A six-month inquiry by the Defence Committee has issued a scathing review of the UK’s defence procurement system, using the beleaguered Type 26 frigate programme as a stark case study.

The report, titled ‘It is broke – and it’s time to fix it’, was released today and criticises the system as being “broken”, noting that “multiple, successive reviews have not yet fixed it.”

The inquiry, led by Sub-Committee Chair Mark Francois MP, found the Type 26 frigate programme severely delayed and financially strained.

This programme for the Royal Navy had the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) date slip from October 2027 to October 2028—making it 11 years from first steel cut to IOC.

Commodore Stephen Roberts, SRO for Type 26, candidly admitted, “The forecast that it took us to complete the engineering design for this complex ship was optimistic at the time. It has certainly taken us as an enterprise longer than we forecasted to integrate quite a wide variety of combat systems.”

The report unambiguously states that “The delay in the Type 26 programme comes at a cost of £233 million—close to a quarter of a billion pounds, thus placing further pressure on an already highly-stretched naval budget.”

Moreover, it details that the protracted schedule has necessitated the Type 23 frigates to remain in service much longer than anticipated, sparking an expensive Type 23 life extension programme.

The report also underscores the operational implications of this delay. According to the committee, DE&S’s poor oversight of the Type 26 programme, coupled with its track record of managing ship refits, has led to a “perfect storm”, whereby barely half of the surface escort fleet–itself much reduced–is operationally available at any one time.

Concluding, the report urges significant changes: “DE&S’ distinctly sub-optimal management of surface ship refitting and new build programmes has become wholly unacceptable and is now crying out for fundamental reform.”

George Allison
George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison
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105 COMMENTS

  1. I think the key to all these issues is “management”. We have just never had any good management for a very long time. I’m curious why British management is so bad. We get a good manager in from overseas and many companies thrive as British engineers and scientists are excellent. Maybe time for a Royal commission on why British management is so bad.

    • The crapshoot in not replacing the type 23 on time was all political delay not management…the fact the project is behind a year or so is irrelevant compared to the fact the 2010 administration scrapped the 7000 agreed spec..made BAE and the RN redo the who spec for 4 years trying to cram everything into a cheaper 5000 ton hull…then Just in 2014 admitting they cocked up and in 2015 ordering the original spec ( that had itself taken a decade to develop). This is all political shitness..with politicians then blaming the civil servants and managers.

      • Yes. What became the T26 was supposed to be ‘accelerated’ by the Labour government in return for the cancellation around 2008-9 of the last 2 options for T45 destroyers ( which *build* cost was £650 mill at that time)
        The new frigate program was delayed/look for cheaper options/ etc by the new Conservative government in 2010 until just before the 2015 election it was all ‘re-announced’ to actually begin.

  2. HMS Glasgow is in the water so how will fitting out and trials take over 5 years!

    Is it a deliberate ‘go slow’ to balance a spreadsheet?

    If so a complete false economy when the T23’s are being flogged to death and cost more and more to keep going!

    • HMS Dreadnaught built in 12 months in 1905 by Jackie Fisher. For its time highly complex and with many new technologies. Management has to manage and the Treasury has to get its skates on and stop slowing things down.
      Also built in an English Royal Dockyard where sabotage was a Capital Crime.

      • Not new technologies at the time , apart from the steam turbine. The 12 in guns existed , just having an all large calibre armament was Fishers pushing based on others ideas ( The all big gun IJN Satsuma was laid down 6 months before Dreadnought).
        The other feature of the time was the ship was commissioned before trails were done , the reverse of today

        • It’s a shame that the production rate is not significantly better using modern plasma cutting edge technology.th navy should have been clear and demanded that two ships per year should be delivered

    • A real shame that it will take so long, could some more of the modular building have had had the fitting out done? 6 years is just not good enough. The navy needs ship’s now, not eventually.

  3. £250 million over budget and 1 year late for a complex warship program that has fare more export success than every other naval program in the past three decades seems pretty good to me compared to Ajax.

    • Exactly this.

      It us unfelt negative and fails to accept the massive plot I am interference.

      Also the levels of UK warship export success are incredible.

      Maybe the report could highlight a warship building program that ran better than this…….it will take them a long time to find one…..there isn’t one…..

      • Feels like to me they had to find something to criticise the navy for so they can criticise the army over Ajax.

      • ‘It us unfelt negative and fails to accept the massive plot I am interference.’

        Ummm…er…pardon?!? TIA? Should we be contacting the closest stroke team? 🤔😳😉

        • Truly sorry to learn of your condition. Was actually not attempting to be unduly flippant in my reply to SB, have read previously that temporary difficulty w/ speech and/or writing ability can be associated w/ a Transient Ischemic Attack (TIA), which can be a precursor to a full-blown stroke. 🤔

      • Overdone was relevant for Corporate but mainly because if it’s SF adaptations which none of the SSN then had.

        Using an Astute for SF is crazy as it risks a major asset.

        • Such tactical strategy for the use of submarines and special forces almost did for the Onyx in the Falklands.in 82. Damn underground rocks.

    • Concur. Believe Admiralty is in recovery mode, and managing the T-26 program as well as its political masters will permit.

    • The U.K.’s ‘national bird’, chosen by the public, is the Robin. Lots of us said it ought, in the light of the national passion to do ourselves down at every opportunity, to have been the grouse!

    • Agree absolutely. It appears that politicians are attempting to score points for their own cock-ups. Apart from the delays caused by political indecision this is a successful program by any standards, if not the most successful modern warship program ever.

    • Most of the time these extra costs provide more money for defence company profits. Seems to me our whole economic set up provides maximum returns for minimum product., Big money runs Western democracy & seems very happy with incompetent politicians.

    • That number fails to take into account the significant increase in price that was already budgeted for, taking the batch 1 costs up to £1.25bn per unit, and the huge costs of running the Type 23s into the 2030s (the refit of Iron Duke alone cost over £100m). When you look back at the announced price for a run of 13 Type 26s in 2015, comparing it the actual cost of the first batch shows that was a disaster costing us billions.

      The £233m is just a little extra on the top.

      • So Jon, Mr Outraged of Oxford, would you like to present evidence of any global platform that is cheaper for the same technology? No I thought not!

    • T31 export success is great for me nation, it proves that the U.K is still in the top tier of nations aspiring to become bigger players on the world stage. Only the oberons were more successful, before them, it was the T12 frigate design.which was a size of warship I think still has relevance today, putt a gas turbine in it, artisan, a modern gun on it and you’d have a perfectly good design. I like the khareef ships, corvettes, they are, but a tweak here and there is a good way to look at a T32 ship?

    • AJAX is really a Spanish/US project very little to do with UK – I predict that reliability will be dire. Were you aware GD have a contract pending for service. Each AJAX service cost per month is £20,000!! No one has responded on how many hours servicing that equates to…….

      But at these costs you can’t help but wonder??? So each AJAX vehicle will cost £240,000 PA. Also what will availability for use on this vehicle be? Will it be as Warrior? 96% in Op Granby?

      What is the barrel life? 10,000 rounds as specified or a lot less??

      Is ambient noise still 117dB?

      What we now appear to have is many Rambo-esque videos and statements of how transformational the vehicle will be.
      But, no comment on the long list of defects, or even whether the first 100 hulls which were dimensional incorrect (leading to many of the vibration and noise problems) will be corrected in Drop 4.
      Or perhaps we will be stuck with 100 unserviceable or scrap vehicles that pose a danger to their operators?

      This is all aside from the vulnerability of the recce version of Ajax. Is our doctrine correct or are we arming for the last war? Experience from Ukraine shows A vehicles identified engaged and destroyed by FPV drones in as little as 110 seconds. FPV @ £1000 or Ajax at £13,000,000

      Had we progressed VERDI 2 and fitted Warrior with a Stabilised gun thirty years ago as recommended by the defence select committee we would not be reliant on US and American companies. We would still have a sovereign A vehicle capability and would be in a much better place.

  4. Here we go again, of course, we haven’t built warships before and made the same mistakes. We can not forget HMS Glasgow is a prototype and like all such beasts confronts issues from day one. Ship No8 will go like a dream.

    • HMS London 2036 according to Navy Lookout, so let’s hope so!

      In focus: delivering the Type 26 FrigatesDECEMBER 12, 2022

      LINK

      • Glasgow was prefitted to some extent, as photos of the blocks just before joining show this. ( but it also required opening up after for late heavy equipment). Just in time is great on paper!
        Wasnt helped by BAE using a different site for the final fitting out as that would have that workforce and workshops in a different location
        The real worry is the Babcocks T31 doesnt seem to have any internal fitting out at all even as the entire hull and superstructure is built under cover

        My guess is that the internal layout in the 3D CAD/CAM and the simulation ( of electrical, fire,data etc) they now used before its built was still being completed

    • Our pressing problem is in the Persian Gulf should matters turn nasty. The Russians are ‘otherwise’ engaged; even with a third of the U.S. SSN’s waiting for maintenance (Sub Brief) we have them covered. China is clearly having second thoughts; they need us more than we need them and their economy is subject to all the problems the western countries face with bells on. Pushing the panic button is the last thing we need. Drumbeat, steady and purposeful is what is required.

      • There is enough cover out here in the Gulf for the threat in hand should it turn hot. In the past month I have seen RN, USN, JSDF, French and other western navy assets alongside. Then there are the GCC countries units before you even consider the shore-based air assets that are on call.

        FAFO is in force for anyone on the Persian Gulf side who wants to martyr themselves.

  5. I think this report missed the key point that the issue was not the delay in the programme…that’s a minor delay that should be built into the programme anyway…the issue is the total screw up around how long it took to get the programme started…the replacement for the type 23s was started in 1998…plenty of time..now it went down a rabbit hole with new hull forms which was fine..and in 2005 went back to a new hull form…finally agrees the specification in 2010 and design started 7000ton global combat ship…that’s fine all on target for replacing the 23s…new government then changes the specification to save money down to a 5000 ton hull…for the next four years this is tossed around and BAE and the RN finally get HMG to agree it has to be 7000ton hull..it’s not put 2015 the serous work starts 17 years after the start of the concept and design phase…so the rout cause was actually the 2010 decision to change a spec which had taken a decade of work to get to…basically to save a bit of money on austerity…this then ended up costing a fortune as after four years they had to go back to the spec they had taken a decade to develop….leading to the need to life ex the type 23s…if they had just signed the contract in 2010..we would probably have the first ship commissioned and a drum beat of 1 a year.

      • Unlike you I am happy to acknowledge the very capable people managing these projects under difficult circumstances, with constant interference and criticism from uniformed idiots.
        Currently have a friend staying with me from another country who works for a military and foreign affairs government oversight committee. It’s been interesting how universal lazy uninformed criticism is, despite the availability of ample resources.

  6. Hello. Why is this all directed at DES? WHO was it in the governments from the late 90s all through the early to mid 2000s and on into the Tory era who did not get a replacement program for the T23s started and ACTUALLY commit to it? Or replacements for just about everything else?

    Where are they, and why are they not now on national TV being grilled for this?

    The responsibility cannot be put solely at the door of the current workforce of DES.

    • I actually feel sorry for the DES team on this.

      Most of the highlighted mess has nothing to do with them at all. The high level timeline is set in Westminster.

      • Wider time frame isn’t though, which was my point. That I’m 4 years out from memory doesn’t make my point invalid.

        List me the major procurement programs 97 2010 that actually progressed to production in the RN, Army ( especially) and the RAF.

        Debacles such as this are not made overnight but go back many many years, which is why I now find politicians blaming DES for politicians failure utterly pathetic.

          • Yes, of course. There are some. Not many, that was what I’m trying to point out, especially army. We know these things take a long time and through the whole Labour era especially such was the obsession on wars against terrorists that conventional abilities went to the wall in so many areas. We are now playing catch up, and blame is not with DES but multiple governments.

            Could the T31 formula be a way out, get them in the water asap and improve later?

          • T31 formula

            I was starting to think that.

            I’ll await seeing the build quality of T31 – the photos on NL looked worryingly poor.

          • Oh, so that’s why you voiced concern other day regards convo with GB and NaB. Not seen them.

          • Doubt it. Some of us have good memories, and take note of certain posters amongst many posts that might just be general “chuff” as my learned friend A says.

            SB is one of the posters I take note of, for obvious reasons given his comments.

            Also, incase you’re not aware Andy, you can click on a posters history?

          • Yes, if you’ve not done so, click the name, it tells you how many posts made. Click View full profile, you see your entire comment history.

        • Quite, The 2000’s when the Defence Minister was a part time job. Some of us can remember that. Indecision was the watchword which was appied in spades also to Nuclear Power Stations and the sell off of Westinghouse and with it our ability to design and build Our own NPS. Yes you Gordon Brown! I’m talking about you!
          I think we need to hold Ministers to account more effectively.
          I’m sorry Ben Wallace is stepping down. Best Defence Minister in living memory in my opinion.

          • Very much so. The failure of governments for decades, not just bloody Tories, is coming home to roost.

      • The programme for replacing the type 23 kicked off in 98, yes they were still doing final trials on the last type 23 in 2000 but the Type 23 only had a planned life of 17 years and at that point Norfolk had been launched 11 years ago so the timer was ticking as within a decade or so of 1998 ( 2010) the plan had been to have decommissioned the sixth earliest type T23s…probably one of the reasons they sold the first 2 to chile along with one other as it saved money on the life they needed.

      • Frigates primarily hunt subs, except for our new T31s for some reason. B3 T22s were great ships, but would need an area SAM rather than just the short ranged but otherwise excellent seawolf to be destroyers.

      • The T22 were attractive Ships but they reflected their design age,as GB has mentioned on here many times they were Manpower and Fuel heavy.How much money would the MOD have been prepared to spend on them to make them relevant for today – Artisan and SeaCeptor at a minimum the costs would have just been too much.

      • If that was my 97 – 2010 comment on wider MoD procurement programs they are Inescapable facts David, so sorry that you’re tired of them. Do please ignore my posts.

        J detailed the narrower T26 situation much better than I ever could, putting the cause squarely at the Tories door with the 2010 idea to save money. Happy now?

        Like I keep saying, many here have very short memories for either ideological or actual innocent reasons.

    • Well that government in the 2000s was starting the Astutes, the new Carriers and completing the T45. What became the T26 design was started around 2008-9, sure late enough but considering the existing commitments not unreasonable

      The Tories and their City friends went for total austerity and the T26 program was put into bureaucratic run around for 5 years until just before the 2015 election and it was this 5 yr hiatus when it was likely a T26 could have been put in the water in say 2013 instead of the pushing the T23 outside their intended ( short) life and the money that entailed – even then the refits were a shambles with chop and changing and some retired to save money and manpower costs

      • Absolutely, the T26 is firmly at their door. We have many, many other procurement issues that go back much earlier, which was my wider point. I can list them if necessary.

    • Well if the government ministers (idiot Cameron and his idiot Chancellor), were to walk down the mall naked with shaved heads, I would happily join the throng pelting them with eggs and shouting shame!

  7. I’m sorry…this is the political class blaming the civil servants and managers for what is a political cock up. A 1-2 year delay on a project like this is in reality to be expected and this project had to live through covid…so actually keeping it at that level is not that bad..The real issue is the political meddling…

    The story of replacing the T23s started in 1998…the RN did work on new hull forms…that did not work out,,by 2005 they had gone back to a more traditional spec ( that’s fine you need to push and they had time). From 2005 to 2010 they worked through and agreed the spec for a 7000 global combat vessel (essentially the T26), they were at or close to main gate and If that had gone through would have probably been cutting steel in 2011.

    Then the politics come into it…later in 2010 the new conservative administration decide to save money and tell the RN and BAE to start again with a 5000 ton cheaper ship…four wasted years and they finally admit they need to order the 7000ton hull…steel was not cut until 2017 almost 2 decades after they started development of the spec for the T23 replacement….that is not the present project or procurement teams fault..that is political.

      • Sadly they are the people we keep voting to represent us….not that we get much in the way of choices….no a lot of stand out politicians in the last decade I would say.

    • Indeed Andy, this was a pretty long term balls up over a couple of decades…so not a one party or one priminister issue.

    • It’s worth pointing out a titbit that came out of a recent select committee hearing (31at June) that DE&S have no representation on the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee. If those in charge of procurement don’t have enough say on the requirements, of course we’ll end up with overpriced and overspecced equipment, and not enough of it.

    • I disagree, There is no reason that a mere ASW frigate needs to be a 8000t monster.

      That is a choice by RN and industry

      • Well to be fair they did not really just procure a ASW vessel, they procured a something that could do a bit of everything it was a global combat vessel. But I did read a good paper on warship design that showed 5000 ton and below hulls are not really cost effective over their lifetime ( you end up paying one one or another).

        • Yes but if the global combat vessel is impossible to do then you change the project to something that is viable and can put the money saved in other needs.
          UK MOD kepps fighting against reality, for example wants a tank that could be transported in C-130 but was unable to face that is impossible to accomplish with technology so the FRES went on and on and millions spent for nothing, enter in Boxer project, get out of Boxer and return to the Boxer 10 years later… It is always the same story. Seacat pretend that it works and show everyone that we have a missile first but it is way worse than a couple radar guided 40mm Bofors…

          • The worst thing about FRES is that does not appear to have developed any technology to accomplish it. They could have developed a Trophy like APS, easy to use modular armor etc

          • That is true, but in the case of the type 23 replacement by 2010 the design perimeters had effectively been settled between the MOD, RN and BAE..infact after 5 years of work, they were on the final design phase and probably ready for steal cutting within a year or two..the incoming administration changed the rules of the road, to try and save money in year by making them start again with a smaller design…knowing this would lead to the Type 23s all having to go well into 25 years and need very expensive lifex and the new vessels would not be in service until the mid 2020s at best….essentially the Cameron mortgaged the future for some in year austerity savings.

      • AlexS, have you even bothered to look at the tonnage of other recent warships before posting such nonsense……

    • What nonsense. Are you seriously coming the Italian navy with the RN. Have you read up on their cock-ups?

  8. As many commentators here have already articulated perhaps if various governments and defence chiefs had committed to a straight up replacement for the T23 10-20 years ago we could have had a more affordable frigate built more quickly and in greater numbers.

  9. There is no shambles to correct, as most knowledgeable commentators have noted. This is a political arsesaving report.

    • I believe that my comment speaks for itself. The problem is that many “outraged from Essex” types have no experience of international project or risk management and are too lazy to do comparative contextual research. So come up with lazy uninformed comments. By any competent comparative measure the T26 project has been a success, despite the best efforts of the government to sabotage it. For these same politicians to bring out a nonsense report (yes I have bothered to download and read) suggesting otherwise is as I have described.

      • So Andy, chill out man! If someone says something rational and informative based on experience (see DavyB/Gunbuster et al), then I applaud/learn/welcome. If someone posts nonsense, based on no relevant experience and just assumes people doing their jobs at MOD are idiots then I call them out. I visit this site because I’m interested in the topic and like learning from experts, but there are also idiots that dis the forces constantly and the MOD in particular based on no evidence. They don’t read audit reports, they don’t read foreign services blogs, they don’t read congressional reports etc etc. My views are based on the reports that I read. I know you may think that’s stupid but there you go.

  10. The problem is procurement within government as a whole, this is easy, why is it BAe not paying for this? It’s simply wanting to have cake and eat it, if the MOD signed up to 8 type 26 frigates to this spec, by this time – BAE how much? Then contract signed, MOD have nothing more to do other than say thanks for first ship, good for everyone BAE know they have to build 8 no matter changes of government etc. MOD know how much they’ve got to pay.

    Problem is MOD signing a contract is no guarantee of no reduction in numbers, MOD orders small quantities to enable reduction in numbers, BAE don’t know how many they have to produce. MOD change requirements and timescales to save money and no one can budget for anything

  11. Supply lines are still strained now due to the pandemic, 12 months to get some cars from order. electrical fittings and IT kit still on long lead times.

    forgetting the world stopped manufactory anything while you were sat at home working means you don’t understand how the worlds worked. some of these MPs cannot get of the bus for work without there security tell them

    • Most of the problems and loss of time and over runs on money are due to the absence from major projects in the UK of what are called Dispute Avoidance and Adjudication Boards on them, which for very modest cost, provide a real time avoidance and resolution process for variations, differences and disputes. These Boards, also sometimes called Conflict Avoidance Boards or Conflict Avoidance Councils, provide an independent and standing body, which sees all the project documents, undertakes site visits and deals with issues as they arise. These are generally mandated by the World Bank and the other what are called Multilateral Development Banks on the projects they fund. The Ministry of Defence and the relevant procurement bodies and their advisers have been aware of the advantages of these techniques for some time but, so far, they have not been adopted, for reasons which remain a mystery.

      • First of all, as someone that has worked at a senior level on international project management, I am not aware that the WB or MDBs have a particularly good record in project delivery. But do correct me if I’m wrong. Secondly, I am not aware that any major nation uses such a dispute resolution process in its arms procurement. Large organisations have complex project management processes and taxonomy to best reflect their industry and risk profile. The deficit is commonly not process but personnel, in my humble professional experience.

  12. T23 system integration was not pain free which is why it’s worth doing right. Norfolk was sailing around without a working command system for years and as such was pretty much worthless as a shooting war asset.
    Glasgow will avoid that because the systems are proven (for the most part) and integration work has been done on other units.

  13. Is thUSs woody Williams ship the ugliest thing on the seas? I’ve got a bad feeling that a littoral strike ship might look like this 🤬

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