Many of you will remember that, way back in March 2023, Britain delivered 14 Challenger 2 main battle tanks (CR2, MBTs) to Ukraine, having previously trained Ukrainian crews how to operate them.
The initial media interest died away quite quickly, although I think it’s fair to say that then British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s initiative in gifting our tanks to Ukraine encouraged others to follow suit, most notable Germany and the USA with their Leopard 2s and M1A1 Abrams respectively.
On this occasion Britain led the way, and we should acknowledge and celebrate the fact. Kudos to Rishi.
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In Ukrainian service, CR2’s report card is a bit of a mixed bag. It has been lauded for the accuracy of its rifled 120mm gun, with some referring to it as “a sniper rifle among tanks”.
On the other hand, the three-piece ammunition that it uses is incompatible with the 120mm smoothbore guns which equip the Leopard 2 and M1A1 tanks, and so cross-loading of ammunition in the field is a non-starter. Plus the rounds for the British gun are no longer in production, and accordingly ammunition will eventually run out.
Ukrainian operators have praised CR2 for its high levels on crew protection thanks to its composite armour. In some situations crewmen have survived multiple hits which would have destroyed comparable MBTs. However it is not invulnerable, a topic to be returned to below.
So, Britain’s tank has been appreciated for its accuracy and crew protection, but as ever these have to be balanced by criticisms of other aspects.
It has faced some challenges on the Ukrainian battlefields due to its weight and mobility issues in certain terrain. Some Ukrainian crews have reported that the tank’s weight can cause it to get bogged down in soft ground.
This is hardly surprising. CR2’s all-up weight can well exceed 70 tonnes when fully loaded and with extra theatre-specific modifications, for example, the “cope cages” welded on to mitigate the drone threat. In addition, its relatively underpowered engine (1200 bhp as opposed to Leo2 and M1A1’s 1500 bhp power plants) has been found wanting in some soil conditions.
Logistically, it also carries a burden with it. Only 14 CR2s were donated to Ukraine but nonetheless bespoke logistic support was required to support them; it wasn’t just ammunition compatibility that has had to be catered for, but also almost everything else. It used to be a proud boast in the British army that no CR2 had been lost in combat (friendly fire incidents aside). Service in Ukraine has changed all of that.
On 4 September 2023, a video emerged from Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast which showed the first combat loss of a CR2 in the Ukrainian theatre of operations. A 9M133 Kornet missile triggered a fire that apparently cooked off the tank’s ammunition charges, and the resulting blast displaced the turret from the hull. Later, according to Ukrainian media, by 10 March 2024 two more CR2s had been damaged, leaving only seven of the original 14 remaining fit to fight.
Then, in August 2024, British news media were reporting that CR2 tanks were involved in Ukraine’s Kursk Oblast incursion. During this operation, a CR2 was destroyed by Russian forces using a Lancet loitering munition, the second confirmed total loss of a tank during the war. The third CR2 was destroyed on 14 November 2024 after a Russian FPV drone struck the driver’s position while the tank was parked in a tree line. A fourth CR2 tank was destroyed on 5 January 2025 after a Russian FPV drone struck its gun mantlet.
So, how many CR2s now remain operational with the Ukrainian armed forces? It’s hard to tell, but given that four have been destroyed, at least a couple of others damaged, and the lack of spares, the figure is probably half a dozen at best. That’s a token force, but to be fair the 14 originally donated was a token force in the first place.
What are the implications for Britain’s new Challenger 3 main battle tanks (CR3/MBTs) from their predecessors’ performance in Ukraine, or at least what little we know about it?
There aren’t many. CR3 is more or less a completely new design, albeit with parameters rapidly becoming obsolescent – four-man crew, manual loading of main armament, no in-built active protection system (APS) – which are unlikely to feature in future modern MBT designs. And, worryingly, it has no uprated main engine, retaining the 1200 bhp diesel engine of its predecessor.
CR3 will mount the German Rheinmetall 120 mm smoothbore gun, which is good news, making it compatible with Leo 2 and M1A1 Abrams, but will be “fitted for, not with” and APS system, of which only 60 are to be ordered under current plans. And its overall weight will be over 66 tonnes, which suggests the mobility problems experienced by CR2 in Ukraine are likely to be the same.
Finally, the UK is only ordering 148 CR3s, which is far too few. If one lesson has come out of Ukraine it is that you need mass, lots of stuff if you prefer, and the CR3 order does not represent the reality of modern armoured warfare. Britain’s new tank will be fine, but its numbers relegate it to yet another token gesture until some more credible plan comes along, if indeed it ever does.
Lt Col Stuart Crawford is a political and defence commentator and former army officer. Sign up for his podcasts and newsletters at www.DefenceReview.uk
Reasonable points.
It seems the correct order size is either 0 or maybe 400+ units, with the 148 the UK is ordering probably the worst of both worlds. All the infrastructure and support requirements for heavy armor are retained (training, spares, transporters, recovery vehicles etc.) and the Army has a token 2-day tank force. Given the quantities of armor some of our NATO allies are procuring (Poland about 1,000) I do question this and wonder if earlier investment into artillery (current 155mm fleet at 14 units… RCH155 when?) would have been a better call.
We should have gone for k9 straight off the shelf a number of other nato countries are buying rch is still pie in the sky and you have to wonder how many of the 14 archer are actually fully serviceable I know one for sure is banjoed after it rolled
One Archer out of action does not mean most of the fleet is non-available. In REME we worked to 70% of a fleet being available at all times rising to 90% after 24-48hrs concerted work assuming spares were available.
With the AS-90 replacement programme Sunak should have permitted the army to hold their competitive evaluation, rather than deciding for them. As I recall in the mix were Archer, Caesar, RCH-155 and K9 Thunder.
The Koreans were going to build k9 in the uk and base their European spares hub in the uk I’m not going to speculate how many archer are available apart from six in Estonia I’ve been led to believe the guns over here are being cannibilised for parts
“assuming spares were available” – this seems to be the main problem nowadays, e.g. there was nothing fundamentally wrong with AS90 but spares hadn’t been ordered for years and it basically needed an obsolescence management programme where parts from defunct manufacturers were replaced with ones that could still be ordered and produced on demand.
The sad fact is its not the numbers of tanks but the underlying economy that counts. In some ways Russia is uniquely placed along with the US in being more or less self sufficient hence the fact they are still pushing forward on their brutal mission of conquest.
Meanwhile with the disastrous state of the UK economy anything beyond 148 CH3s is a nonsense. Fielding 3 divisions at full stretch in a Euro war would be impossible unless on the scale of the Ukrainian Army as a defence force in say the Nordic arena. Gone are the glory days of BAOR let alone 21st Army Group!
There is now a self inflicted black hole shortfall of 40bn GBP just to stand still. Thanks to the last 5 years and particularly the last year of failure to get to the root of the problem, its over, until we have a Government that can rebuild the country after the recent shenanigans and hold it together.
Otterman, Ukraine has lost just two CR2s confirmed by Ukraine MoD. That is in over 2 years of operations. So why do you think we would lose all 116 tanks (assuming two regts deployed) in 2-days?
I do not see how tanks and SPGs are interchangeable – you seemingly suggest having no tanks and instead an earlier order for more SPGs. You need both – different roles.
It’s the old bad maths: Russia is loosing X number of tanks per day, therefore the UK has Y number of tanks Y/X=Z days. Forgetting that Russia has a lot more points of contact with the Enemy than the British Army ever will.
Is the UK really going to field 100 or so Challenger 3s in Central Europe ever??Doubtful.Any Tank on Tank warfare is going to be happening in Finland,Poland and the Baltic states, if Putins tanks head this way.CH3 costs be better spent on more Archer units and surveillance drones.Or follow Poland and buy 500 MBTs off S.Korea,sadly no money for that option.Perhaps the UK is waiting for future change in the White House(US defence umbrella back in place courtesy of friendlier White House) or change in the Kremlin(next leader less interested in Cold War nostalgia) so the money doesn’t have to be spent.Maybe consult a fortune teller for next SDR?
Marcus,
What real difference does it make if we (UK) deploy armoured forces to Central Europe or elsewhere in Europe, from a procurement POV? We have committed an armoured division to the ARRC and it is farirly usual to have some tanks in it!
Archer is an SPG and has a totally different role to a MBT. Surveillance drones have their place and we have some but they do not kill enemy armour. An armoured division needs tanks as well as SPGs and drones (surveillance and attack).
How do you crew 500 tanks with the current Orbat?
Our defence spend is not related to who is in the White House or the Kremlin. We are working to NATO-set targets.
Next SDR is probably 3-4 years away. I am more interested in seeing the DCP in a few months time.
Why would we deploy armour to Central Europe? We’d deploy it to Finland or Estonia.
UK SDR 2025
‘The Army will continue to need armoured platforms and attack helicopters to confront a major state adversary, fighting to take and hold ground.’
‘Role 2: Deter and defend in the Euro-Atlantic: providing one of two Strategic Reserve Corps to NATO, in line with NATO’s Regional Plans, ready to deploy rapidly from the UK to anywhere in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Army must also sustain its contribution to NATO’s forward presence in Estonia and Poland.’
‘The Army must modernise the two divisions and the Corps HQ that it provides to NATO as one of the Alliance’s two Strategic Reserves Corps (SRC).’
CR3 appears to be a stopgap.
‘The Army must accelerate the development and deployment of its new ‘Recce-Strike’ approach—combining existing capabilities and technologies, such as armoured platforms, with constantly evolving technology—as part of its efforts to modernise the SRC. It should be bolder in its ambition, seeking to increase lethality ten-fold, measured against a conventional armoured brigade model.’Consideration should be given to pre-positioning ammunition and heavier equipment in appropriately dispersed storage facilities in Europe, supporting NATO readiness and reducing the demand for strategic movement.’
Maybe we are waiting for the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) ‘…a modular main battle tank ‘which fulfils various capability requirements as a multi-platform system’.
If we are, then, in order to provide NATO with a Corps of two divisions capability in short order, we’re going to need a bigger Royal Armoured Corps and some COTS MBTs…….right away……
So that’s a load of random off topic shit that isn’t answering the question I asked.
Also “two divisions” doesn’t mean “two armoured divisions.” The UK has been very clear that it intends it’s commitment to ARRC to be the HQ, an Armoured Division and a Light Mech Division.
You haven’t read the Strategic Defence Review.
If you had, you wouldn’t be asking silly questions.
‘The Army must modernise the two divisions and the Corps HQ that it provides to NATO as one of the Alliance’s two Strategic Reserves Corps (SRC). The SRC should be led by the Corps HQ (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps) and enabled by, and command, Corps-level capability. The first division should comprise a fully deployable Headquarters, three manoeuvre brigades with armoured and mechanised capabilities, support brigade, and associated enablers. Planning should include the integration of the Royal Marines Commando Force into the SRC when appropriate.
The Army must accelerate the development and deployment of its new ‘Recce-Strike’ approach—combining existing capabilities and technologies, such as armoured platforms, with constantly evolving technology—as part of its efforts to modernise the SRC. It should be bolder in its ambition, seeking to increase lethality ten-fold, measured against a conventional armoured brigade model.’
The SDR makes it quite clear that both divisions will (eventually) have to be armoured:
‘The Army will continue to need armoured platforms and attack helicopters to confront a major state adversary, fighting to take and hold ground…..Armoured platforms improve the survivability of personnel in an increasingly transparent battlefield……Consideration should be given to pre-positioning ammunition and heavier equipment in appropriately dispersed storage facilities in Europe, supporting NATO readiness and reducing the demand for strategic movement.’
They just haven’t worked out how or when to fund it yet. It is to be hoped that they have three to five years to sort things out.
How ‘out of production’ is the chally ammo really?
IIRC there was a recent shift to insensitive munitions so the propellant at least was recently produced and I assume it’s probably the same for the HESH charges.
I expect it could be produced again without too much difficulty but there is no appetite to given we are switching to different ammo. And how much ammo can 14 tanks that are mostly lurking in tree-lines waiting for targets of opportunity and indirect fire missions actually consume?
As far as I know HESH is still being manufactured in Belgium. The Charm APFSDS were being made by BAe. Who are one of the few manufacturers in the World that can make the depleted uranium darts.
An excellent article!
And points out exactly why we will have issues with CH3, and also the low numbers
I think it’s been a mistake to select CH3…too few to matter indeed!
Nice to have some, but the British Army needs more to help give options even on the ever changing modern battlefield
But as we see, the tank is now becoming like the cavalry on horses in 1914…Time for a rethink!
All the tanks in Ukraine suffer the same issues as mentioned above, and they are drone bait.
The video’s I see of the tanks and in fact artillery, shoot and scoot and get put back in their camouflaged hideouts QUICK!!
Those who go on the offensive may not survive
Drones will spot them
A quote I saw recently about tanks in Ukraine:- “Functioning more like cautious artillery” CORRECT they were!!!!
The Ukrainian tank brigades have ceased to exist this month and re-rolled to Medium \ Heavy Mech Brigades, with the new CORPS already being organised, and the tank issues were mentioned
Ukraine’s tanks are dispersing on the battlefield to help enable survivability and into more of a supporting role than a lead role
Ramble on …over🤣😒👍
Yes let’s swap real fire power and a real air force for cheap drones. Brilliant idea!
Not what he said, idiot 🤡💩
But what about the problem of “real firepower” being so expensive that it’s almost impossible to get hold of? There’s a strong argument to be made that a lot of cheap stuff is better than a few high-end items.
John, the article points to the author’s perceived reasons for disatisfaction with CR2. In no way does it mean that CR3 will have all of the same ‘issues’. For a start, it will have a NATO-common gun and ammunition. What really were the alternatives to CR3? Scrap CR2 and buy Abrams, Leo2 or K9 Thunder? Are any of those a quantum leap ahead of CR2 (in mobility, firepower, protection), affordable or ‘made in Britain’ meaning good for UK jobs? No, so it had to be CR3.
The numbers are disappointing. CR3 is to replace a fleet of what once was 386 CR2s (which was not a Cold War purchase, but a post-Cold War purchase, ie intended for the newer smaller army coming out of Options For Change, the summer 1990 defence review). I presume the order numbers were based on the Future Soldier Orbat of just two armoured regiments. Daniele tells us that KRH is to remain as the third armoured regiment so 148 tanks is nowhere near enough. A rethink is required to deliver far more than 148 tanks. It will be interesting to see what the answer will be.
The demise of the tank has been predicted since the first anti-tank weapons were fielded in 1918 – they are still around.
What I don’t think people appreciate is just how insanely cheap the challenger 3 is..an all up modern MBT is 20-25 million pounds a pop..we are getting that challenger 3s at just a smig over 5 million a pop.. that’s essentially buy one get 3 free.
To put that into context the 148 challenger 3s are costing 800 million which cheap as chips.. if we had purchased a new MBT we would have had to spend 3700 million pounds…
Also a little point from me:
The Horse wasn’t obsolete in 1914. In fact cavalry was pretty important throughout the Eastern, African and Palestine fronts, and was British cavalry had a decent success record when it managed to get into action on the Western Front (getting Cavalry into Action was tricky, in 1914 it wasn’t an issue because the front was mobile, in 1915 there was a lot of headscratching. In 1916 there was an attempt to get the cavalry divisions into action in the Somme, but it failed [basically the lack of Radios and the fact that you needed to build bridges over trenches and cut wire meant you had to plan where you wanted the cavalry to break through, and if there was an issue with the infantry breaking through at that specific location… the cavalry just had to sit behind the lines, and because everyone was worried that would happen and block supply lines the Cavalry where right at the back (because no radios to call them forwards everything was on a time table). So by the time the Cavalry was told to move forwards it was too late.
In 1917 with the German withdrawl to the Hindenburg line, the change to defence in depth (and some clever inventions like the mobile cavalry trench bridge) the Cavalry actually had some actions, and showed themselves to be useful, dynamic and even demonstrated that there was still a place for the charge and saber on the modern battlefield (I can think of several occasions where British Cavalry used Rifle and/or Machine gun fire to pin German units and then used mounted men with saber to flank and charge, overwhelming their opponents decision making cycle). But also had some issues, lack of Cavalry – Infantry co-operation led to incidents like when a Cavalry Sqn had to un-surrender some prisoners who then re-armed themselves and attacked the Sqn from behind.
By 1918 the cavalry came into it’s own, but there just wasn’t a lot of it. The few mounted units that took part in the Kaiserschlacht acquitted themselves well, using similar tactics (which had been developed pre war btw) as mentioned above.. In the Hundred Days offensive, while the German Imperial Army never fully broke and ran causing a general pursuit: British Units that had Cavalry Support on average took twice the ground each day that unsupported Infantry and Tanks took. (Cavalry also had a good reputation dismounted, as high initiative pre-war professional soldiers, largely held in reserve for 1915-17 more comfortable with manuever than the Infantry accustomed to their trenches they where just “good” mounted or dismounted.
Anyway the Cavalry wasn’t made obsolete until really the 1930’s when internal combustion engines really started to be as reliable and cross country capable as horses, but the combination of having sat in reserve for several years, and the myth of British Cavalry “charging machine guns” (in and of itself a hodgepodge of bad eyewitness accounts, confusion with French and German Cavalry, and at least one incident of bad command, that stuck with the press and was seized on by the RTR) created the “Cavalry is obsolete pre-War stuff” myth. (Even then, worth noting that in WW2 Polish Cavalry was shockingly good all things considered).
Yep and the 1945 polish cavalry and there victory in the east Pomeranian offensive was not. even the major use of horse power in ww2. In 1940 the battle winning monster that was the German army still had 70%-80% of its logistic capabilities driven by horses.
Operation Barbarossa saw the use of about 750,000 horses and mules.
As an example the German army lost 52,000 horses at the battle of stalingrad
Even the US got in a few Calvary charges in WW2
Even after WW2 horse powered cav and logistics was still a thing. With the Russians finally getting around to full mechanisation of its cav and logistics units in the mid to late 1950s.
But even now there are still active horse powered cavalry in the modern world.
The militia groups in Sudan still use cavalry charges. Some nations ( China ) still have mounted patrol and reconnaissance units for extreme terrain. Even in Ukraine apparently horses and donkeys are being used for logistical purposes as a way to help hide from drones.
The horse is even now not quite gone from war.
There is a difference between Horse Mounted Logistics and Cavalry to be fair.
And it’s a lot harder to defend the non-obsolescence of Cavalry in WW2 than it is in WW1. Yes the US and UK executed a couple of Mounted Charges, but they didn’t end well, and the US ones where not cavalry as I remember, just some blokes who grabbed pistols and jumped on horses. The UK’s only real Cavalry operations was the 4th Cavalry brigade walking over the Iraqi’s. For most WW2 cav they where relegated to Recce forces.
Our issue is we can afford the tanks but not the manpower, however there are countries in NATO with the opposite issue. We should be donating equipment to make up our 5% commitment.
An extra few % doesn’t go far in terms of wages but in terms of equipment it’s pretty huge.
This is another excellent article by Colonel Crawford.
This year’s Strategic Defence Review makes plain the way forward for Britain’s land forces
‘The SDR is the Plan for Change for Defence. It sets out the following new ambitions:
‘NATO First’—stepping up on European security by leading in NATO, with strengthened nuclear, new tech, and updated conventional capabilities…..the UK, with its allies—especially those in NATO—must once again be ready to deal with the most demanding of circumstances: deterring and preventing a full-scale war by being ready to fight and win…..Role 2: Deter and defend in the Euro-Atlantic…….This new model should underpin the transformation of the two divisions and Corps Headquarters committed to NATO’s Strategic Reserves Corps…… The UK-led, multinational NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) Headquarters already provides the Corps Headquarters and two divisions for one of two new Strategic Reserve Corps….
That cannot be achieved by 148 CR3 and Boxer wheeled APCs which fall over in rough terrain if a cannon turret is fitted.
‘The Review will boost the Reserves’ so Boxer must go to reserve Infantry Battalions.
Britain’s ARRC is not credible without a minimum of two fully formed armoured divisions of three brigades each. A two brigade division lacks depth and that depth cannot be supplied by allied formations if tactical coherency vital for tempo is to be maintained. So the British Army needs a planned acquisition, immediately, of 1200 Leopard 2 (including war replacement tanks) and a simiilar number of CV90.
Why immediately? Because the conventional deterrent once provided by 1(BR)Corps on continental Europe is once more required immediately. Drones, digitisation and what have you are now indispensable parts of a credible war fighting formation. But it is armoured divisions in being that provide a verifiably credible conventional deterrent. Once NATO armoured divisions were disbanded, the Long Peace of 1945-2014 ended in Europe.
That was very much not a coincidence.
Much is made, rightly, of the constraints imposed on armoured operations by the proliferation of drones of all shapes and sizes on the modern battlefield.
But armoured operations have always proved difficult without at least local air superiority. Battlefield drones are but the latest, more micro, air superiority challenge. And, like every previous air superiority challenge, counter drone technology is evolving:
‘AI-powered drone threat prediction systems are rapidly advancing, with the potential to predict a drone’s behavior before it becomes a risk.
The key strength of AI is its ability to rapidly process vast amounts of data, something that has become key for counter-UAS. As the advantages of layered defenses have become widely accepted, many counter-UAS systems have integrated extensive arrays of sensors, cameras and other detecting equipment. The use of AI is key for making use of all of this data in real-time. We have already seen AI systems that not only detect and track rogue drones but also anticipate their flight paths….. and development of AI technologies will only accelerate. These AI-driven systems will become faster, more accurate and able to predict drone movements in real time. AI is likely to become the backbone of layered defense strategies, aiding in the orchestration of extensive counter-drone suites.’
Ukraine’s armoured incursion towards Kursk showed us once more the utility of armoured operations under conditions of local air superiority.
And the drones will also implement AI technology too. They won’t remain technilogically static. In the meantime adding defensive systems and their munitions (where applicable) will increase the cost of the tank. Even if you managed to make a tank 100% proof against drones, which an enemy can afford to use in vast numbers, it will be unlikely that a similar level.of protection can be afforded for the vehicles resupplying the tank, or those carrying fuel and munitions to the places where those vehicles replenish.
Tanks have always been vulnerable. That is why their successes have, since 1918, occurred when employed as part of combined arms manoeuvre. They have always required at least local air superiority for success in the offense, dispersal in hides, protected by infantry, rapid concentration in ambush defence. Air drones are simply a micro part of the air battle, land drones a micro part of the land battle. The fundamentals of both land and air battle remain the same.
As many of us hypothesised some years ago, Chally 3 is nothing more than a bloody job creation exercise, as a developmental cul d sac, with only handful procured, its an utterly pointless waste of money.
We should have simply bought an off the shelf option we could have scaled up procurement of easily if needed.
John, It didn’t help that the army had only two armoured regiments in the Future Soldier Orbat, so we were never going to buy 300 or 400 tanks to replace CR2. Not their fault – their headcount was forced down by politicians and HMT. An OTS option would have been about 3x the price.
I believe the Starmer government said the UK were on a war footing a couple of months ago ,with only 148 Challenger 3 and no increase in hardly anything else it’s not a good Start 🙄 Lord help us .Great article by Colonel Stuart .
Andrew, we haven’t got a single CR3. They are being built. We have 213 CR2s on the active list, but many will be in RBSL being converted.
👍
Challenger 3 has an uprated 1500bhp engine, uprated transmission and uprated suspension.
Do you have a reference for that, may I ask?
This is the best information that I have so far been able to get my hands on:
Though Challenger 2’s hull is retained, its insides will change too, including new-generation Horstman hydrogas suspension that should improve stability (and therefore accuracy) when the tank is firing on the move. There’s also a new engine cooling unit to prevent overheating.
Challenger 2 in particular has suffered mobility issues due to having a less powerful motor than the comparable Abrams and Leopard tanks, despite weighing more. It’s unclear whether the 3’s new TN54E epicycle transmission and Perkins CV12-8A or -9A V12 diesel engine will boast a higher output (some claim 1,350, 1,400 or 1,500 horsepower) or end up having the same 1,200-horsepower output as the Challenger’s current CV-12-6A diesel. Regardless, the engine (and the tank’s electrical architecture) will support increased electrical generation.’
I’ve seen recent pictures of a CR3 CV12-9a powerpack from a Babcock (hull upgrade contractors) display with a plaque stating it’s 1500bhp.
The answer to a question in Parliament last year was that CR3 would have 1200hp.
https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2024-03-11/17793
That, then, is the official position….until it isn’t……
The answer by MoD to a question in Parliament last year was that CR3 would have 1200hp.
That remains as the official position on this subject.
I guess nothing is truly official until the first tanks are delivered.
If I had to pick I’d take the company responsible for the upgrades words from last week over an MPs answer in parliament 18 months ago.
Let’s wait and see.
As you say, all will become clear in due course.
It is highly unlikely that a Minister of State would knowingly mislead Parliament. He would have been briefed on the best information available to the MoD at the time.
Myself, I would take the word of one of a Company’s key customers over Company promotional material every time.
There is no question that the engine in question is capable of 1500 hp. The question may be as to whether even CR3 improved engine cooling permits 1500 hp or simply provides more reliability, engine hours at 1200 hp.
No MBT engine can run continuously at rated power, it’s a question of how long they can run. In any case people seem obsessed with peak power output when sprocket power is the more important gauge. For instance CR2 may ‘only’ produce 1200bhp but its cooling fans take ~100bhp compared to Leopard 2’s ~300bhp, meaning their net output is within 100bhp. CR2’s (6A) problem is poor low engine speed performance due to its low compression ratio highly turbocharged design. The 8A was intended to solve this with higher compression pistons and new turbochargers, I imagine the 9A will be a further improvement. So even if the 9A retains the same rated output (which I doubt) it will offer significantly better performance than the 6A.
No doubt that is why the Minister made the reply that he did.
I doubt the specs of the 9A were even locked in 18 months ago, it would have been a base requirement.
CR3 UK Government official disclosures: 19 March 2024 – Challenger 3 will have the Caterpillar CV12 9A engine which produces 1200hp.
Quite properly, Parliament was the first to hear.
Parliament will definitely not be the first to hear. Remember they announced the new tank was to have a 60mph top speed.
It was announced in Parliament on 11 March 2024, a week before the Ministry of Defence press release to that effect, as referenced above.
Monro, My inderstanding is that the CV12 version for CR3 is tweakable to deliver 1500 hp, but that is likely to incur higher fuel consumption and possibly a fall-off of reliability.
That, as usual, makes a lot of sense. Logistics being as important as they are, reduced hp, extra engine hours, imply greatly improved availability. Given its improved suspension, CR3 will no doubt do a fine job, if lacking the startling alacrity of Abrams at the traffic lights.
I don’t think the Challenger series gas a mantlet as such. Also CR3 is going to have the Trophy APS, if the Israelis will still tell it to us.
Chris, it has an internal mantlet. I am sure the Trophy APS has been ordered – it may even have been delivered to RBSLs factory. It was said a long time ago that only 60 were ordered.
I would be pretty sure that T&E numbers have been delivered to test integration.
I’d be slightly amazed if the whole lot was delivered given just-in-time mania and what it would do to the cash curves!
The British Army is an expeditionary force that has to go to the fight, having large numbers of MBTs requires a huge logistical footprint, that’s what costs the most. We need MBT killers, think, ATGM armed UGVs deployed with the heavy armour & Infantry utilising drones at section level, combined with long range fires, & you have the offensive mass to defeat an enemy at any level, with speed of maneuver whilst maintaining essential logistics.
Cheers 🍻
John M, We designed and developed the tank solely for expeditionary warfare ie service in France in WW1 against German forces. We deployed the tanks overseas in 1916/17 and have deployed them overseas for exercises and operations many times ever since. We know how to do that and have 110 years experience. All the HETs are built and paid for. Some tanks are pre-positioned in Germany. Things have got a bit easier – we now have the Chunnel. You make too much of this logistic difficulty. We also have to move thousands of other AFVs and lighter vehicles to war, not just tanks. We can do it.
We certainly neeed more tank killers – need to replace CVR(T) STRIKER, FV438, SPARTAN with MCT etc etc.!!
IF the UK government is serious about being able to send a credible armoured to the continent then it needs a lot more than 148 tanks. Simple as that. Personally, unless the UK intends to build large numbers and go for export markets, I don’t think they should be British designs. The development cost for smaller numbers (like148!) aren’t worth it. Whether we get German or Korean tanks wouldn’t be an issue for me – sad, considering we invented the things – butwe can’t make everything ourselves and the tank force is pretty much a minor option when looking at, say, Poland. We have nuclear subs and aircraft carriers; let Poland and Germany provide for the land battle.
I’m not saying we should be looking for cheap options, but more cost effective options that fit in with what everyone else will have in a land battle!
Rob, we are under remit to deliver an armoured division and an infantry/mech division to NATO as part of the ARRC. We can’t choose not to supply tanks in the armoured division!!
And an armoured division really needs more than 148 tanks available!
Did a search (Google AI… I know…) and got: ‘For instance, a modern US armored division can have around 260 tanks, comprising three armored brigade combat teams, with each containing roughly 87 Abrams tanks. ‘, ‘For context, some sources mention a Russian armored division may have approximately 220 tanks.’ Meanwhile a British armoured division ‘In contrast, the British Army’s 3rd (United Kingdom) Division, currently the only heavy division equipped with tanks, includes three Armoured Regiments (battalion-sized formations), each possessing 56 Challenger 2 tanks, leading to a divisional total of 168 Challenger 2s’ – So if we only have 148 tanks left, and allowing for spares/replacements, we WON’T be able to field a true armoured division, whatever ‘we are under remit to deliver an armoured division and an infantry/mech division to NATO as part of the ARRC. We can’t choose not to supply tanks in the armoured division!!’ says!
Spot on.Let the eastern europeans provide the tanks,we should be providing fast air and what we have always been known for,a STRONG Royal navy
Devonboy, what kit should we have in the armoured division and in the infantry/mechanised division that we are under remit to send to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps?
Many outside the UK have already commented that the British Army is woefully under strength, and ill prepared for a major, peer on peer, war. IMHO, realistically, there are not enough tanks to even stop an invasion of the British Isles. A full on conflict on British soil will see all the CH3 tanks gone in less than a week.
My personal opinion is that :
Maybe it’s time for the MoD, and all those other British antiquities, to pull their collective heads out of British sands. Maybe they should realize that, even though the UK invented the Tank, the UK has long lost the cutting-edge of Tank Technology, and Tank Warfare. They lost it way back in the 1930s when Germany invented the Blitzkrieg, and other modern Tank Doctrine. The UK has just been playing “Catch up” ever since then. The UK does not have the capacity, or ability, or the Will to build a World Beating MBT at this time. The “Golden Rule” of “There will always be a British Tank, designed, and built in the UK!” should be be discarded for present day Reality, and Practicality. Get new MBTs that meet current British Army requirements, put a BV in it and call it British. Get new logistics, and personnel vehicles. Stop depending on 50 year vehicles that are no longer in production. Time for the UK to rethink Defense Priorities, and make realistic decisions for today, and lay Plans for a self – sufficient UK Military Complex.
Sorry for the rant. Again, just IMHO.
I think I read recently that the UK still has 219 C2 hulls that could be converted. So, we could add an extra 60 C3 conversions if we wanted to i.e. go from 148 to 208.
“200” sounds psychologically better as well as being physically better. Silly not to maximise on what’s left of the
CR2s. Good extra reserve-buffer quantity. Needs an anti drone RWS to replace the pintle mounted gpmg.
“200” sounds psychologically better as well as being physically better. Silly not to maximise on what’s left of the
CR2s. Good extra reserve-buffer quantity. Needs an anti drone RWS to replace the pintle mounted gpmg.
An MBT is a means of delivering effects, kinetic and otherwise. If those effects can be delivered less expensively, with less risk and more effectively by another system or system of systems, the need for the tank goes away and its possession becomes a liability. Ukraine recently opted to do away with armoured brigades and focus on smaller tank units within mechanised and infantry brigades to provide tank support, cautiously, where appropriate. Those circumstances will almost certainly arise less and less frequently over the next few years.
Ukraine does not have control of its skies. The Russians are using half trained conscripts to drive their tanks. In other words, both sides are not doing optimum tank warfare. In another conflict, where you cover your tanks with Typhoon, F-35, Apache, Trophy, EW & GBAD, then your tanks may make major breakthroughs.
The alleged ineffectiveness of the tank in modern warwfare has been highlighted several times since the start of the Ukrainian conflict and has been debunked on here several times more. My understanding from the numerous discussion on here is the modern battle tank is still the only mechanism by which a modern force can rapidly advance , take and then continue to hold ground. Just because the drone influenced battle ground contains extra risks for a tank does not negate this basic premise. It may impact on how tanks can exert this influence, but not their requirement to do so.
As an ex-REME guy, I would add that we also gifted two CRARRVs!
I regret that I always take some issue with Stuart’s articles. The ‘sniper rifle’ label leads some to think that all these CR2 tanks have ever done is to sit hull-down in static positions and fire away at long range targets. It has done this and with considerable success, particularly in 2023 and early 2024, much rattling the Russians. However CR2 was the western tank selected by UKR to lead its offensive charge into the Kursk region of Russia. It is thus as effective in the offensive as in the defensive.
‘Cross-loading of ammunition is a non-starter’. True but so is cross-loading between any western tank (Abrams, Leo 2 and Chally) and the Soviet-era Ukrainian tanks. I don’t recall cross-loading any ammunition on NATO exercises was ever done much, if at all.
Stuart might have mentioned that the CR2 destroyed in Sep 2023 had first blundered into a minefield and received an M-kill from a mine strike; it was then a sitting duck for further attacks by the other weapons he mentions. Also worth mentioning that all 4 crewmen baled out and lived to fight another day due to good (anti-mine) armour protection.
Bogging in. Several reasons for a tank to bog in: high NGP (not just weight); poor route selection; mud type and extent; weather conditions; inexperienced driver not knowing or lacking the skill to get through mud. [I am aware that even experienced drivers can bog in!]
Late model Abrams weighs the same as CR2 so might sink with a similar frequency, yet the story persists only about CR2 being particularly prone to bogging in….probably as on one occasion a CR2 bogged in in front of Ukrainian TV.
Traversing the terrain. CR2 has almost identical cross-country speed to Leo2 due to its superior suspension. Yet some theoreticians however assume CR2 must move slowly across country due to its 1200 hp engine being less powerful than the 1500 bhp of Leo2 (and Abrams).
Numbers of CR2 destroyed. Stuart is trusting Russian sources but most (non-Russian) reports say that only 2 have been destroyed. The first Ukrainian Challenger 2 tank was indeed destroyed near Robotyne, in Zaporizhzhia Oblast – posted on 5/9/23, but the action may have happened in Aug 23. Second tank destroyed on 11/8/24 in Kursk region. The 3rd and 4th ‘destructions’ was released on several Russian Telegram channels including Rybar, and have not been confirmed by Ukraine MoD or Oryx. Strong doubt has been passed on No. 4 destruction by some British newspapers ie Daily Express.
Specialised logistic and engineering support is not required just for CR2, but also for Abrams and Leo 2 and all other western supplied kit.
In the interest of balance Stuart could have detailed issues with those latter two western tank types. For example it is widely reported that UKR had withdrawn the Abrams fleet from front line service in Apr 2024 and that UKR has now lost 26 or 27 out of 30 Abrams either destroyed, damaged BER or captured by the enemy.
There are many videos on YouTube of UKR tank crews praising CR2 but I have found none praising any other western tank.
A lot of discussion on here regarding the utility of tanks on the modern battlefield, also the logistical problems associated with armour and the deployment to Europe from Britain of armoured formations.
However, it is the key role of armoured formations in being to provide verifiably credible conventional deterrence. That is best provided by a planned forward defence of Britain on Continental Europe, with at least heavy equipment (but, preferably, manpower as well) pre-located overseas.
We know what to do, we have done it before; it works.
‘Erosion of the effectiveness of the Atlantic army will inevitably result in an erosion of political will, strategic flexibility, and freedom of action. As a bare minimum, it is the role of the Atlantic army to replace the strategic nuclear deterrent as the instrument with which the attack option is foreclosed to the Soviet Union. But that is a bare minimum. In a modern strategy the Atlantic army must provide for the West a sense of security to a degree that will encourage it to act and react in respect to global events with confidence. That forecloses to the Soviet Union the options of intimidation, blackmail, and political leverage.’
‘An Atlantic community paralyzed by its military inferiority in Europe could only wring its hands as Soviet power and influence moved unimpeded into the so-called Third World, portions of which provide the materials upon which the industrial, economic, and social health of the industrial West depend……So even if one believes that an attack on Western Europe is not a very likely scenario, he still cannot view the growing strength of the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe without a certain uneasiness……’
‘While agitation for the reduction of US forces in Europe has subsided for the moment, it could rise again if within the US it is thought or perceived, however fairly or unfairly, that Atlantic partners are not bearing an equitable burden.’
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DE WITT C. SMITH, JR. US ARMY, 1977
CH3 was a reasonable decision at the time, procured, so far, at reasonable cost. If we could tack an extra 20-50 units on at decent price that would be helpful in actually having a proper reserve and perhaps expand the regimental allocation slightly, but it may not be possible due to the state of the remaining hulls. In future I think the British army should switch to an entirely medium-weight format though. As it stands we have no railway units and very few heavy transports to actually get any of this armour to anywhere useful, plus the fact that AJAX is so heavy and large it needs to kind of transport and logistical requirements of an MBT anyway. With most tracked IFVs being fairly old base designs that have reached their growth potential (ASCOD/AJAX,CV90,Bradley) and Germany, France, and Korea being far ahead in heavy armour design and production, I think we should try and find a niche in the mid-range category, bearing in mind that probably now extends up to 45-55 tonnes, that is more suited to our industry and and the needs of the British Army.
Lessons from WW2 showed that more numerous lighter reliable easy to produce well gunned vehicles are ultimately of more use than limited numbers of high value tempermental heavy tanks. Have things moved on, or will history be destined to repeat itself. P
But lessons from Israel’s wars or the Gulf wars show that powerful and expensive western MBTs make mincemeat of more basic Russian designs.
A WW2 Sherman would cost @$600k in today’s money. A new MBT costs $12m or more. Even a less powerful tank ,like the Booker M10, costs more than $12m one of the reasons the US has cancelled the programme.
France and Italy are planning to field @200 upgraded tanks each, Germany have only @300 in combat ready state. Upgrading a few more CR2s would allow UK to match those levels without breaking the bank.
Except you are drawing a bad connection there. For starters the US, UK and USSR all used Heavy tanks, Pershing, Churchill, KV and IS, for second the WW2 paradigm of Light, Medium and Heavy tank doesn’t really exist anymore, as MBT’s aren’t really any of them. For a third: “lighter” is relative, M4, M3, Cromwell, where still Tanks. T-34 (and Firefly) did not weight that much less than Panther, and certainly was not more reliable. 35 vs 42 tonnes, not a huge difference.
Four: Modern MBT’s are not “highly temperamental” and lessons learned in maintenance means they are comparatively easy to repair when they do break (although yes preventative maintenance is still a thing).
For all those who suggest we should buy a new MBT.. from the U.S. or Germany.. what I say to that is with what money, there is 800 million in the challenger 3 contract that would buy you about 32-35 brand new MBTs from Germany, the U.S. or Korea….
What I don’t think people appreciate is just how insanely cheap the challenger 3 is..an all up modern MBT is 20-25 million pounds a pop..we are getting that challenger 3s at just a smig over 5 million a pop.. that’s essentially buy one get 3 free.
To put that into context the 148 challenger 3s are costing 800 million, ordering 148 new abrams would cost you 3700 million… for new German or US tanks for exactly the same numbers we would be looking at an extra 2.9 billion pounds…. Or about 10 type 31 frigates.. or 26 F35Bs…. Essentially pissing money away.
What would be sensible is seeing how much it would cost to convert the extra 70 MBTs that are still in active service and even look at the possiblity that some of the other 80-100 that have been stashed away to see if they are within Economic rebuild.. after all you many not be able to rebuild them for 5 million.. but there is a shed load of different between 5 million and 25 million..,so any old challenger 2 is probably worth a rebuild to challenge 3 as its never going to cost the same as a new MBT ( Russia are rebuilding literal rusted hulks because is still cheaper than new) if they could get the rebuild numbers up to 260 that would very much give the army every MBT it needed.. 3 type 56 armoured regiments ( 168 tanks), the training establishment squadron ( 18 tanks) 10% maintenance pool ( 18 tanks).. that would leave 56 tanks that could sit as an attritional reserve and essentially equip 3 squadrons of the royal Wessex yeomanry with actual tanks.. so they could be deployed as whole reserve sabre squadrons if needed.
Wessex Yeomanry seemed to be good at bending idler arms, mudguards and breaking extended fuel drum brackets. Drive it like you stole it !
Well as they don’t “own” their own tanks they essentially use “hires” so drive it like you stole it rules would apply.
Babcock Bovington used to provide about 14 “hire” tanks (reinforcing fleet), the contract stopped as only about half were available at any one time due to spares shortages so not good value for money. Most likely they are the ones in Ukraine
As I see it, C3 is a minimum-credible stop-gap capability to maintain skills in the UK. IMO a sensible holding strategy, given that the future role and/or requirements of tanks are in flux. Many see tanks going the way of warships, with less in the way of armor, and much more in the way of sensors and active defenses.
The UK tank fleet is not either, IMO, a massively urgent NATO priority, given the focus and urgency of European allies much closer to the threat (most notably Poland and Germany). Our immediate prioritization of rapidly self-deployable medium forces (i.e. Boxer, RCH155, Archer, Skysabre) makes more sense here.
To be honest the uk military in my view is a single offensive force 1 division 1 major assault then its going to struggle its capable of smaller warfare and has some really good equipment and very well trained troops but it just lacks the numbers
and yet the loss of up to 8 Challenger 2s (4 total loses and 4 knocked out requiring repair) has come at a much higher cost to the Russians than these tanks, totally disproportionate losses, by some OSINT accounts the C2s have destroyed in excess of 30 MBTs, 100 IFVs, 200+ other armoured vehicles and around 100 unarmoured vehicles. Their superior range, precision and night vision equipment has been a brutal lesson for the Russian army.
Such is the C2s performance in Ukraine that you have to ask why the hell dont we convert every last C2 we can to a C3 standard?- all 200+ remaining vehicles.
Good point well made, sir!
You need both sides of the balance sheet to make an accurate assessment of the effectiveness of any system.
Cheers CR
Note that the CR3 will not have the accuracy of the CR2. It will be reduced to the accuracy of the Leo2 et al. Did anyone think to ask Ukraine if they would like more CR2 or the revamped CR3?
Rh120 is not materially less accurate than L30, with APFSDS it’s a wash, and RH-120 APFSDS, with it’s longer roads and longer barrel, and not needing to neutralise the spin, is more lethal. Rifling makes sense for HE, HEAT and HESH, where the accuracy shines, but fin stabilized HEAT and HE exists now.
I would have thought an Active Protection System would be a standard fit on Challenger 3 especially since there are so few units being built. If it’s a money thing somebody needs to stick a boot up the arse of the the Treasury Official…he’s obviously well out of his depth.