Above Ukraine rages a battle unlike any in Western experience. We should pay attention to how it is being done.
The war in Ukraine grinds on into its third month. Events since then have shocked the world – Russia’s vast capacity to squander advantages and Ukraine’s ability to capitalise come as a surprise to many.
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However, with judicious application of hindsight and a closer analysis of the actual state of both militaries (now illuminated in the harsh light of high intensity and highly documented conflict) it is easier to discern how the current situation developed. However, there are significant questions that remain unanswered – for example, how is that Ukraine is still projecting power in the air, despite the seemingly insurmountable odds stacked against them?
Russia, it has to be said, is not playing its cards well. The VKS (Russian Aerospace Forces) have proven almost entirely unprepared and unequipped for the task that was asked of them. The factors contributing to this likely include issues like poor training, inadequate equipment, flawed planning and intelligence failures all the way up and down the spectrum from the specific positions of targets to Ukraine’s will to resist.
To overcome air defences is anything but as easy as the West has at times made it look. In Iraq it took thousands of aircraft conducting operations so complex and finely timed that they stunned many of the ground commanders watching them unfold – unused as they were to the potential tempo air operations could reach. Russia, which rarely trains its pilots to operate in groups larger than two or four (and which had not apparently even assigned an overall commander for the invasion) has proven incapable of mirroring the Coalition planners’ masterwork. Whilst competent in operating as a part of their own nation’s air defences or conducting strikes against ill-equipped insurgents, their problems with offensively dismantling a well organised and capable Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) should probably come as no surprise in hindsight.
Now that Russia is fighting in a manner they are better equipped to deal with (massed artillery cued by drones) in the Donbas there are signs of the Ukrainian air defences local to that area suffering losses. This is worth noting – and serves as a lesson in how it isn’t just aircraft and air defences that take part in the air war – but it is a local and limited success at best. Scratching a narrow fingerhold in Ukrainian airspace is the most that this artillery-led effort can achieve, enough to ease the job of close air support (which faces other problems, like the myriad shoulder-launched missiles Ukraine possesses) and little more. Outside of this, Russia appears generally restricted to strikes on fixed targets with missiles, being either unable or unwilling to conduct systematic interdiction through Ukraine’s IADS. If unexpected in results, the state of affairs Russia is operating within, and the overall shape of its air campaign, are largely recognisable as those facing the ‘traditional’ air offensive.
Ukraine’s air force and air defences, however, are approaching this conflict in a manner alien to Western experience. This strategy appears similar in character to aspects of the naval ‘fleet in being’ concept, as well as the established hallmarks of guerrilla warfare. The lion’s share of air denial is left to air defence rather than aircraft, a reversal of the West’s Modus Operandi. Under this umbrella what aircraft there are can ply their trade behind friendly lines, or foray out on low intensity, high impact attacks. By rapidly dispersing their aircraft at the start of the war and flying infrequently (reportedly only five-ten sorties per day) Ukraine ensures its force persists, lowering its rate of attrition to Russian attack as far as is reasonably possible.
This low rate of manned sorties is supplemented by drone attacks – ranging from purpose-built strike aircraft like Bayrakter to octocopters carrying modified 30mm grenades. These, whilst individually unlikely to cause much damage, maintain pressure and steadily attrite assets. They also constitute a valuable reconnaissance and spotting asset, and alongside a steady stream of intelligence from Western sources (including specialised air and space assets Ukraine does not have native equivalents of) contribute to Ukraine’s fight for information superiority. This low-intensity trickle of painful stabs from the sky against Russian forces compels them to deploy and operate large numbers of their own air defence vehicles and systems, further straining already challenged logistics and maintenance and stressing crews – to say nothing of the morale impact it has on the units suffering attacks without any apparent recourse to retaliate. Now that the war has progressed for some time, it seems that Ukraine is also finding points into which they can insert their remaining manned air strength for maximum impact – chinks in the Russian armour which allows them to access and destroy high value targets such as the fuel storage yard at Belgorod, reportedly set ablaze by a pair of Ukrainian Mi-24s.
Using these tactics Ukraine has achieved several things: credible air denial, persistent pressure on Russian units, exploitation of the air for reconnaissance purposes and preservation of their precious stock of conventional aircraft until worthwhile opportunities to commit them for significant impact could be found and exploited. Drones operating in the air littoral, Western intelligence assistance and infrequent and unpredictable strikes from more valuable systems allows Ukraine to exploit what air power they do have to maximum effect, circumventing or neutralising Russia’s material advantages. Naturally, they also benefit massively from their apparent intelligence advantage and from the surprising Russian inability to operate a suitably watertight system of air defences themselves, but it is one thing to be given opportunities and another to find and exploit them as Ukraine is doing. In the fight with Russia’s largely conventional air force and air strategy, Ukraine has chosen to fight differently.
What is there to be learned from all this, then? First and foremost is that the dynamics of air power when operating in areas with disproportionately strong air defences compared to aircraft are distinct and offer their own raft of restrictions and opportunities compared to what the West is used to. As the worldwide arms race between aircraft and air defence continues, events in Ukraine may hint at the ways in which the former can continue to have an impact even when the latter’s strength is too great to be broken within acceptable timeframes.
Secondly is the restatement (hardly needed at this point) of the fact that drones are invaluable and must both be exploited and countered. The capacity to deploy offensive, defensive and supportive forms of airpower is proliferating and devolving down to the level of individual soldiers with comparatively minimal training. When accompanied by abundantly clear confirmations that the air situation can be influenced by events on the ground just as much as the other way around it seems plausible that the distinction between air and land power may be becoming blurred.
Thirdly, and finally, is the demonstration that with appropriate employment even smaller, weaker aerospace forces can prove extremely dangerous if used correctly – and that the ability to secure the skies and leverage them at leisure is a luxury hard-won. Russia is now experiencing, and Ukraine is adeptly demonstrating, what can happen when the nominally ‘superior’ air power cannot successfully degrade the capabilities of their opponent or leverage their own strengths. Airpower is crucial and allows the edge the West tends to enjoy to diminish risks it finding itself in Russia’s shoes – abundantly equipped with expensive systems that it cannot use without suffering ruinous losses, and incapable of countering its adversaries’ efforts to leverage their own strength.
One wonders, for example, what a current generation jet aircraft could do to stop a grenade-toting octocopter. Food for thought, at the very least.
I do think one of the biggest take-aways from this war is the way the UA has managed to survive and continue to fight under such a bombardment. You couldn’t say they had the best equipment, mig 29s are ancient now but can be no doubt about the training of there crews and the general shear guys and determination. It does draw comparisons to the battle of Britain in a way, I hope the RAF are learning these tactics-i fear we may need it soon
It’s a good piece.
I am not sure about the BoB comparison – in BoB both sides had recent equipment, and the UK side were better organised / more efficiently coordinated.
And indeed began to out produce the attacker. Shortage of highly trained pilots was the major hindrance be interesting to know how Ukraine compares in that regard mind and if there is a highly committed regime to produce well trained pilots.
Yes and the falklands is very important for the U.K., you cannot overstate the advantage of Carrier born aircraft close in theatre compared to land based sorties that may have to travel a 1000kms or more.
Good article. Typo in second from last paragraph threw me for a loop for a moment. I think: “allows the edge” should be “allowing the edge”
Actually the title is something of a misnomer as the Israelis were the first to use the UAV to devastating effect in 1982 when they carried out Operation Mole Cricket 19 which saw the IDF destroy 29 out of 30 Syrian air defence batteries, granted the UAVs used by the IDF weren’t destroying stuff like they are today, but they were the first (as such) to realise the potential of the cheap numerous UAVs in a war setting. The Western military instead of seeing the UAV as a cheap force multiplier, instead (like the generals of WW1) treated the UAV as they did the Tank as something of niche tool, and an expensive one at that, it was the Turks who after been refused access to the predator drone built their own cheap as chips TB2 which has changed the battlefield of today, it was ISIS who started using quad copters to drop grenades, meanwhile the UK fannies around with its expensive watchkeeper UAV which after billions thrown at it in which to get it work, is unable to carry weapons, but hey you bet the bloke in charge will receive a gong.
Excellent point and has wider implications I think where we very often see only gold standard weapons and equipment as survivable and/or effective in modern war fighting. Hope we might learn to modulate that approach especially as even top notch equipment especially in small numbers will be degraded even in non drawn out conflicts leaving you having to improvise. Surely best then to have such weapons available and trained to use and develop strategies in their use, to not only fill that gap as it develops and maintain an effective force, but more importantly in using it cleverly as the Ukrainians are, it can slow the degrading of far more expensive and capable equipment/weaponry because the latter has far too often to be put in harms way or be over used in doing the basics.
Farouk makes an excellent point, and one that goes unrecognised. The IDF have tight budgets and many enemies. It drives innovation and their development of UAV’s into loitering munitions is stunning, let’s also not forget they have upgraded the F35 as well for their specific needs.
Israels strategy is driven by the fact they are vastly outnumbered and therefore need to make very body count, this has been proven time and again with the Merkava which has an exceptional record.
the UK could learn an awful lot from the IDF. Whether we do so is another thing entirely.
What IDF are you on about ? The Star drone of the Ukraine Vs Russia war is the Turkish Bayraktar which has solidified it’s reputation after Syria Libya Azerbaijan while many said before it won’t succeed against a serious power like Russia. Israeli drones must be first tested against Russia before we learn anything about them .
Ukrainians made a song about it even.
See IDF Harop loitering munition V Pantsdown sorry that should read Pantsir in the Syrian conflict.
Most of these innovations eminate from the IDF and are battle proven.
it doesn’t matter who is making them now, it’s the fact the IDF are ahead of the game mainly due to the fact they are always under threat from larger forces.
in almost every area they are better than the UK (structurally) and we should really be taking a good look at what they do and how they do it..
they have even modified the F35 whilst we wait on block 4 integration of our missiles….
Farouk,
from the Thales website – ‘The Thales Watchkeeper WK450 is an unmanned aerial vehicle for all weather, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance use by the British Army’.
So not intended to be an attack platform, carrying weapons.
Costs of the programme to March 2018 were £1.08 billion, more than £200 million above the original budget. I agree that is a lot for 50-odd ‘drones’ plus support infrastructure.
Building on Farouk’s point, the SAAF deployed UAVs in a similar way in the South East Angola campaign of 87-88. I’m convinced the IDF supplied the Seeker UAVs and advised on tactics, as the similarities are striking.
These uav’s were used as decoys to intice SAM launches. These were plotted and engaged by SA army long range artillery to destroy these SAM batteries, ,
The Watchkeeper which is btw an Israeli design based UAV do have not weapons while in British service because it was designed for reconnaissance only.
Now British Forces including Royal Navy have many time shown their preference for specialization or “one trick ponies” . That makes sense for efficiency in a large army, but not in a small one that British Army is now.
Without any doubt UAVs have immense potential for future operations and something the British armed forces should definitely take away from the Ukraine war. There is an element of cost-effectiveness by using Bayraktar drones or their UK/USA equivalent- eg Reaper/ Predator series- their cost per flying hour is much reduced compared to a Eurofighter typhoon or F35B and against frontline targets such as artillery emplacements or military convoys where MANPADS and SAM systems are likely to be deployed defensively you wouldn’t want to risk a manned frontline fighter jet. So UAVs are without doubt the future- the RAF needs to work on 2 or 3 emerging drone technologies to leverage our qualitative edge over Sino/Russian opposition
1) Long endurance high altitude stealthy reconnaissance drones
2) Stand alone heavy strike drones for close air support (like Reaper/ Predator series)
3) Swarming drones- ideally co-ordinated in a Co-operative engagement manner by F35B or Eurofighter Typhoon or ground based controllers from a substantially stood off distance. I think this CEC concept should be central to Tempest’s core abilities- drone deployment and control.
4) Resupply and logistic drones to deliver to the frontline or cut-off forces- a heavy logistics drone like quadcopter would really be useful to the Ukrainian garrison in Mariupol right now enabling them to continue the fight and replenishment ammunition, first aid, medicines etc. The resupply drone element would have to have excellent stealthy low level flight characteristics and be able to fly in all weather day and night- especially night to reduce risk of intercept from MANPAD systems. The logistic drone concept would also need to be dirt cheap so if units are shot down it really doesn’t matter because the British armed forces have hundreds available or can easily and cheaply manufacture more- 3D printing and modular construction?
We live in fascinating times.
One can even envisage a smaller less rich country but able to produce and otherwise acquire such weaponry, defeating a far richer opponent that is initially well stocked but with generally high cost weaponry by being able to maintain effectiveness their longer, indeed to a degree we are seeing that in Ukraine. We must learn because as has already been stated by ex military that British tanks would be gone in a week in the Baltic States even if they took out 4 or 5 enemy. Our fast reducing stock of high end weapons as good as they may be, that we can ongoing supply Ukraine is fast drying up so might hint at this very factor. Ironically decent drones would likely be the most useful equipment they could usefully exploit I suspect and all we have is some prototypes on Salisbury plain that for the most part wouldn’t be as good as what they can get elsewhere anyway.
I would not say that our armed forces need much awareness of UAVs – in June ’63 we collaborated with Canada on the Canadair CL-89 drone project, fielded in about 1970, by the British Army.
UAVs are not just for the RAF, who discovered UAVs along time after the army.
I would be interested to hear about the payload of logistic support drones – ammunition is extremely heavy.
The RN and Army have been evaluating Malloy for logistics, you can see different payload variants at link below. Up to 180kg currently it seems.
https://www.malloyaeronautics.com/
Ok, that will carry 4 x 155mm arty shells or 7,000 rds of 7.62mm.
Hope it doesn’t get shot down or jammed.
It’s really rather premature to draw lessons concerning the use of drones in a peer-to-peer engagement. The Ukrainians have proven to be masters at propaganda and there is nothing more dramatic than an aerial shot of a Russian tank/vehicle being destroyed by a bomb dropped from a drone. But is that truly representative of how the Ukrainians are taking out so much Russian armor? What percentage is attributable to drones?
The Russians have so far shown themselves to be remarkably inept, under-equipped and, if I may coin a phrase, under-technologied. Where is their vaunted EW? The US, for instance, has a very advanced anti-drone program titled MRP that will provide a layered defense for moving convoys and fixed installations.
My only point is this is a rather unique “special operation” and it is just too soon to be drawing lessons from it concerning weapons systems.
Spot on. We know very little about the Ukrainian’s success or otherwise in using the TB-2. We don’t know even basic data like how many they have had delivered and how many of those have been destroyed. But the AFU/US/Russians and Turks know. The Russians in particular are very happy at the way their Tor-M1 is dealing with it.
I have not spotted discussion on it here but on the evening of the 8th there was a follow up major attack by the AFU on Snake Island. To have captured the island on the 9th May would have been a huge PR coup. But the Russians seemed to have known it was coming.
Some here will rubbish the following but from Russian MoD reports it was a catastrophe. The Ukrainians lost 4 TB2 strike UAVs, 3 Centaur armoured amphibious assault boats with a minimum of 27 marines who died in the water, 3 Su-24 bombers and 1 Su-27 fighter, 3 Mi-8 helicopters with paratroopers on board and 1 Mi-24 support helicopter were shot down. In addition, 6 more Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters involved in the operation were destroyed on the ground with supersonic Onyx missiles at an embarking area on the mainland near Artsiz, Odessa Region.
Thus, this operation ended in disaster for Ukraine. The militarily pointless attempt to seize Snake Island on the eve of WW2 Victory Day resulted in the senseless deaths of at least 15 aircrew, more than five dozen Ukrainian fighters and members of elite AFU units, the loss of 4 aircraft, 10 helicopters, 3 boats and unmanned aerial vehicles.
I’ve not heard about that, nor seen any footage on funker360. Do you have a link to trustworthy source?
The problem is the “trustworthy” in a war where the Ukrainians have top grade PR and the Russians have little apart from their twice daily basic updates on top of very good OPSEC by both sides.
The situation is compounded in this case by the site being 20 or so miles offshore so no civilian cameras plus the Ukrainian serious clampdown on said cameras. On the Russian side only the DNR/LDR militias take phones and commentators with them, not Russian forces and rarely the latter as they are not interested in feeding news outlets like the West does.
As a consequence apart from the very low key Russian announcements there is virtually nothing and, apart from the Onyxes, no clues as to what happened apart from the results. It might be tosh but given that they have not tried to exploit it I can’t see any reason why they would have made up the story, conversely there is every reason for Ukraine to be quiet.
If more appears I’ll report it and thanks for not jumping down my throat like many here do when I put an opposing view.
There’s a reasonable balance of footage provided by both sides on sites like Funker360. I would be very surprised if the Russian MOD/pro-Kremlin sources failed to capitalise on such events via informal and non-state controlled channels.
To be honest, unless I see evidence with my own eyes, I tend to take claims by both sides with a pinch of salt. However, given the Russian Govt’s proven propensity to lie through it’s teeth, I am very skeptical that anywhere near that level of losses of men and material were inflicted on the Ukrainians, especially given they were allegedly attacking a strategically unimportant island that is incredible vulnerable to counter fire by Russian stand off weapons (and somewhere where the TB2s have been happily wreaking havoc on patrol boats, landing craft and defensive sites on the island).
Still, I am happy to be corrected if any footage/pictures etc can be provided.
Ha ha ha ha haaaaaaa FFS you are going top chuff today son! Good OPSEC by the Russkies? Ha ha ha ha haaaaaaaaa! I could rip your puke inducing post apart but I can’t be bothered, aside from the fact you do not have an opposing view, you support the Russian invasion, make excuses at every post, have no depth or reality of argument and never come back to reply to posters who challenge your view! You just repeat shite like RT! And we are all still intrigued why you have never answered my oft repeated question of why will you not condemn Putins illegal invasion of Ukraine?
Any condemnation of Putins illegal invasion of Ukraine yet?
What concerns me is while we’re patting ourselves on the back for Russia’s failure & ineptitude faced with strong Ukrainian fighting spirit & western supplied kit, Russia could recognise & learn the costly lessons, reorganise & adapt. That could draw out the war, even produce further gains just as we thought it was nearly over.
I’d rather see direct military assistance to make the most of Russia’s weakness(not so weak as to stop the daily killing & destruction) to push Russia right out of Ukrainian territory before the opportunity is gone.
Oh my giddy aunt
That is quality!
Worth noting too the impact on the air defence regime of the sinking of the Moskva
Lets not forget Ukraine is getting intelligence from all those modified NATO B707s flying about. Yes drones are vital. Was it wise to cut 4x Protector drones from the RAF? Should we now restart the proposed Starstreak upgrade? Should one of the UK Army Boxer variants be an Oerlikon Skyranger AD model? Should all UK MBT have an active protection system (Trophy?). Can we finally get a long range precision heavy stand off weapon for the F-35B?
And how useful would have been those RAF Sentinels too?
Like to see a Starstreak ER or navalised Seastreak system used on navy ships that don’t/won’t get CAMM, RFA’s, Bays, Rivers, Carriers etc.
The UK by rights should be building its own class of MALE UAVs. They are the most basic of airframes to build. Yet we have to purchase systems like Reaper and Protector from abroad, why?
Today Army’s chief of staff has finally admitted that a force of 73,000 is too small, duh!
Boxer is a good vehicle, but not a vehicle to replace Warrior. The Warrior sustainment and upgrade program should be reinstated. But looking at the evidence provided by the Ukraine war, it is essential that it has an APS.
Boxer, should still be used by the Army, but in its original “light strike” role, not included as part of the heavy brigade. To that end, it needs the ability to provide dismount supportive fire. Which should be provided by a turreted CTAS 40mm system. Anything other will just increase the logistics burden and force up the price of the CTAS 40mm rounds.
Included in the Boxer variants would be an air defence version. It would be very easy to port across the Stormer’s system into the Boxer’s module. But it could be better. If the Boxer was also fitted with the turreted CTAS 40mm autocannon. As its air defence programmable rounds would also pulverise any aircraft/UAV that can into range.
The still obvious choice for our F35Bs is to integrate Storm Shadow. It is a proven weapon system and despite what the Russians claimed, is very difficult for ground based air defences to intercept. However, it could be further enhanced by enlarging its target set. It can already be used against stationary ships, so why not include moving ones? How hard would it be to amend its programming to include a relatively slowly moving target. The missile can be programmed to attack in either a sea skimming mode (perhaps down to 5m), or a pop up attack ending in a very high angle diving attack. How much damage would the 450kg Broach warhead do to a ship, if its programmed to go off after penetrating the ship?
The F35B’s ability to get much closer to targets that are heavily defended by layered air defences, combined with Storm Shadows ability to penetrate hardened structure etc, is surely a no brainer!
Yes to all of that. The still obvious choice is to integrate ANY U.K weapons on the F35b! Storm shadow would be fantastic as an interim anti ship missile, along with Spear3….a device I would call a swarming drone, as a bunch will sort themselves out target wise. To my mind, Spear3 needs to be made vertical of boxed launch capable and put on almost everything…ships and land based systems.
Martlet would appear to be a good anti-drone missile and relatively inexpensive. Perhaps army helicopters should be so armed for anti drone use?…and anything else.
AA
I have been thinking a bit more about Storm Shadow’s capabilities. Most of the ingredients are already in place, especially when you consider the SCALP version. For maritime use it can be fired from either a submarine or from a ship. MBDA gave it a booster so it can be fired from Sylver VLS cells. The SCALP has a smaller warhead and dropped the cruising speed to increase its range over Storm Shadow. It also uses a mixed combination of an active radar along with infrared imaging to detect its target.
So there is an clear and available option of using Storm Shadow as a ship based anti-ship and land attack cruise missile. There is a choice with the sensor package. Though as its not designed to be radar stealthy, it would be better to keep the imaging infrared sensor. But combine it with something like BAe’s RF analyser, so it can also home in on to a ship’s RF broadcast (radar, radio, data-link). Thereby allowing it to sneak up to ships without broadcasting its position.
From a ship/ground launched position and keeping the Broach warhead we would still be looking at 250+ mile range.
Oops, forgot to add SCALP can be canister fired as well.
The RN uses 30mm, the AAC 30mm on its Apache, RAF Typhoon 27mm. So there are 3 alternative rounds already in UK service.
The Army (ground based) is supposed to be switching to the 40mm CTAS. I appreciate Apache use 30mm, but the M230 chain gun is completely different to the one used with the Navy’s DS30M mount. The Bushmaster 2 that the DS30M uses has a shell 30mm x 173mm, whereas the M230 uses 30mm x 113mm. So the shells are not compatible. It would be handy if the RAF, Navy and Army all used the same calibre and shell size. The CTAS 40mm is too powerful for a forward firing gun on an aircraft, and also too big for an Apache. But it would be a good upgrade to the DS30M.
Turkish made drones killed more Russian forces than anything else above the skies of Ukraine. Turkey has established itself as a drone superpower just behind the US in drones numbers . The Bayraktar TB2 is the main star in a class of its own that the US nor Israel have which Turks took advantage of big time, but it has developed way more advanced ones in different classes . A naval version of the TB2 known as TB3 will be on the light Turkish carrier and Japan has shown interest . But Turkey main new drone is the Akinci which some claim Ukraine may have few of as they can strike deep into enemy territory, but it’s only rumours
Turkey is developing a stealth supersonic fighter drone due to fly next year called MIUS which can take off its light drone carrier, the world first drone carrier! Meanwhile EU countries still haven’t build their first drone yet with delays after delays.
I really admire the Turkish determination of transforming their defence industry from importing 80 percent to developing 80 percent in such short time .
Turkey’s decisions about drones are worth noting.
I’m impressed by TB2.
How much is one system?
Meanwhile we pissed 1 billion away on Watchkeeper.
Baykar Bayraktar TB2 = 5M USD
but UK gov interest in IAI Heron UAV,
perpomence of Heron
At 8.5 meters (27.8 feet), Heron can support a payload of up to 470 kg (1,000 lbs). Its impressive operational endurance of 45 hours is matched by a range of at least 1,000 km (621 miles), depending on fuel availability
and most importantly info , it cost is = 140M USD
LOL
I guess UK GOV like expensived one.
You don’t know what you talking about. Not even maths. A 45 hour endurance at 110kph means +4500km, how that is matched by 1000km? Or you talking about SAT control?
140M USD means how many drones, how many control systems + support vs 5 M USD?
Plus what sensors and mission packages available they have?
For example the Watchkeeper not even Heron level size have a Synthetic Aperture Radar which means even in bad weather will be able to operate in reconnaissance mission.
‘ the world first drone carrier’ you mean the Anadolu?
Its hardly the worlds first drone carrier, they are stuck with it because the US refused to sell them the F35’s.
What are you going on about? I have never changed my name on this site in all the years I have used it. Sadly I used to be about the only person on here using my name however recently many more people seem to be using it.
Agreed! You sadly do have a troll who is also called James, who used to be called Alex, who is using rather bad English to cause make childlike anti-UK comments! I will ensure I do a little more due diligence when I hand the other James his arse when he posts! And I do believe that you are also answering the other James and taking him to task. Apologies for my error to you but I don’t intend to stop outing the sad few trolls on here who ruin decent conversations. Cheers.
You are correct, just like the US refused to sell them Predator and Reaper led to the birth of Bayraktar, the F35B refusal led to TB3 for it’s carriers plus MIUS Europe first stealth unmanned supersonic drone fighter. Give where credit is due , Ukrainians are singing Bayraktar even in demonstrations. Turkey is an important ally that gets on with the UK and I certainly won’t reject some Bayraktar on our carriers or for our infantry that would give them an edge on the battlefield
Claiming a drone is stealth and it actually having real world capability in an area they have no experience will have to wait to be seen. Also whatever they build and put on the carrier is hardly going to be a substitute to the F35B.
They are an interesting ally at times, personally I dont agree with alot of what Erdogan does especially as hes put himself in default charge the same way Putin did.
Of course they have a couple of models even.
I suspect we will see history repeat itself with the drones , like WWI drones are spotter aircraft and some bombers [though drones are farther ahead in that dept. than WWI aircraft ] next drone fighters to kill the spotters , then drone dog fights ?
Just some thoughts…
British Army. Perhaps it’s time to put a drone platoon into every infantry Battalion support Coy. Mix of recce and anti armour man portable drones. Artillery Regt’s to get an extra Battery per Regt of loitering target acquisition drones. We will also need a very portable and cheep anti drone missile system. It doesn’t need to shoot down fast jets just enemy drones. Perhaps an anti drone Battery per BCT?
RAF. I don’t think the days of manned fast jets is over. The Russian Air Force is failing because it can’t do a large scale air superiority campaign. NATO can so let’s not throw the baby out with the bath water. However I would say that our own air defence systems are far too few. RAF Regt should operate Sky Sabre to defend our air fields and we need more stand off weapons and swarming smart UAVs to support our manned jets.
RN. Well the RN are already doing well with integrating UAVs on the carriers and other vessels – we need to accelerate this. Defensively we need a greater layered approach; expensive SAMs to counter ballistic and cruise threats, cheaper options to tackle drones and helicopters put on more platforms.
On top of that, and it ain’t sexy but necessary, is more spending on the digital info infrastructure. That means Navy like battle space awareness shared to every platform. That means commanders of Army Platoons, RAF aircraft as well as ships sharing and contributing to the big picture through digital means so that all commanders can make decisions in real time and deploy all arms as appropriate to counter threats as they present themselves.
It’s not the end of tanks or manned aircraft. Rather we are now looking at a larger combined arms picture where the side that can do information fusion to deploy the right weapons at the right time will prevail. Luckily the West is in a great position to do this and Russia is not.