The Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) E-7 Wedgetail programme, a critical component of the UK’s future Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) capability, faces new hurdles as its Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating fell from Amber to Red in the latest Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) Annual Report 2023-24.

The programme aims to deliver cutting-edge radar capabilities while ensuring interoperability with key allies.

Britain’s first new early warning aircraft takes flight

Key Challenges Highlighted

The report outlines several challenges that contributed to the downgraded DCA rating:

  • Affordability Risks: The programme is grappling with budgetary pressures, necessitating adjustments in the Full Business Case, expected in early FY 2024/25.
  • Global Supply Chain Delays: Difficulties in securing equipment and materials have further strained the project timeline.
  • Skilled Workforce Retention: Maintaining an adequately skilled workforce at the modification facility has proven challenging.
  • Aviation Certification Complexity: The increasing complexity of certification in the aviation sector has introduced delays to the project schedule.

Despite these obstacles, the programme’s end-date remains fixed at June 1, 2027. However, the report notes that this timeline is under review and may face revisions as issues are addressed.

E-7 Wedgetail in-service date remains 2025

Financial Overview

The Whole Life Cost (WLC) of the programme increased from £1.877 billion in FY 2022/23-Q4 to £2.053 billion in FY 2023/24-Q4. This rise reflects the MOD’s decision to release additional funding to align with updated cost forecasts. The final WLC will be detailed in the Full Business Case.

Importantly, the budget variance remains within acceptable limits at 0.4%, indicating strong financial controls despite the challenges.

Strategic Importance

The E-7 Wedgetail programme is set to replace the previous E-3 Sentry fleet and provide the UK with a 5th generation AEW&C capability equipped with a Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array radar.

This technology is vital for enhancing situational awareness and operational effectiveness in contested environments, supporting the MOD’s long-term strategic goals. The aircraft’s interoperability with allied forces ensures its integration into joint operations, strengthening the UK’s role in global defence partnerships.

Outlook

While the programme’s Red rating indicates significant risks, the MOD is actively working to mitigate challenges through strategic planning and resource allocation. The submission of the Full Business Case is a critical step toward addressing affordability and delivery issues.

Understanding Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) Ratings

The Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) ratings provide an evaluation of the likelihood of a project meeting its objectives in terms of time, cost, and scope. The Infrastructure and Projects Authority uses these ratings to identify challenges and provide recommendations for improvement. The ratings are categorized as follows:

  • Green: A Green rating indicates that the project is on track to deliver successfully, with minimal risks identified. Any issues are well understood and manageable within the existing plans.
  • Amber: An Amber rating signifies that while successful delivery is feasible, there are significant issues that require focused management attention. These challenges could pose risks to the project’s timeline, budget, or objectives if not addressed effectively.
  • Red: A Red rating reflects serious concerns about the project’s ability to meet its objectives. Immediate corrective action is needed to address fundamental issues, as the project is unlikely to succeed without significant changes or interventions.

These ratings offer a snapshot of project performance and help ensure that potential issues are identified and mitigated early, improving the likelihood of successful delivery.

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

17 COMMENTS

  1. Land rather than Air is more my area of intrest, but if memory serves me right, the following points spring to mind…..
    Isnt this the one where we have 5 radars but only 3 planes
    I thought it was already in service with Australia
    The build is taking place at a purpose built facility near Birmingham.
    The project was due to move aircraft to Boscombe for testing and evaluation purposes.

    My question therefore is why the issue going from Amber to Red

    Anyone with info, please feel free to update my limited knowledge and information on this project.

    • In this instance, as we were only buying 3 frames, I’d gs e got AUS to do the work on a fixed price contract.

      There is precious little advantage to us reinventing wheels, expensively, to put together a system someone else has designed and perfected.

        • Must admit I have sympathy with that view, this project has presented problems right from the moment we initiated this ‘relatively safe’ option the change in numbers only exacerbating it and I do wonder if it will now cost as much as it would have for 5.

          From what I remember the original problem lay in the fact it was at the time a one off mature project for Australia that goes back to the mid noughties supplied by Boeing and utilising Northrop Grumman airframe/radar that ended up being so good it attracted attention elsewhere when it really wasn’t set up to take easy advantage of that interest. Not sure what the situation was with the Northrop Grumman radar in this regard but Boeing and airframes did represent a ‘challenge’ right from the off. It’s based on the NG version of the 737 which had already pretty much been replaced in production by the disastrous MAX by 2019 unlike when Australia ordered/developed theirs. So new airframes were difficult and no doubt expensive to attain as only those still being fitted out were in existence and no doubt being supplied to existing customers. So 2nd hand airframes were also acquired. However I assume even in Australia the conversion process was not in existence any more so expertise had to be re-accumulated and the process then created in the UK from limited companies with the experience and expertise to do so. Clearly the process has been rather worse than hoped.

          Now in addition to us getting on board both Korea and Turkey had acquired them after Oz and now the US which no doubt has complicated matters increased delays, skilled personnel and costs in a competitive scenario. It’s important to note Boeing had to pay out a considerable sum for delays in the original contract with Australia with radar integration presenting problems and delays.

          I would be interested to know how the Korea and Turkish adaptations went though airframe issues would have been a lot easier no doubt. Interested also to find out where the US is getting its airframes from with I just checked 26 planned.

    • The E7 production line has been closed for around 10 years and a number of components of the mission system are now obselete, out of production or no longer available and new components found and certifiedm for use in the system. The contractor is Boeing who have subcontracted the work to a UK aircraft maintenance company with very little prior experience of large scale military system integration. Also Boeing and Northrop Grumman have themselves probably lost expertise due to time and the gap in the production line. Having been involved in a very succesful military conversion of a civilian airliner (new build) the quality of the work packages which make up the conversion iis key to a successful conversion and given closed production line I would suggest the E7 work packesge were not up to modern standards and needed rework and certified by the MAA. This coupled with the lack of equivalent expertise of such a conversion made it almost certain to be late. Its my experience that system problems do not show up untill late in the conversion when system testing starts in ernest. The USAF E7 contract has recognised these problems and allowed for it in their plan hence they are only building two ‘prototype’ aircraft to prove the design before starting full scale production of a further 12 airframes.Delivery of these prototypes is two or three years away although the USAF mission system is based on todays RAF standard.

  2. Thank our civil servants, they destroyed our aircraft industry so we can’t make our own planes any more. What we need is a pro British government that will exile out civil servants and replace the edifice with a smaller body of pro British people whose mandate is to improve our war readiness, more defence, more production, energy security, stable pro British educated population who have all been trained to fight.

  3. All I am reading seems little more than covering people’s backsides. Politicians are largely uninterested in facts beyond maintaining themselves in office. A complex system of systems such as this is detail they abhor. The capability was not ordered soon enough, was imprecise (3,4 or 5?) and collided with domestic politics where we had more ex Prime Ministers than Top Brass at the Cenotaph last November. Ron (above) is correct. The E7 is on trials. Our only serious adversary in this hemisphere is incapable of doing much more than nuisance to other countries sea floor assets. The E7 is coming and there can be no shortage of money when large sums are being spent weekly on refugees that have crossed continents to get here for some reason.

    • You are right about leaving it too late. When our Sentry aircraft were clearly heading towards end of life and immensely expensive to maintain we should have envisaged that a window of opportunity existed which would rapidly run out as the later part of the last decade approached anticipated it and ordered replacements years earlier when the skills to make Wedgetails hadn’t faded, airframes available and the timescale wasn’t so compressed. But of course you save money by delaying such de isions to others to make when overall costs will be much higher however. Madness but typical ironically we made the actual decision very quickly in the long delayed end without any long drawn out competitive contest which Saab objected to. Imagine the problems had we not done that, I shiver to think… well unless we had gone for the Gulfstream option in the end I guess. Just glad Ukraine has so successfully reduced the Russian AWACS fleet to negligible proportions.

  4. I wish we hadn’t cut the AWACAS plane numbers but with this net zero crap and having expensive energy prices shame we can’t make our own planes

  5. Having flown on both the Shackleton and E-3D, this project was never going to run smoothly. I will not go into the details but it is the usual ‘go for the lowest bidder’ regardless of risk. The E-3D (and Sentinel – I was an instructor on these) could have remained operational for many more years had we invested in them like the USAF, NATO and the French. We always fail to adequately support the product – I am sure this is the case with RN and Army assets.

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