A new policy brief argues that the Royal Navy has weakened its ability to think strategically at a time of growing international pressure, warning that the loss of dedicated analytical capacity risks undermining long-term fighting effectiveness, according to the author.
In a paper published by PolicyBrief, Sinking the third component of the Royal Navy’s fighting power, James Pritchett of the University of Hull contends that the effective disappearance of the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre has hollowed out what he describes as the Navy’s “conceptual” component of fighting power. He argues this sits alongside the physical and moral components and is essential to adapting to future conflict.
According to the brief, the reduction in institutional strategic thinking comes as the Royal Navy faces renewed challenges from Russian naval regeneration, uncertainty over long-term US commitment to European security, and China’s growing maritime assertiveness. Pritchett situates the argument in the context of recent defence debates, incuding the UK’s Strategic Defence Review and evolving US strategic priorities. The paper draws on the framework popularised by strategist Colin S. Gray, who argued that military power rests on physical, moral and conceptual foundations. Pritchett writes that while the Royal Navy has continued to invest in platforms, personnel and morale, its ability to sustain critical thought and institutional learning has diminished.
He argues that the loss of the RN Strategic Studies Centre represents more than an internal reorganisation. In the brief, Pritchett states that “the loss of the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre is not only a sign that the Navy is losing its grip on the conceptual component of its fighting power, but also a weakening in its efforts at creating a Navy-wide learning organisation”.
The paper stresses that this is not a call to over-academise frontline activity, but a warning about long-term consequences. Pritchett writes that “this has not been an argument for the intellectualisation of the practical business of sailing and fighting”, but rather a case for sustained engagement with theory and history across a naval career. He questions how the Royal Navy now tests assumptions, challenges doctrine and develops future concepts without a dedicated body for independent analysis. The brief asks: “Without it, who is guarding the conceptual component of the Royal Navy’s fighting power? How and where does it really think?”
The paper concludes that the current balance of investment is strategically unsound. Pritchett argues that “given the comparable investment in the other two components of the Royal Navy’s fighting power, the apparent abandonment or diminution of the conceptual component is a strategic error”, adding that the situation “needs reversing – at pace”.
The brief was published in January by PolicyBrief and is, they say, intended to inform debate on naval reform, professional military education and how the Royal Navy adapts intellectually to an increasingly contested maritime environment.
Understandable, when the MoD and HMG do a bloody good job at screwing up defence.
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No fighting strategy required when you have nothing to fight with.
You probably don’t know it but what you’re describing is exactly what the paper is highlighting. An obsession with equipment and numbers which is very typical of military thinking as opposed to strategy.
In the modern military there is very little ability to think at upper level. You can watch the parade of ex generals and colonels that trot themselves out as “experts” on times radio to see how shallow the pool is.
Our armed forces have become far to use to being a component in a US structure.
Our upper ranks have become obsessed with polishing those capabilities (especially bespoke ones the US relies on because this is how they grew up in their career.
Strategy informs with respect weapon systems requirements – I was being fatuous – I know this all too well.
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I agree, there is a reliance on the yanks, when the yanks are no longer reliable partners which has resulted in degraded national capabilities and mass to back up national (instead of collective) interests – Note the yanks created that reliance by design, for influence and I don’t think they (now) realise they are pissing that all down the drain.
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Upper ranks are just toeing the line, since if they speak out against their political bosses, there goes their careers, and while yes that may appear spineless, it would be self defeating (in this world) to do otherwise…probably explains why I didn’t further my own military career in that respect (I had no such filter!).
Yep, one of the most interesting things about the MAGA movement is its bizarre blindness to what has driven US power since 1945. They seem to think it’s some innate quality in their nation that they can somehow hold hegemonic power without a robust geostrategic and geopolitical plan in place.. power is not enough, because the US is not more powerful that all the other major powers that may combined against its interests if they see it as a power that needs containment, I think in its mad hubris MAGA does not understand this.
Yep
Just to labour the point you made… the ability to think conceptually about challenges without US interests as a central factor in that consideration is a blind spot and affects everything we do in defence
Basically a long winded ‘I concur!’ From me
We have Donuts In charge with promises of Jam, so we should be good in a Bun Fight.
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One day, the Chinese will sail a carrier group into the north sea, and then they can think.on that for a bit.
AA
I suggest that Atlantic Bastion is very much planning for that day and actually Atlantic bastion is the best piece of strategic thinking to come out of the MoD in half a century.
However Atlantic Bastion may now need to be expanded to incorporate a full A2/AD capability to completely dominate the entire North Atlantic both sub surface, surface, air and space.
The North Atlantic is ultimately the most important stretch of water on the planet, it’s literally the centre of the western world, control of the North Atlantic was the reason the UK ended up with the largest empire in the history of man.
To be honest the more immediate and important risk is china deploying and keeping a carrier battle group in the western Indian Ocean across vital sealanes to and from Europe into the Indian Ocean and Indo pacific region.
Now would be a good time to “Aquire” some Islands there.
Oh hang on 🤔
But surely the ACSC at Shrivenham is designed to teach people at Cdr/Lt Col/W Cdr level how to think strategically ? At that level they are of course used to thinking tactically, but the course is designed to stretch them. No one gets to be an Admiral/General/Air Marshal without completing that course.
Old Tony, I am sure that the ACSC would focus on the Operational level. Not sure if the HCSC is still run for senior officers but that would surely cover the Military Strategic and Grand Strategic.
No surprise when you see what successive governments have done to the Royal Navy since the end of the Second World War. We are now just a small insignificant navy that struggles to keep its ships at sea, carriers that are more symbolic than fully operational with few aircraft to fly off them. One wonders how we maintain our nuclear deterrent submarines that are on their last legs and when this government boast about new frigates and submarines none have been built or operational, its always going to be in the future when the need is now. What’s the point of planning for a blue water navy when we have to rely on the RFA instead of warships to support US navy.
The RFA has tankers…. Which the US needed use of, so yeh, they’re supporting them
The UK has to a great extent forget what gives our own nation power and security because I suppose since suez that power and security has come from doing what the US wanted and being a good NATO member. Now NATO is breathing its last dying gasps we need to have the ability to re invented our national geostrategic position in a world that will likely have 3 super powers, US, EU and China.. as well as a number of mid sized world powers that may or may not align with the three likely superpowers ( UK, Indian, Japan, Russia definitely, Brazil leading a South American group maybe, South Korea maybe some of the Middle Eastern nations banding together maybe) that requires a lot of thought on our position and the power we will need to lever position in the new order..and for us as an island nation of many islands in key geostrategic zones and choke points that means maritime power and balance between superpowers we would lose wars against ( US, EU, china ). Maritime powers that are weaker than the major powers keep sovereignty by being able to lever their advantages and make going against them to likely to tip power away from a major power to another major power.. they act as a fulcrum on which the major powers balance.. a mid sized world maritime power can do this because it does not court ruin and war on its own soil ( where as a mid sized land power courts disaster and invasion being a fulcrum, as happened to Ukraine)
So we essentially need to rebuild our maritime power base and relearn what true maritime power is and how we as an island need to be dominate as much as our size and resources allow in that domain for our survival and national interest. This includes a lot of work on
1) maximising the potential power of our geographical Position, including that of our oversees territories A nation’s location, including its coastline length, access to strategic straits or sea lanes, and natural harbors, significantly influences its potential for maritime power and we have one of the greatest geographical positions on the planet for levering our geostrategic maritime power.
2) Focusing our Commercial and Economic Strength on the maritime domaine as a strong maritime power must possess a strong “blue economy” that includes merchant shipping and commercial fleets to facilitate global trade, ports and infrastructure, including docks, shipyards, and logistics networks.
3) The capacity and will to exploit ocean resources, such as fisheries, aquaculture, offshore energy (oil, gas, wind), and seabed mining.
4) A very strong shipbuilding industry and related technological base.
5) Military Capability that is focused on the blue bits of the map and the land that attaches to the blue bits.. a martime power should invest its armed forces in that zone.. for an island to be focusing its power in a mid continental region is to squander and risk its power ( that is to a degree why our NATO commitment and following the USA in the war on terror has hammered UK power as an independent maritime nation..which was fine when NATO worked). So what does that Military capability look like for a martime power
NAVY: powerful navy, the very best you can afford, remembering Martime wars are won by numbers and mass across the whole strategic region you are competing in and need to influence, not HMS massive sitting in the North Sea on its own.
AIRFORCE: maritime air power, air power is now fundamental to sea control and our airforce should be focused on that.. because we are a nation of islands if we can control the air above the sea we are powerful.. controlling the air above a mid continental mass dilutes our strength and leaves our maritime power and home vulnerable ( when we were sure NATO worked this was a sacrifice worth making, now it’s courting disaster)
ARMY: the focus should be a force that can be deployed by strategic sea lift to support allies around our sea lines.. so the Northern European nations, African nations, Middle East etc.. where we need to sell things, get things or have sealanes we should have an army that can support those nations.. but the army should be sized to be deployed and we should have sea lift to that size.. no more no less.. again focusing on mid continental deployment is squandering our national power base.. the army is the missile launched by our ships to support our friends… the whole concept of an army in Central Europe was to support NATO.. if NATO dies so does that need and all resources put to it become wasted.
So to summarise for millitary capability it should be designed to support a martime power ( because as a set of islands we are that, or we are slaves to a foreign power) and are critical for protecting national interests, deterring aggression, and projecting influence by:
Sea control: The ability to use specific sea areas for one’s own purposes for a period of time and deny their use to an opponent.
Sea denial: The ability to prevent an adversary from using the sea for its own purposes.
Power projection: The capacity to deploy military force from the sea against targets on land or at sea.
Presence: Maintaining a persistent global presence through naval deployments for diplomatic purposes and crisis response.
6) Culture, which is a mix of Government and National Character: A maritime power depends on its government’s focus and policy, which must focused directly on resources needed to formulate a coherent national maritime strategy. Such as A national character that is inclined towards maritime pursuits and global engagement. Sound ocean governance frameworks and adherence to international maritime law. Strong alliances to ensure mutual protection of trade and shared security interests. Finally the people, developing your population as a maritime focused population with availability of a skills including trained personnel for the navy, merchant marine, and related industries.
We lost it and since we did our national power and sense of security has declined, as well as most importantly a sense of national identity.. before the rise of British sea power.. we looked out to sea with fear and trepidation, ever worried about invaders coming for our little islands.. then from the late Middle Ages we embraced the sea and we truly developed our national characters of what it was to be English, Scottish and Welsh and we no longer waited in trepidation for the next invader.. even when faced with massive superpowers as a small middle weight maritime nation we knew in our hearts that when those powers threatened us and stepped into the Ogin to attack us (as they must always do ) they would die to our maritime power.
Sadly the nation that now profoundly understands this is china.. and even without the requirements of geography it has bootstrapped itself to become the defacto maritime superpower… we need to get that back and our geography and national character will do the rest.
Jonathan you really need to write a series of guest articles somewhere, or get a job as a parliamentary adviser. Your analysis is wasted.
But re your blueprint for the armed forces, completely agree, couldn’t have put it better myself [ 🙂 ] etc. You and the people like you at the Council on Geostrategy make me much more optimistic amongst all of the end of days stuff going on.
What you are describing sounds suspiciously like the USMC plus ships and strategic air. That would suit a scenario where we cut loose from NATO entirely (or it collapses entirely) and we lead a new alliance of countries in similar situations, perhaps expanding and focussing JEF as a maritime alliance including Canada. Then, having a focus on sealift for the entire Army would be reasonable given the likely focus on defending Norway, Finland and the small baltics against Russia. Atlantic Bastion would become an alliance effort to keep anyone we don’t like out of the North Atlantic and allowing free reign for carrier-based shenanigans against Russia.
I came here before finishing just to emphasise how essential conceptual thinking is to any effective & deliverable strategy, in any realm of focus
I wouldn’t get too fussed over this, it looks like someone senior (1SL?) got to hear about the RNSSC and realised that it was giving very poor value for a c.£1m annual budget. The RNSSC had just five people (not even all full time) – headed by a former Captain now Professor – who justified their salaries and travel expenses by occasionally appearing at conferences around the world and very occasionally publishing policy papers that few people ever read. It didn’t even have a website. It’s functions have been taken over by the Operational Advantage Centre.