In today’s digitally driven battlespace, electronic warfare (EW) is emerging as one of the most decisive factors in military success.
EW refers to the use of electromagnetic radiation, such as radio waves and microwaves, to enhance a military’s own capabilities or to disrupt those of an adversary.
This article is the opinion of the author, Lord Ravensdale, Vice Chair of the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines.
Although global capabilities in this field are advancing rapidly, new research from the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) highlights significant challenges for UK defence, with our EW capability falling behind that of leading nations.
How is electronic warfare changing defence?
Modern militaries rely heavily on the electromagnetic spectrum for communication, navigation, targeting and situational awareness. EW exploits this reliance.
Techniques such as ‘jamming’ can block or confuse enemy sensors; directed energy weapons, including lasers and microwave systems, can physically damage electronic components; and spoofing can mislead adversaries by mimicking legitimate signals. For example, it’s possible to spoof global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals (such as GPS) by sending false location and timestamp information, tricking the receiver into thinking it is at a different location. This can cause ships or aircraft to lose their way and missiles to miss their targets.
The Ukraine conflict has brought EW into sharp focus. In Ukraine, Russian EW systems have been reportedly responsible for 75% of Ukrainian drone losses and have significantly reduced the accuracy of artillery. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have quickly developed a range of EW countermeasures, demonstrating rapid innovation. One of the most striking adaptations has been the use of fibre-optic-controlled drones. To bypass Ukrainian detection and jamming, Russian forces began operating drones via kilometres-long fibre-optic cables, effectively “hardwiring” them to avoid electromagnetic interference. This physical workaround, paired with artificial intelligence (AI) for navigation and targeting, offers greater defence and resilience against communication loss.
But EW is not confined to the battlefield. All UK critical national infrastructure depends on electromagnetic signals, including air traffic control, maritime navigation and emergency services. There has been limited testing in the UK of how these systems would respond to an EW attack, despite the fact that disruption, whether accidental or deliberate, could have cascading effects. In 2024, for instance, GPS interference reportedly caused outages affecting commercial aviation and shipping across Europe.
The UK’s EW capability gap
The US, Russia and China are considered global leaders in EW, while, despite its strategic importance, Europe has critical capability gaps. According to Justin Bronk, Senior Research Fellow at RUSI, airborne EW capabilities are one of the areas where NATO countries depend most on the US military.
This has been set out in starker terms by former Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter. In evidence to the House of Lords’ International Relations and Defence Committee, he noted that the UK does not have “the electronic warfare capability that we need”.
The 2025 Strategic Defence Review recognised cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum as a distinct military domain and committed to establishing a CyberEM Command by the end of 2025. The Command aims to address the lack of a central coordination body, as so far, each branch of the UK’s armed forces has developed its own EW expertise, leading to fragmentation. While improved coordination is a welcome step, implementation will take time. Compounding this is a persistent skills gap.
Another recent report from POST found skills shortages across STEM sectors cost the UK economy an estimated £1.5 billion a year – and defence is not immune to this widespread issue. UK defence struggles to recruit and retain personnel with STEM expertise, and only one UK university offers specialist postgraduate courses focusing on EW. Without a strong pipeline of trained professionals, even the most advanced systems risk falling short in practice.
Additionally, structural barriers hinder the UK’s progress in EW, with defence procurement being among the most significant. Traditional “vendor-style” contracts, where a single supplier delivers an entire contract, are often too rigid for rapid innovation, leading to “vendor lock” and limiting adaptability. The MOD’s new segmented procurement model aims to address this by tailoring contracts to the urgency and risks involved for each capability. However, there are still regulatory challenges for testing and development. Strict spectrum management rules have historically limited the ability to test EW systems within the UK. Although these rules were withdrawn in 2024, a new framework is still being developed.
What’s being done to close the UK’s EW capability gap?
Despite these challenges, there are promising developments, and the UK is investing in cutting edge technologies. The MOD has committed to installing the DragonFire Laser Directed Energy Weapon on warships between 2024 and 2027, to counter targets like missiles and drones at low cost. In recent years, there has also been investment in the SPEAR-EW, a decoy and stand-in jammer mounted on miniature cruise missiles.
Of course, you can’t have innovation without investing in research and development. The Electromagnetic Environment Hub was established in 2023 to link five universities with industry partners, and earlier this year the MOD announced a new UK Defence Innovation organisation. With a £400 million annual budget, it’s designed to accelerate the adoption of commercial technologies. The UK also continues to collaborate with NATO and recently joined the Capability Coalition for Electromagnetic Warfare, sharing knowledge and resources with European allies and Ukraine.
If implemented effectively, plans outlined in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review to improve coordination and innovation, training and spectrum-sharing between military and civilian sectors could significantly enhance the UK’s EW resilience and capability.
To move forward, it’s important we recognise EW is no longer a niche capability, and control of the electromagnetic spectrum is fast becoming as critical as control of air, land or sea.
If the UK can not grasp the nettle on this issue, then we can expect a grim period in the not-too-distant future. Every element of our lives could face disruption on so many levels, from drone attacks to hacking and electronic interferance to radar, telephone connections, and even corruption of our car computers, rendering them useless. Range Rover has seen the effects of modern hacking, and it’s not only put their business on a back foot but caused a drop in UK productivity.
Interesting china have a bit of a fascination with EW and cyber.. it plugs directly into a modern version of their warfighting paradigm..system warfare, essentially if you can destroy or suborn an enemies systems you essentially destroy its will to fight, even if it has significant forces left if its systems of control collapse it does not matter.