Many of you will remember that, way back in March 2023, Britain delivered 14 Challenger 2 main battle tanks (CR2, MBTs) to Ukraine, having previously trained Ukrainian crews how to operate them.

The initial media interest died away quite quickly, although I think it’s fair to say that then British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s initiative in gifting our tanks to Ukraine encouraged others to follow suit, most notable Germany and the USA with their Leopard 2s and M1A1 Abrams respectively. 

On this occasion Britain led the way, and we should acknowledge and celebrate the fact. Kudos to Rishi. 


This article is the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines


In Ukrainian service, CR2’s report card is a bit of a mixed bag. It has been lauded for the accuracy of its rifled 120mm gun, with some referring to it as “a sniper rifle among tanks”. 

On the other hand, the three-piece ammunition that it uses is incompatible with the 120mm smoothbore guns which equip the Leopard 2 and M1A1 tanks, and so cross-loading of ammunition in the field is a non-starter. Plus the rounds for the British gun are no longer in production, and accordingly ammunition will eventually run out.

Ukrainian operators have praised CR2 for its high levels on crew protection thanks to its composite armour. In some situations crewmen have survived multiple hits which would have destroyed comparable MBTs. However it is not invulnerable, a topic to be returned to below.

So, Britain’s tank has been appreciated for its accuracy and crew protection, but as ever these have to be balanced by criticisms of other aspects. 

It has faced some challenges on the Ukrainian battlefields due to its weight and mobility issues in certain terrain. Some Ukrainian crews have reported that the tank’s weight can cause it to get bogged down in soft ground. 

This is hardly surprising. CR2’s all-up weight can well exceed 70 tonnes when fully loaded and with extra theatre-specific modifications, for example, the “cope cages” welded on to mitigate the drone threat. In addition, its relatively underpowered engine (1200 bhp as opposed to Leo2 and M1A1’s 1500 bhp power plants) has been found wanting in some soil conditions. 

Logistically, it also carries a burden with it. Only 14 CR2s were donated to Ukraine but nonetheless bespoke logistic support was required to support them; it wasn’t just ammunition compatibility that has had to be catered for, but also almost everything else. It used to be a proud boast in the British army that no CR2 had been lost in combat (friendly fire incidents aside). Service in Ukraine has changed all of that. 

On 4 September 2023, a video emerged from Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast which showed the first combat loss of a CR2 in the Ukrainian theatre of operations.  A 9M133 Kornet missile triggered a fire that apparently cooked off the tank’s ammunition charges, and the resulting blast displaced the turret from the hull. Later, according to Ukrainian media, by 10 March 2024 two more CR2s had been damaged, leaving only seven of the original 14 remaining fit to fight.

 Then, in August 2024, British news media were reporting that CR2 tanks were involved in Ukraine’s Kursk Oblast incursionDuring this operation, a CR2 was destroyed by Russian forces using a Lancet loitering munition,  the second confirmed total loss of a tank during the war. The third CR2 was destroyed on 14 November 2024 after a Russian FPV drone struck the driver’s position while the tank was parked in a tree line. A fourth CR2 tank was destroyed on 5 January 2025 after a Russian FPV drone struck its gun mantlet.

So, how many CR2s now remain operational with the Ukrainian armed forces? It’s hard to tell, but given that four have been destroyed, at least a couple of others damaged, and the lack of spares, the figure is probably half a dozen at best. That’s a token force, but to be fair the 14 originally donated was a token force in the first place.

What are the implications for Britain’s new Challenger 3 main battle tanks (CR3/MBTs) from their predecessors’ performance in Ukraine, or at least what little we know about it? 

There aren’t many. CR3 is more or less a completely new design, albeit with parameters rapidly becoming obsolescent – four-man crew, manual loading of main armament, no in-built active protection system (APS) – which are unlikely to feature in future modern MBT designs. And, worryingly, it has no uprated main engine, retaining the 1200 bhp diesel engine of its predecessor.

CR3 will mount the German Rheinmetall 120 mm smoothbore gun, which is good news, making it compatible with Leo 2 and M1A1 Abrams, but will be “fitted for, not with” and APS system, of which only 60 are to be ordered under current plans. And its overall weight will be over 66 tonnes, which suggests the mobility problems experienced by CR2 in Ukraine are likely to be the same.

Finally, the UK is only ordering 148 CR3s, which is far too few. If one lesson has come out of Ukraine it is that you need mass, lots of stuff if you prefer, and the CR3 order does not represent the reality of modern armoured warfare. Britain’s new tank will be fine, but its numbers relegate it to yet another token gesture until some more credible plan comes along, if indeed it ever does. 

Lt Col Stuart Crawford is a political and defence commentator and  former army officer. Sign up for his podcasts and newsletters at www.DefenceReview.uk

Stuart Crawford
Stuart Crawford was a regular officer in the Royal Tank Regiment for twenty years, retiring in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in 1999. Crawford attended both the British and US staff colleges and undertook a Defence Fellowship at Glasgow University. He now works as a political, defence and security consultant and is a regular commentator on military and defence topics in print, broadcast and online media.

1 COMMENT

  1. Reasonable points.

    It seems the correct order size is either 0 or maybe 400+ units, with the 148 the UK is ordering probably the worst of both worlds. All the infrastructure and support requirements for heavy armor are retained (training, spares, transporters, recovery vehicles etc.) and the Army has a token 2-day tank force. Given the quantities of armor some of our NATO allies are procuring (Poland about 1,000) I do question this and wonder if earlier investment into artillery (current 155mm fleet at 14 units… RCH155 when?) would have been a better call.

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here