A concept image (shown below) designed to show how the ‘Future Commando Force’ will operate shows two ‘Littoral Strike Ships’ as well as ‘discrete shipping’ being used to land British forces.

The Littoral Strike Ship concept has been off the radar for around a year, with nothing new coming into the public domain.

The concept was unveiled in 2019 and is essentially an adapted commercial hull equipped with command and control capabilities and an embarked military force. There were to be two ships, one of the ships would be permanently deployed east of Suez, and the other in the anywhere from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean.

Then Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson said:

“Our vision is for these ships to form part of 2 Littoral Strike Groups complete with escorts, support vessels and helicopters. One would be based East of Suez in the Indo-Pacific and one based West of Suez in the Mediterranean, Atlantic and Baltic. And, if we ever need them to, our two Littoral Strike Ships, our two aircraft carriers, our two amphibious assault ships Albion and Bulwark, and our three Bay Class landing ships can come together in one amphibious task force. This will give us sovereign, lethal, amphibious force. This will be one of the largest and best such forces anywhere in the world.”

This ‘coming together’ is detailed below, the ‘LS Group’ would comprise of LRG(S), LRG(S) aggregating together and operating as part of a carrier-based Maritime Task Group’.

The image above comes from a Ministry of Defence announcement discussing the fact that the Royal Navy will be hosting the next Maritime Enterprise Planning Group seminar/meeting on Tuesday the 16th March 2021 to discuss Littoral Strike.

According to a document released by the Ministry of Defence to industry as part of a call to industry over the capability, the intent for the Maritime Enterprise Planning Groups is to:

• Improve understanding. The problem led approach to future capability development will drive a closer relationship with industry.
• Enhance situational awareness. Providing industry with a common ‘customer view’ from which they can respond and develop solutions for RN capability requirements.
• Enable alternative thinking. Creating a thought-space where Royal Navy and industry can focus on the requirements for a solution to a problem.

The document also states:

“The complex problem set faced by the Royal Navy in the modern operating environment calls for a closer alignment with industry. This is required in order to both understand mutual requirements and to pursue transformative capability that will deliver operational advantage in a more agile way.”

What do we know about the status of the Littoral Strike Ship concept so far?

Last year we learned that work already undertaken on the Future Littoral Strike Ship programme will help inform the upcoming defence review regarding the UK requirement for the vessels.

Gavin Robinson Shadow DUP Spokesperson asked in Parliament:

“To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what progress he has made on the Future Littoral Strike Ship.”

Jeremy Quin, Minister of State for the Ministry of Defence, replied:

“The Prime Minister has committed to undertake the deepest review of Britain’s security, defence and foreign policy. This review will examine how we strengthen and prioritise our alliances, diplomacy and development and will consider all aspects of our defence and security capabilities, including our approach to procurement and maintaining our technological edge. The work already undertaken on the future Littoral Strike Ship will feed into this review.”

We’ll see what happens over the next month or two.

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

165 COMMENTS

  1. It’s certainly an interesting question, but unless I’m missing something there isn’t anything particularly new here.

    The direct amphibious assault has arguably been dead for decades, and I can’t see any new system bringing it back. The Falklands approach of exploiting weak points and approaching from unexpected angles would still seem to hold. So aside from further integration of networked sensors, what is fundamentally different about any of this?

    • I believe many people believed that these ideas had been shelved, so for me its certainly refreshing to read they are back under consideration again. I do hope they won’t be used as a replacement for the Albion’s though.

    • flexibility @ best these are 2 cargo hulled type ships, block built in a non-UK shipyard like the TIDE Class. to respond to various mission capabilities without the need to send a Full-blown warship. UK Yards busy with frigate orders and could offer a yard work to see thru Brexit/covid crisis.

      • It seems rather unlikely the UK will have any warship built abroad again for while. There’s general dissatisfaction with the Tide-class programme, and the political wind is firmly in favour of domestic production. There are several options for a UK build, primarily either H&W in Belfast or CL in Liverpool. CL is better positioned due to currently being active in shipbuilding, but if H&W win the FSS contract then they’d be well placed to follow up with the Littoral Strike Ships

    • And move the bridge to the starboard side, increase the freeboard and add a couple of lifts down to a hangar for the helicopters. Then if you want water borne craft to move heavy equipment provide a flood able dock in the stern. Hey presto an LHD.

    • Because you’re using a ship that can pass for civilian, especially if painted up like one. Stealthy approach for surprise attack. If you want an LHD, get an LHD. This is closer to the US Navy’s sea basing concept, using commercial ships with holes cut in the hull for access to various bits.

      • Yes, I think this is also the thinking with the River 2s. Their presence and humanitarian role converts easily to a conflict role ….just add UAVs, 50 RM with say pedestal launched missiles and containerised Merlin capable light vehicles. And its difficult for a potential adversary to distinguish which configuration is sailing off your coast.

      • Don’t think it’s so much about the Q ship concept (naval vessel masquerading as a commercial vessel at any level) but it’s much more about price and (possibly) speed of build

    • Because that forward bit is where the explosives are stored since there will be no deep magazines.

      It also provides a bit of weather and wind protection to the deck – noting forward facing hangars which I’m still not sure how that will work. Damn cold and draughty place to work with water guaranteed to be blown in, and thats before it starts raining. Not encouraging for effective ac maintenance.

      I’m assuming flight ops will have to be at zero ship speed… (hangar and airflow distirbance off the front).

      But Im sure they’ve thought all this through…

      • Agreed, you and the US Navy seem to share the same concern. Their version of the LSS (USS Lewis B. Puller for instance) had a rearward facing hangar at the bow presumably for this very reason

  2. Really glad to see the Marines return to their original role, of amphibious landing and assault. However, this ‘future commando force’ is a very fancy name for ‘cuts’ . I hope the news isn’t true, that Boris is thinking of cutting 10,000.

    • Technology will make up for a lot of those potential lost numbers. Capability is key, not the total number of personal. And the conflicts of the future will be fought very differently from those in the past. Even Afghanistan would be done very differently today.

        • There has been the growth of easily deployable ISTAR assets like miniature drones, or the rise in better communications, coupled with an increase in firepower for most infantry units. This means the level of situational awareness, operational understanding and the ability to deliver an ever wider array of effects means even Company or Platoon sized forces will have an ability to influence matters in a way previously not available.

          • I don’t think that makes up for another 10k chop at all Robert, numbers are a capability in themselves, especially with the army. There is absolutely no justification for army numbers being cut anymore.

          • Maybe, but i think that could be the reality we are facing. I think we face smaller interventions in the future, smaller groups of highly specialist/capable groups that are highly deployable. In a perfect world we would have an Army 100k strong, and all the best toys, but it doesn’t working like that. We haven’t even been at 82k for years. Maybe the cut in numbers through natural wastage will pay for the very best kit, and the ability to plug n play into the American system for day 1 of a conflict. If not, they might just ask us to stay at home, regardless of numbers. Some Army’s have impressive numbers, but can’t deploy and sustain beyond there own borders. The British Army is one of very few that can.

      • In what way would Afghan be done differently?

        properly? I.e. recruit a 150,000 strong local Army with western officers all under direct western command? Appoint western “district officers” (civilians) and spend decades building up local capacity?

          • Maybe! But its the only way to actually acheive what we said we did. Not very PC or likely though 🙂

            Send 10.000 Brits out to live in and command afghan forces, you get the longevity, continuity and everyone is on the same tempo and timeline so it gels. You all work and live together so that gels and the result is an effective and united force.

            The opposite of what our “in and out” western roulemants vs marathon running locals who get the crap jobs and kit by comparison.

          • It didnt appear they all agreed with what did happen.

            It also doesnt appear that the significant blood and treasure we expended, acheived much.

            As Einstein said, doing the same thing and expecting different results is the definition of insanity.

            A key issue in Afghan was the mismatch between “here today, gone tomorrow” western troops who had amazing kit and wanted to sprint through their 6 month tour before going back to comfortable home for tea and medsls, and the local forces who were in it for life yet were used as expendable cannon fodder with at best indifferent lewdership and generally poor training and kit.

            The result was contempt by the locals of the western forces. Read how the ARVN saw the US forces in Vietnam and how rotten they were themselves as the “second raters”.

            Contrast that to the British Indian Army, how the KAR performed in WW2.

            Did you see the documentary of us leaving Bastion and what the Afghan Army said when they saw our accomodation “soft ****s, this is where they spent the money” was about the politest.

            Or when I listened to Afgahn senior officers slating the US/UK forces and attitude for being selfish and totally ignorant of what they were doing and where (whilst the translators said something entirely different!). These were our “trusted allies”, the ones we sent to Shrivenham and so on and paid for their kids to come west and go to boarding schools. Yet the juggernaut continued until we gave up and went home.

            No wonder we arent doing that again. Yet the problems in the world are still there.

          • Think your talking a bit chuff and quite disrespectul in regard to your comment about “wanting to sprint through a 6 month tour and back home for tea and medals”! Was that a sprint throught he first tour or the 5th? And many of us didnt spend time in bation of KAF, operating from FOBs or patrol bases. I appreciate not everyone can or did tours there, or even spend time in the military but your rather generalisation and presumption, using others opinions and news reports not quite fair or correct.

            I am presuming you have never operated with the ANA or the ANP? You may have, you may have a big ninja tash and eat glass, having done some underwater knife fighting with 5000 talibs…I dont know but you may not want to presume that if you wanted a 6 month sprint tour, others didnt. You will find most agree its their country and mainly wanted us to offer training and OS support. They will fight for whatever reasons they think apt, and while most had a set of balls, the vast majority knew when to just shoot, duck, shoot again to keep all sides content.

            While I personly think, after 5 tours and a number of years back their in a private capacity, that our efforts in Aghan was wrong, and we should have left around 2003 when AQ had fucked off to East Africa. However its a fact we were there, and some still are, and lets not presume that what you see or read, and form your narrative is quite as accurate or true as it appears.

          • Wow thats a big chip and an awful lot of guff about knifes and all sorts of other irrelvant rubbish.

            ANA mostly I’m afraid, limited ANP. Very much embedded. Does doing something 5 times make it more or less pointless than doing it once?

            Fact is nearly everything we were doing was wrong, and most gains were lost the moment we stopped doing it. That is and was pointless.

            ANA needed kit, training and leadership. What they didnt need and didnt like, although they kept it quiet not surprisingly, was the “fly in, fly out” Westerners who were not committed to what they were and were running a sprint vs their marathon and who changed over every 5 mins and then had to get up to speed. It took a lot to get to that truth, not listening to interpreters too much for instance as they knew the game they had to playz

            The reality is if we actually wanted to acheive what we said we did (and that is a big if), then a mass Army controlled and led by Westerners was the only way to do it. But clearly not PC and so could never happen.

            Therin lies the strategic failure and no matter what tactical genius and blood sweat and tears that the troops put in, nothing could have averted that failure.

          • So if someone challenges a certain part of your post, its due to a chip, inersting, and you spent time in uniform, in the mil, and you have never come across the underwater knife fighting piss take?….mmmmm….once again most interesting. However, back to the post, if you didnt like your tour, and wanted to get home quickly for your tea and a medal, thats fine, but try not to presume that others were the same. I have no idea of your service/Arm/Reg/Bn/Sqn/Ship/Chip shop unit you served, however there are professional, motivated people and organisations out there that see operational tours (combat tours different than operational) as they should be seen, as part of a trade which ensures knowledge and experience at all level. Many see soldering as a profession, to which you excel at, at all times.

            You do the wars and the tours that are there, be them 6 days, 6 weeks, 6 months or longer, so maybe try not to put your own possible feelings, onto others, in order to sell your narrative. Theres so many strategists sat in the rear, sippin cold pepsi with the A.C on, saying how shits wrong and they could sort it……but then theres the small group of motivated professionals, who couldnt give a hoot about the strategic, as all they are concened about is the tactical, next morning, out the FOB/PB at 03:30, safely, to crack on with the days task without getting anyone killed or maimed! Best leave the political and strategic to those paid for it. Opinions are like arseholes, weve all got one! Leave strategy to those paid to set it, otherwise get yourself to those high levels and have an input.

          • Surprisingly populations tend to get a bit unhappy about being ruled by foreigners and tend to start showing it in various lethal ways.

          • And who exactly is going to sign up for that?! The army struggled to retain people in part because so many deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq that interfered with family lives, and now you suggest long-term deployments lasting years. That would make recruitment and retention ten times worse.

          • ?? Recruitment and retention clearly isnt your thing.

            Paid to live for free overseas is an extremely popular thing with forces and ex forces people including myself. It is a world of opportunity out there. In days gone past they never lacked for recruits to the overseas opportunities (whilst UK forces did) and the same draw is there today. This would be a complete break with the roulemant idea, a new force effectively

            If anything, the “rest of the Army” doing its part time 6 months every 2 1/2 years would be the one struggling…

            I agree some locals (the ones you arent getting on side) might not like it – but if you want to nation build, you need to do it civ and mil and you need to be in control to set the tone and to be there longer than 5 mins whilst living the life of the locals. That is the lesson of India and Malaya.

            Politically it wouldnt float for a second but this “western forces rush in, do some training and oversee an election and handover to the local forces to all go home having swapped and swapped and swapped in the mean time” clearly does not work.

            Ideally we could lift the best from imperialism (genuine development of places with western ideas and tech) whilst moving on from the worst (human rights, exploitation). Instead post afghan we have a chaotic vacumn in many nations with vast tragedy occurring whilst we tinker at the edge and look the other way to ignore latest the bunch of corrupt and vicious thugs that have seized control whilst they go about their merry way. Personally I have issues with that, yet our model of intervention the last few decades was conplete failure.

          • The lesson of India is to be a set of aggressive duplicitous scum bags with no concern for killing of locals etc and not too bothered about British infantry deaths. Completely different time and place to recent Afghanistan. Our population wouldn’t stand for that now

  3. Why does UK military posture need a more specific amphibious assault bent. What geopolitical message is this stating: Is it about countering any Chinese aggression in the south China sea, helping US and ASEAN balancing and containing them: Is it something similar in the Baltic with Russia . Why now , when clearly if we need new ships , as is much debated here, we need frigates . Personally I support anything that increases our forces , but worry this proposal is not the whole story..

    • How would you propose the U.K. reinforce the northern flank of NATO something, which is something we have done since the 1970s and please do not say by airlift.
      It not a case of a “more specific amphibious assault bent” but retention of a capability that is essential. It was cut in 2010 and that should be reversed if we are serious about being a small but influential player.
      Given the proposed reduction in the army, our elite units, RM’s and Paras need increasing in number and have the full range of equipment so we at least maintain a limited but world class intervention capability that can move by air or sea.

    • The main NATO role to the Royal Marines is to support Norway in defending North Norway against Russian invasion. In recent years the Russian army has been crossing the border into Norway claiming they are lost! It is an easy claim to make given the border is unmarked, up the Russians didn’t seem to have the same difficulties as they do these days!

      The problem would be getting the RM ashore on a very rugged coastline and possibly with near by ports closed by air attack. So this capability would potentially allow a landing, supported by Norwegian forces, to be undetaken with at least a responable chance of success.

      Then there are the ‘out or area’ scenarios that you highlight. So yeh, potentially an important capability to have.

      Cheers CR

      • The ships , built to I assume commercial standards, would be death traps unless operating within a defensive umbrella providing total protection from surface, sub surface or airborne attacks. They are large, relatively easy to hit vessels with little to no defensive armament or sensors.
        I think if we need LHDs or LPHs let’s just get a specific vessel built to military standards.
        I know 2 hulls provide useful additional presence and “showing the flag” but that has to be countered against their survivability if put into harm’s way.
        For operations vs pirates or armed insurgencies such as Sierra Leone then fine, but against anything more capable and we might regret investing in these ships vs something more capable.
        I personally think a new version (or 2) of HMS Ocean type platform is needed. Helping to provide a useful 2nd ASW helicopter platform. Crucial escorts and submarines are more depressingly needed. So type 32 (5 more at least) or more type 26s (another 3-5) and a follow on batch of astute class much more useful.

    • Way I see it, literally any engagement or war we undertaken now will require an insertion from the sea unless it is a guerilla war against insurgents. Having more ships to serve this purpose – especially those that are almost as flexible and much cheaper than LHDs – in my book can only be a good thing

      • How I see it too Levi, these could be quite handy for disaster relief, a ‘mother ship’ for smaller vessels like MCM’s etc too.

  4. And move the bridge to the side, increase the freeboard and add a couple of lifts down to a hangar for the helicopters. Then if you want water borne craft to move heavy equipment provide a flood able dock in the stern. Hey presto an LHD.

      • In theory…..an MV22 is clearly depicted and this may in fact solve a major problem we have. Under no circumstances whatsoever will a QE operate as an LPH sitting just off a hostile beach. But the range and speed of the Osprey means it could operate from a large vessel in deep water and still put troops ashore fairly quickly despite the distance it might have to fly.
        I would put money on this being a future consideration.

        • I would bet my house we never buy V22.

          Vastly expensive to buy.
          Vastly expensive to run.
          Horrible accident rate.
          Capacity of less than a Chinool/Merlin.
          Horrible downdraught environment.

          Happy to let USMC provide them though as is the case 🙂

          • I suspect Uncle Sam will happily lease some to us. They have a far greater range and speed than a Chinook, totally outclassing it. and the safety rate is now much higher. A number of early incidents were later attributed to pilot error, due in the main to crews being unfamiliar with certain characteristics of the aircrafts behaviour, particularly in descent.

          • No way in hell will the Marines or any other service let go of their Ospreys. They are just too valuable and capable. Criticism of them may have been justified 20 years ago but they now have an enviable safety record and a solid record of achievement.

          • Why would we lease V22s? Why would the US let us smash their kit with flying hours?

            Please link to public evidence of this “enviable” safety record.

            As someone who sees actual stats, I hated flying in them, horrible experience as you cant see out and get very disorientated. Also quite cramped inside.

            Chinook any day of the week please.

          • The Osprey has the best safety record of any rotocraft the USMC flies. Look it up. Who cares whether you liked flying in them and you felt cramped? Absurd way to evaluate an aircraft. A better way is to examine the Osprey’s combat record and the abilities it gives the USMC as opposed to any other helicopter. Combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan gives the mod to the Osprey, Hands down. That’s in the opinion of the Marines who have to go into combat, not someone claustrophobic.
            My point was that they are so valued by the USMC that they wouldn’t lease them to the UK.

          • Ah so no link provided. If you cant evidence something, telling people to “look it up” is even stronger evidence you are talking complete BS.

            And now, instead of “enviable” safety record, as in the UK should “envy” it vs our own. Its just the safest of USMC rotorcraft – AH1, UH1, CH53, CH46 – none of which are renowed for, guess what, a good safety record.

            I like how you’ve decided I must be “claustrophobic” becuse Ive dared prick your fanboy balloon, and so I’m betting youve never been near one let alone in it. I also note you miss out the disorientation effect, is that tacit admission this isnt a particularly useful transport? Given its role is to transport people ready to do things…

            And in your view, the experience of people who use things is a poor way to evaluate things? Do you know how we evaluate things. Go on, look it up…

            Wow. Just wow. There truly are some idiotic fanboys out there.

          • Exactly!! But the US is also keen to see the UK, particularly the RN move forward and increase its capabilities as it finds itself deploying increasing numbers of assets in the Pacific and South China Sea. The advent of the QE class has been a blessing for the US as its key ally now has 2 large carriers that could be used to ease the pressure on US assets. Leasing the UK some MV/CV22s is not as far fetched as you might think, indeed you could find USMC units with these birds operating from one of our carriers. We carried out a lot of testing with an Osprey on HMS Ocean, we weren’t doing that for nothing.

          • Its insanely far fetched.

            We did the Osprey work so USMC units could operate from our ships with us because that makes loads of sense.

            Not so we can buy penny packets of equipment at vast procurement and in service support cost to look like a really small version of the US forces.

            If we really need a V22 for something, it’ll be a joint op and they’ll provide the V22 and we’ll provide the deck or the pink bodies that slip into the night from it. Otherwise we’ll do it another way or not at all.

            I’m not sure why it is difficult to comprehend, or why people are so obsessed about being a really (really) miniture version of US forces (UK is one tenth of the economy, one seventh of the population).

      • The Osprey is the best in its class, and like a good wine it just gets better with age. There are no other tilt rotors that match it, and probably won’t be for a long time yet.

        • Have you been in one?

          You literally state “best in class” and then that is is the only one in its class. By your own statement it is also worst in class.

          What you also miss is that the class isnt worth the candle vs other classes that are safer and more generally useful, eg Chinook.

        • It could outlift, outpace and outrange an Osprey with 1950’s technology. Use modern engines, composites, fly by wire and noise cancelling and you could have a winner.

      • Might be worth revisiting that concept with modern technology and materials science. I bet UKPLC could make that work. At least in prototype form until HMG pull the rug out from under it.

    • Realistically any engagement will require insertion from the sea. South China Sea, Falklands (unlikely but you never know), NATO engagements in Norway or the Baltics all will require the bulk of our materiel and men arriving by sea

    • I think its more to do with having the ability to do so if needed? Its all about preperation, and if you havent got a capability then it reduces your options, making a bad option seem feasible, through lack of preperation…..

    • Look at a map, there is pretty much nowhere left we havent invaded, generally several times.

      As the disclaimer always says, past petformance is no predictor of the future, but on the other hand, it usually is!

      • Which is precisely my point! I would rather we commit to our European responsibilities….this makes sense for our own national security. With a bit more concerted effort from us and our European partners gangster-land Russia could/should be under serious threat….and bloody-well should be!

        • Sadly as it stands the British Army is a minnow and is a ill-relevance in mainland Europe. It is not what I would like but it is fact and we are not about to increase the size and capability of the Army any time soon. We therefore have to think about what we offer to Europe and beyond in a different way.
          Our maritime, airforce, deterrent and elite light forces are where we offer the most and it is where our future lies.
          I genuinely believe China represents a bigger danger to U.K. interests than Russia, which can be deterred and I tend to think that is also what those setting policy believe. We therefore need to have mobile forces that can support our allies in Asia as well as Europe.
          Unfortunately, this all coincides with a difficult period for the army whose leadership seems incapable of setting a new vision or role going forward. As for some kind of a resurrection of BAOR that would be political suicide given the difficult recent negotiations over BREXIT.

        • Our European partners are of two minds.

          Western Europe doesnt give a sht about Russia and just wants to spend the money on other things.

          Eastern Europe cares very deeply and is putting its money where its mouth is. They are much more aligned with us strategically (also being very pro US vs western europe which is waiting to open the champagne on the US collapsing and wants to compete).

          Given the UK-EU relationship, this is a prime opportunity to get in with Eastern EU nations in terms of shaping our relationships and EU behaviour. The future of NATO also comes in here.

          So having the Army (and RAF) east of the Oder is I would say very important to the UK. Whilst raiding the Mid East and Indo Pac are “nice to have”.

          Which is why I dont think the Navy will get much other than what could be useful in Europe and to try and finish the carrier project.

        • Odds on the C2 upgrade will go ahead and that a workable solution to the Warrior issue will be funded and that we will forward base armour in Europe, possibly Poland. An anti EU friend is a friend indeed 🙂

    • Special services intervention or humanitarian rescue intervention in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Mozambique, Yemen quite likely I would have thought. Another Ebola outbreak in West Africa, Carribean hurricane season, another typhoon in the Philippines, see these ships being very busy replacements for Argus and Ocean.

    • In all honesty. I could see a requirement to reinforce Taiwan from the sea against Chinese invasion. That is the most scary scenario.

      • I would hope any threat of Chinese invasion would result in a massive show of force from USN and its allies. Not sure the world could ever allow a democratic country of 30+ million to be invaded by China.

  5. Interesting, especially the idea of “low-signiture shipping” presumably it referring to the SD Victoria. However, I can’t see the existence of the Bulwarks if these LSS come to existence. With only two commando available for amphibious operations will we even have the manpower to justify all four ships.

  6. Sorry for being naive or ignorant, but what is the benifit vs an LHD i.e. HMS Ocean V2.0? Seems to me that LHD has more room for helicopters on deck and can launch beach landing crafts to ferry armoured vehicles ashore (apc, ifv, tanks, etc…)

    • The only benefit is price but they will have limited military value and if procured to replace the LPDs then you have just disabled the Royal Marines.
      If they were to supplement what shipping we already have then they would be useful to Sea base some forces but definitely non front line vessels.
      They remind me of RFA Reliant a merchant ship converted aviation support ship procured post the Falklands war that was deposed off after only 3 or 4 years service. The cost of conversion was about £6m in 1983 from memory and she was a failure.

      • I am confused because AFAIK Bay Class does what these LSS do and more at a competitive price. Bay class are not old, are they already being retired?

      • If its Albion and Bulwark going for these we need 2x 25k+ LHDs.

        If they wre extra then the civillian concept, permamently afloat with zero – 100 SF and support (eg RMs) is the answer.

        The delay is I suspect due to ensuring the two bits above arent merged for lack of money and they replace the LPDs which would be awful.

        • Noting the graphic does not show the LPDs… and the author had to drag up Williamson’s original “and LPDs” vs the language now used. So pretty discouraging.

          The problem with Reliant was the ISO container “modular” approach which was unsuited to the realities of being at sea (leaking/flex etc) vs a properly built-in permament hangar structure as Argus acheived. (LCS take note!

  7. YESSS! Its brilliant to see some updated news on the LOV \ Littoral Strike Ship

    When I first read about them in 2019 via the RUSI paper it showed what the future of the RN and RM would and should be.

    What a surprise to come on and see this

    So I do hope they invest in its future

  8. Oh dear, this could be an excuse to chin of Albion and Bulwark, to be replaced with two cheap used hulls, with minimal conversion to “littoral” role, while still claiming we have “landing ships”……thoughts?

    • I cannot see LSS being acquired in addition to our LPDs. Despite the recently announced increase in funding, much of the equipment budget black hole remains. It is becoming worryingly clear that some hefty cuts are going to be announced. Much of the pressure on what by most standards is a large defence budget comes from 2 projects: Trident successor and the carriers. Cheaper alternatives to the former have been reviewed and rejected, so this will go ahead. But, given our unwillingness to buy more F35s,( and the ongoing problems with the aircraft), should we consider operating just one fixed wing carrier? Cameron’s decision to have one carrier as a super LPH( made when he found he couldn’t cancel the order) does make some sense. As the RM moves away from beach assault towards smaller helicopter operations, this would allow the LPDs to be deleted and the F35 cost to be reduced. An LSS could work in tandem with a carrier, allowing the latter to stay further offshore.
      Both carriers could operate F35 if needed to distribute risk but we would normally have a single carrier group, thus not needing to use most of the surface fleet as escorts.

      • Yes, we are going to operate just one fixed wing carrier. The second is in reserve, training, refit, whatever, and can be taskedin emergency, be that carrying helicopters or even splitting the F35 forc3 between the 2.

        Merlin remains a problem as too few to split.

        The LSS in no shape or form can replace the LPDs and their capabilities, number of LCVP and LCU, and Command facilities.

        They should ideally be used as forward deployed floating SF bases, with the LPDs added if something more akin to a Commando Group is needed.

        I remain optimistic.

        • Building a£3b carrier just to sit in reserve is bonkers( another Gordon Brown winner!). A new ship needs to be operated but we don’t have enough F35s to fill one carrier. So by default, POW will have to be mainly a helicopter carrier. Although that seems a poor use of an expensive vessel, its better than sailing round empty. We would need more Chinooks but they are cheap compared with Merlin or F35.
          My money is still on the retirement of the LPDs with an LSS or two as a sop to critics.

          • We didn’t build a carrier just to sit in reserve. We built 2 carriers so that we always have one available. A single carrier, like the French, means we have to hope a war doesn’t happen when it’s in refit or maintenance.

            The Americans have 11 super carriers; they have zero intention to ever have all 11 deployed at once! They’ll have 3 deployed, 4 at most.

            We also have two carriers to be able to operate them together under surge conditions, but that would be a SHTF, brown-trousers type of conflict. Basically WW3 or leading up to it.

          • Not strictly true. We ordered 2 carriers with a plan for 140 odd F35s. We built 2 carriers because the contract prevented DC from cancelling at least one. Despite cutting everything else to help fund them, we have shown by the F35 numbers we will not fund to the original planned capacity. Of course 2 means we should always have one available. But now we have PoW coming onstream, it has to have a meaningful role. It won’t be launching.F35 sorties ( unless we split the already inadequate aircraft fleet). Developing a different normal non surge role will need training and practice. If I were in charge, I could easily spin the retirement of LPDs in favour of a bigger, newer vessel as an improvement!

          • But the limitation of the design( no cats or traps) means the ships cannot launch or recover large UCAVs !Ike the x47. So they will either be small or rotary.
            I’m not sure about the feasibility of recovering a long range turboprop drone, but I guess that if this was feasible, we wouldn’t need Crowsnest.

          • We committed to 138 F35s “over the life of the programme.” I don’t think they ever intended to operate all 138 together, same as they never planned to operate both carriers together except in dire straits.

            The MoD and HMG has said all along they would operate 4 frontline squadrons plus an OCU. 12 planes in each comes to 60 airframes, then 20-30 spares, so likely we’ll get 90. This does also allow the possibility of standing up a 5th squadron in dire circumstances, which is how 809 Squadron formed in the Falklands in 1982.

            If we do get all 138 the remainder will probably replace the oldest airframes.

            But the carriers were designed around operating a max of 36 F35s plus helicopters anyway, so if we have 4 squadrons we can still fill one to the brim and have a dozen on the other in a dire situation, the 2nd one operating helicopters, or both operating 24. 24 F35s is still a significant force and more than we’ve operated in 50 years!

          • A 2nd carrier could be deployed with 207Squ(OCU), in home waters/GIUK for at sea training and ASW exercises.

          • And I would think would also be the fastest way to provide close air support to forces defending Norway against Russian incursion. Its a thousand miles from Lossemouth to Tromso,

          • Yes. Even with a reduced order of F35, we could operate say 4/6 on PoW to provide air defence. But we need to get the contracted 48 delivered to be able to do that and have a 20+ load on QE.

          • Well we have place the order for the initial 48 so if we welch out of that we’ll have to pay LM anyway. We’ll get all of that 48.

            To be honest I think we’ll end up with around 90 F35s total.

          • Just re-read a long article on the NAO report. The costs of 48 contracted F 35 are included but there is no funding in place for more. And even with this small number, there is a multi billion shortfall over the next 10 years.
            I think we will not see more than 48 over that period.
            Our problem might be that the growing disenchantment in US defense circles with the cost and poor availability of the aircraft might see it cancelled after much smaller than planned orders have been met. The F22 was chopped early despite the plane having far fewer problems. So despite the $400b spend to date, there is a precedent.
            The biggest factor preventing cancellation is the USMC.

          • The F-35A is Not to be chopped!
            The USAF is still planning to forward deploy 48 F-35As in Lakenheath later this year.

            Even the Harrier was problematic when first operational, in the early 1970s!

          • Yes,its not exactly a Vote of Confidence in the F35 when even the USAF are looking into other Platforms to replace their F16’s.

      • What on earth gives you the impression the UK operates by patronage? 92 hereditary Peers, 26 Bishops and 692 political place men in the House of Lords perhaps?

    • My guess is Albion and Bulwark will be decommissioned early and replaced with a compromised solution of some description, probably involving converted used hulls. Whether they are anything like the LSS concept remains to be seen. Never been a fan of LSS myself. The LPDs are approaching 20 years old so going with a converted hulls fudge now means no direct replacements for the LPDs in a decade or so. Could be wrong of course but that’s the way I see it.

        • I’m not saying it is what they should do but what they may do. Fearless and Intrepid faced the axe as part of the 1981 Nott review. How would we have reinforced Norway then when the threat was far greater than it is now? Ditto the 1975 Mason review, which began the run-down of the assault capability and indicated that no further specialist ships would be built. Presumably there were ‘gap filler’ alternatives under consideration that could have been used instead, e.g. adapted merchant ships?

          Even when the decision was taken to reprieve and eventually replace Fearless and Intrepid, they were not intending to build like-for-like replacements. Obviously the situation changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and a return to an expeditionary focus, so the Albions were built. My point was I question our commitment to retaining and replacing the Albions like-for-like when there are so many other pressing demands and the RM mission seems to be moving away from traditional beach landings.

      • Albion and Bulwark have both been in reserve and deep extended readiness. Their hulls are not worn out or their engines fatigued. I would think they both have at least another 20 years viable service life left in them.

        • The planned out of service dates are 2033 for Albion and 2034 for Bulwark, so much less than 20 years. Given a decade is required to plan, design and build replacements we need to begin work on this during the current parliament. Hopefully the integrated review will provide clarification.

          It is not just about their material condition but how much they cost to crew, run and maintain, particularly as they age. Ships are often decommissioned early if the on-going costs are not justifiable when there are more important priorities.

          For example, are the RM moving away from beach landings? If so, there is little point in keeping the LPDs whatever their condition as the money is needed elsewhere. Again, the integrated review should clarify the future shape of the amphibious capability and assets required.

          • There is No other way we can hold Norway without substantial forces insertion, which is the LPDs role.
            As you said in the previous post, we were planning to lose Norway in the 1980’s, is the UK Gov planning the same exercise again, to make Norway an easy target?

          • We would struggle to make much of an impact with two modest LPDs, only one of which is actually operational. Surely the US with vastly more resources would take the lead with the RN, RM and European allies playing a relatively minor supporting role.

            I am not opposed to the assault capability or indeed LPDs. But if we are just being tokenistic and keeping it going as a sacred cow (I get the impression that to some extent we are) then continuing with the status quo is not a sensible use of resources. It is an issue that has to be considered.

          • We did hold off the Germans in Norway for a few weeks in WW2! If only Uncle Sam had joined the War at that stage(April 1940), would have been enough time for reinforcements to arrive across the pond, and Norway would have been held.

            Once you have loess
            a foothold, it is harder to get back in
            again!

          • Do we really need LPDs to reinforce Norway? If there are no ports available to off load men and heavy equipment,Norway is already lost.

          • You Don’t need ports with LPD’s!
            Their landing craft can land on a beach with heavy equipment. That is the advantage of LPDs, if ports are inaccessable for some reason.

          • You Don’t need ports with LPD’s!
            Their landing craft can land on a beach with heavy equipment. That is the advantage of LPDs, if ports are inaccessable for some reason.

            It can be undefended beach as well.

  9. Williamson clearly considered the LSS as additional to rather than replacement for the LPD, but I have not received the impression that this view is mainstream MOD. Seems difficult to believe UK could support all those assets i.e. from A/C to Bays plus all the facilitating troop platforms they’d require to be effective.
    LSS are interesting concept, but I understand their main u.s.p is as helicopter strike platforms to aid rapid littoral assault over the vulnerability of landing craft to modern guided weapons. Sound by itself, but we have few Mk4 Merlin and the like at high cost per unit. Landing craft must be considerably cheaper to supply and run and thus potentially enable more units, though increasing their speed would be helpful, admittedly. The fewer, more expensive, longer to build helos are faster, but still very susceptible to guided missiles/guns!
    Follow the logic that you attack an ‘undefended shore’, but in that case the risk level should also drop for landing craft in higher numbers?

  10. This has come to light again probably to counter any leaks coming from MOD main building of the future and upcoming defence review. This is the future of defence as I have said many times before the army are going to take a big hit and be re- roled. Heavy armour as we now it is going right or wrong as for traditional land warfare its not going to happen in the planners mind. The top brass know this and are going to kick up big time. I can see the RAF changing the way it does buisness in the not too distant future right or wrong. The Royal Navy will come out shinning and I can see an acceleration in frigates on the slipway. Im ex RAF and it pains me too see how sall it has become.

    • I think you’ll be wrong.

      This review will be more of the same. Same general force structure, some salami slicing.

      Boris is not a revolutions person (even less than Cameron and his daft “no capbadges” ruling) and just plays esch side off to deliver an otherwise mundane outcome. There is no way he’ll put his name on initiating some major change in defence direction like binning heavy forces given the flak the Army and retired Generals would throw at him and that’s one quarter still broadly on his core team, especially as its those that give the UK a European role which is of prime importance to big up given the friction elsewhere in that relationship – even more so as its Eastern Europe focussed which has the dual advantage of giving the UK an “in” with a part of the EU more aligned to us generally.

      That’s my geostrategic view – entrench the UK in Eastern Europe to both buy favour and split the EU, whilst doing the age old “out of area” pretence for global role.

      As for the RAF, what could it do differently? Not fly aircraft? Not operate them?

      • Under Cameron and Fox we lost entire capabilities, no salami slicing there.The whole point of this review is less people to do more. The Secretary of State has dropped alot of hints over the last 12 months and none of it was to gauge public opinion for what its worth. We now have laughingly Space force, Cyber security corps and a carrier battle group. The RAF is and will still stand QRA and a flexible transport force. The future we are told is the loyal wingman concept unmand drones, swarm drone technology and more autonomy. Less crabs, less pongos but more fish heads. Rotary in the Air Force is in need of urgent replacement of new assets the Pumas are ragged and over half the Chinook fleets is getting for 40 years old. I agree with you on one thing I can see it happening on the cheap.

        • Caneron just cut stuff that was due to die anyway (Harriers shagged, Type 22s with no ships in the yards to replace them). Absolutely nothing revolutionary in strategy.

          Note Hercs and Pumas in not dissimilar state today…

          But Boris doesnt want to be a “cutter” and appewrs to have a magic money tree so that dynamic is worth watching.

          RAF future is Tempest, noting loyal wingman has to have something to be loyal too!

          The question is what of the magic money goes on mew useful capabilities and what goes down the pan with the usual procurement…

  11. So long as it isn’t a replacement for conventional amphibious assault ships, this seems like a really versatile and flexible way to expand amphibious capability on a budget.

  12. If there is enough money to build these ships, keep Albion & Bulwark operational and enough escorts to escort both amphibious groups as well as the carrier group I’ll eat my hat. Also the idea that one group is based east of Suez and the other west really signals the death nell of 3 Commando as a Bde group. Presumably they see a commando group with each amphibious force, a bit like a USMC MEU. In turn that would mean our ability to rapidly reinforce the Norwegians with a amphibious Bde of arctic trained commandos would be gone.

    I still feel the best option would be to replace Albion, Bulwark and Ocean with 2 large LHD (Canberra or Mistral Class vessels). That would allow a full Bde to deploy, be able to do vertical as well as seaborne assault and possibly allow for a small number of F35Bs to be forward deployed in direct support of the Bde.

  13. All good stuff – two would make a useful replacement for Argus and go someway to closing the gap left by Ocean going. Not sure how flying operations will work; I’m sure there is a good reason that all other ships either have a through deck or a deck behind the superstructure of the ship…..

    This plan will need a lot more sea going helicopters – do we need 72 Chinooks? (and F35s obviously)

  14. “Autonomous Advance Force”

    What were those autonomous semi submersible things believed bought for SBS trialled last year?

  15. Mother-ships forward based to launch small Royal Marine teams and helicopters on day 1 of a crisis rather than waiting weeks for the carriers and/or other amphibious ships to arrive makes a lot of sense to me.

    They’d at least partially replace the LPH capabilities lost with Ocean and allow any Argus replacement to be a dedicated hospital vessel rather than a compromised design too.

    Controversial view but with these in place for low level SF stuff and the carriers providing ample planning/command & control facilities for larger ops i don’t really see any need to have distinctive LPD’s in the shape of the Albion’s.

    Maybe better to then look to replace the 5 remaining Albion’s and Bay’s from the early 2030’s with 4 simple but slightly larger LSD’s (with hangar’s would be nice!) in the style of the Bay’s to provide the bread and butter lift and shift capability for full-scale amphibious scenario’s.

  16. As anyone that have seen some of my posts on this site I like some of the ideas from the Dutch Damen group. Especially for the new T32 as I think the Crossover Combatant would be a good fit, in the Crossover family they have an Amphibious version able to carry 200 Royal Marines and their equipement, a hanger for two medium helicopters (Merlin) assault craft LCVP/CB-90 and able to defend itself. So possibly the Crossover Amphib could be a good start for the LSS especially if the T32 could be based on the Combatant. By doing things this way it should save money as much of the two types of ship are the same

    • Hi Ron

      I think there is 2 parts to this.

      the T31 / T26 should/could be able to dispatch a company of RM using CB90’s or similar – but we need to factor this into their builds now (Absalon has this capabilit, nothing to say we can’t add the extra deck back into the Huitfeldt design which itself is an upgrade on the original Absalon design)

      If we want something bigger/meatier, then we need to look at the Karel Doorman type design as it offers so much more than any other vessel out there.

      I know a lot of people want task specific assets, but the world isn’t like that anymore and a KD design improved for the RN would be a great asset

      It would mean changes to the way we operate and adoption of some ship to shore hovercraft to use it to its full potential, but given the RN is innovative I don’t see them as being unable to overcome what will be some design / functionality changes.

      Most stores solutions will revolve around containerised solutions that can take advantage of the generous lane metres when in a stores role, probably likewise for a containerised hospital.

      Its all doable and transferrable, which only increases these vessels utility.

      • Pacman, I agree that we do need to get more out of less. There is as you say a few ways to look at this issue. The first is what do we want or need to do. To put Royal Marines ashore we need one type of ship but to put battlegroups from the Army ashore something diffrent. I agree that the KD is a good design but I think that should be used as a Bays replacement. The reason for my idea is we want to build our frigate numbers and carry out small scale raiding by the RM. The Army needs bigger ships to put large numbers ashore and heavy equipment. Sometimes I wonder if the RN and British Army should be equipped possibly be seen as a type of USMC.
        With the T31s I do agree that they should be able to dispatch a company of Marines, but the T26 is a fleet escort blue water vessel. So should we build a dedicated LSS, not really, a ship that can dispatch 100-200 Marines would be enough for this raiding task. However should we have some KDs yes but as I said in the Bay/ Argus/Point replacement programs. With the new T32/LSS program there is the possibility to have a light frigate with assault raiding capability if we only we would sometimes look at what some other nations are doing and pick the best ideas then use them in our own designs.

        • The problem as I see it is that the need to land a brigade is really niche now and the beauty of the KD type vessel is we can get daily value by assigning them to replenishment, mothership and humanitarian tasks, but when needed they can be turned into a respectable landing platform

          the key enablers here will be S2S connectors which themselves are expensive, but again offer flexibility (think recent floods in uk)

          I would really like to see all of this wargamed up to see which platforms give the most utility and vfm and ruthlessly pursuing these assets.

  17. I didn’t think you were allowed to disguise military assets as civilian craft? Is this only in war or are the government being clever with word choice here to play by the rules?

  18. Built to civvi standatd, this is a floating fuel tank/magazine probably made from a second-hand hull. Why not just go for an LPH/LHD in the first place.

  19. I have to say I don’t think we need these ships, if we can commit to more T31’s and kit them out with CB90’s or similar we could get more for our money.

    We either go with a support fleet of 8 Karel Doorman type vessels and 3 SSS to replace the Bays (3), Bulwarks (2), Forts(3),Waves (2) and Argus (1) that would give us this mother ship capacity as well as the ability to configure for operation.

    Ultimately a T31 kitted out with 3 or 4 CB90’s would give us the required force if we increase the number of hulls – it also allows for a wide variety of other tasking.

    Personally I believe a KD type hull in enough numbers is the way to go, as their capabilities are simply stunning when compared to what we currently have.

    We need to be bold with this go for scale and start building to tempo. 1 ship every 2 years will then take us to the Tide replacements, standardising on hull form (Aegir) and fit out will also bring the cost down and improve utilisation (as RFA ships are also tied up)

    • I am also a fan of the Karel Doorman. We should definitely be looking at ships of this type to replace some or all of our of our existing amphibious assets. A much better option than the LSS fudge and new hulls which could be built in UK yards.

    • It would be best If KDs were fitted with a stren door to allow LXUUVs to deploy covertly?
      And to prevent any lopsiding if lifted by crane, due to the weight of them.

      • I would advise anyone to take a look at the specs of a kd and then look at the specs of a Fort class and the bays. They are just about as good as it gets for a multi purpose vessel and I am sure could be improved/tweaked as needed.

        40 tonne crane
        2 lvcp
        2000 lane metre
        hanger for 6 merlins or 2 chinooks

        2 Replenishment-At-Sea masts
        c. 8000 m3 of fuel,
        c. 1000 m3of helicopter fuel,
        c. 450 m3 of potable water and
        c. 400 tonnes of ammunition and other supplies.

        it also has war rooms and a 20 bed hospital and can hold 300 personnel in total.

        that to me seems to be pretty impressive overall and a fleet of 8 or so could be a game changer.

  20. I think Gavin Williamson was an excellent defense secretary and his vision of using hulls already built is sound IMO.

    Callum. Littoral Strike Ship would have been suited to the Falklands, gone are the days of charging a beach. I thought this idea had gone with GW, pleased to see it alive. Hope it’s not an the expense of Bulwark and Albion.

  21. Understanding the Procurement process. Ukgov is going to invest in services for supporting the country. Having a project on going is a way of delivering a contract for industry to survive the pandemic. Imagine having one of these as a self contained support platform. HMS Ocean was built on this scheme but reached her upgradeable limit for a modern navy. Brazilian navy down graded her to a lower spec. Modern navies will have less short build numbers and more flexibility within there ships

  22. Point-class sealift ship Mark 2
    4 ships have proved their worth over the last 20 years. time for a GTI Model.

  23. Electroplated (no welding) Hydrofoil & Hull

    1.Electroplate (from mixed metals of waste dump) ship as a single piece
    1.Star Wars” used this radical technology to win the “Cold War” MDA904-94-C-6210
    2.Hulls built in 2 days at 10 different shipyards generates:
    1.200 FFG(x) annually production
    2.1,800 US flagged merchantmen annually production
    3.150ft Strut gives hull-wave clearance & stability (in sea state 10)
    4.Multiple hydrofoils allows 5-150mph (kite sail & GE LM2500 turbines)
    1.Sprints 150mph fuel (World record is 322mph)
    2.Cruises 60mph wind (20mph surface winds implies 68mph at kite sail elevation)
    3.Range unlimited on wind 
    5.Hull floats regardless of damage (18 lb/ft3 hull density, “Metal Bubble Wrap”)

    Cost $20M/hull

  24. This manufacturing technique will replace current ships and generate more profit for the shipyard.

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