The book tells the story of how the Harrier went from an airshow attraction to an iconic symbol of British combat aviation.
This is a review, the opinion is soley that of the author.
A short while ago, I was sent a copy of ‘Harrier 809‘ by author Rowland White in the hope that I would have the time to review the book. Last week I ended up in Dunoon for most of the week, near Faslane naval base’, in a hotel overlooking the Clyde in full view of the coming and going warships and submarines. What better setting to sit and read?
I’m glad I found the time to sit and read the book and I am thankful to Rowland for sending me a review copy.
Rowland White is the author of three critically acclaimed aviation history books, namely Vulcan 607, Phoenix Squadron (I’ve read this one and I think it’s great) and Storm Front. All three have been Sunday Times top ten bestsellers. Rowland studied Modern History at Liverpool University and is well known for his research efforts and gripping style.
Anyway, on to the book! In short, Harrier 809 is about a Sea Harrier squadron at war in the Falklands and the wider effort to keep the carriers safe from air attack.
Morning. Here’s a photo of an 809 NAS Sea Harrier dropping a pair of 1000lb retarded bombs on the abandoned Argentine ship Bahia Buen Suceso. It was taken on 21/10/82, the day the squadron finally headed home from the South Atlantic aboard HMS Illustrious pic.twitter.com/zTsT3hPy9J
— Rowland White (@RowlandWhite) March 28, 2020
I should point out that I am far, far from an expert on Harriers or the Falklands War, I’m certainly familiar with both but I wouldn’t rely on my answers if questions about either came up on a pub quiz but that being said, the book was accessible to someone with my level of familiarity with the topic and I’ve come out of the other end feeling more informed.
What more could you want from a book on the topic, really?
The book tells the story of 809 Squadron under Lieutenant Commander Tim Gedge, transported south to the Falklands on the ill-fated Atlantic Conveyor. Don’t worry, I’m not going to give too much away, trust me you’d rather read it for yourself.
Reading with the pace of a thriller, the author manages to include comprehensive research in an effort to explore the full story of 809 Naval Air Squadron being reformed, trained and sent south to fight. Of note is just how quickly this was managed, done at a fraction of the time it would normally have taken, something discussed in great detail in the book.
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The book doesn’t shy away from the mishaps and tragedies either, detailing for example instances in which two pilots were believed to have collided in mid-air and a pilot being taken prisoner.
‘Harrier 809’ truly seems to be an honest account of what happened. It tells the tales it sets out to tell in an authoritative, gripping and accessible way.
Today, 809 Naval Air Squadron is being reformed to operate the F-35B fifth-generation stealth aircraft that will fly from the Royal Navy’s new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, you can read more on that here.
You can order his book here and here. I fully recommend that you do.
I am curious as to what this adds over Sharkey’s account….
I guess a little less anger and resentment…
809 as a quickly formed squadron (from the training unit?) comes with its own story and challenges. Quickly becoming operational? Heading south on the AC? Getting OFF the AC before it was hit will be a different narrative to Sharkey Ward. I read 2 of the other 3 Roland White books mentioned and he picks more obscure but to me more-so fascinating material. His writing is excellent and I fully intend to read this.
Hi Geoff, The book has just arrived at the Reid household – and I’m looking forward to getting my teeth into it. I’m a big fan of Roland White, particularly his “Vulcan 607” – he skilfully writes narrative history like a fast-paced novel.
After a quick flick through the pages, though, I must confess that sections focused on Sea Harrier air-combat don’t seem to add greatly to what is already out there – in particular the material already in “Air Combat South Atlantic” (1983) by Alfred Price and Jeffrey Ethell. A book that I would certainly recommend – with an inexpensive Kindle edition now available.
I think Sharkey Ward’s book is very candid and interesting – it’s honest, and intellectually courageous, and certainly not a bland account!
Indeed, much of his criticisms of the Admiral’s staff on Hermes (and that ship’s controversial Captain), were accepted by Sandy Woodward in his second edition of “One Hundred Days”. His advisors simply didn’t understand the capabilities of the Sea Harrier.
I’d also recommend Jerry’s Pook’s “RAF Harrier-Ground Attack Falklands” (2007). A member of RAF No.1 squadron, Pook flew the GR3 from Hermes in some of the most dangerous sorties of the conflict. In similar vein to Sharkey, he was furious over the mishandling of his squadron’s capabilities by the command on Hermes.
It would appear that in the Sea/Air campaign off the Falklands, the Admiral’s staff greatly mishandled the air-element.
Anyway, perhaps – I’ll post my own review of Roland’s new book once I’ve worked my way through its 431 pages! lol
Morning Alan. geoff with a small ‘g’ here. Regarding the “mishandling of..the Squadrons capabilities”, it would be interesting to know the specifics of these allegations. It would seem that the air-element should have been given maximum input in the operation but in all fairness to the Admirals staff, how do you incorporate that into the overall battle plan where strategic and tactical considerations apply and of cours there would have been political considerations thrown in to the mix? Will look out for the book here but your thoughts would be interesting in the meantime. Can you finish it by Friday? 🙂
ps An example of this would be Churchill’s restriction of RAF fighter cover over Dunkirk for which he received much flak but in the end would seem to have been the right choice when the end result of the Battle of Britain was such a near run thing! Those precious few fighters that may have been lost in that action could arguably have cost us Victory. The Harrier was critical to the win in the Falklands and a conservative approach to how it was managed might have justified the Admirals interference. Just playing Devils Advocate here.
Hi geoff
Thanks for your interesting observations, my friend.
Probably a 4, 000 word essay is needed to do justice to your post! But I hope these 500 words might do meantime ……
I think criticisms made by Sharkey Ward and Jerry Pook observed that Woodward’s staff were not well versed in the capabilities of the Sea Harrier’s Blue Fox radar and NAVHARS – or had sufficient understanding of modern air-to-ground combat tactics. As a submariner, Woodward was not experienced in carrier operations and therefore somewhat reliant on his staff – including his controversial Flag Captain on Hermes, an ex-Buccaneer pilot – and a man who seems to have produced very strong reactions. Hermes does not appear to have been a very happy ship in 1982. But to pick up on your excellent Churchill/Dunkirk observation, neither Ward nor Pook criticised Woodward’s careful husbanding of Hermes and Invincible, and his need to strike a balance between their safety from Exocet attack – and the requirement to put Combat Air Patrols over the San Carlos bridgehead of effective flight-duration. Whatever his alleged limitations as a carrier admiral, Woodward seems to have had a very sound strategic grasp.
Ward was the OC of 801 squadron on Invincible – and had brought the Sea Harrier into service, with the opportunity to become fully versed in its capabilities. He states his unit was obtaining detection ranges with Blue Fox of over 20 miles, while the less experienced No.800 squadron on Hermes was only achieving about 10 miles. Indeed on 1 May 1982, 801 squadron conducted highly successful radar interceptions of Argentinian air-attacks and shot-down two Mirages and a Canberra. The other Sea Harrier squadron on Hermes, however, appears to have been more sceptical of their aircraft’s potential. That view seems to have coloured the confidence of Woodward’s staff on the STOVL jet’s effectiveness. It appears the flagship decided the fleet’s ship-borne missile defences, and not the Sea Harrier, would be the primary means of air-defence.
Although Invincible was instructed to run the air-to-air war, in his 1992 book, Ward argues the flagship unnecessarily intervened to divert Sea Harriers off CAPs to conduct other tasks, like surface searches. Such a gap in the air-defences was exploited by Super Etendards on 4 May, with the loss of Sheffield.
Critically, Ward states the low-level barrier CAP planned by Invincible to protect the San Carlos bridgehead was not supported by Hermes – whose Sea Harriers operated at medium altitudes. Ward writes that the low-level CAP was an effective deterrent and caused over 400 Argentinian attack sorties to be aborted, but that the medium level CAP too easily allowed Skyhawk and Dagger fighter-bombers to penetrate into the anchorage – leading to the loss of Ardent and Antelope.
Jerry Pook argues that Hermes did not understand how to conduct effective air-to-ground operations, particularly on the critical need for pre-strike photo-reconnaissance. Too often, GR3s were sent-out on speculative armed-reconnaissance missions which produced limited results. He writes about his, “… sheer cold anger at the incompetent and arrogant way in which the RN did their level best to foil our efforts to carry out effective operations” (p.182, 2007).
Going back to your Churchill/1940 comparison, just as the aftermath of the Battle of Britain produced controversy over the manner in which the air-defence was conducted ie Leigh Mallory’s “Big Wing” -v- Park’s more fluid defence, so in the wake of the Falkland’s conflict was there disagreement on the effectiveness of the air-war prosecuted by the British task-force.
This is the longest post I’ve ever made on UKDJ – but I hope it has stirred your interest!
I’ll try to post later on “Harrier 809”.
Thank you Alan. I appreciate the time you have taken to reply to my Devils Advocacy! Military conflict in history is littered with incidents initiated by individuals whose commands have changed the shape of our futures! Going up the wrong valley in Crimea is one that comes to mind!!
BTW-I used to receive a CMS message telling me when posts had been replied to but has stopped for some reason so have to keep remembering where I posted 🙂
Cheers from Durban
Hi geoff, I would certainly recommend “Harrier 809”
The author has skilfully synthesised material from a variety of sources to create a rattling good yarn.
Although the breakneck deployment of 809 squadron is White’s main hook into the Falklands conflict, he does widely cover the Harrier’s air-war – and the contribution of the other SHAR squadrons on Hermes and Invincible. Plus their Argentinian opponents are not left out, either.
The RAF is not neglected – and there is an interesting section on its secret deployment of units to Chile, and the operation of a Nimrod R1 on SIGNIT duties from the lonely Pacific island of San Felix. So secret was the operation that not all Chilean units were briefed – and the Nimrod was forced into desperate evasive manoeuvring over the Beagle Channel to escape a curious Mirage 50. There are tantalising hints of a Canberra PR9 deployment – but I think the full story of the Chilean angle is still to be written.
To sum-up: A great Xmas stocking filler, geoff, and I would drop a hint to the family!
I rember when the Harrier first flew(dating myself). Then Argentina invaded the Falklands, and the public learned bout the Harrier. Then there was the Sea Harrier. There was talk of a Harrier III, but that became the F-35.