The Defence Investment Plan published on Tuesday is written in two languages: there is the language of ambition, of commitments, billions and contested frontlines, and there is the language of deferral, of extend, explore and consider.

The ambition is the better part of it, with more than £5bn going to drones and autonomous systems, and the plan is franker than any before it about what these things run on, saying that space is the central nervous system of high-intensity warfare. Yet having named the dependency, the plan spends heavily on the limbs and hesitates over the spine, funding a force that lives or dies by our capability in orbit without fully deciding whether that capability should be ours.

The previous baseline for space ran to roughly £6.4bn over ten years, whereas the new plan commits £3.2bn over four, a materially higher annual rate and, by our analysis, the most Britain has ever put up for defence in orbit. What it buys, and who ends up controlling it, is what the plan leaves open.

The MOD will not proceed with the Skynet 6 narrowband satellite system, and will extend the ageing Skynet 5 while it weighs allied and commercial alternatives. Skynet is our sovereign satellite backbone, so this looks like a retreat, but I read it differently: it is a shift from a single exquisite, expensive programme towards proliferation and a mixed model, some systems we own, some allied, some commercial, wherever each is faster or cheaper.

Whether it was the right route to sovereign control is a fair, unsettled argument, but competition here is healthy, and the MOD should want more of it, away from the comfortable legacy primes and towards firms that move.

Of that £3.2bn, £880m goes to space control and ISR, space control being the ability to keep your satellites working while someone is trying to stop them, and it begins with knowing what is overhead, and knowing when a foreign satellite quietly shifts its orbit to slide up alongside one of yours and sit there, watching, within reach.

It ends with being able to do something about it, to defend against jamming, spoofing and lasers meant to blind a sensor, and to deny an adversary the same freedom in return, which is the difference between occupying orbit and holding it.

None of this is theoretical, because the head of UK Space Command has said British satellites are stalked and jammed weekly, and something up there follows something of ours around, and until recently the honest answer to what we do about it was watch and hope. That is what those drones and uncrewed vessels now sit on top of, and we have already watched a commercial satellite operator decide, mid-war, how much of its network a combatant was allowed to use.

It has taken too long to get here, and that uncertainty has made it harder for companies, suppliers and investors to build in the UK. There is also still a lot to resolve, including how the next Prime Minister makes the numbers work and how the UK gets to 3 per cent of GDP on defence, but for companies trying to invest, hire and build capability here, a plan in writing is a meaningful step forward.


This article is the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines.

 

29 COMMENTS

  1. War /defence stuff is a hobby for me. I have no vested interestm

    Thought I should say so because I get some comments on my posts that seem to assume otherwise.

    War is mostly unlikely but has been treated and is being treated as an opportunity for unfair/undemocratic profiteering.

    To cut a long story short it is not possible to find shareholders profits without raising taxes.

    The question you should be asking is who should be paying those extra taxes?

  2. I think there is one really big lesson from the Ukraine war that has been completely obvious and it’s overlooked by most folks because it’s nor sexy, not high tech and not even particularly expensive.
    In the first 3 days of the War Ukraine had to deal with Russia applying their asymmetric warfare capabilities to the maximum possible, little green men, sympathisers, Spetznats execution squads, Airborne attacks on key infrastructure the lot.

    Their society had learnt a lesson from the 2014 invasion and that was for a Society to win a war it has to be united and committed to fight that war everywhere, not just at the front line.
    They had prepared their infrastructure, massively increased the size of their National Guard, trained a lot of volunteers basic combat skills and stockpiled weapons in locality’s.
    That ensured they survived those 3 days !

    And we have done ……..nothing ! And that is despite Salisbury, despite the attempts on the PM and despite us having a neighbour who freely allows Russians to enter their country and come straight over an open border into ours !

    That’s the threat and lesson that isn’t mentioned !

    Get Jim an armband and an AK47 (robust cheap and easy to use).😉

    And George you can defend UKDJ HQ 😜

    • Gotta genuinely give people a stake in the country to win them over though….

      I like where you went with this and offer encouragement…

      It’s really fair to say that gen z and most millennials in the UK have recieved no material foundation from UK society that might encourage them to feel loved by their country…….why stand and fight for a society that doesn’t fight for you?!!

      I’

  3. It’s not often that Defence matters trouble the BBC but… there is story coming from Poland that should stop MPs dithering and buy stuff now. The US has tipped off Poland that Russia may intentional provoke Poland or the Baltics, to firstly pressure supporters of Ukraine and secondly to test NATO. There was always the risk that a Russia losing, or at the very best, not winning in Ukraine will act like a wounded bear

  4. I personally think Ukraine has proven lots of things, including high tech weapons have a place and low tech artillery still makes a bang. What does it all mean though to the UK is quite uncomfortable, ironically the abandonment of Storm shadow when the Ukrainians are negotiating to manufacture more of them!
    The DIP picks and chooses lessons learnt to save money when the Ukraine war only proves one thing in my opinion, war is extremely expensive, a lesson that gets forgotten at the first opportunity.
    I also notice the author is falling for the expectation management, what significance has that 3% GDP number got, the challenge is to get to 3.5% by 35. The milestone of 3% should be set to 2030 but the DIP does not do that and makes it plain the current government has no intention of meeting the 3,5 commitment

  5. As a skint person born to skint parents I’ve always been skint. Our society doesn’t help me with that and in fact allows the removal of humane and earth rights by wrong minded people.

    On balance and after much consideration I can categorically state that MY material existence would have been more under nazi ism and id probs be a little more materially satiated under Russian governance….

    I’m not alone in populating this ignored statistical relevance.

          • You are being petty and tiny minded. You label me rather than attempting to explore mindstates and philosophy.

            I can’t help you and that bothers me because I really like to help.

            You decided to misunderstand . You decided to be a dick….

            …..kinda proves the argument I was making….but you don’t care about that

              • Every day is a school day and you need to re educate yourself.

                You are a nasty little bully who proposes that I have no right to opinion or discussion because I am from and continue my existence in a subclass.

                Do you want to pay the extra taxes needed to pay indolent profiteers for the defence improvements.

                You are a very nasty example.

              • The website is ukdj…

                It doesn’t say thatt I have to be a delisional fantasist nor indulge creative accounting to post.

                You do you

                Leave me be

      • I want to say:-
        ‘Truth Serum 1984’ or :smooth russian vodka on the back of perfected Bavarian beer…

        But alas I was on best of British (and massively overtaxed) extra strong cider ( itself some kind of magical truth potion.

        That’s assuming you were asking me and not the knotted up speed freak?

  6. I think the biggest lesson Russia has learnt during this war is that, despite the size and potential capability of its air force, it simply wasn’t prepared to achieve air superiority over Ukraine, which is why it is still fighting over four years later.

    Russia had hundreds of modern combat aircraft, long range strike capabilities, AEW aircraft and a large inventory of long range missiles. Ukraine had a much smaller air force and an ageing Soviet era integrated air defence network. Most analysts expected Russia to establish control of the skies within days.

    The first mistake was Russia’s opening air campaign. Instead of concentrating its firepower on Ukraine’s air defence command network, radar sites, communications infrastructure and surviving fighter force, it spread missile and air strikes across a broad target set. Thanks in large part to US intelligence, Ukraine had advance warning of the invasion and was able to disperse combat aircraft, relocate mobile S-300 and Buk batteries, move command centres and prepare decoys before the first missiles landed. Rather than delivering a knockout blow, Russia found many of its highest value targets had already disappeared.

    Russia then failed to conduct an effective SEAD/DEAD campaign. Ukrainian S-300 and Buk batteries constantly relocated, only activating their radars briefly before moving again. Russia struggled to locate and destroy them, meaning its aircraft could never safely operate at medium or high altitude across much of Ukraine.

    As a result, Russian aircraft were forced to fly at very low level to reduce their exposure to radar guided missiles. While this helped avoid long range SAMs, it placed them within range of MANPADS such as Stinger, Starstreak and Igla, along with anti aircraft guns, while also reducing pilots’ situational awareness and time to identify targets.

    Doctrine also played a major role. Russia has historically relied far more on its extensive ground based IADS than on offensive counter air operations. By comparison, NATO has spent decades refining offensive air superiority, integrating fighters, EW, intelligence assets, suppression aircraft and precision strikes into highly coordinated operations. Russia has never demonstrated that same level of large scale integrated air warfare.

    The contrast with Israel’s campaign against Iran couldn’t be much clearer. Before launching Operation Rising Lion, Israel had spent years gathering intelligence, mapping Iran’s integrated air defence network and preparing the battlefield. On the opening night, it combined intelligence, covert operations, EW, cyber capabilities and precision air strikes to target senior commanders, radar sites, SAM batteries, command and control nodes, missile launchers and airbases simultaneously. The strike packages themselves were highly integrated, bringing together stealth aircraft, EW platforms, ISR assets, aerial refuelling and precision guided munitions in carefully coordinated waves designed to overwhelm Iranian defences from multiple directions. Within the first 24 hours, much of Iran’s IADS had been severely degraded. By around the fourth day, Israel had declared air superiority and was able to fly repeated strike missions over Tehran with minimal resistance.

    Training was another weakness. Russian pilots generally flew fewer training hours than NATO air forces and had relatively limited experience conducting complex, mixed force air operations against a capable opponent. Operations in Syria, for example, bore little resemblance to the challenges they faced over Ukraine.

    Poor intelligence, inadequate battle damage assessment, limited stocks of precision guided weapons and a highly centralised command structure further reduced Russia’s ability to adapt as the campaign unfolded.

    • “Russia had hundreds of modern combat aircraft,”

      Having hundreds do no mean capable of combat flying hundreds.

    • I would add that Russia’s principle anti-radiation missile, the Kh-31 is hopelessly outdated. As it doesn’t have a GPS based navigation system that can be used to remember where the radar was last transmitting from. The Ukrainians, also have the Kh31 in their inventory, knew full well the weaknesses of the missile, and the means of countering it, i.e. by putting their radar in to standby, the missile would loose track. Missiles like the Advanced HARM and Spear-3 have the ability to remember where the radar was last operating, so if it doesn’t transmit again, it flies at the last known location, where the radar is probably still located. Spear also has the ability to use its active radar to identify objects on the ground, which it then uses to match to the threat, to then target.

      Russia, simply does not have the right tools for a SEAD/DEAD campaign, luckily for Ukraine.

  7. Hi Thomas, an entire article on UK space and not a mention of One Web. The UK doesn’t own Skynet 5 either it’s a PFI, unlike Airbus however the government does retain a golden share in OneWeb which remains a British company and provides the only LEO alternative in operation today to Starlink.

    As we have seen in Ukraine GEO satellites are of limited use and LEO satellite are vital, it’s very easy for Russia to park a satellite next to our sky net 5 satellites in GEO, it’s already done this and there is nothing we can do where as LEO satellites can and do maneuverer and even if knocked out can be replaced easily.

    We need to do with our communications satellites what we do with our reconnaissance satellites, develop our own minimum viable product, pay to gain preferential access to commercial constellations with friendly governments and in instances where the cost is too big we should share with Allie’s.

    We have already invested in One Web Gen 2 satellites for UK sovereign military communication and potentially other payloads. We need to double down and make sure One Web stays in business at all cost even if we have to nationalise it. It’s that important.

    We should explore a commercial contract with either Amazon or Space X for use of their constellations as a back up in the way we do with Planet Labs, ICE EYE and AirBus imagery.

    Lastly if a globe spanning GEO satellite network like Skynet is still required then we need to swet out Skynet 5 for as long as possible while looking to develop a capability with Europeans, CANZUK and Japan that all probably have a similar need.

    What we don’t need to do is spend £6 billion on three satellites in GEO because that’s what we always did in the past.

    I suggest that we are actually learning all the lessons in Ukraine ( distributed capability, LEO based, High bandwidth, Commercial off the shelf like OneWeb) and forgetting the legacy programs (slow, inflexible, vulnerable, expensive like SkyNet)

    Turning off Starlink to Russian forces may be the event that wins Ukraine the war.

    At today’s prices £6 billion that was earmarked for SkyNet 6 buys you 1,000 satellites on One Web. One Web is now the most important sovereign space company we own and we need to ensure it gets what it needs to compete because it represents the future nd unlike Skynet people pay to use it offsetting our costs.

    • Silly question from a non-technical person, but would a few (100s) dummy satellites be useful up in orbit or would the current all have some built in ECM?

      • Satellites are expensive to launch and fairly cheap to build. Better to just launch more. LEO satellites come with considerable delta V capabilities make them quite hard to intercept.

    • Silly question from a non-technical person, but would a few (100s) dummy satellites be useful up in orbit or would the current all have some built in ECM?

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