UK won’t rule out hitting back if Russia cuts sea cables

Responding to concerns over whether the UK is doing enough to proactively deter adversaries in the so-called grey zone, Armed Forces Minister Luke Pollard told MPs on the Defence Committee this week that the government is stepping up its approach – but that retaliation doesn’t always mean mirroring the adversary’s actions.

During an oral evidence session on Tuesday 25 March, Labour MP Derek Twigg challenged the Minister over whether the UK was “too soft” in its response to aggressive actions, particularly in light of recent Russian naval activity near undersea cables. Twigg asked whether the UK might be too reactive, questioning: “Could we be more on the front foot?”

Pollard responded: “I think you’ve seen from this government… examples where we are being more proactive.” He pointed to the UK’s increasing leadership role in support of Ukraine, including the £4.5 billion military support package and recent efforts to form a “coalition of the willing” with France to enhance deterrence.

Pressed further on how the UK might respond if an adversary were to sever undersea cables, Twigg asked bluntly: “Would we go and do the same thing to them?”

Pollard made clear that retaliation would not necessarily mirror the original action: “It’s not always an eye for an eye… In the event of any actions being taken against UK infrastructure, we would look at all the options available to us.”

He added that while the UK possesses “exquisite capabilities”, responses may come through a variety of channels — including military, diplomatic, or strategic communication — and emphasised the power of public attribution and messaging.

“There is a benefit in not being our adversaries in terms of the approach,” Pollard said. “The response may not be in the same domain as the initial activity.”

The Minister also highlighted the UK’s strength in alliances, particularly NATO, and described this as a key pillar of deterrence in the face of hybrid threats like cyber attacks and undersea sabotage.

NATO warns saboteurs in Baltic Sea will be caught

The Shadow Fleet

Recent incidents in the Baltic Sea have intensified concerns over Russia’s “shadow fleet” and its alleged sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure. Notably, the Estlink 2 power interconnector between Finland and Estonia was disrupted, with suspicions pointing towards the Russian tanker Eagle S as the culprit. This vessel, part of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” is believed to have damaged the cable by dragging its anchor over it.

The “shadow fleet” comprises vessels operating under complex ownership structures, often flying flags of convenience and lacking Western insurance. These ships frequently disable tracking systems to conceal their movements, facilitating activities that may include sanctions evasion and covert operations. The expansion of this fleet has raised alarms about the security of vital undersea cables, which are essential for electricity transmission, internet communications, and financial transactions across Europe.

In response to these threats, NATO has initiated Operation Baltic Sentry, deploying ships and patrol aircraft to monitor and protect undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. This mission underscores the alliance’s commitment to safeguarding critical networks against potential sabotage and hybrid warfare tactics employed by adversarial nations.

I went onboard a Swedish warship taking part in this operation, here’s my report from the Baltic.