In a recent message to the Commando Force, the Commandant General of Britain’s Commando Force, General Gwyn Jenkins, alongside Corps Regimental Sergeant Major Nick Ollive, delivered a compelling and comprehensive address to their troops, underlining the continuing significance and evolving role of the Commando force.
The detailed speech, shared via the official UK Commando Force Operations Twitter account, reaffirms the commandos’ specialised nature and champions their innovative capabilities in modern military contexts.
The new message to the Commando Force from the Commandant General and Corps RSM has just dropped.
Watch it now: https://t.co/9pa93hWzbe— UK Commando Force Operations (@Commando_Ops) April 24, 2024
The address began with General Jenkins reminiscing on the origins of the Commando force, first established in 1942 at Achnacarry. He noted the special operations warfighting force’s enduring relevance: “Commandos are a special operations warfighting force. This unique role that was born in the hills of Achnacarry has never been clearer, more relevant, or more important.”
Throughout the speech, the focus was placed on the unique capabilities of the commandos, characterised by their small, highly trained teams that employ unconventional tactics and master the element of surprise. RSM Ollive articulated this, saying, “We are small groups of specially trained individuals who use novel tactics, master the element of surprise, and have an aptitude for performing the improbable. We overcome a numerically superior enemy and defeat the most difficult targets.”
The leaders also detailed the rigorous training and technological advancements integral to the Commando force. General Jenkins elaborated on the comprehensive nature of their preparation, “Our uniquely comprehensive, arduous, and testing training develops this ability. It is technical, it is physical. Above all, it is cognitive. The Commando mindset is the single most important thing we have.”
Concluding the message, RSM Ollive challenged the commandos to fully embrace their roles and adapt swiftly to the changing nature of warfare: “We are the modern Commandos, the warfighting Commandos, and we will adapt to the modern age faster than anybody else. My challenge to every Commando is to live this vision, embrace the robust challenge your team needs to do things differently.”
The leadership’s message underscores a commitment to maintaining the Commando force’s edge in modern warfare, emphasising adaptability, rigorous training, and a proactive mindset.
Something we do well according to rumours. I would like to see much less in print or internet on our unconventional forces and their tradecraft. I detest the ‘razzmatazz of ‘Look at us! We can walk on water’. A greater part of this capability is the other side should remain in the dark looking over its collective shoulders.
Would it not have been better to keep 3 Cdo at Brigade level for arctic/amphibious just as 16 Air Assault do the role from the air? For me, yes. Cynically speaking, that would not result in the cuts that they were seeking. For Grey Zone, which is indeed of great importance which I have supported here before. We have the Tier 1 SF and supports in UKSFG. We then have SFSG, part of the above. We then have the 4 Battalions of the ASOB. We then have the FCF, minus Four Two Commando which had already gone from being a… Read more »
Totally agree with everything you have said but I would add that this statement makes no mention of the recruitment and retention issue, which is putting a huge strain on those that remain.
The taskings for the RM’s have been significantly increased in recent years whilst the headcount has been substantially cut. Combine this with poor pay and conditions and you have the perfect storm for the Corps.
This has all been ‘achieved’ by politicians in 14 years.
Yes, v good point. I read only yesterday about that on Twitter.
Another thought, if they’re now in small teams and so “don’t need” LCU LCVP types and only ORCS, or whatever they’re called now, RRC, and RIBS, well that is pretty daft.
Any ship can launch a RIB. The need to land a larger or heavier load still exists, they might need vehicles for example.
Vikings from ASGRM were landed in Somalia I recall.
Unfortunately, you are using logic whereas a lot of FCF narrative is in MOD management speak. There is a competition to find a replacement for the LCVP and it will be interesting to see what comes from this but the basic need to take 35 troops to shore or small vehicles needs to remain. These vessels need to travel 150nm and do 25knots so quite demanding performance. What is probably more interesting is the plan if any to replace the LCU’s. The demand to put a 65t MBT ashore really is the governing factor here. Not really a requirement of… Read more »
The RM raison d’être is now raiding.
Go in.
Mallet everything using organic and external strike packages.
Mallet it again if you need to.
Get out.
They are not going to be STOM.
They are not going to be holding ground.
LCVP replacement will support that.
But not a CB90…Please!
Having worked on and refitted them for another Navy the RN/RM will need to employ dwarf orangutans to get to all the electronics and mechanical systems that are tucked away in unreachable locations behind ballistic plates. You have to dismantle half the boat to get to stuff.
Funny what you said about the CB90 because that’s what my son said and hence my comment “something like”
Designed with zero though for maintaining it!
Personally the MRSS program is a no brainer. We need 4 slightly faster Bays with hangars and a larger well deck. I read a lot on here about enhancing the self defence capabilities of these vessels but this misses the point that they are auxiliary vessels and not warships. A dangerous peacetime mindset that is all about cheapness to build and operate. Again making these vessels smaller makes no sense if they are to be held offshore but would dramatically reduce their ability to carry troops, equipment and helicopters. It would of course save some money but the vessels would… Read more »
4 MRSS is TOTALLY inadequate for the roles the military are doing already, as we know. Unless, again, as I keep warning, Labour withdraw the UK from world affairs ( European NATO only ) and we do not need LRGs or an expeditionary capability, however small. That brings into question our ability to land on the Falklands, do HADR, deploy to rescue British nationals beyond European NATO, carry out SF ops, so many uses the vessels could be used for. ( I’m well aware of SD Northern River and SD Victoria’s uses here too but it is not the same… Read more »
Of course 4 MRSS is not enough but when did any MOD procurement programme deliver one for one replacements.
I agree about Labour but ironically they are far better at ordering ships than the Tories and once built they have any uncanny capability to sail beyond the European theatre!
Very true!
The issue is, the combined marine & commando role. The force offers an awful lot, other countries don’t combine the marine infantry and the commando role. With society getting ever weaker and less and less being willing to even undertake the commando course it makes more sense to allow the RM to focus on the sof or commando role and to train infantry battalions to do (basic) amphibious assault. In answer to the numbers thing, there’s never enough to carry out all the potential sof taskings. Uksf didn’t have enough to hit ALL potential targets during Afghan, the RM could… Read more »
Hi S5. Thanks for that. I recall 1 Rifles briefly was added to 3 Cdo Bde’s ORBAT years back, did not last long. So you would support something like that happening again? Would you also support the arctic specialisation going more to the army beyond the arctic, Commando trained elements in 29, CLR, and 24? So the RM could go all in on the raiding side? “the rangers don’t do what the rm do, sorry but the RM own the “grey area” when it comes to maritime/ littoral/ arctic,” Yeah, fair enough that, and I would not suggest they could.… Read more »
Hi mate, the issue with the rifles thing was centered around making them do the all arms commando course and then moving them to the brigade. After a while it became a none starter, if they did a basic and I do stress basic amphibious assault course and remained within Thier own brigades I don’t see it being an issue. Although I have suggested this on a forum before and someone rightly pointed out that apposed amphibious assault required testing/ training of an arduous nature to prove the individual capable of overcoming the odds..so that’s a fair point as well.… Read more »
Thanks mate.
I’m going to throw some things in here because I finally got to chat with someone from SFAB, and again, carefully and respectuflly disagree with S5 here again. So Rangers can’t really do Light Infantry, not because “when they properly get going” they’ll be scattered, it’s that their internal orbat simply does not give them the mass to fight as a conventional light infantry formation.Theoretically there’s a degree of scalability in the Ranger ConOps, but ultimately even if you focused a Ranger Battalion on a single task there’s only so many rifles they can point on target. I’ll leave it… Read more »
“SFAB on the other hand, from what I’ve been told, has generally retained their old Infantry ORBATs “
😳 I thought they had each reduced to something akin to a Reinforced Company Group? So if they have retained their old ORBATS?
That is very interesting indeed? Do you know their establishment?
I’ve never liked the Coy Group analogy tbh. SpecInf, even before the uplift to Rangers never was that. There are considerable structural differences (retaining QM’s, MT, BHQ, and a very heavy med branch) meaning that although small, and specialised, they where still Battalions. Anyway, all I know is what was said in one conversation with one person within SFAB that claimed they’d not reduced establishment, he could only be talking about his battalion, he could also be wrong (!), or out of date, but atm it’s the only person I’ve spoken to who has actually been in 11 SFAB so… Read more »
Thanks mate, no reason to doubt them.
Really? I have plenty of reason to doubt, sadly I have no better source or way to cross check.
I’m a trusting soul!
“ always had a ? over Irish Guards loosing a load of personnel”
They formed a couple of new Companies for PD I recall.
Still would create “?”s though because Spec Inf didn’t reduce its establishment uniformly, the lower ranks where disproportionately hit. If you where an officer your pid was safe, junior NCOs it was basically top 3rd got to stay and for bods only like the top 10th got invited. If you go from 4 platoons of 40 to 4 task units of 12 you’ll still need 4 junior officers to command. So if IG solved the manning issue by essentially “moving” 2 coys to PDTs then where do the officers go? Or do the IGs actually operate as 2 Coy Groups?… Read more »
2nd reply as on my mobile it is “awaiting approval”
All of which is way above my level mate! But I see what you mean though, nothing is ever as simple as it seems is it. Clearly my suggestion that the 2 extra PD Companies that IG created,9 and 12, are not the answer to the missing!😆
Unless they gained a few extra majors to command those extra coys? Honestly who knows at this point.
Doesn’t help that SFA don’t seem all that keen to learn from those SF wannabes over at ASOB 😂😂😂
The army actually detailing FS would help, beyond their soundbites and headlines.
Seeing a proper updated ORBAT for each and every formation and what it means.
I know you’re ahead of me there simply due to your position, but still.
Going to disagree with S5 here, because 3 Ranger is becoming specialists in Arctic Warfare alongside the RMs, and in that world the difference between “High Readyness” and “constantly deployed” is pretty moot. The advantage of each Ranger Battalion being aligned to a region is that while “Rangers” as a whole don’t build a specialisation like the RM did with the arctic, the various units build operational specialisations in various environments.
Much of what you say makes sense but for two comments The reduction in the number of the RM’s since 2010 has nothing to do with changes in society but is a conscious decision to reduce numbers by the Navy as a result of the overall manpower cuts imposed on all three services. The need to provide more matelots has been at the expense of the RM’s. The policy has been a disaster as RM numbers were steady and recruitment levels very good up to 2010. The idea that you can train infantry to do basic amphibious assault begs the… Read more »
The numbers thing is because of what you said and what I said. Numbers have been cut yeah but now there’s also an added issue of people not applying , getting in or passing the cdo course. The reason behind not increasing commando numbers but qualifying infantry to basic level amphibious assault would be a money thing, it costs more than twice to train an RM cdo than it does an infantry soldier then an extra 8-10 weeks (dependant on reg) and a higher level (more expensive) of continuous training due to the roles and the very high readiness thing.… Read more »
I appreciate there is different generation out there but to bring the Corps up to say 7000 we just need one in a million from our population! Even a U.K. Government should be able to get over that low bar. Sadly it has everything to do with your last point i.e money or the lack of it. Personally, any increase in U.K. defence spending needs to focus on more quality and a focused increase in numbers so lets provide the new larger northern flank with a dedicated artic trained Army brigade alongside a rejuvenated 3 CDO BDE. That would make… Read more »
I have said more or less the same for some time on here. The threat to the Finish gap is very real. Probably more in play than ever. 3 CDO BDE have thrown the baby out with the bathwater. I personally do not think they could mount an amphibious landing at brigade level. It’s not been down for so long the knowledge gap has disappeared. Plus let’s face it the kit is just not there. How many serving SNCOs have played well deck chess. How many planners have put together a Serial Assualt Schedule. How many waterproofing guys have gone… Read more »
Firstly, I would acknowledge that I have never served but have had friends and family in the Corps since 1959. I also have family in the Navy. You are 100% correct and to give you a recent anecdote of how bad things are, when RFA Mounts Bay recently deployed to Norway it took just one serviceable LCVP alongside the ORCs. The other broke down and they couldn’t /wouldn’t fix it. Of course things break down but we had no other serviceable LCVP. The onboard Royals spent most of the exercise overseen by the Dutch doing very little. Whist there were… Read more »
The strategic situation for having RM support/reinforce the NATO Northern flank has massively diminished.
With Finland and Sweden now in NATO it has took away the need to get Royal north ASAP.
RM still has a place for fighting in the high north areas but its again going to be small unit stuff.
Interesting the reaction of our new allies, the Finns and Swedes because they all seem to want to train with RN and the Royals. That hard earnt reputation for skill and expertise still means a lot it seems.
Yes but RM is not going to be doing massive formations up there anyway. Its going to be small ish unit work in lots of different locations.
Your Son I recall?
Yes for his sins he is a Royal and i have long serving cousin in the Navy. He is now a sub lieutenant having joined as an AB many years ago.
I mean you’ve long known my skepticism of the FCF. I fully think that the Commandos needed to remain a conventional fighting brigade, either wholly Commando Force, or remove the specialist forces (Like Fleet Protection, and 42) from 3 Cmdo and reinforce with a few Army Units. Like 16 has it’s Para units and then 1 RGR and Royal Irish attached to them, 2 Battalions of RM with a further 2 Battalions of Medium Infantry would be a good square brigade IMO.
Agreed.
Shame to see HIPPO BRV going (without replacement?) – I had a small role in getting that into service. Clearly the FCF will not need to push a broken-down or bogged-in vehicle up off a beach in future.
Sadly. I believe it is a capability that should be retained.
Yes, if you want to move vehicles off a beach.
Heavy emphasis on FCF being all about small groups of specially trained individuals deployng on difficult tasks etc. How small is small? Section? Troop?
I think FCF aims to deploy in teams of about 20 IIRC.
Thanks mate. Have a great weekend!
So, based on a 3:1 ratio, they could take out an enemy section of about 7 men! Is that good enough?
Don’t know their ConOps well enough I’m afraid.