Ukraine has said total Russian combat losses have reached around 1,302,370 personnel since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, according to figures published by the country’s Ministry of Defence.
The latest update, citing the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, includes an increase of 1,110 personnel over the previous 24-hour reporting period. Ukrainian officials also reported daily losses of 2,387 unmanned aerial vehicles and 85 artillery systems.
The figures provided by Kyiv also detail extensive equipment losses. Ukraine says 11,835 Russian tanks and 24,344 armoured fighting vehicles have been destroyed, along with 4,109 pieces of special equipment and 87,149 vehicles and fuel tanks. The latter category alone increased by 199 in the most recent update.
Artillery losses remain a central part of Ukraine’s reporting. According to the figures, 39,378 artillery systems and 1,716 multiple launch rocket systems have been destroyed, alongside 1,338 air defence assets. In the air domain, Ukraine reports losses of 435 aircraft and 350 helicopters, as well as more than 217,000 operational-tactical UAVs and 4,517 cruise missiles.
Naval losses cited by Ukraine include 33 warships or boats and two submarines.
The figures are based on Ukrainian military assessments and are updated regularly. They have not been independently verified.
Estimates from Western officials and independent analysts are generally lower, though still broadly comparable in scale. Recent public assessments have suggested total Russian casualties, including killed and wounded, are likely in the region of 1 million to 1.2 million since 2022, reflecting different methodologies and definitions of what constitutes a loss.
Some of you may have seen the MARCH statistics of 35300 plus enemy casualties and 151200 targets
Well, they are heading toward 50,000+ russian casualties per month👀😯
Russia has lost 1110 soldiers killed and wounded, 2 tanks, and 85 vehicles and fuel tankers over the past day or so!
Got to keep the pressure on and make advances
They are losing more than they can mobilize
Also Ukraine gained more ground than they lost in March, there’s a ongoing counter offensive, admitedly small and slow moving, in the Zaphorizia Oblast.
That’s true, Dern 👍
Chipping away at the russians
Made some good progress in some of the sectors recently
The brigade I help was hit last week and took casualties and lost a bit of equipment, including an EcoFlow. We raised the ££, and they just received it 😁, and we got a video from them saying thanks etc
Due to being involved with fundraising for Ukrainian civilians and the frontline, I’m usually super glued to the PC most days, so I’m always looking at the updates and seeing what the Ukrainians are saying about things.
Meanwhile, an awful russian attackon Kherson today, a civilian woman was killed😖
And people still think Russia will have a go at NATO in the next few years, they can’t even take more than 25% of Ukraine after four years of fighting.
Ukraine is a totally different ball of wax from the majority of the European NATO nations. How many infantry/armor/artillery battalions (and drone detachments of any size) can NATO actually put in the field? Russia has somewhere between 65 and 71 battalion tactical groups (550k to 750k troops total) in Ukraine at the present. They are not great troops but they keep advancing and die hard.
Even Poland would have a hard time handling half the forces that Russia has thrown into Ukraine over the past 4 years, and they are the best prepared of any of the EU nations.
The UK would have been the best prepared not too many years ago, but they are more of a boutique force of late.
Ukraine has simply done an amazing job against a huge, aggressive force with deep weapons reserves, albeit of dubious quality.
Europe can put way more than 70 Battalion Tactical groups (Also Russia stopped using the BTG as a standard unit a few years ago, and even if that wasn’t the case a BTG is about 800 troops, so 70 BTG’s would be 56,000 troops, not 550,000) into the field FYI. Finland alone has about 60 Battalions once the Operative and Territorial Forces are mobilised. Estonia has 10 when the EDF is stood up. Even if you discount the 9 Panzer Brigade, 41 Panzergrenadier Brigade and Franco-German Brigade as unlikely to deploy Germany has about 18 Battlegroups that it can deploy to Eastern Europe.
Poland is well on the way to having 40 *Brigades* between the Land Forces and the TDF/BDC btw. And given the length of the Polish-Russian border (about 250 miles even if you assume Belarus allows Russia access) I think the Poles are much better placed than Ukraine was in 22 btw.
The Russian BTG’s are the tip of the spear. There are more logistics troops behind them. I would not have thought that they have the 1:9 tooth to tail ratio of the US or UK but it looks like they do.
Europe would not be able to get close to actually deploying 70 BTG equivalents without the US. Germany would be lucky to be able to field more than 6 or 7 Battalions actually able to fight within a month. Their artillery units might be their best forces, which might not be a bad thing. The rest of their units’ readiness rates are abysmally bad. Even the ones they sent to Afghanistan, the best of their best, were unable to fight effectively and lost 59 troops while having great difficulties in accomplishing their missions and there has been a 15 year acquisition drought since then, though it has recently been reversed it will take time to overcome it.
The Italian/Bulgarian Forward Land Force could probably arm and move 3 or 4 modern battalions within a month (plus several less modern but still capable Bulgarian forces) but their readiness rates are probably not all that great either.
I do not know enough about France to say anything, but I would guess that they would be in a similar state as Germany.
Belgium and Denmark have good troops but their air forces are more effective than their army.
The Baltics (Estonian/UK FLF and Lithuanian/Netherland FLF) and the Scandinavian countries are better prepared than most of central and southern nations, but it sounds like their war planning is primarily to support each other, not central Europe.
Poland is the guardian of Europe if Putin ever decided he needed to roll the dice with a quick invasion of Germany or the Czech Republic. And their army, though growing, is not all that large either. They have 216,000 troops, of which around 190,000 are support troops. They have approximately 26,000 troops in infantry/armor/artillery units, so on paper Poland has somewhere between 35 and 40 battalion equivalent units at this time, not 40 brigades. Compare that to Germany. As I said, even Poland would have a hard time handling 35 invading Russian BTG’s. They could do it, but the rest of Europe simply could not do so, in my opinion. And the leaders of most of the EU states realize this, which is why they have increased their defense spending by huge amounts over the past 3 years. But that money will take time to have a real impact on readiness.
Ukraine has done a phenomenal job against a very large Russian force.
Russia, as I said, hasn’t used BTG’s since 2023. So your tooth to tail estimates are irrelevant.
As I said, Finland alone is close to having 70 BTG’s that it can deploy without the US.
“Germanny would be lucky to field 5-6 Battalions” Nope. Germany maintains 2 Battalions in Lithuania as it’s forward presence, and has 3 Light Infantry Battalions and 2 Airborne Infantry Regiments as it’s high readyness forces in the DSK. Just those forces alone exceed your 6 Battalions. Panzerbrigade 21 is modern and equipped with Boxer, and would be deployable, and Panzerbrigade 12 and Panzergrenadierbrigade 37 would also be available at the probably cost of canibalising Panzerlehrbrigade 9 and Panzergrenadierbrigade 41, hence why I didn’t count those formations.
I’d also push back heavily on your propaganda take on the Germans in Afghan, which you seem to know even less about than the European and Russian armies in general.
The idea that Italy and Bulgaria combined would struggle to move more than 4 battalions is hilarious. The Alpini and Paracadutisti *alone* have 13 Battalions between them. The entire Italian Army is obviously not deploying, but Italy can get 3 Mechanised or Armoured Brigades plus most of the Alipini and Folgore into the field within a month, and that, I am sorry, is way more than 3-4 Battlegroups.
You Don’t know enough about France to say anything? That didn’t stop you from talking about the other nations you know little about.
“But it sounds like their war planning is to support eachother not central Europe.” Guess you haven’t looked at a map either, because guess what, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Scandinavian countries are the bits that Russia has to get through before it can even threaten Central Europe.
“Roll the dice with a quick invasion of Germany or the Czech Republic” again proving you haven’t looked at a map. Oh sorry I guess you might think Russia has developed the capability to teleport troops 300 miles.
“Poland has between 35 and 40 Battalions” Oh thanks for proving you can’t read as well. (BTW I counted the Polish Battalions in the Regular Army, it’s 54, not 35 or even 40). But *ahem* please refer to this line
“Poland is well on the way to having 40 *Brigades* between the Land Forces and the TDF/BDC btw”
Good that you admit this is your opinion, I think your opinion is pretty worthless as you seem to not grasp either Russian or European force structures and are just operating on your own personal “Russia stonk” vibes. (Btw Ukraine has more manpower in the ZSU then Russia did in it’s invasion force several times during this conflict, most notably during the Kherson offensive, so the “very large Russian force” is not in fact that large).
Why all the rudeness? Why not just make your points politely, rely on the quality of your evidence, cogency? Your arguments would be a great deal more persuasive if conveyed in that fashion.
The key here in comparing forces is to also compare battlefield experience/ability to concentrate overwhelming force/quality of combined arms weaponry and ability to use them in combination.
At the moment, only two or three armies in the world are experienced and capable of utilising swarms of drone/drone interceptors effectively in support of the land battle.
The Battle of the Ardennes in 1940 combined the element of surprise with concentration of force and superior leadership, command and control, combined arms land/air battle experience.
It may very well be that Russia is hopelessly incapable of such an effort against NATO…but it may not be.
Deterrence is therefore critical…and, certainly as far as this country is concerned, we have no real conventional deterrent worthy of the name:
‘I can absolutely assure the Committee that we can provide a trained divisional headquarters and certified and assured brigades—16 Brigade, 7th Light Mech Brigade Combat Team, and an armoured brigade—but there will be capability gaps
in our ability to get there and our ability to sustain it for time.’ General Sir Patrick Sanders Nov 2023
Not much has changed since then…
Consequently, as the SDR 2025 pointed out, Britain must spend a great deal more on defence. Funding could very easily be made available by abandoning the frankly absurd pursuit of net zero. All that is lacking, so far, is the political will.
‘I was never swayed by Nato. I always knew they were a paper tiger, and Putin knows that too, by the way.’
Bore off tone policing science denier, I have fuck all to say to you.
What a remarkably silly and pointless comment.
You have made yourself ridiculous…and not for the first time…
Says the coward avoiding replying directly to me.
You have been phenomenally rude; foul mouthed:
“I have fuck all to say to you”
“On yonder hill there stood a coo
If it’s no there
it’s awa’ the noo”.
Oh and more cowardice.
Oh sorry, I treat you with the contempt you deserve.
‘Success to James Scrymgeour,
He’s a very good man,
And to gainsay it,
There’s few people can;
Because he makes the hearts
Of the poor o’erjoyed
By trying to find work for them
When they’re unemployed.
And to their complaints
He has always an attentive ear,
And ever ready to help them
When unto him they draw near.
And no matter what your occupation is.
Or what is your creed.
He will try to help you
In the time of need;
Because he has the fear
Of God within his heart,
And the man that fears God
Always takes the poor’s part.’
Dern, I believe you are confusing paper brigades with battalions capable of being deployed. And many that can be deployed will not be capable of fighting. Russia does deploy half trained troops with antiquated equipment, because they are willing to suffer huge losses and still force those troops to continue to attack. It is doubtful that Germany or any central European nation would be willing to do the same for long.
Your comment “guess you haven’t looked at a map either, because guess what, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Scandinavian countries are the bits that Russia has to get through before it can even threaten Central Europe.” It appears that you believe Belarus would be capable of keeping Russia from taking the historic route to Germany, directly into Poland.
It would be a remarkable feat of arms if Finland were able to deploy 70 battalions in less than 3 months, let alone the month it would probably take Russia to deploy forces to Belarus (not north of Kaliningrad) and threaten Europe via Poland and Southern Lithuania.
Italy and Bulgaria have large formations, but the problem again is that paper formations do not always equate to battalions capable of fighting.
We both seem to be repeating ourselves and I think we may be wasting both of our time, but Poland is nowhere near fielding 40 Brigades that are ready to fight, and it will take years for them to do so. Most of the German battalions deployed are still not supplied with modern functional equipment at a level that would allow them to fight effectively for more than a day or two. You must have missed all the articles over the past 10 years about the Bundswehr’s shockingly bad readiness rate.
The EU armies are in no shape to fight a land war against an enemy that is willing to accept casualties at a rate like Russia is willing. They are a pale shadow of the forces they deployed in 1989, and they are weaker now than they were when many of them deployed to Afghanistan after 9-11.
They ARE improving. The question is, how fast will they regain the capabilities they lost?
I am not confusing Paper Brigades with actual Brigades, because if you read my comment you’ll see I am discounting brigades that are not fighting formations and can’t be deployed. I get it, you do not have a grasp of European Orbats so when I say “Italy has 3 Brigades it can deploy” you don’t understand that that’s not the entire Italian Army, that’s the deployable bit. The “paper” formations I am actually leaving out.
“It would be a remarkable feat of arms if Finalnd wee able to deploy 70 battalions.” Nope. The Finnish Army is entirely capable of putting 70 Battalions into the field, it’s one of the benefits of their total defence model, and the breakdown between their Operative and Territorial Forces. But in 3 months? Absolutely Finland will have mobilised it’s reserves, and have that level of force deployed. Not sure why you think Finland would deploy forces to Belarus, it has a 800 mile border with Russia it will be fighting on (again maps not your strong suit). Assuming Belarus would even be working with Russia, they backed out of the Ukraine conflict really quick, you still won’t teleport troops into Czechia or Germany btw.
I have counted the actual deployable fighting formations of Italy, unlike you who have gone with just vibes.
Yes, you are wasting your time, because you seem to be capable of reading a thing I write.
I pointed out that the 40 Brigades are standing army and TDF/BDC, and you still haven’t grasped that. So unless you are willing to read and actually engage then yes, please stop wasting both our times.
I pointed out that the Bundeswehr units I am counting are the ones with high readyness rates, and the ones that could be deployed at relatively short notice by canabalising units I am not counting. You have again chosen to ignore that. I also have not ignored the readyness rate of the Bundeswehr in the 2010’s, I experienced it first hand when I was stationed there. It also isn’t 2015 anymore, and the Bundeswehr has closed a lot of those gaps. But again, I’m working with facts not vibes.
And bla bla yeah more vibes based on nothing in that last paragraph.
Zivbnd, a country that lost 59 men in Afghanistan is not necessarily fielding a sub-par army; plenty of nations, the UK included, lost more than that and yet had competent armies in the field. I am sure that all contingents had great difficulty in accomplishing their missions out there; it was not ‘a cake walk’ for anyone.
The courage of the European troops that deployed to Afghanistan is something to be proud of by the countries that deployed them. But they were not trained as well as they should have been and most were not equipped as well as they could have been either. The Battles of Halmazag show that German troops could fight well, though and the Danes fought well in Helmand as did the Canadians in Kandahar, if my memory serves me. The UK forces were in Helmand primarily, I believe, and they were the one force that brought in just about every branch of the military that they needed to function nearly independently. It would be difficult for them to deploy a similar sized, trained and equipped force at this time.
Denmark and Canada also fought hard in Afghanistan, and smaller nations like Georgia fought and paid a high price as well, but almost all of them either relied heavily on American or UK air support and intel service. Plus only a few of them had sufficient artillery support.
After all these negative comments I will finish with, given the increases in defense spending over the past 3 years and the increased emphasis on returning capabilities to most of the military/naval forces of Europe, this situation should change for the better. The question is, how much better? And how soon?
Russia probably won’t have a go at NATO if they believe that a united NATO can respond quickly to them. What they are looking for is any sign that NATO responses will be fractured, or that they can get a 2014 style deniable win in before NATO can respond. If Russia can grab places like Narva and Klaipeda in a deniable fashion, dig in, and present NATO with a fait acompli that would mean NATO forces have to attack dug in Russian positions, they certainly will try it.
What Russia can’t do is roll tanks over the border and expect to reach Paris or even Warsaw. Their objectives will be much more limited than that.
I agree 100% with your first paragraph!
The second paragraph… Not so much. If Putin fears for his own survival and needs to blackmail the EU, it is possible that he could scrape together a large force of mobile troops in Belarus and push west through southern Lithuania and Poland while holding strongly dug in shoulders to the north and south. It would be near suicidal in the degree of risk, but if Putin saw no other way to keep the Russian Empire dream going, it is possible that he would roll those dice and try to push close to Berlin, though probably only close enough to threaten it with artillery. And then negotiate a new European order.
I do not think this will happen but it could. And I would bet that Russia has many different plans that they think would give them the best chance of accomplishing it. And the current re-armament of Europe will probably preclude this invasion from succeeding within 5 years.
But the fact is that Europe should not have put themselves in this situation to start with. Their defense spending was sufficient prior to 2006 to maintain their defenses. The “defense-dearth” from 2007 to 2022 is the problem and it will take years to rectify.
“the second Paragraph not so much” Cool, thanks for proving you don’t know what your talking about then.
Russia can’t push through Poland. Their logisitics base does not allow for that kind of advance even in the face of light resistance, and Poland wouldn’t offer Light Resistance (and would be reinforced by basically the entirety of the rest of Europe). The Russian Army, in 2022 when it was in a much healthier place, against a Ukraine that was caught flat footed and had a much weaker military than Europe, advanced at it’s maximum 100 miles (this is in the Kherson Region where it was facing minimal organised resitance btw as Ukraine focused it’s defences towards Kyiv and the Donbass).
Just for comparison, if Russia advanced from the most Westernly part of Belarus that means their advance units would just about get to Warsaw. Berlin is out of the question, and anyone who actually has a handle of the state of the ENATO forces and their size, as well as the Russians knows this.
Strange that Ukraine didn’t mention their losses in terms of troops and equipment.
Not really. Ukraine is a war for its very existence against an enemy willing so unhinged it is will willing destroy its own economic and demographic future in the process.
The stakes are therefore enormous so it’s actually pretty sensible for Ukraine to keep that sort of sensitive information guarded.
Ukraine has, in fact, not so long ago released some figures relating to it losses
Rough numbers Feb 2026>>>
55,000 soldiers killed
Independent estimates>>>
100,000–140,000 casualties
No official release numbers
Incredible numbers. Would be interesting to know if there is a type breakdown in the stats e.g. what are the ~40,000 artillery pieces. I assume a mix of things from SPGs to mortars.
Yes, there is a daily tally of equipment per rough type
Various sources collect the data, and it’s posted online on Twitter, giving a breakdown, but it does not go too technical👍