Fiona and Iran’s role in the Scottish independence debate

An account on X, presenting itself as an ordinary Scottish independence supporter, has become a case study in how Iranian state-linked influence operations infiltrate and exploit domestic political debates in the UK.

The profile in question, @fiona175161, outwardly appears to be just one of many activists pressing for another referendum. At the time of writing, this account is followed by a number of Scottish politicians across several parties. They are not named here — that is not the point — but the fact underlines how easily such inauthentic profiles can blend into mainstream political discourse.

It is also important to stress that @fiona175161 is not unique. It is one of many accounts following the same pattern: presenting as Scottish or British, amplifying nationalist or anti-establishment rhetoric, falling silent during the June 2025 blackout in Iran, and re-emerging with both pro-independence and pro-Tehran content.

Taken together, these accounts form a coordinated network.

Constructing a Scottish identity

The account, simply named “fiona,” was created in May 2024. Its bio reads: “Proud Scottish lass | Passionate about Scotland’s independence & our right to self-determination | Advocate for a free, fair, & thriving Scotland | #IndyRef2.” The avatar depicts a young woman with long hair draped in a Saltire cape. Researchers who examined the image noted the tell-tale smoothness and asymmetry consistent with AI generation, a technique increasingly used in disinformation networks to provide plausible but non-traceable identities.

From the start, the account adopted the vocabulary and tone of Scottish independence activists. Hashtags such as #ScottishIndependence, #IndyRef2 and #YesScots dominated its output. Posts included calls to action (“If you believe Scotland has the right to choose its own future, please retweet”), motivational slogans, and stylised imagery portraying Scotland as shackled but on the brink of liberation. Some of these messages attracted only a few dozen interactions, while others reached tens of thousands of likes and retweets, suggesting a combination of organic engagement and algorithmic boosting through coordinated networks.

Follower growth was steady, rising to more than 2,300 by August 2025. Analysis of its following patterns shows a cluster of similar pro-independence accounts with near-identical themes, many of which were later flagged as inauthentic.

The posting record reveals oddities. In its first months, before fully committing to independence themes, the account produced apparently meaningless posts such as “Dubai Cat” or “wait here” alongside unrelated images. Forensic analysts describe these as test content, typical of sockpuppet operators trialling engagement mechanics before locking into a sustained narrative.

By June 2025, the account’s voice had become confident and unambiguous. On 11 June, it wrote: “Raise your hands if you detest Labour 🙋‍♀️.” On 12 June, it posted: “The fact that Scotland cannot be sure that it can leave the United Kingdom is the surest sign that it should.” These are representative of the populist and emotive slogans it used to drive engagement.

Figures claim 26% of recent Scot independence posts by Iran

The silence

On 13 June 2025, the account fell silent. For sixteen days there were no tweets, no replies, no retweets. The silence was not unique. Hundreds of accounts with similar themes vanished from X in the same window.

The dates align precisely with a nationwide blackout in Iran following Israeli strikes on the country’s infrastructure between 13 and 25 June. According to Cyabra, a disinformation detection company, this was the moment when proof of their suspicions emerged. As conversations around Scottish independence and Brexit spiked online, more than a quarter of the profiles driving that debate were in fact fake. Cyabra’s investigators found that 26 per cent of accounts posting about Scottish independence were not authentic, together producing more than 3,000 posts in six weeks. When Iran’s grid went down, those same accounts disappeared.

The scale of the campaign was striking. Cyabra assessed that the fake accounts generated more than 224 million potential views and over 126,000 engagements. Their tactics were designed to blend in: AI-generated profile images, the use of local slang, and emotionally charged slogans such as “Another very good reason for #ScottishIndependence” and “Brexit betrayal.” They amplified coordinated hashtags like #ScottishIndependence, #FreeScotland, #BrexitBetrayal, #BetterTogetherLied and #BoycottTheBBC, often posting identical or near-identical content across multiple profiles. By retweeting each other, the network manufactured the appearance of consensus while interacting just enough with authentic users to embed itself in genuine communities.

Israel has suffered greater damage than it ever has in its entire existence.
The “Impenetrable Iron Dome” was a failure.
The goals of regime change and permanently ending Iran’s nuclear program have not been achieved. pic.twitter.com/ayh5y3tYiI

— fiona (@fiona175161) June 29, 2025

The blackout exposed the ruse. On 13 June the network went completely dark, with hundreds of fake accounts vanishing at once. When they returned 16 days later, their focus had shifted. The same personas resumed posting, but the messaging now included pro-Iran narratives and attacks on the West. According to Cyabra, this pivot left little doubt: the network had been caught mid-operation, and its state control laid bare by the interruption of Iran’s infrastructure.

Do you agree Israel lost to Iran?#IsraeliranWar pic.twitter.com/JsXpSfDS84

— fiona (@fiona175161) June 30, 2025

The new emphasis was immediate. Posts lauded Iran’s strength in resisting the United States, portrayed it as a moral actor standing up for regional liberation movements, and cast Western foreign policy as hypocritical. Scottish independence slogans continued, but now they were punctuated with Tehran’s talking points, linking Iran’s struggle with Scotland’s and presenting Iran as victorious against its adversaries.

This pivot was short-lived. Within days, the account reverted to near-exclusive focus on Scottish independence. Yet the interlude was revealing. It showed that the account’s operator was not only silenced by events inside Iran but also redeployed to broadcast Tehran’s narratives once communications were restored.

Networked behaviour

@fiona175161 rarely operated in isolation. It quoted and retweeted a number of accounts, which adopted the same personas of young, pro-independence women. These accounts also went dark during the blackout and returned afterwards with identical themes.

Analysis of retweet patterns shows synchronisation across the network. Polls and slogans appeared across multiple accounts within minutes of each other. Hashtags such as #BoycottTheBBC, #BetterTogetherLied, #AbolishTheMonarchy and #IsraelIranWar were pushed in lockstep. This is classic botnet behaviour: a closed cluster of accounts amplifying each other to simulate grassroots consensus.

Profile imagery across the network was similarly suspect. AI artefacts, duplicated visual styles, and stolen stock images were common. Bios often claimed to be NHS staff, socialists, or students — identities designed to resonate with real communities but offering no verifiable details.

The content cadence of @fiona175161 reinforces the picture of an inauthentic operator. Posts often appeared at regimented intervals, regardless of UK time zones. Phrasing was repetitive, with the same slogans resurfacing over weeks. Engagement patterns showed heavy interaction within the sockpuppet cluster and relatively limited conversation with genuine activists.

Clemson University researchers have described this as “narrative laundering”: the use of synthetic identities to deliver foreign talking points through seemingly domestic voices. The repetition and regularity of the posts, combined with AI imagery and networked amplification, are consistent with this technique.

Coordinated silence during the blackout, followed by the pivot to pro-Iran narratives, provided compelling evidence of a state-directed operation. Clemson’s analysis linked the network to previous campaigns run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including efforts targeting US politics.

Wider context

Iranian disinformation campaigns are not new. In the United States, researchers have attributed more than 240,000 posts to Iranian networks attempting to influence elections and social issues. Across Europe, Iranian sockpuppets have amplified divisive debates, often using AI-generated personas.

In the UK, the focus has been clear. Brexit, austerity, the monarchy, and Scottish independence have all been used as fault lines. By inserting synthetic voices into these debates, Iranian operators seek to deepen division, erode trust in institutions, and undermine cohesion within a NATO ally.

The Scottish case is particularly potent. Independence remains a live political issue, capable of mobilising real grassroots support. By amplifying this cause, Iranian operators can project instability in the UK while simultaneously building channels that can be redirected to Tehran’s immediate geopolitical narratives, as seen in June 2025.

The exposure of @fiona175161 illustrates the challenge facing both policymakers and platform operators. Disinformation is increasingly localised. Foreign actors no longer rely solely on crude propaganda but instead mimic the language, imagery and grievances of real communities.

Not every pro-independence account is inauthentic, obviously and very clearly. Many are genuine citizens with deeply held political views. Yet the infiltration of the debate by Iranian-controlled sockpuppets complicates the picture. Genuine activists risk suspicion by association. Disinformation can distort perceptions of the strength of public sentiment. Most dangerously, it can corrode trust in the democratic process itself.

Dozens of pro-Indy accounts go dark after Israeli strikes

Political response

The controversy has not gone unnoticed in Holyrood. On 25 June, External Affairs Secretary Angus Robertson was pressed on the revelations during cabinet questions. Conservative MSP Murdo Fraser asked whether it should concern the Scottish Government that “its central policy objective is being actively backed by the terrorist state of Iran as part of its campaign to weaken this United Kingdom.” Robertson rejected the framing, warning against “seeking to smear people in this country who believe that this country should be a sovereign state.”

He pointed out that independence was the position of a majority of MSPs and argued it was beneath his opponent to conflate foreign interference with genuine political conviction. The exchange illustrated how the issue risks being misunderstood in political debate. The original UK Defence Journal investigation stressed in an editor’s note that “this article does not claim that Scottish independence is a foreign plot, nor does it suggest that support for independence is illegitimate, inauthentic, or driven by anything other than sincere political conviction.”

The focus, we underlined, was not on genuine activists but on documented attempts by Iranian-linked actors to exploit authentic political debates for their own strategic purposes. Robertson’s reply arguably missed this distinction. The concern raised by analysts was not that independence itself is tainted, but that foreign actors are infiltrating the conversation, seeking to magnify division and undermine trust in democratic processes.

What is the point we’re making?

@fiona175161 was not a quirky outlier but part of a coordinated network. Its silence during Iran’s blackout, its sudden pivot to Tehran’s narratives, its AI-generated imagery and automated posting rhythm,  all point to state-linked control. Dozens of near-identical accounts behaved the same way, amplifying Scottish independence slogans while also serving as vectors for Iranian propaganda.

The point is not to cast suspicion on genuine activists, but to show how modern disinformation embeds itself in real debates. These operations work by blending into authentic communities, exploiting divisive issues, and revealing themselves only through operational lapses.

The lesson for the UK is clear: vigilance. Influence operations are already inside national debates, disguised in familiar voices, and ready to be turned toward foreign objectives at moments of vulnerability.

Editor’s Note –  This article does not claim that Scottish independence is a foreign plot, nor does it suggest that support for independence is illegitimate, inauthentic, or driven by anything other than sincere political conviction. The focus is not on genuine activists or grassroots communities, but on documented attempts by Iranian-linked actors to exploit real political movements in the UK for strategic advantage.

Importantly, the article does not equate support for independence with foreign manipulation. Rather, it highlights how state actors — in this case, Iran — often mimic the language and cultural markers of existing political groups in order to infiltrate and distort online debate. This includes crafting fake personas aligned with left-wing or anti-imperialist sentiment, not to persuade, but to amplify and launder their own narratives through credible channels. All claims made are supported. Readers are encouraged to engage with the primary sources linked throughout the article.