Britain is working with industry to secure materials and reduce bottlenecks in the Challenger 3 upgrade programme, the UK Defence Journal understands.

Three questions were submitted by Labour MP Luke Akehurst, who asked about Challenger 3 production, tank and artillery lead times, and efforts to cut overall procurement timelines.

Defence Minister Luke Pollard said the Ministry of Defence is “working closely with the supply chain to ensure the timely development of Challenger 3,” adding that the department is focused on “securing the necessary materials, identifying opportunities and mitigating risk to deliver tanks to users as soon as practicable.”

On broader procurement timelines, Pollard cited the Defence Industrial Strategy, which currently estimates “an average of six years to contract for major defence platforms.” He noted that comparing lead times to other NATO countries is difficult because “differing procurement systems make direct comparisons challenging.”

Pollard said the MoD’s new segmented procurement model, supported by accelerated commercial pathways, is intended to cut timelines and move major programmes to contract faster. He reiterated that the department is “making progress towards the target date of 1 April 2026” for full implementation of the reformed approach, as set out in the Strategic Defence Review.

Lisa West
Lisa has a degree in Media & Communication from Glasgow Caledonian University and works with industry news, sifting through press releases in addition to moderating website comments.

82 COMMENTS

    • Any increase in production rates means increase in number which means increase in money.

      The problem is that there needs to be a commitments pot of money on the table to fund 20 years of procurement.

      The risk is you do that and the mega projects get greedy eyes: Tempest; DNE; SSNA and conventional ends up still scraping the bottom of the barrel.

      • I thought more money was going to procurement. Maybe there is a plan to potentially order more in the future once they speed up production?

        They reactivated reserve Challenger 2’s recently didnt they?

            • It could be by transferring Challenger II parts to the reserve hulls as they are stripped for refurb?

              Anything is possible if you have the will and are prepared to avoid the usual handwringing perfectionist nonsense.

              • True, would be awesome if it was more tanks though. I get warfare has changed, it always changes but tanks still have a part to play.

                • A Disingenuous attempt by Ministers to make the fleet look bigger than it is. Knackered hulls at Ashchurch stored in the rain or in hangers with leaking rooves left for decades added to the overall total.
                  For interest, Ashchurch has finally got investment and new builds going up as we speak.
                  Agree on Tank numbers. The Army needs more, but not the BAOR levels. It lacks the CS and CSS for that.
                  3 Regiments at T56 as planned post 2010 SDR with proper reserves is realistic. As it is, reserve and training / maint pool is wafer thin it is laughable.

                  • On the Subject of Ashchurch, much has been said about the Rail link from that base, & therefore the mobility of platforms both to & from the base, “But” I have also heard that the surrounding rail network it’s self is not up to the job of carrying the unit’s loads & wondered whether there was any future plans to invest in that network. Kind regards P.

                    • We’ve discussed it here before, with Simon amongst others who I see has also commented.
                      I’ve no idea if the link into Ashchurch is intact cannot tell on GE and I don’t live nearby to look. Insanity if not.
                      Wider infrastructure, that is indeed N R responsibility.
                      The company I’m still employed by, so no comment there.

                  • Daniele, Your three T56 regiments need 168 tanks and we are only creating 148 CR3s. Then, as you say there are tanks required for the Trg Org (RAC and REME), the Repair Pool and the Attrition Reserve. They just must be going for T44 or T38 regiments.

                    • I think T38 myself.
                      You know the tired old line only HMG believe and which the chiefs comply with, more with less, more modern, more high tech.
                      Have we had T38 Regiments before?

            • 69 according to Force Index. Would they have done this if they didn’t intend on ordering more than 148 C3? It could be to maintain numbers while the conversion work is ongoing, but lets hope the equipment plan calls for more.

              • They absolutely could have done it to keep the order at 148. Temporarily increase the CR2 fleet so that numbers are maintained as CR3’s go into production so that the fleet stays at strength.

              • Yeah, just found the article – brief and to the point. The picture looks like a Chally 2 mind 🙂 Nice close up.

            • According to Army Recognition, “On 30 October 2025, the United Kingdom published its annual statistical release UK armed forces equipment and formations 2025, in which the Ministry of Defence lists 288 Challenger 2 main battle tanks in the British Army inventory, compared with the 219 vehicles recorded in the 2024 edition.”

        • Elliot. They did not reactivate Attrition Reserve tanks. They should already be good to go, ideally. They are now counting some tanks on the Inactive list as active tanks which is ridiculous. It’s a pathetic smoke and mirrors game.

        • Yep and there is literally no barrier to refitting a knackered challenger two to challenger 3.. Russia has reactivated tanks left outside for multi decades in worst conditions that any UK challenger has been stored in… it would simply cost more.. the numbers being refitted purely relate to the number that can be refitted for the budget provided.. increase the budget increase the number refitted.

      • With zero prospect of this government increasing defence spending beyond 2.6% and GCAP closely followed by AUKUS about to go draw heavily on the defence £, there is zero prospect of any significant uplift in anything anywhere.

        Despite all the talk of this and that, I expect nothing to change, as there simply isn’t any money to fund change or expansion of anything.

        If the government had announced a plan to shift towards 3.5% by 2029, investing billions extra each year, we would have been in with a chance, as it is, its bullshit, spin smoke and mirrors.

        • Beautifully expressed.

          Are you going to pop into your namesake’s shoes and sort out The Tangerine Tinted one’s anti narco war? I hear Dr Ryan is on standby with an old cab….

          • Now where did I leave that M16 shorty carbine, 🤔 ill need it again to dispose of renegade Cuban intelligence officers and so forth 🤣🤣

    • This was asked before, but could they not explore buying back some of the better conditioned CR2s from Oman(?) and upgrade those to CR3s rather than new builds? Might be cheaper and quicker to build up the tank fleet to 200-250 if required.

    • 222 Challenger 3 tanks would be the perfect number, that’s half of the 148 added onto the original order, making it 222. it just makes more, it’s a much more robust number than 148.

  1. 1,200 CHALLENGER 3 main battle tanks should be the correct order-enough to equip 5 Armoured divisions.After that start design work on another even better MBT=THE CHAMPION MAIN BATTLE TANK with a 130mm main armament.We also need to increase the British Army to 200,000 men and buy another 100 Apache attack helicopters.

    • Fantasy Fleets I’m afraid. There were around 900 at BAOR peak in the late 80s fielded by 13 Armoured Regiments, 12 of which were in Germany.
      In 3 Armoured Divisions.
      We have a single undersized Armoured Division after Strike 2015 neatly cut one of the 3 Brigades.
      We have 3 Regiments, and a lack of HETS to move them, and RLC railway capability not yet rebuilt.
      Where are the REME, RLC, and people for such a force? Even if it were possible, which it isn’t, I’d spend such money on the RAF and the RN first.
      We do need a bigger army to rebuild missing CS CSS, we don’t need a force that size given our geostrategic position.

            • We do. All the services need more.
              For the Army, I hope to see CS CSS, which includes GBAD and Artillery, as areas to expand, even modestly.

                • And they’re not for UK home defence anyway, the two we have cover MRAD and SHORAD for the Field Army, so 12 and 16 RA.
                  Rumours of a 3rd to be formed.
                  On home defence, I’d start to rebuild the RAF Regiment for that role but that means HMG actually doing something ?

      • there something a bit odd with the numbers of HET as well . Fasttrax have 92, yet there are 165 on the books and number have been at level or above for a number of years. Unless the Fasttrax ones are only for tanks ?

      • Sadly mate, we are getting the square route of sweet f#ck all.

        The extremely modest lift to 2.6 % will be entirely swallowed by GCAP and AUKUS and the raft of drone programms, its all unfunded political spin.

        I expect further cuts unfortunately, medium helicopter capability first on the chopping block.

        Thypoon Tranche 2 will also likely be starved of any updates and withdrawn, slowly replaced by penny packet orders of F35A.

          • At least Ship/Sub/ fast air is genuine sovereign capability mate.
            There’s no way the Army aren’t getting starved of funds with 2.6% to play with, it simply isn’t enough to shoulder two extremely expensive programmes almost simultaneously and fund any increases or serious re-capitilisation programmes.

            The Army will be issued with off the shelf purchases for the next decade.

            The only hope is a new government in 2029 that decisively increases the defence budget to at least 3.5%. I would argue we need to return to 5%, as it was in the last cold War.

            We have allowed things to drop so far below critical mass, it will take sustained and really significant ( double the current budget) to turn it around.

            • I always hope to remain realistic.
              Equip the Army we have properly, starting with the CS CSS it needs.
              All else a bonus.

              • Totally agree, the small army we have requires recapitlisation of its assets, they need effective and mobile GBAD + laser based systems, Artillery and strike missiles, APC’s, Chally 3, attack drones controlled from our Apaches etc, etc…

                We might only be deploying in Brigade strength, but we can at least ensure that Brigade is extremely well equipped and protected and able to throw a powerful punch…

    • And how are you going to a) pay for all that and b) recruit 200,000 troops?

      It’s a nice thought but pure fantasy.

      Increasing to 180-200 tanks would be a nice start.
      Personally, I’d rather extra money go towards additional Typhoons, F-35s, ships, submarines and/or increasing weapons stocks.

    • I assume this is an attempt at humour Simon. At the very least what would be the point of another 100 Apaches. With recent events they are working hard to work out ways of keeping those they have viable and survivable. Maybe they can find a true survivable role for them, that would be great but spending money on increasing the potential risk that they can’t would be madness at this point. Unmanned platforms as things stand look like a far more sensible move.

        • 5 Armoured Divisions is not affordable. Especially if it’s coupled with the development of a native MBT. Effectively you’re asking to more than double the size of the army, as well as equip it in the most cost intensive way and are pretending that the budget can cover that.

          • We need to more than double the size of all of our armed forces in real terms=200,000 Army/100,000 Navy/80,000 air force with 80,000 Army Reserves/30,000 Navy reserves/30,000 Air force reserves.12 Divisions-5 ARMOURED/1 AIRMOBILE/1 MARINES/1 MOUNTAIN/4 INFANTRY all fully equipped to wartime establishments.We need 4 85,000 tons nuclear powered catobar/emals aircraft carriers with 75 aircraft each and helicopters on each one,plus each carrier battle group with 4 cruisers and 8 destroyers each plus 26 nuclear attack subs and 4 nuclear missile subs and 40 P-8A maritime attack aircraft.The air force should be massively increased in size to have over 50 front line squadrons-30 multirole fighters/10 transport squadrons/2 aew squadrons/5 refuelling squadrons/2 combat search and rescue sqns/1 vip sqn/8 training sqns and 8 reconaissance sqns and 10 reserve sqns.All helicopters to go to the army and navy except combat sar and vip.Do not try to tell me this is unafordable-it is more than capable of being done.

              • Not just that, BritForce1….we need a Sqn to operate out of RAF Northolt same as the US Mercury Doomsday planes and also the AF1 Boeings. Starmer and Lammy/Cooper would love it having critiqued the Tories for using VVIP for so long while then happily using them themselves as the need arises.
                They’ll need a Brit Force 1 to command all these missile programs they keep starting.

            • Thing is with these fantasy fleets, the enablers and Logistics I love are often ignored.
              So, practicalities….
              30 Fast Jet Sqns…..cool.
              So that is, ideally, 15 MOBs then as usually RAF Wings had 2, or sometimes 3 Sqns each.
              So 10 if you must.
              Each of these 15 or 10 RAF Stations would need HAS for the 2 or 3 Sqns, plus be linked to the GPSS, plus have a SSA, plus ATC, plus the associated Fire Station, Admin, Ops, and Support Wings.
              What locations do you have in mind?
              I can think of 7 sites already, that have HAS, but not the rest. The HAS might also need upgrading, new runways put in, as some sites don’t have a usable runway, and some the HAS are used for other things.
              Where are your other 8?
              Fantasy fleets I’m afraid, but fun.

    • Why the hell would we do that.. the security of the UK is dependent on the following ( there is no order of precedence)
      1) strategic nuclear deterrence
      2) strategic conventional deterrence ( the ability to harm another nation without nuclear weapons) that’s Carrier battle group, SSN and long range strike aircraft as well as other strategic range munitions
      3) a navy to secure our sea routes to and from the UK
      4) protected our EEZ and land from air and sea attacks
      4) NATO surviving as a politically viable defence alliance

      The UKs job in NATO should be in securing the seaways to and from Europe, supporting air and sea dominance in the North and being able to sustain a division for supporting Northern European boarder integrity.. there is literally no place for 5 heavy divisions when we cannot even protect our own airspace and EEZ from air surface and subsurface attack and we do not have the capability to attack an enemy over and over again with strategic range weapons.. because if NATO decided it’s not attacking Russia and yet Russia decides to take lumps out of the UK.. those five divisions would be useless

      If we had adequate tanks for 3 type 56 regiments as will as an attritional reserve of another 56 tanks ( that could equip the royal Wessex yeomanry as a functioning set of sabre squadrons ).. 250 would do for that.

      • Strategic Conventional Deterrance is based on Land forces. Navy and Air are adjuncts to that. The UK’s job absolutely should not be securing sea ways. One of the wealthiest ENATO countries can not simply slopey shoulders the hard fighting and focus on the easy job.

        • I would not say deploying a heavy division is slopping shoulders.. and land forces are not a strategic deterrent in that by their nature they would be defensive.. strategic deterrent needs to be able to hit a nation hard and deep.. that destroying its infrastructure.. the UKs naval forces have never been an adjunct they have always been the primary force.. by the nature of being an island our army is alway depend on an ally..our navy is not… if for instance Poland and Germany decided for whoever reason to no prosecute a land war, no matter how strong our army it would essentially be neutered..and there could be situations in which Poland and Germany chose not to fight if it was in their national interests to not do so.

          • Land forces are not in their nature defensive. In fact, by the very nature that they can advance into enemy territory and occupy it, unlike Air and Sea forces, they are the least defensive option. And deploying a single heavy division and under investing in the Army while waffling about “protecting sea lanes” from a foe with a second tier navy is 100% sloping shoulders, and you know it.

            We aren’t going to war without an Ally, so that line about an army being dependent on an ally is bunk. “If Poland and Germany decided not to prosecute a land war.” A) We’d have the option of staying out of it. B) Without a credible land force we are not winning a war in that scenario. And if Poland and Germany don’t fight then it’s *EVEN MORE* important for the UK to have a credible land force.

            • You make a good case for strengthening the Army Dern, but as it is, Labour simply arnt going to provide funding.

              The army is now sized for deploying Brigade elements at best, it lacks the manpower, the equipment and the enablers for anything else.

              The reality of the new cold war is that Poland (and perhaps Germany eventually) will provide the main Army elements.

              If things carry on as they are, I suspect we will see larger deployments to the Baltic states, somwhere the British Army could make a useful contribution.

              Perhaps a permanent deployment of 3,000 ish as a trip wire force.

              Like it or not, the political classes have reduced the capability and capacity of the Army, for reasons known only to them.

            • Dern you know very well the army is not going to punch deep into Russia, that’s not happening and never will. At best it will be used offensively on nato territory, yes you may see some deep strike but to actually undertake true deep strike we will use strategic range weapons systems.

              And I’m really sorry Dern the whole notion of “we are not going to war without an ally” is the false paradigm that has got use to we’re we are.. of course we could and probably will end up going to war with an ally, but it’s just as likely we will not, it’s happened to us before and will happen again.. and as a island the we have fought many wars without allies and first we would fight with our navy, they navy losses and the army would be irrelevant. This navy first approached has allowed us to both strangle our enemy and strengthen our army and collective alliances.. the simple truth is NATO may not do what it says on the tin, that is the nature of alliances they are both mutable and fragile and time limited, we have been the best friends and bitterest enemies with nations all in one generation and we may end up at war on our own

              So yes for the UK a reasonable proportion it a complete heavy division to NATO and providing it with a good airforce, good navy and good strategic nuclear response.. Because NATO is important but it’s survival as a political and military power is not in our power and the duty of the government is first and always protect the UK not protect NATO, supporting NATO is a matter of self interest only.

              But we are not slipping shoulders because we provide 50% of E natos nuclear deterrence, 60% of its SSNs, 66% of its large carrier force… and the very best way Europe becomes irrelevant is to spend all its defence money on heavy land divisions.. because in a decade if the US keeps pulling away and China keeps developing it’s maritime power and is an ally of Russia it will be the RN and La Royale that prevent Europe from a war of strangulation.

              So the two divisions we have and from that being able to deploy one very good heavy division on a permanent basis ( because the next war will be long) is appropriate.. because you yourself point out we are not getting more brigades and many of the brigades we have don’t have full CS CCS.. so for me being able to deploy fully 4 brigades in a division or an indefinite period is an appropriate ambition ( 1 MBT brigade, 2 mec brigades and a light infantry brigade ) since we cannot even consider doing that at preset then first we do that.. but the continental powers of Germany and Poland need to be providing most of the land forces because they are not spending money on SSNs, SSBNs and carriers.. we cannot do everything and Europe needs our SSN, SSBNs and carriers more than the extra armoured brigades.. our nuclear deterrent will be sucking 128 billion pounds over the next decade.. to equip and run a British army armoured brigade for a decade is about 5-6 billion pounds.. ( 3 billion ish capital costs and 300 million a year running costs) so that nuclear deterrence we provide to ENato is the equivalent cost of about 20 armoured brigades over the next decade ..so no we don’t have slippy shoulders. We need to invest more but not in some vast land army.. 6 brigades done well so we can have a far crack at a long term deployment of 1 full division to Europe.. because to deploy 2 divisions long term we would need 12+ brigades and that is not happening or needed.

        • Perhaps you would tell us when protecting Britain’s/NATO’s sea rotes was an “easy job”. It wasn’t in either World War and it is difficult to imagine the task being any easier now.

      • Jonathan, An interesting post that manages not to mention the army!! Is it because you cover the defence of the UK as if we are not in an alliance, NATO, for our national protection?
        ‘Why the hell would we do that.. the security of the UK is dependent on the following ( there is no order of precedence)
        1) strategic nuclear deterrence
        2) strategic conventional deterrence ( the ability to harm another nation without nuclear weapons) that’s Carrier battle group, SSN and long range strike aircraft as well as other strategic range munitions
        3) a navy to secure our sea routes to and from the UK
        4) protected our EEZ and land from air and sea attacks
        4) NATO surviving as a politically viable defence alliance

        If Ukraine had a very strong army equipped with lots of high quality western equipment in Feb 2022 and with much of that close to their borders with Russia and Belarus, I doubt the Russians would have invaded – so strong land forces, forward based are a good ‘strategic deterrence’. Under strategic conventional deterrence you perhaps could have included NATO eFP – which has posited land forces in NATO frontline countries and includes our BG in Estonia and a smaller British force in Poland.
        We are not in this ‘crisis’ alone. Also, armies count. We should not just ‘do’ naval and air to deter and defend across the Euro-Atlantic region, with allies.

        • Hi graham, to be honest I sort of rolled the army into 4) as our army contribution is part of nato surviving as a politically viable defence alliance.. the troops we have in Europe are essentially the skin in the game that locks use firmly into the alliance.. completely agree we need an army but we should never have an army first approach as we are an island and utterly and completely depend on the sea for our security and safety. Therefore the army is alway about our contribution to an alliance or allies as we are never going to face or defeat a land powers army on our own… so building 5 armoured divisions for Europe while are navy is incapable of providing the escorts, patrol vessels, submarines and mine warfare and our airforce is down to 7 squadrons is not what we should be considering.. we just need to contribute to nato land deterrent.. but we need our own defence and interests managed as well, beyond a nato land border with Russian.

  2. Must admit, Pollard is funnier than Eagle was, in a “wordy” kind of way. I love socialists and their magic money tree.

  3. Is this another instalment of the release of the defence industrial plan by stealth? The whole thing was due in Autumn. I might remind Mr Pollard that those of us following the Celtic calendar are almost half way through winter!

  4. Pollard says his aim is 6 years to contract. Then from Contract Award there will be several more years of design, development, testing, manufacture. So what’s that? 10 years to fielding? Longer for something really complex like a carrier.

  5. We’re looking ay speeding up production? That’s nice. Another ten years and we night have two whole Brigades fo 48 tanks. WOW!!

  6. The Strategic Defence Review is clear:

    ‘Russia, a nuclear-armed state, had invaded and brutally occupied part of a neighbouring sovereign state. And in doing this it was supported by China, supplied with equipment from Iran and by troops from North Korea, deployed in Europe for the first time ever…..The sheer unpredictability of these and other global events, combined with the velocity of change in every area, has created alarming new threats and vulnerabilities for our country—and a dangerous complexity in the world…..If anything, the geopolitical context has worsened since we started.’

    ‘This Government is endorsing the vision and accepting all 62 recommendations in the SDR, which will be implemented….UK leading within NATO and taking on more responsibility for European security…updated conventional capabilities…..We will create a British Army which is 10x more lethal to deter from the land, by combining more people and armoured capability…’

    ‘The Army has some capability enhancements already underway, including Challenger 3…..But it must be bolder…..The Army must modernise the two divisions and the Corps HQ that it provides to NATO as one of the Alliance’s two Strategic Reserves Corps (SRC).’

    That means many more tanks (within associated combined arms formations) and everything required to sustain them in the field on extended operations.

    But this is the stark reality of where, in actual fact, we really are today:

    ‘I can absolutely assure the Committee that we can provide a trained divisional headquarters and certified and assured brigades—16 Brigade, 7th Light Mech Brigade Combat Team, and an armoured brigade—but there will be capability gaps in our ability to get there and our ability to sustain it for time.’
    General Sir Patrick Sanders, Nov 2023

    Long on aspiration: an Army Corps of two (perforce armoured within Central Europe) divisions. Short on actuality: a division (-) with one armoured brigade.

    Given these uncertain, dangerous times, something has to, will, give.

    Either the government junks net zero and fronts up to its NATO commitments, restoring a verifiably credible conventional deterrent in Central Europe or it risks the annihilation in battle of the entire British Army in short order and, potentially, the break up through force of arms of the United Kingdom within the medium term.

    • ‘The a priori elimination of coal as an energy source should at least be reviewed. The Ratcliffe-on-Soar coal plant should be maintained until the policy is clarified. We’re just about to eliminate the major coal processing plant. While I understand that fossil fuels should be reduced in the energy mix, their eradication is impractical and counterproductive.

      Further, the National Grid should be placed under the control of the Ministry of Defence as a matter of national security. It requires urgent restoration and expansion. My experience is that it is an opaque and taciturn institution utterly captured by the lanyard class and reluctant to fulfil its mission of cheap energy for the nation. The increase in defence spending must be shared with the National Grid so that its effectiveness and capacity are viewed as central to our national defence. At the moment, to coin a phrase, it is not fit for purpose.

      This is a colossal national task that should also be integrated into the renewal of vocational training and industrial strategy….’

      Lord Maurice Glasman Dec 2025

  7. Could we have 250 please so we can have three type 56 regiments with an attritional reserve of another regiments worth of tanks.

    • Further all hulls, not a select few, to be equipped with Trophy APS. That’s not nice to have rather as essential as armour.

      • Yes agree the evidence is huge around the survivability of armoured vehicles with trophy vs those without.. it needs to be standard kit.

        • As you have said all along the cost of aCR3 is relatively cheap,to add trophy as standard should be well within reach if the will was there.

  8. This guy sounds interesting:

    ‘After leaving college, Smith enlisted in the Canadian Army under an assumed name. His father found out and arranged for his discharge. After the United States entered World War II, Smith enlisted in the U.S. Army on 28 October 1942….he was commissioned as a second lieutenant of infantry on 12 July 1943. He served with the 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion, 4th Armored Division in Europe, earning a Silver Star Medal, two Bronze Star Medals and three Purple Hearts….He returned to active duty during the Korean War. Smith later commanded the 2d Brigade, 3d Armored Division in Germany and a combat brigade of the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam….In 1974, Smith was appointed commandant of the Army War College……’

    I wonder what he has to say?

    ‘Warfare is tri-dimensional and has been since at least the Spanish Civil War. To distinguish between surface and air, whether the struggle is for control of a sea area or a land mass, seems wrong. Making a distinction between an “air” battle and a “land” battle is not possible except at the lower tactical or procedural levels, certainly not at a strategic level…military forces, including land forces, have two important effects on an adversary. One is the physical, the other is psychological…the psychological effect of military force during periods of nonactive conflict becomes all-important.

    Even under conditions of nuclear inferiority, (Russian) strength in East Europe deterred the West from any initiatives in respect to demonstrated (Russian) vulnerabilities in East Germany, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia and from any ideas of “rollback” once expressed by Foster Dulles. Strategic nuclear parity, coupled with conventional superiority in Europe, could lead to temptations that even the traditionally conservative (Russian) regime might find hard to resist.’

    And so it proved, not just in 2014 but in 2022 as well, despite security assurances given to Ukraine by the U.S. and Britain (and Russia) in 1994, backed by strategic conventional air deterrence…but not backed by a verifiably credible conventional land deterrent after 2010.

    ‘So even if one believes that an attack on Western Europe is not a very likely scenario, he still cannot view the growing strength of the (Russian) Army in Eastern Europe without a certain uneasiness. For that Army not only serves the (Russians’) legitimate security interests, but it also exercises an influence on the (European NATO) Community that could be in the long run as fatal as naked aggression. The (Russian) Army in Eastern Europe….is a powerful political instrument. It is a vital element in (Russia’s) modern strategy….

    Opposite this (Russian) Army in Central Europe, the nations of the Atlantic Community maintain(ed) an army structured into 26 divisions and about 1600 tactical aircraft. There is a litany of shortcomings that one hears with ever more frequency in regard to the effectiveness of this army. Nonetheless, for almost (70) years, it….accomplished the basic mission for which it was formed-to deter (Russian) attack on…..Europe.’

    We know what to do. We have done it before. It works:

    ‘As a bare minimum, it is the role of the (European) army to replace the strategic nuclear deterrent as the instrument with which the attack option is foreclosed to (Russia). But that is a bare minimum. In a modern strategy the (European NATO) army must provide for the West a sense of security to a degree that will encourage it to act and react in respect to global events with confidence. That forecloses to (Russia) the options of intimidation, blackmail, and political leverage. The political requirement is that the military situation in Central Europe be in balance-that it be stabilized so that global freedom of action is not impaired. There is much work to be done if this political requirement of modern strategy is to be met.

    A stable nuclear balance makes imperative a stable conventional balance in Europe. Without that stability there can be no political or military counter to expanding (Chinese/Russian) influence in the Near East, South Asia, Africa, or in the great ocean basins upon which an interdependent world relies…..’

    LAND FORCES IN MODERN STRATEGY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL DE WITT C. SMITH, JR. US ARMY

    • The Peace Dividend delusion is over and we are not safe.
      Time to pay the insurance premium for freedom or learn ruzzian [CDS, 2025]

      The Peace Dividend delusion has allowed politicians to safeguard their electoral prospects by shifting Defence spending to social provision and even war in Europe hasn’t enabled them to pivot back to Defence.

      We bailed out the bankers in 2008 and now its their turn to invest in Defence since their business depends on peace and stability. Lower risk means lower cost for Defence Investment Bonds than standard Gilts.

      Thus the 3.5% GDP Defence spending target for 2030, and 2.75% GDP for 2026 are affordable without tax increases. A long term investment plan for national security.

      A requirement for a banking licence.

      Over to Finance Ministers to make it happen.

      PS: Rachel from accounts failed already with 2.6% UK GDP Defence spending for 2026.

  9. An interesting post on X,connected to the information in this article,suggests that the CR3 Build is encountering a few ‘ Issues ‘,Nimrod MR4 anyone ?.

    • They were experiencing supply chain issues which was said to have delayed, speeding up would rely on supply of prepared hulls from Babcock Bovington.

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