The Ministry of Defence has confirmed that the Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS) programme, intended to replace the Royal Navy’s current amphibious fleet, is progressing through its concept phase, with the first vessel expected to enter service by 2033.

Please note that the image above is illustrative and not representative of any choice for the ship’s design.

Responding to questions in Parliament, Maria Eagle, Minister of State for Defence, outlined the timeline and purpose of the programme. She stated:

“The Multi-Role Support Ship programme will recapitalise the Royal Navy’s amphibious fleet, which consists of the three Bay class landing ships (RFA Lyme Bay, Mounts Bay, and Cardigan Bay) and RFA Argus, which provides medical and aviation support. These vessels are planned to leave service by 2034, with MRSS intended to replace them.”

The MRSS programme is designed to ensure the continuity of the Royal Navy’s amphibious capabilities, including global deployment and support for the Royal Marines.

HMS Albion and Bulwark Decommissioning

The confirmation comes amid discussions about the early retirement of HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark. According to Luke Pollard, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Defence, their decommissioning will not impact the operational capabilities of the Royal Marines, as they are currently held at lower readiness. Pollard noted:

“Both are currently held at lower readiness, having not been to sea since 2023 and 2017 respectively. This Government inherited a position where neither was due to go to sea again before their planned out-of-service dates of 2033 and 2034.”

The Royal Marines will continue to be supported by the Bay-class ships and RFA Argus until the MRSS fleet comes into service.

Funding and Timeline

The MRSS programme is funded from the Defence budget, enabling the Royal Navy and Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) to undertake detailed preparatory work. Eagle stated:

“The programme aims to deliver the first of class by 2033. This timeline remains on track to meet operational requirements.”

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

41 COMMENTS

  1. Bad timing. Losing amphibious assault capability just when Russia threatens the arctic northern flank of NATO and China via President Xi has openly declared they will rejoin Taiwan with the CCCPs China by 2030.
    That’s a confirmed timeframe and means the RN will have a limited role in helping to defend our allies in the far east when China will be launching a war of conquest.

    • Then again, not much ROYAL could bring to a bun fight with China, RN, the Astutes but the projected American losses are horrendous, even given their numbers; would you really want us to see our boats being sunk, given our woeful numbers?

      • From first hand feedback they are not particularly pleased. In reality the RM have been loosing experienced people for a while and the gapping on the last few trips on board Albion was evidence of that. The RN leadership have focused on the carriers so the RM headcount is less important to them indeed it allows them to recruit more matelots, which has been a failure.
        The RM are now limited in capability and in no way do the Bays make up for the loss of the LPDs.

    • Good. Taiwan is not an ally so it is not our fight. There are plenty of countries in the area which,in combination with the US, can oppose any Chinese aggression. We should concentrate our resources against the nearer and more immediate threat of Russia.
      In due course, AUKUS will make a contribution in the Far East, mainly through increased SSN numbers.

      • I think we will support the Aussies in that fight and I can see the Royals spending more time down under as they have done this year. The fact they will be based on RAN vessels will just reflect our loss of capability.
        The idea of deploying an SSN to the pacific is laughable given we currently have 5 and we are struggling to get some off the wall because we have inadequate maintenance facilities and crew. We will be lucky to get up to 7 operational boats before the end of the decade. Any increase above those numbers will be nearing the 2040’s.

      • You could say the same thing of Ukraine, but we still had to suffer double digit inflation and pay I don’t know how many billions subsidising fuel prices. A war over Taiwan will be everybody’s business.

      • Strategically Taiwan is very much our fight. The majority of the world’s high end chips are manufactured in Taiwan. If China retakes it the shock to the high end computer and telecommunications would be devastating.
        As well as the implications for world order and embolden other dictators.
        The key to defending Taiwan is to not let them onto the island in the first place and turn the South China Sea into Iron Bottom Sound 2.0.

  2. On a more positive note HMS Defender is apparently in dock getting it’s CAMM silos fitted, I guess that is the only benefit of scrapping our frigates before their replacement is ready we’ve got a lot of spare CAMM missiles “mushroom farms” available.

    • The T23 ‘mushroom farms’ as they now appear to be named are zero use on anything else as they are bodge into the Sea Wolf launchers.

      All of the new RN vessels *graphics* use the standard six pack CAMM launchers.

      • Do we know what the six pack launchers seen on RN renders actually are? Are they 2 x Lockheed Martin 3-cell EXLS quad packed to give 24 x CAMM (I believe some other CAMM users are buying EXLS to host their CAMM) or is there some other MOTS launcher for CAMM, or even a custom design of a six pack launcher for the RN?

  3. So the Bays and Argus are due to leave service in 2034, but the first MRSS is due in 2033. I very much doubt the remainder will be ready before 2034, so does that mean yet more capability gaps? What hope does Argus have of making it to 2034 I wonder.

    The RN will have operated just 4 ships, that are at least in part providing amphibious support, for a minimum of 10 years. Now lets guess how many MRSS will be ordered.

    • Yes, I did wonder about Argus making it to that venerable vintage.

      Sure, she was super well built with c very thick high quality plate and has been very well looked after.

      She was in Corporate in ‘82 so she would be over 50 years in RN service by 2034! She wasn’t new then….

  4. My understang is that the T23 have a distinctive Mushroom farm appearance as the camm silos were fitted inside the old vls seawolf tubes, and they are taller than the old tubes, hence the extended domed covers. As far as I am aware these are non-transferable.
    AA

  5. Only a 8 year gap in capacity…infact the 8 year gap in which we probably have the highest risk of a global war since 1962.

    What I really want to hear is how are the proposed 6 MRSS going to be crewed. One of the big picture issues that everyone seems to ignore is that the Albions were commissioned warships, the RFA vessels are not. In international law that’s very significant as only commissioned warships my take belligerent actions.

    Infact the RFA vessels are first and foremost logistic vessels designed to ferry troops to a controlled landing site..the launching of an amphibious attack from the bay class potentially puts the British state and the crew in a very uncomfortable legal position.

    “Until the rule changes, U.S. Navy auxiliaries have been intentionally designed and utilized to perform only supporting tasks which fall well within current legal norms. These include providing logistical support, or serving as air or seaborne launch pads to transport troops and ammunition. But there is an increasing desire to expand the functions which auxiliaries can execute, including electronic attack, intelligence collection, command and control, and mine countermeasures. To the extent these and other missions could be construed as belligerent acts, the current rule straitjackets auxiliaries in armed conflict. As the potential list of activities performed by auxiliaries expands, the legal restriction against belligerent acts by auxiliaries has imposed an unnecessary hurdle in operational planning and execution.” ( CIMSEC 2019).

    There is a real legal danger to this, as essentially another nation could take the crew of an auxiliary acting in a belligerent role as outside of the protection of the rules of law and executive them.

    “even armed merchant ships ordered by a belligerent government to attack enemy submarines (i.e. ships that had arguably been converted into warships) did so at considerable legal risk. One British merchant ship captain trying to ram a German submarine was subsequently executed by the Germans as an illegal combatant.”

    Essentially moving the UK first line amphibious forces away from commissioned warships manned by the RN to RFA auxiliaries is an area of real legal jeopardy for the UK and RFA..does anybody doubt that Iran, china or Russia would not execute a British RFA captain in wartime or massively heightened tension if there was way to do so within the international rules of law.

    • The last statement from a senior officer described MRSS as “large non complex warships”. That would seem to imply building them in UK and RN crews. With manning problems in both RN and RFA, who knows

    • Putting aside the legalities of using the Bays as warships their practical use in amphibious warfare is very limited. Inadequate Command and Control capability, minimal ship to shore vessels and most importantly they are not built to warship standards.
      A recipe for a suicide mission unless we are talking about a humanitarian aid mission with minimal hostile actors. The U.K. is basically out of the amphibious warfare scene for at least a decade in which time undoubtedly a Government minister will ask where are our Amphibious Assault Ships ?
      The best amphibious warfare troops on the planet have been kneecapped.

      • Indeed because they are logistic ships, not amphibious assault ships…designed and built as auxiliaries to transport troops and supplies. For many of the missions they are fine, such as reinforcement of an ally..for belligerent amphibious actions they are not equipped and not legally supported.

        In reality it was fine to scrap Albion, but bulwark should have been kept in service until 2033.

        • Absolutely agree with you. Why we would scrap Bulwark is beyond me but I suspect she will be sold to Brazil to raise a few million £.

          • I don’t disagree with you but she was totally stripped of kit in late 23 and early 24. It would have to be of been a 1982 scenario for her to be brought back. A sad and unnecessary loss.

  6. As these things go that is actually a very fast timeline.

    So where do they get built? They will need to start building in 2-3 years given the glacial pace of UK shipbuilding?

    Solids stores has Belfast [theoretically] full over this period.

    T26/T83 has BAE occupied. Particularly us Norwegian T26 comes off which we all hope it does.

    So that leaves Babcock doing these?

    Or can they build in one of the Rosyth dry docks? As they built QEC. These are going to be very big lumps that won’t fit in the frigate sheds.

    So the next issue is workforce unless T32 is binned and the T31 team moves straight to this?

    That means the frigate shed isn’t making frigates but blocks?? Which seems a waste…

    Unless I have missed something? Which I may well have done!

  7. Oh well could always ask the Scottish “government” to build a few ferries and transport the RM around in them. Be novel along with using SNP funded camper vans as beach transport.

  8. Does anyone know what specs the MRSS are being designed to. From my view point it seems that there are three possible types for the MRSS.
    1. The Ellida type, but that is only good if the ship has two RAS postions and could be used as a stores and fuel ship if she is not needed for Royal Marines. She should have the capacity for 250 Marines and their equipment, workshops a 100 bed hospital with ICU, CT scan, X-ray and 3 operating theatres. As these ships are likly to be forward deployed for extended periods of time and act a base ship for other in theatre assets then further accommodation and recreaction facilities would be needed.
    2. The HMAS Canberra type vessel. These would be the more classical type for amphibious forces and more ‘fighty’. They would not be forward deployed and would need a surface ship escort. However, they would be able to land anything up to a battalion size battle group with their own airsupport over the beach if need be. These ships could also act as ASW helicopter platforms, baby escort carriers for convoys and uav/uuv/rov motherships. Again they would need workshops and hospital facilities.
    3. The stretched T31 or Damen Crossover Combattant type vessel. These are for all intents and purposes frigates that are able to carry and land 100-120 Marines with their equipment. This is the type of ship that I could see becoming the T32, with a multi mission bay very much like the T26, a mission deck with stern access able to launch three lcvps/cb-90s and two Merlin helicopters. These ships would be very useful for the small incursion. task. With a 5 inch gun two blocks of Mk41s forward, 24 CAMMs midships, two sets of NSM, two 40mm and two Phalanx they would be more than capable of looking after themselves. They would help push up surface combat ship numbers. These ships would lack the endurance to stay on station for long periods of time. However, if they were combined with a vessel from 1 or 2 then they could become a part of a very flexible independent littoral response group.
    I am not sure what is the best solution for the RN from type 1 or 2, for pure fighting capability I prefer the LHD type vessel also the flight deck gives the RN some flexibility in use as I said if they worked with two T26s that is a ASW hunter group for the N.Atlantic, or in the escort carrier role for important convoys from the US to Europe. This type of vessel cannot stay on station for long periods. The Ellida type is a vessel that can stay on station for long periods, they could also be used for forward deployed stores and fuel, forward deployed workshops, forward deployed recreation facilities to give frigate crews a break in a secure area and have a good hospital. These ships would also be very useful in the humanitarian role.

    If I could I would have a mix of all three but that seems unlikly due to cost. So as much as I am going to hate myself for it I would take three Ellida type ships and six stretched T31s to form three littoral response groups. These three Ellidas would be RN and a further 3-4 Ellida’s to replace the Bays and Argus for the RFA. If money was not an issue I would have two LHDs, four Ellida’s and eight stretched T31s. This would cover just about every form of flexibility required forming two littoral task groups (1 Ellida plus 2 stretched T31s), two amphibious tasks groups (1 LHD, 1 Ellida and 2 stretched T31s).

    • Only funding for 3 vessels with 6 as an unfunded aspiration.
      Most likely somewhere between an LSDa and LPD, certainly not an LHD or a heavily armed ship

  9. The Minister’s statement is that MRSS will replace four existing ships. This implies a maximum of four units, more likely three.

    • What a pitiful sleight of hand. Keep true to the MRSS program goal of a 1 for 1 replacement for current vessels but cut the numbers from 6 to 4. How to square that circle? Easy (for a government minister). Retire 2 of the current vessels early (Albion and Bulwalk), wait long enough for most people not paying attention to forget that they ever existed, and then announce the next stage of the MRSS program that is indeed still going to deliver a 1 for 1 replacement for current vessels but now there are only 4 vessels to be replaced (3 x Bays and Argus) rather than the 6 when the MRSS concept was first announced. And sadly I suspect most of the public fall for this stuff because they just aren’t interested enough in defence to have followed the tricky little twists and turns along the way and will just see 4 older ships being replaced by 4 shiny new ships (assuming we even get to that number of MRSS).

  10. surely the core question for MRSS in terms of design isnt about marines per se, but about to what extent you want it to be able to offer them UAS support since decisions around this issue determine if you want to give it a full flight deck or not. It would certainly be a nice to have for marines to know that long endurance or high payload drones were overhead when they were ashore, but they have to come from somewhere. If these are to operate away from the carriers then a key early decision will be whether they will need to operate larger UAS.

    Surface and subsurface drones are more straightforward for this type of vessel i think. And a helicopter flightdeck will handle rotary UAV. The issue is around more conventional takeoff/ landing (and larger) UAVs perhaps?

  11. Given the importance of airborne support for amphibious ops then the need to accommodate helicopters and eventually drones is crucial. If the ships are large then for me their reaches a point where about above 20,000t a thru deck becomes a good choice, which brings us back to selecting a simple LHD solution.
    The trouble starts here because of the sensitivity in the RN and within political circles of having more carriers!
    Part of the politics in building the Albions as LPDs was to avoid having two 20,000+ LHDs that looked similar to the Invincible’s. The fear and not unwarranted was this would lead to one or more of the Invincible’s being discarded as we don’t need 5 carriers.
    Putting the hangar deck in the Albions was then subsequently deleted to save money and a cheap LPH designed with two planned and one built.
    If we built say 4 small LHDs then in the bean counters and politicians minds you have 6 carriers. Those with more in depth knowledge know differently but it is an issue.

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