makes virtually every platform the navy and Airforce operate and zero for the army now despite BAE land systems having the worlds largest portfolio of land vehicles.

        (I’m not including Rheinmetall products based up by BAE like boxer and Challenger 3)

        That’s very telling.

        • Jim, do you really think that the army has the final say in whether we procure a British/BAE product or not?

          The army assesses all offerings arising from the Bidding process. Those that meet or can be expected to meet the Requirements form a short list.

          Usually the cheapest option is selected from the short list by the responsible Minister (Min Defence Procurement) but political considerations also come into the reckoning ie does this Project create jobs in South Wales/marginal constituences etc.

          By several accounts, including those of Lt Col Crawford, many years ago the army favoured Leopard 2, but the politician picked Chally 2 (jobs for workers up North!) .

          If the army top brass really is more interested in saving capbadges, they have spectacularly failed over the years – not many capbadges of historic regiments (Inf and Cav) survive more than about 30 years at most.

        • “Point in case BAE makes virtually every platform the navy and Airforce operate and zero for the army now despite BAE land systems having the worlds largest portfolio of land vehicles.”

          A result of the deindustrialisation of UK manufacturing. We end up with only 1 major company and we end up buying everything from them. Apart from when procuring for the army we seem to think that we should use anybody but BAe, even when it makes sense, CV90 anyone.

          Guess you don’t want to be held randsom but 1 company but if it keeps jobs, developement, manufacturing and profits in the UK it does make sense. Especially due the politial move away from manufacturing to a more service based economy.

      • The thing with that is that is that capability takes alot of time to generate. It’s all well and good being a “peace time army” but one of those still needs to be able to switch to being an Army at war quickly. For that we need mass, but we lack that at the moment and we aren’t building resilience into the system going forward. It’s scary.

      • If UK government hadn’t decided to leave the project in 2003 some of the production might have been in the UK. Too late now

    • For goodness sake Jim, give the party political broadcasts a rest please. We’ve got months to go yet. 😷

  3. Uk MoD could have saved time and money by simply buying the South Africa Denel G6 Rhino 155/52 system that BAE was at one time involved in.

      • Do tell more.

        Company blurb says: “The system is designed for high strategic, operational and tactical mobility. The 6×6 vehicle can reach road speeds of up to 70 kilometres per hour (56 mph), is capable of traversing snow and water up to a depth of one metre (3.3 ft), is rail transportable and can be air-transported. Can deal with a 58% (30 deg) slope and has a ground clearance of 0.45m.

        Not so bad for a wheeled SPG? 

        • Small turret stock the auto load system has no manual back up if there’s a problem in the turret and it uses a modular charge system that is not in general use throughout nato

          • If it is no good, we need not worry as it is only an interim system until Boxer SPG comes along, which I am sure will be much better!

            I am not sure what you are comparing it to in order to have a negative impression – unfair to compare it to a tracked SPG or towed artilery as it is a different type of artillery system. It is more relevant compared to another truck-mounted artillery piece – Caesar – that only has 18 rds in the 6×6 version, wheras Archer has 21 rds.

            It is problem if there is no reversionary mode and if the auto-load system is unreliable – but is it? I do trust Swedish engineering – I had several very reliable Volvos once!

            Wiki: “The vehicle carries 21 155 mm projectiles in a fully automatic magazine.[18] Reloading the magazine from the accompanying munitions carrier takes about 10 minutes using the purpose-built lifting device. The howitzer can use NATO modular charges or Bofors Uniflex 2 modular charges”. 

            So, if Wiki is right it can use NATO charges as well as the Bofors/Nexter type.

            Archer is performing well in Ukraine and their army have no bad words to say about it.

          • As far as I know the only nato country that uses modular charge system is Sweden and now the uk I’ve always been a tracked gunner Abbot M109 and As90 I’m probably more inclined to prefer a manual operated loading system using equipment that can be operated after failure I would have preferred to see a proper trial between K9 and RCH

          • I fully agree that a proper trial between K9 and RCH (and anything else that looks useful) should have happened.

            Also, I am not sure there was a serious practical evaluation of prospective CVR(T) replacements either back in the day. Not sure how a non-existent design (Ajax) from a start-up company (GDUK) was selected over a mature platform from a seasoned British manufacturer (BAE, nee Hagglund, Bofors) that only needed the recce suite adding on.

            Also what were the options other than the BAE/Rheinmetall CR3 for our next tank – and were they evaluated?

            Some odd stuff going on in the procurement world.

          • Yup agree we should have gone cv90 with improvements already in use with other nato countries it’s unlikely ajax family will be sold to other countries so the production line will head south as soon as our procurement about is reached same as As90 .

          • CV90 Recce variant always seemed to be a better bet for me, but BAE offered UK assembly far too late – big blunder on their part. It may have led to us buying CV90 IFV if WCSP absolutely had to be canned for some genuine reason, not the reason advanced by MoD now.

            Shame AS-90 did not achieve expoert sales – it was so much better than M109 of the day. But I guess countries were used to buying American. Maybe they would have changed their minds if the Braveheart upgrade had been fielded by BA.

    • Agreed John ,like I said on a post a few weeks ago is this what the Army want ?Or more of a Sunak deal 🙄 think we would of been better off with Archer 👍

      • A Sunak deal I guess. Boxer units could be put to better use. Archer has proved its worth in Ukraine so is combat proven. Wheels within wheels with the MIC. Not practical thinking based on reality. Money talks.

  4. Hope I am not asking a stupid question, but, is the RCH 155mm for Boxer a module (drop the module off and install a diffrent module diffrent tasking) or a permanent mounting? If the later that would mean an extra 100+ Boxer drive units.

  5. I saw a nice image online of the turret mounted on a tracked ASCOD vehicle.
    Tracks seem to make more sense but maybe with today’s drone filled battlefield track marks are easier to spot?
    That may be the only advantage of Bozer and the timescale. Ukr is getting some ASAP so it will be battle tested and can perhaps have some necessary add ons eg EW jammers to defeat drones and APS.
    I would think dressing it in one of those anti IR jacket things would make sense.
    How is the ammo lugged though and crews to rotate as 2 man will soon get knackered?

  6. If the Government of the day back at the start of this century hadn’t pulled the plug on the original “Boxer/MRAV” program, UK would have a far greater share of the build and profit from these vehicles. As always,short termisum and an incompetence Procurement policy has yet again resulted in the current state we find ourselves in. Both sides of the house are responsible for the dire straits we find ourselves in, along with poor management, governance and leadership with the Army and DE&S

    • It was the army not the government, the army wanted something lighter than air that could fit into a C130 but withstand a direct hit from a 16 inch battleship gun.

      Unrealistic expectations from army officers qualified to jump out the back of a plane but little else trying to run massive industrial programs.

      Now we are where we are, thank god the Germans kept going.

      Easy to blame politicians but show me a politician anywhere who ever gave a crap about armoured vehicles enough to cancel one and I’ll be amazed.

      • army wanted something lighter than air that could fit into a C130 but withstand a direct hit from a 16 inch battleship gun.

        Great image, precisely. They wanted C-130 air mobility but able to combate like if it was a tank companion. An impossibility.

        • We all wanted C-130 transportability for wheeled vehicles in the 90s. Given that a C-130 could carry 19 tonnes and was capacious, it did not at first seem an unreasonable ‘ask’.

          In the early 90s, no-one saw MRAV (later Boxer) as a tank companion – it was intended to replace residual 432s (eg mortar carriers, ambulances), Saxon and non-turreted CVR(T)s. Warrior was the tank companion – and was not due replacement having only been first fielded from 1987. The expectation was that MRAV would not have armour protection quite as good as Warrior which was in the Direct Fire zone, ie somewhat lighter armour.

      • All good banter!

        Boxer started in 1993 as a joint venture design project between Germany and France, with the UK joining in 1996. At that early stage it was not clear that a behemoth would result. Certainly the UK hoped for it to be C-130 transportable. C-130 could carry a payload of 19 tonnes eg 2 x M113s and a CAESAR SPG, according to manufacturers literature. It was not for several years that it became apparent that France and Germany (the senior and original partners) were pushing for a vehicle much heavier than 19t. France left in 1999 to pursue VBCI instead. Germany then dominated proceedings with their heavy 8×8 offering. The UK left the programme in 2003 to develop a national solution for MRAV under FRES. [UK rejoined in 2018, the desire for C-130 transportability had long been abandoned as unrealistic].

        Who are these Parachute Regiment senior officers who dominate the army? – CGS, Gen Sanders, is RIFLES (ex RGJ).
        None of the other 4* Generals appointed in the last 10 years have been PARA Regt – they were commissioned into respectively INT CORPS, LI, IG, 17/21L, RTR, RGJ, 14/20H, RGJ.
        Or do you mean 3*, 2* or 1* officers? Which ones? Who are they? In which appointments?

        Senior army officers do not run massive industrial programmes – on the MoD side it is committee work but the various Chairmen (senior military officer or civil servant) with sign-off powers is influential. I accept that certain other senior officers are influential (eg. CGS, Heads of Arm or Service etc), in shaping military thinking on a particular procurement option. Senior civil servants, HM Treasury and politicians in government (MinDP, SofS, Chancellor, PM) are also influential (often more so) in procurement.

  7. Despite the Russians Chinese Iranian etc threats the the present and future governments will still cut the defences of this country because it is what politicians do thats why we nearly lost the 2nd World war and if the Argentinia had waited a year or 2 we would could not have been able to retake the Falklands them

  8. The item title is some what not correct. A long winded answer with no facts in it sadly a MOD specialty.

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