The UK has suspended 30 arms export licences to Israel from a total of about 350. The decision came after a review by the new Labour government found that there was a “clear risk” the arms could be used in serious violations of international humanitarian law in the war in Gaza.
The suspensions mark a notable – if only modest – policy shift from the previous government.
But they won’t change much in Gaza, where the war is approaching its first anniversary.
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The government was reluctant to link the suspended licences to any specific violations of law. And, notably, the decision was not based solely on Israel’s military conduct in Gaza, due to the lack of definitive evidence available from outside the enclave.
However, the assessment did state that the number of civilian deaths and the scale of destruction were of great concern, while also citing what it calls “credible claims” of the mistreatment of Palestinian detainees.
At the same time, the review argued that Israel could be doing more to alleviate the “appalling humanitarian situation” in Gaza by ensuring that food and medical supplies reach civilians.
Israel maintains that it is facilitating the entry of aid into Gaza. But aid groups say that the conditions created by Israel, including onerous inspections, destroyed roads and a lack of security, have severely hindered distribution efforts.
What effect will the suspensions have?
The suspended items include components for military aircraft, including fighter planes, helicopters and drones, as well as items used for ground targeting.
However, aside from the fact that the suspensions will affect less than 10% of the UK’s existing arms export licenses, less than 1% of Israel’s total arms imports come from the UK. So, the suspensions are unlikely to have any material impact on Israel’s military operations.
The UK’s arms sales to Israel totalled about £42 million in 2022. This compares to the US$3.8 billion (£2.9 billion) in military assistance that the US provides to Israel each year. Germany is the second-largest arms exporter to Israel, providing it with US$355 million worth of arms in 2023. Most other countries that have supplied arms to Israel in the past have already introduced export suspensions of some kind.
The licence suspensions will also not apply to all British-made components in the global F-35 fighter jet programme. F-35 fighter jets have been used by Israel to conduct air strikes in Gaza, causing extensive damage and loss of life.
The move to suspend the export of some weapons to Israel is not unprecedented. Prime ministers both from the Labour and Conservative parties have restricted arms sales to Israel in the past. And the US even temporarily paused some weapons shipments in May as Israel moved to invade the Gazan city of Rafah. However, the suspensions still mark a symbolic increase of pressure on Israel by one of its close allies.
The announcement also came just a month after the UK dropped the previous government’s planned challenge to the International Criminal Court (ICC) regarding arrest warrants for Israeli leaders, and after the government renewed its funding for Unrwa, the UN agency that aids Palestinian refugees.
But the UK’s foreign secretary, David Lammy, has reiterated the UK’s support for Israel to defend itself, and emphasised that the suspensions do not constitute an arms embargo or a blanket ban.
He has also underscored that the decisions, which are based on the UK’s strategic export licensing criteria, were not a judgment on whether Israel had breached international law.
In his comments to Parliament on the suspensions, he said: “This is a forward-looking evaluation, not a determination of innocence or guilt, and it does not prejudge any future determinations by the competent courts.”
The statement was made in reference to the ongoing genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice, and the request for arrest warrants for Israeli leaders on charges of war crimes by the ICC.
The suspensions have not gone down well in Israel. In a statement, Israeli foreign minister, Israel Katz, expressed that his country was “disappointed by a series of decisions” made by the new UK government, including those regarding arms exports. Katz said that the latest decision “sends a very problematic message” to Hamas and Iran.
Israeli defence minister, Yoav Gallant, likewise said he was “deeply disheartened” by the UK’s decision. He also lamented that the announcement came days after six hostages were killed in Gaza and as Israel’s fight with Hezbollah in the north of the country intensifies. Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, described the decision as “shameful” in a post on X.
But non-governmental organisations and activists seeking a full ban on arms exports to Israel have said the decision is merely “window dressing”. Others have criticised the F-35 exception as a major loophole.
In an interview with Al Jazeera, Samuel Perlo-Freeman of the Campaign Against Arms Trade described the exception as “a bit like saying you’re going vegetarian except for bacon”.
The decision also moves the UK further from the Biden administration’s policy of providing mostly unconditional aid to Israel. Yet it could lay out a model for a potential administration led by Kamala Harris to leverage the Leahy Law, which prevents US aid going to security forces suspected of committing human rights violations.
The law has has never been applied to Israel. But it may warrant more consideration, as has been advocated for by various state department officials, if ceasefire negotiations continue to stall.
In all honest assessments, the UK’s leverage in the Gaza war is limited, and the decision by Labour to suspend some arms export licenses won’t be a game-changer on its own. But policies and signals still matter, especially when perceived as part of a broader shift on a highly fraught and protracted conflict.
Julie M. Norman, Senior Associate Fellow on the Middle East at RUSI; Associate Professor in Politics & International Relations, Deputy Director of the Centre on US Politics, UCL. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
