The Royal Navy’s Type 32 frigate was once billed as a key part of the future fleet. First announced in 2020 with little prior warning, it was positioned as a general-purpose escort and, more intriguingly, as a platform to support uncrewed and autonomous systems.

Since then, the project has drifted through the early concept phase, never quite cancelled, but never fully committed to either. In the background, financial pressures have grown, and new strategies are due.


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Whether the Type 32 ever becomes more than a design study will depend in large part on the outcome of the upcoming Defence Investment Plan and broader decisions about the size and shape of the fleet.

The idea behind Type 32 was always loosely defined. When then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson unveiled the programme in 2020, it came with little detail beyond a promise to grow the escort fleet and reinvest in British shipbuilding. The 2021 Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper later described the ships as general-purpose frigates designed to protect territorial waters, provide forward presence, and support the new Littoral Response Groups.

Gradually, the discussion shifted. In speeches, ministerial answers and shipbuilding strategy documents, the Type 32 started to be described as something more experimental. In 2022, the refreshed National Shipbuilding Strategy said it would likely be “the first of a new generation of warships with a focus on hosting and operating autonomous onboard systems”. Jeremy Quin, then Minister for Defence Procurement, described it as a platform intended to operate uncrewed systems to support anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures.

Type 32 Frigate project makes little progress since October

Industry took note. BAE Systems proposed an “Adaptable Strike Frigate” with modular mission bays and space for drones, while Babcock floated a stretched version of its Arrowhead 140 design with increased capacity for boats, payloads and containerised systems. Both aimed to align with a vision of the Type 32 as a flexible platform that could deploy uncrewed surface and subsurface vessels for roles such as minehunting or shallow-water surveillance.

If it does proceed, the Type 32 is likely to sit somewhere between the high-end Type 26 and the more affordable Type 31. It would not be a full-spectrum warfighting platform in the mould of a destroyer or advanced ASW frigate, but rather a multi-role vessel tailored to persistent presence and support functions.

Possible roles include:

  • Hosting mine countermeasures drones such as RNMB Apollo and future MMCM variants
  • Supporting littoral operations and acting as an escort to amphibious groups
  • Launching and recovering uncrewed aerial and sub-surface systems
  • Contributing to anti-submarine operations in coastal or shallow waters using off-board sensors
  • General patrol and forward presence in lower-threat environments

This profile matches the Royal Navy’s stated need for more flexible, affordable ships to free up its more advanced assets. With the surface fleet stretched thin and escort numbers at a historic low, additional hulls would help cover both home waters and overseas deployments.

A Promise Without a Plan

Despite this operational logic, the programme has stalled. In the previous year, the National Audit Office reported that the Type 32 had been removed from the funded Equipment Plan due to affordability concerns. It also revealed that other naval projects, including the Multi-Role Support Ship and Type 83 destroyer, were beyond current funding limits. The following year’s NAO report stated that the Ministry of Defence was facing a £16.9 billion shortfall in its equipment programme, and that new warships collectively accounted for nearly £6 billion in unallocated costs.

Although ministers continue to describe the Type 32 as a future ambition, the Navy has no current funding line for it. The 2023 Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, said the ship would not be procured until the 2030s at the earliest, and that work was still underway to define what it would be. In a later response to Parliament, the Minister for Defence Procurement confirmed the ship was still in the concept phase and that decisions on its future would be taken as part of broader strategic reviews.

The upcoming Defence Investment Plan, expected in late 2025, is now seen as the pivotal moment. Designed to bring transparency and predictability to long-term defence spending, the DIP will lay out how the government intends to balance current programmes, industrial priorities and emerging threats. It will also attempt to reconcile the defence budget with the ambitions of the Integrated Review.

If Type 32 is not included in that plan, or if its funding is not ringfenced alongside other major naval projects, it is difficult to see how the ship could proceed.

Industry Expectations and Political Promises

From an industrial point of view, Type 32 was meant to help maintain momentum. The government’s shipbuilding strategy highlighted the need for a consistent pipeline of orders to avoid gaps in work and preserve skills. With the Type 31 frigates expected to complete around 2030, the plan was for Type 32 to follow immediately after, making use of the same workforce and design knowledge.

Shipyards such as Babcock’s Rosyth facility had counted on the programme as a likely follow-on to the Type 31. If the contract does not materialise, there will be political questions about regional investment and levelling-up commitments. The programme has also been used in ministerial statements to showcase long-term support for British shipbuilding. Quietly shelving it may not go unnoticed.

What Happens Next?

The Defence Investment Plan will effectively determine whether Type 32 goes ahead. So far, the concept has been allowed to remain on paper, with little real-world commitment. That could change if the Plan allocates funding and provides a clear timeline for assessment, design and procurement.

If not, the ship may linger in a grey zone for years, overshadowed by higher-priority programmes such as Type 83, Fleet Solid Support, and Multi-Role Strike Ships. With costs rising across the defence portfolio and Treasury pressure mounting, the Navy may be forced to make hard choices. Delaying or dropping Type 32 remains a very real possibility.

Whatever the outcome, the Royal Navy’s interest in uncrewed systems is not going away. Autonomous capabilities are already being introduced across the fleet, including on auxiliary ships and offshore support vessels. What the Type 32 offered was a chance to bring those technologies into the heart of a new warship. That idea still holds strategic value. Whether it can be made affordable in the current climate is the harder question.

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

30 COMMENTS

  1. There are currently a lot of distractions re new system… it would be a pity if drones and other unmanned systems were to cause the government to lose sight of the basics. We need, if not a Type 32, then at least an equivalent. However, that equivalent could be a system with minimal crew numbers… if drone/AI technologies keep going as they are, why not a Type 32 sized vessel with a crew of 10 -30? That, to me, is a reason why Type 32 could prove obsolescent before it enters service.

    But we need something. Apart from anything else, we need to maintain production capacity. We also need to increase the size of the fleet. For both these needs to be met then we still need Type32 or similar.

  2. It was always a press-release without a budget or a plan (Typical Boris Johnson era announcement).

    Just cancel it, save the hassle and cost of designing, testing and operating THREE different frigate designs at the same time, and commit to a second batch of T31 – gaining all the benefits of scale from a larger order and reaffirming faith in the the T31/Arrowhead design for export sales. If you want ‘drone mother ship’ or whatever, then do a different fit-out of the basic T31 hull.

    Sigh

      • Apart from the eight T26 and five T31 currently in build, of course….

        If we’re stopping at 13 new frigates, then all the more reason to stop pretending, formally cancel T32 and release staff for other things. If the goal is to expand the number of escorts (and that’s what has been stated) then best to do so as efficiently as possible.

    • Boris announcing plans for a massive project without considering the cost or reality, doesn’t sound like him. He would never come up with a roundabout under the Irish sea or a floating airport in the thamas or well a dozen other schemes.

      To be fair not sure the navy would really want yet another type of escort. T45/t26/t31/river2 already means little room for savings through common design or equipment. If they find the money better to focus on extra t31 or 26 or to fit out the river2 so they could actually do something useful in a war situation.

  3. Perhaps they should put T32 on hold for now and order more T31 – the RN badly needs more escorts.
    If they are looking for money-saving suggestions, here is one: refit the remaining Bay-class auxiliaries as the first three MRSS. Strip them down to the weather deck and build new superstructure, including a hangar for multiple helicopters, and fit them out with similar sensor and weapons fit to T31. Yes, there are disadvantages to doing this, but when needs must…

  4. If the future of the RM is smaller company scale operations, the T32 could be a flexible platform capable of frigate duties and the MRSS role. T31 could be an affordable base platform , larger than the twin role Absalon class.
    We don’t know the current state of the 10 year equipment plan. The last one, published in 2023, had swung back into shortfall largely because the RN had included costs of unapproved programmes- T32, T83, FSS, MRSS and FAD( together with a big increase in the nuclear budget to cover AUKUS.)

      • I remember the ” large non complex warships” description. But it hasn’t been mentioned for a while. Do we really need large for company sized ops? Can we afford MRSS and additional escorts?

        • The most recent imagery suggests a large ship, as does the NN interview with the RN official in charge of the programme.

  5. A second batch of T31 is a no brainer to me but fitted with the CIP upgrades from the start. A 32 cell Mk 41 for TLAM and quad packed CAAM plus NSM. If the Royal Marines and amphibious ops come back in fashion which with the First Sea Lord being a Royal Marine it might ( although personally and sadly I doubt) then NGFS might also make a come back so you could swop out the 57mm in favour of a five inch gun . Speaking to a former frigate skipper pal of mine he said he couldn’t imagine being a frigate driver without any idea of what is going on under the sea so I would also add a hull mounted sonar for which the basic T31 hull form was designed to include and possibly provision for some form of TAS, possibly of a CAPTAS type and to keep down initial build cost fitted for not with.

  6. So as the article says, T32 was meant to be midway between T26 and T31 in capability, an adaptable multi-role frigate. Well, seeing as the T31 project seems to be going well, then why not just buy a second batch T31 and this time arm it properly – give it a 5 inch gun, a 32 cell VLS, the future anti-ship missile and a containerised towed sonar. Could order 10, or even 12, and sell on the original T31s as replacements become available.

    Spending the money on actual ships would be far better value for money than spending it on fantasy designs that can never be produced.

    • Why the five-inch gun? There’s precious little that it can do that the smaller 57mm cannot in the modern battlespace.

        • Most analysts are suggesting that the NGFS requirement will be pretty irrelevant into the future, given the rapid proliferation of shore-based anti-ship weaponry. Operating close to the shore of a contested coastline will be suicide.

  7. It seems as though ordering an extra two or three frigates from Babcock would be a cheap and straightforward improvement to combat mass. Crewing is set to improve in the future, so that should become less of an issue. Similarly, the price of each individual warship of the class should come down with each new ship added to the order. The RN will lose its forward deployed Batch II River-class ships soon as they replace the Batch I in the home waters – these proposed extra Type 31 frigates could replace those vessels.

    I’m not entirely sure that the Type 31 requires the Mk41 urgently. Doubling the Sea Ceptor count in the design would be an easier change to make and would significantly improve its air defence capability. I’d rather see the money spent on sonar.

      • Firstly, is there any evidence to support your claim?

        Secondly, assuming you’re correct, a containerised system could be used. A hull-mounted system could be fitted – the IH-class had a bow-mounted sonar. Either would be an improvement over its current fit.

        • My evidence? Go look up type 31 bow

          Are you strapping the container to the bottom of the ship? There is no bow done for a sonar, it’s solid steel

          • Containers could be placed into areas of the ship specifically designed to be left empty for future upgrades. A TAS could be used. Babcock have advertised that the design could be given an improved ASW performance through additional sonar and quieting, so the potential is clearly there.

            If you’re willing to spend the money, the solid bow could be replaced, although the practicalities of such an operation are debatable.

  8. Government problem “we haven’t enough escorts”
    Government plan “we will build no more than the current type 23s in numbers.
    Result – we will be in the same situation later down the line.
    Genius.

  9. I liked the idea of the fearless Class Multi-Role Ships. Basically felt like a merge of mrss and Type 32 in one ship.

  10. Problems with introducing a third frigate are considerable.

    We are just about broke as a nation. Claims that we are the 7th richest nation in the world are one-eyed, we are only so due to GDP per head x population. Virtually every country in western Europe has a higher standard of living than we do and more to spend on defence Pro rata.

    The RN’s proposed acquisitions alreadt exceed its budget by miles. There is basically no cash to pay for MRSS, the second Proteus, anything more than 3 Stirling Castle MCMVs and the gap between financial reality and RN aspirations is now pretty massive – even before amyone says T32 FF.

    Strategically, the new emphasis is going to be on NATO first and the air and land forces we are committed to providing but are singularly failing to do so. For instance, we are meant to provide a strategic reserve of 2 heavy divisions, meaning 6 armoured infantry brigade groups. We have just two to offer and they have almost no field artillery, sparse air defence, a tiny tank force, no counter-UAS weapons and a fleet of armoured vehicles 30, 40 and 50 years old. The priority here is pretty clear: first RAF fast jets the number of which have shrunk to minimalist proportions, then the land equipment for this UK corps for NATO.

    Facing a pretty limited naval threat from Russia, the RN is strategically the least important service for the forseeable future. (Yes, we are an island and rely on international trade routes, but so many of our allies are islands or have much large littorals than we do, without feeling the need to send a flag-waving carrier group X,000 miles away from the NATO area.

    More escorts would be great, along with more subs, corvettes, MCMVs and the rest. But financially, it’s not going to happen and strategically, it’s not a high priority in the new scheme of things..

    What the RN could perhaps pitch for is a return to the original T31 plan. That was building the first batch as T31E, the E standing for escort. The idea was that they would be flogged off to overseas navies and replaced by more capable ones.

    T31 is not wildly valuable as an out-of-area patrol frigate, because it has no dedicated ASW fitout and would be far too vulnerable to.attack from below the waves. Revert to the original plan, sell off the T31s and replace with a propetly armed T32, with a hull-mounted AESA radar, rafted engines and equipment, to make it less noisy in ASW mode, then you would have a useful addition to the fleet. It would be a good bit more expensive than a T31, but that is the price for having a capable general purpose frigate that can do all 3 roles – air defence, ASW and surface combat.

    .

    • How are you paying for 5 more somehow well equipped frigates when the T31 won’t even sell for its build price, besides the fact we need them till T26 is all in service

    • “Facing a pretty limited naval threat from Russia, the RN is strategically the least important service for the forseeable future. (Yes, we are an island and rely on international trade routes, but so many of our allies are islands or have much large littorals than we do, without feeling the need to send a flag-waving carrier group X,000 miles away from the NATO area.”

      Nonetheless. The Russian Northern Fleet is growing, and in capability of new class of subs. It will become even a more of a challenge once the Ukraine War ends in a stalemate. A new Cold War will be with us again for a couple of decades. Don’t be surprised if the Ru. launches some cruise missile strikes from the Irish Sea, because we have very little conventional deterrence left! Restore the Royal Navy fleet to pre 2000 size!

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